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ABSTRACT.
This study is primarily an examination of the role and 
effectiveness of international law in the protection of fundamental 
human rights, with specific reference to the prevention of torture. 
The basic theme of the study is that fundamental human rights involve 
the relationship between the state and the individuals over whom it 
has jurisdiction, so that the protection of such rights is essentially 
dependent on the restraint of national governments, but that 
international law is seriously restricted in ensuring the effective 
protection of human rights because the international legal system is 
founded on a concept of national sovereignty which rejects any direct 
intervention by the international community in the domestic affairs of 
independent states. Accordingly, it is only within the context of 
national legal systems that the imposition of restraints on 
governmental action in internal matters can be achieved, with the 
result that in practice the protection of human rights is ultimately 
dependent upon the existence and efficient operation of safeguards 
within the constitutional and legal framework of each sovereign' state. 
The problem is, however, that as a result of a widespread rejection of 
the liberal view of human rights as inherent rights of the individual 
and the related notion of limitation of government, many national 
systems do not have democratic institutions and legal procedures which 
can ensure control over governmental action, while in other countries 
the use of emergency measures seriously undermines formal safeguards, 
and it is precisely this absence or erosion of guarantees which 
permits the systematic violation of human rights, including the 
employment of torture. On this basis, it is argued that the 
protection of human rights should not be dependent an the operation of
measures within individual states, but must be secured at the 
international level. It is recognised, however, that although 
international procedures have some value, the doctrine of national 
sovereignty deprives them of any real effectiveness when confronted by 
systematic violations of human rights, and it is the conclusion of 
this study that the effective protection of human rights by means of 
international law can only be achieved through a fundamental 
reappraisal of international legal concepts and a radical 
transformation of the international political order which will permit 
the genuine supervision of national governments by international 
agencies enjoying guaranteed constitutional status and authority in 
each sovereign state.
Chapter One relates the recent development of international 
concern over torture in response to an increase in its use, especially 
by governments for political purposes, and the disparity between the 
public condemnation of torture by governments and the clandestine 
authorisation of its use is explained by reference to the ideological 
rejection of the western liberal view of human rights, leading to 
diverse conceptions of human rights which do not, however, prevent a 
superficial consensus. It is argued that any international action 
must be based on an acceptance that certain rights are universal, and 
humanitarian rights are identified as the most suitable candidates, 
but the conclusion is reached that the different attitudes to human 
rights involve a rejection of the notion of limitation of government, 
with the result that even if humanitarian rights are recognised many 
systems lack the institutions necessary to uphold respect for them.
Chapter Two is a discussion of the historical development of 
torture, with particular emphasis on Roman law and its influence in
Europe from the 12th and 13th centuries, when judicial torture became 
institutionalised in the legal systems of continental Europe. The 
18th century abolition of torture is also dealt with, and the 
conclusion reached is that while judicial torture has remained 
exceptional, the unlawful employment of torture has probably never 
been eliminated, and on a global scale has certainly increased 
dramatically in the last few decades. The chapter also contains a 
brief consideration of the definition of torture.
Chapter Three deals with the question of the possible 
justifiability of torture, firstly in relation to its use in obtaining 
confessions, secondly in relation to a few minor uses of purely 
historic interest, and thirdly in relation to the extortion of 
information. It is concluded that while torture cannot be justified 
for the purpose of obtaining confessions, since verification is not 
possible, there are circumstances in which a plausible argument in 
favour of the use of torture for the purpose of eliciting information 
can be made on utilitarian grounds. It is then argued, however, that 
the principal objection to torture is its inhumanity, and this is 
presented as a conclusive argument against any use of torture. The 
effects of torture are considered in support of this proposition.
In Chapter Four, there is an examination of the circumstances 
in which governments justify the use of torture in practice, and the 
assertion is made that the most common situation in which governments 
resort to such extreme measures is when there arises a serious threat 
to national security. It is noted that security forces require 
torture in these circumstances because of the difficulty in obtaining 
information about subversive activities, and that the rationale 
employed is that the end justifies the means, and it is painted out
that essentially what is involved is the subordination of humanity to 
national security. The role of security forces in the practice of 
torture is considered, and the remainder of the chapter deals with the 
relationship between the breakdown of safeguards and the facilitation 
of torture. The effect of states of emergency in undermining normal 
legal guarantees is examined, especially in relation to detainees, and 
it is pointed out that in many countries the absence of safeguards is 
a permanent feature of the political system.
Chapter Five is a case study of events in the recent history of 
Uruguay, where a complete collapse of democracy occurred in the early 
1970's, when emergency measures were introduced and a repressive 
regime embarked on the systematic violation of human rights, including 
the extensive use of torture. The case is presented as an 
illustration of the relationship between the effective protection of 
human rights and the existence of legal safeguards, and the subject is 
considered from the following angles: the background and the
emergence of terrorist activity, the response of the authorities and 
eventual intervention of the armed forces, the effect of the emergency 
measures and the introduction of torture. A clear link between the 
erosion of safeguards and the introduction of torture is established.
In Chapter Six, existing international procedures for the 
protection of human rights are discussed, and the limitations on 
international measures are identified. It is recognised that 
international procedures do have some value, but it is made clear that 
the dependence of such procedures on prior acceptance by states and 
the lack of any real power on the part of international agencies 
prevent international law from playing an effective role in those 
situations where serious violations are perpetrated by regimes which
refuse to undertake obligations and co-operate with the agencies. The 
procedures established under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and its Optional Protocol and pursuant to resolution 
1503 of the UN Economic and Social Council are examined, with 
particular regard to their effect in relation to Uruguay, but in each 
case the conclusion is reached that although the procedures have some 
relevance, they are of very limited value and had little impact on the 
situation in Uruguay. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the 
regional systems operating in Europe and the Americas.
In Chapter Seven, the three recently adopted international 
conventions dealing specifically with torture are discussed. The 
terms of the instruments are examined in some detail, and the opinion 
is expressed that since the procedures they create are broadly similar 
to existing ones and subject to the same limitations, they are 
unlikely to have any greater impact. It is recognised that certain 
novel measures are introduced, especially the application of universal 
jurisdiction to torture and the establishment of commissions of 
inquiry to visit places of detention, but the view is put forward that 
these measures do not overcome the fundamental problems. Attention is 
also drawn to the emphasis which the UN and OAS conventions place on 
the adoption of internal measures, and it is suggested that this 
reflects an acceptance of the limitations on international procedures.
In Chapter Eight, there is a discussion of the type of measures 
required at national level to ensure the prevention of torture, based 
on a detailed examination of the UN Draft Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, 
which aims to specify the measures which must be adapted to prevent 
violations of human rights. Independent supervision of detention is
identified, as a particularly important factor, but the point is made 
that the draft does not attempt to propose constitutional changes, 
which may in fact be necessary to ensure that the principles are 
upheld.
Chapter Nine consists of an examination of Codes of Conduct for 
different professions which may become involved in the practice of 
torture. It is accepted that such codes have a role in the overall 
international strategy to eliminate torture by promoting individual 
respect for humanity, but doubt is expressed as to whether they can 
have any significant impact. The professions specifically dealt with 
are law enforcement officials, the legal profession and medical 
personnel, and the subject of medical ethics is discussed at some 
length.
In Chapter Ten, the necessity of safeguards and the restraint 
of government is reiterated, and there is discussion of the 
limitations on international law created by the doctrine of national 
sovereignty, which prevents the imposition of mandatory obligations on 
states and the enforcement of conventional obligations when these 
relate to internal affairs. It is conceded that international law 
does have a role to play in the protection of human rights, but 
reaffirmed that it is ultimately powerless to secure effective 
protection in the absence of co-operation because no real sanctions 
are available. There is discussion of potential sanctions, but it is 
concluded that none of these are really viable under present 
conditions, and it is therefore asserted that if international law is 
to have any genuine effectiveness in relation to human rights it must 
concentrate on core rights on which some consensus can be attained, 
and a new concept of international involvement in national affairs
must be developed. In the final analysis, this involves the radical 
re-structuring of the international politico-legal system.
CHAPTER ONE:__ INTRODUCTION.
Since the Second World War, and. at least partly in response to 
the atrocities which were perpetrated during that, conflict, concern 
for human rights has flourished in the international arena, and 
numerous declarations and conventions relating to the subject of human 
rights have been promulgated, both under the auspices of the United 
Rations Organisation, and at a regional level. One aspect of human 
rights which has attracted particular attention, especially in the 
last fifteen years or so, is the prevention of torture: all. the major
human rights instruments of general scope incorporate a prohibition on 
the use of torture, and recently the practice>has been the object of 
more specific consideration.
Following the Second World War, torture was initially prohibited
by article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948.1 The Declaration
was intended to be only a statement of general principles rather than
a legally binding instrument, and article 5 was consequently framed in
fairly broad terms:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment."
The formulation of more specific and clearly defined obligations, 
binding on states, was the function of the International Covenant, on 
Civil and Political Rights, which was adopted in 1966 and came into 
force in 1976.22 The provisions of this convention were intended to be 
somewhat more precise than those of the Universal Declaration, but 
article 7 of the Covenant in fact merely reiterated the wording of the
1
Declaration's prohibition of torture, although it did append one 
example of forbidden practices:
"Ho one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. In particular, no one shall be 
subjected without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation."
Prohibitions of torture appear also in the two major regional
human rights conventions, the European Convention on Human Rights3 and
the (Inter-)American Convention on Human Rights.14 Article 3 of the
European Convention states:
"Ho one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
The corresponding provision in the American Convention is article
5, paragraph 2, which states:
"Ho one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or, 
treatment. All persons deprived of their 
liberty shall be treated with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person."
Moreover, although both these conventions and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights permit derogation from many of
their provisions in time of war or other public emergency, the
prohibition on torture is in each instance categorically excepted and
is, therefore, absolute.® Regional conventions have not yet been
fully developed in the other areas of the world, but attention should
be drawn to the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights,®
article 5 of which provides:
"Every individual shall have the right to the 
respect of the dignity inherent in a human being
and to the recognition of his legal status. All
forms of exploitation and degradation of man 
particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and 
treatment shall be prohibited."
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The United Nations began to focus special attention on the whole 
issue of torture in the mid-1970's: the General Assembly condemned
the practice in a number of resolutions'7 and requested the Fifth 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment 
of Offenders to consider the question of torture. As a result, of 
this, the General Assembly in December 1975 adopted resolution 
3452 CXXX), a Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being 
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment. While this is not a legally binding resolution, its 
adaption does mark the commencement within the United Nations 
framework of an intensive programme aimed at the prevention and 
elimination of torture. A number of further developments subsequently 
took place: a Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials was
adopted in 1979e and a Code of Medical Ethics in 1982,3 while draft 
principles for the protection of detained and imprisoned persons are 
currently under consideration.10 These developments culminated in the 
adoption of a Convention against Torture in 1984,11 and the 
appointment by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights of a 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment the following year.121 Developments have also 
taken place within the regional systems: an Inter-American Convention
to Prevent and Punish Torture was adopted in 1985, and a European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment was adopted in 1987.13
The consistent prohibition of torture in absolute terms in such 
international declarations, resolutions and conventions, and the 
continuing efforts which are being made to develop measures for its 
effective prevention, might appear to indicate that there exists a
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universal abhorrence of torture, on the basis of which the
international community is engaged in a concerted endeavour to
eradicate any last vestiges of an anachronistic practice which largely 
died out in the 18th century with the increasing enlightenment of
modern man. One might therefore conclude that the re-emergence of 
torture during the Second World War produced a worldwide resolve which 
has ensured that the practice now occurs only in primitive cultural 
conditions and under-developed legal systems, or perhaps as isolated 
aberrations within civilised societies. Such a conclusion would,
however, be quite erroneous. The fact is that the practice of torture 
is widespread in the world today: in 1973, Amnesty International's
Report on Torture1* identified over sixty countries and territories in 
which torture had allegedly been employed, and although important 
political developments have taken place in a number of the countries 
mentioned since the report was updated in 1975, a more recent survey 
indicates that there has in fact been an increase in the incidence of 
torture on a global scale.1S Allegations continue to be made with 
regularity in the media, in human rights publications and in other 
related literature.
It is true that torture is not normally employed today in the 
same manner as it was in times past, that is as an integral and 
legally sanctioned feature of the judicial process, its purpose being 
to secure evidence admissible in criminal trial proceedings. On the 
contrary, not only is torture prohibited in international law, but it 
is also specifically or impliedly forbidden by the constitutions of 
many states, and in no country is its application expressly recognised 
by law as permissible.16 Ho government asserts the right to inflict 
torture, and indeed virtually all governments publicly condemn the
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practice of torture and at the diplomatic level express support for 
the international prohibition. The fact is, however, that a 
considerable number of governments authorise or condone the 
clandestine use of torture by their security forces, often in direct 
violation of national law as well as in contravention of international 
norms. The purpose of such torture is normally to elicit confessions 
or information, especially in circumstances where there is some 
difficulty in procuring evidence by conventional means. The security 
forces may require information purely to assist their own 
investigations, but they may also present evidence to the courts as 
having been lawfully obtained, thus circumventing the laws of evidence 
which establish the inadmissibility of statements elicited by 
coercion. The use of torture has frequently been regarded by security 
forces as particularly: valuable in counter-subversive operations and, 
indeed, in some countries torture is employed routinely by the 
security forces as an integral component of systematic political 
repression. The international campaign against torture has to a great 
extent been a response to the increasing reliance by governments on 
the use of torture in this manner for the purpose of maintaining their 
political control. Many regimes makes use of torture, then, but none 
ever publicly admits to having authorised it. r
Whilst at the diplomatic level there appears to exist a powerful 
international consensus against the practice of torture, then, a 
relatively high number of governments which ostensibly support the 
prohibition and claim to respect it at the same time wilfully violate 
it in practice by authorising or at least tolerating the: clandestine 
and unlawful employment of torture by their security forces. This >■ 
disparity between profession and practice is in fact applicable to
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human rights on a more general level: many regimes pay only lip
service to the ideals of fundamental human rights. Ostensible concern 
for human rights is projected through endorsement of non-binding 
resolutions and declarations, by criticism of the selected violations 
of other governments and even by ratification of legally binding 
conventions provided this does not involve submission to any measures 
which might prove a threat to the international image of 
respectability which every government wishes to portray. The basic 
problem is, then, that many regimes, whilst nominally supporting the 
concept and principles of human rights, persistently display a total 
disregard for them in practice, and it is important to examine this 
phenomenon within the wider context of general human rights in order 
to appreciate the effect on the specific problem of torture.
The explanation for this paradoxical state of affairs lies 
largely in the fact that the high level of diplomatic support for the 
principles of human rights17 does not reflect the political realities, 
but in fact actually obscures profound differences in philosophical, 
ideological and cultural attitudes to the very concept of human rights 
which effectively determine the political conditions within which the 
protection of human rights must take place. The idea of fundamental 
human rights espoused by the United Nations at its inception1° and 
subsequently elaborated upon in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights19 was proposed and promoted primarily by the western liberal 
parliamentary democracies, and was in fact a product of western 
thought and political theory, reflecting attitudes and values shaped 
by factors peculiar to the development of western civilisation. In so 
far as these nations were instrumental in bringing the issue of human 
rights within the scope of the United Rations' field of competence,
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then, the world organisation's concern with human rights had its roots 
in a uniquely western view of the individual and society. The 
Universal Declaration in fact reveals its western origins quite 
clearly in certain areas.20 It is obvious, however, that the 
historical and socio-political conditions which contributed to the 
formation of western society will not necessarily be of relevance to 
the needs and aspirations of other cultures, and indeed several states 
did abstain in the vote on the Universal Declaration precisely because 
they perceived that it expressed a particular cultural viewpoint.21 
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the Universal 
Declaration was adopted at a time when the membership of the United 
Hations was only around one third of what it is today: many of the
present day members were at that time still under colonial control, 
and the western powers enjoyed a political dominance in international 
affairs. This enabled the liberal states to introduce their own 
concept of human rights as one of the constitutional principles of the 
United Nations, but clearly this concept was by no means a universally 
accepted one in 1948.22
The concept of fundamental human rights has, of course, been 
widely adopted and embraced as a valid one in the supervening years, 
but there has never been a universal acceptance of the philosophical 
foundations upon which the western liberal view was evolved, and while 
the traditional western approach remains influential within the United 
Nations as a result of the continuing diplomatic influence of the 
western powers, it has been challenged and opposed by alternative 
attitudes and interpretations, so that there cannot be said to exist a 
common understanding either of the basis of human rights or of their 
meaning. There is consequently no unified United Nations approach to
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the issues involved in the international protection of human rights, 
and it is this lack of unanimity which underlies many of the problems 
encountered by the various efforts to secure effective protection at 
the international level.
The western liberal view of human rights in which the United 
nations concern has its origins asserts that there are "natural, 
inalienable, rights pre-existent to and higher than the positive law 
of the State"23, that is that there exists a universal morality 
(usually based on reason or conscience2*), the precepts of which 
confer certain inherent rights on every individual human being and 
impose corresponding limitations on the actions of governments in 
their dealings with the individual.23 It is claimed that, in so far 
as the laws or practices of a society fail to conform to these 
universally valid moral norms, human rights are, at least potentially, 
violated. Human rights are thus seen primarily in terms of the 
political relationship between the individual and the state, and are 
perceived as particular standards of liberty, security and justice to 
which every person is inherently entitled by reason of his humanity, 
and which it is the moral responsibility of every government to both 
respect and ensure. The substance of natural rights, according to 
Hersch Lauterpacht, "has been the denial of the absoluteness of the 
State and of its unconditional right to exact obedience; the 
assertion of the value and of the freedom of the individual against 
the State; the view that the power of the State and of its rulers is 
derived ultimately from the assent of those who compose the political 
community; and the insistence that there are limits to the power of 
the State to interfere with man's right to do what he conceives to be 
his duty."23
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The idea of human rights as a series of ethical propositions
deriving from an abjective morality superior to the laws of any
particular state has its roots in theories of natural law which can be
traced back as far as the Ancient Greeks.27 Indeed, the idea of
natural law has appeared in a variety of forms in a wide range of
historical situations and cultural conditions: individuals and groups
demanding rights or rebelling against existing social or political
values and institutions have often appealed to principles of justice
and morality external to, and allegedly superior to, the laws of the
land in order to support and justify their claims or actions.
However, such assertions were always of very limited scope or applied
only to specific grievances, and there was never any real attempt to
formulate a comprehensive theory of 'natural rights', and in
particular to found social and political organisation on such a theory
through the limitation of government, until the advent of the Age of
Reason in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. Indeed, both
historically and culturally the norm has rather been for the rights of
the individual to depend upon his status in society:
"Traditional cultures did not view the
individual as autonomous and possessed of rights 
above and prior to society. Whatever the 
specific social relations, the individual was 
conceived of as an integral part of a greater 
whole, of a "group" within which one had a 
defined role and status,"20
Objections have been raised to the concept of natural law or,
more accurately, natural rights, on the grounds that it takes no
account of the so-called 'diversity of morals', but the principle of 
the universal applicability of fundamental human rights remains the 
essential foundation of the western liberal view.
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While the theory of natural law explains the source and rationale 
of human rights, the precise formulation of the actual content of 
particular rights is a more recent development, and the modern western 
concept of human rights is more directly a product of the political 
theories of the rights of man which were propounded by various 
philosophers of the Enlightenment,29 This notion of the rights of man
gained in influence in western thought, particularly with the
promulgation of the American Declaration of Independence and the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in the
latter half of the 18th century, and the principle of limited
government with the consent of the governed came to be accepted in an 
increasing number of countries. The development of the concept of the 
rights of man was, however, rather haphazard and not always entirely 
consistent, and the pious pronouncements of constitutional instruments 
were rarely realised in practice. In particular, there was a failure 
to grasp the full implications of the assertion of a theory of the 
rights of man, so that rights of a universal nature were not
envisaged: thus, although the American Declaration of Independence
stated: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men are
created e q u a l . , this affirmation did not prevent the suppression of 
the indigenous population or the acceptance of the institution of 
slavery. The Declaration's real purpose was in fact to give credence 
to the claims of a group of educated men of European descent in their 
desire far self-government, and there was no intention at that time to 
promote an idea of universal equality. While the origins of many 
civil and political rights are certainly to be found in the social and 
political upheavals of the 17th and 18th centuries, then, the western 
concept of universal human rights in its present day form really dates
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only from the period between the two world wars,30 and indeed the 
experience of war produced a keener appreciation of the issues 
involved.31 Even in the post-war era the concept has undergone 
continual refinement: new areas of concern have been identified,
sometimes as a result of non-western influence, so that the modern 
liberal idea of fundamental human rights actually comprises several 
distinct categories of rights which have been developed in response to 
different social, economic and political situations.3:2 The history of 
human rights has not involved the derivation of specific principles 
from a general theory of natural and universal rights, but has evolved 
rather from a fusion of diverse rights asserted by different groups at 
different times in response to different injustices, and although 
reference may have been made to the idea of natural law to support 
these claims, the modern liberal theory of human rights has in fact 
been arrived at in an inductive manner. Thus, particular aspects of 
the concept of human rights as it exists today have their origins in a 
variety of social and political conditions and conflicts. The major 
factor in the development of civil liberties and participation in 
government was the 16th-19th century synthesis of “an idealistic 
humanism of Greek origin and the Hebrew-Christian prophetic
tradition",33 and the assertion of the right of political 
participation as against the divine right of kings and political 
autocracy. Recognition of other types of rights, however, such as 
economic rights and even humanitarian rights, resulted from different 
experiences:
"It is commonplace to assume that human rights 
are nearly synonymous with natural rights,
individual rights, social rights, or community
rights. Although all are philosophically
related concepts, each has a discrete linguistic 
and historical tradition."34
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A comprehensive view o f h u m a n  rights embraces all these 
divisions, but it should always be borne in mind that their origins 
may be different. Perhaps the most significant development in the 
post-war period has been the recognition that human rights are truly 
universal in a global sense.
The issue of human rights was elevated to the international plane
for the first time in 1945; prior to then, the question of how a
government treated its own nationals was not considered a valid matter
for the attention of the international community, and the League of
greatly
Nations did not concern itself^with human rights. The final impetus 
for the internationalisation of human rights came, of course, from the 
reaction within the victorious western liberal democracies to the 
atrocities which had been committed by the Nazis and the Japanese
during the Second World War. This is indicated, for example, in the 
Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states 
that "disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind".
As we have seen, the idea of human rights has since been adopted 
in virtually all nations, but this has been accompanied by the radical 
re-interpretation of the concept by different governments to suit
existing ideological standpoints or cultural predilections. The
contributions of a broader spectrum of cultural perspectives as a
result of de-colonisation have inevitably had an impact on the 
development of the concept of human rights within the United Nations, 
and the subject matter has been expanded to embrace a wider range of 
issues than was originally envisaged, especially with regard to socio­
economic, cultural and collective rights, but there has never been any 
attempt to reconcile opposing attitudes, to clarify the theoretical
12
foundations of human rights or to create a common conceptual framework 
within which the action of the United Nations in the field of human 
rights protection might be evolved. The United Nations idea of human 
rights, in so far as one can be said to exist at all, consists of an 
amalgam of disparate conceptions, lacking any unified philosophical 
basis and consequently understood in different terms by different 
governments.
The suggestion that the idea of fundamental human rights has its 
origins in western liberal thought alone has been criticised,3S and 
it is true that conceptions of human rights are to be found in most 
cultures, civilisations, religions and p h i l o s o p h i e s . I n  other 
words, certain ideas resembling or analogous to aspects of the liberal 
concept or expressing the same broad principles can be identified in 
the precepts and practices of other societies, past and present. Of 
course, to say that specific features of the western view are 
paralleled in particular values and beliefs of other societies is 
quite different from asserting that the United Nations concern with 
human rights was actually derived from those values and beliefs, or 
that reference was made to them when the matter of human rights was 
adopted by the United Nations: although the subsequent development of
human rights has been influenced to a considerable degree by non- 
western attitudes, the fact remains that the initial 
internationalisation was achieved by the western democracies on the 
basis of a theory of fundamental human rights which was evolved in 
western thought alone. However, the contention that the origins of 
human rights do not lie exclusively in one particular philosophy is 
normally intended to mean rather that, while the United Nations 
adoption of the human rights issue was historically secured by the
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western democracies, many of the principles formulated were not
exclusive to western thought, but in fact expressed or reflected ideas
and beliefs which are recognised and respected in a wide variety of
cultural contexts. Of course, such a proposition would seem to be
supported by the western view, which itself is premised not only on
the universal applicability of fundamental human rights, but on the
fact that they are cognisable through the faculty of reason which is
innate in every human being. Nevertheless, although the existence
within different cultural outlooks of conceptions resembling
particular aspects of the liberal paradigm may be an indication of the
validity of this proposition, it must be stressed that such
similarities are often superficial or apply only at a very general
level, and the underlying rationale is usually quite distinct from
that of western liberalism:
"The demand for humanity, justice and equity is 
as old as man and woman and as new as tomorrow.
Some elements of the instinct for decent and 
humane treatment appear in every religion, but 
these yearnings have little to do with the 
contemporary concept of human rights that 
individuals have claims against the state."3-7
In particular, the liberal emphasis on the individual is rarely 
present in other perspectives, so that even when common principles of 
justice, equality and humanity can be identified, they are seldom 
regarded in terms of inherent entitlements, and are thus mistakenly 
interpreted as conceptions of human rights. Certain rights may 
attract a genuine cross-cultural support because they are founded on 
basic principles of justice which are in fact recognised more or less 
universally by contemporary civilised nations,30 but even when the 
same broad values are accepted in this way by different societies, 
they may be subject to extensive qualification and their precise
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implications may well differ, as a result of which their 
implementation will not have identical effects in different states. 
The fact is that the meaning and impart of any right cannot be 
divorced from the conceptual framework within which it is understood 
and applied. In each society the entire relationship between the 
individual and the state is comprehended in terms of a value-system 
determined by peculiar historical, cultural and political conditions,
and this leads to wide divergences in the theoretical approach to the
very concept of human rights, which inevitably have a profound effect 
on the interpretation and application of specific rights. Thus, even 
where there is a general consensus in respect of certain broad 
principles and rights which particularise these principles, their 
precise scope and significance will vary according to the ideological 
and cultural thought-framework within which they are interpreted.
The rejection of the western liberal view by other ideologies and
cultures has not involved the denial of the idea of human rights as
such, but rather has meant the fundamental re-definition and
adaptation of the concept so that it corresponds to pre-existing
philosophical conceptions about man and society in these ideologies
and cultures. In this dissension lie the roots of many of the
problems facing international protection of human rights:
"...the development of a global conception of 
human rights suffers from the lack of agreement 
on sources of human rights including the very 
foundation of international law. The
uncertainty about the content of the doctrines 
of human rights, including the lack of a
philosophical common core, poses additional 
obstacles. In fact, the very conception of the 
organization of society differs from one culture 
to another.,,3S’
In order to illustrate the difficulties involved, we shall 
consider briefly some of the more important alternative
interpretations of human rights: one ideological (Marxist Leninist),
one political/cultural (Black African) and one religious (Islamic).AO 
Each of these constitutes a major study in itself, so that it is
necessary for us to limit ourselves here to an examination of some of 
the more salient features of these attitudes in order to indicate how 
fundamentally opposed they are to the western liberal concept of human . 
rights.
Marxist philosophy not only rejects the liberal emphasis on
individualism, favouring socialist collectivism, but also denies the ^
basic tenet of the liberal theory, the idea that there exists a -
universal morality, that is that there are abjective norms with which
positive law ought to accord:
"It is common knowledge that the socialist 
concept is sharply opposed to any kind of 
natural law. Maybe I should say that in doing 
so it has detached itself not so much from 
"nature" as from the concept of "law". For ^
instance in the case of human rights it does n o t * 
dispute their being natural - more accurately 
human - phenomena, but it denies them the 
character of rights. The phenomenon commonly *
called natural law is obviously loaded with a 
moral content expressing a determined <
standpoint."4-1 *
Marxism thus rejects the assertion that there can exist rights 
which are not embodied in the form of positive law. This is not 
simply a matter of denying the legal nature of human rights whilst 
upholding a belief in their ethical validity: even the liberal
position accepts that human rights are essentially moral norms which 
only assume the character of legal rights when adopted as such in 
national or international law. The Marxist attack is, however, much 
more fundamental, rej ecting the very idea of an absolute morality
applicable to every social and cultural situation, and thus,, denying < 
the contention that there are universally valid moral standards from
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which the principles of human rights can be derived and which
accordingly dictate the content of positive law. In the Marxist view,
morality is a phenomenon which arises out of specific socio-economic,
cultural and historical circumstances in order to support the
political order within a particular society, and the nature and
interpretation of rights are thus relative to the moral predilections
of that society, which are not static but are constantly evolving with
changing conditions and attitudes:
"For the bourgeois liberal, the belief in human 
rights is premised upon a moral absolute, the 
inviolacy of the individual, which transcends 
all national, cultural, and class 
characteristics. The individual qua human being 
possesses certain inalienable rights which may 
not be abrogated. It is the duty of governments 
to respect these rights and to pass legislation 
which guarantees their protection. For a 
Marxist-Leninist, human rights grow out of a 
system of moral relations which reflect the 
moral consciousness and material living 
conditions of a particular society in a specific 
historical context.1,4:2
The appeal to natural law by liberals is regarded by the Marxist 
as nothing more than an attempt to confer legitimacy on a socio­
economic system which is otherwise invalid and morally insupportable, 
in order to perpetuate capitalism as a particular form of social 
organisation:
"The object of Marx's criticism is not human 
rights as such but the use of the alleged 
'rights of man' as prefabricated
rationalisations of the prevailing structures of 
inequality and domination."43
In other words, Marxism asserts that, because human rights depend 
upon the circumstances within any given society, it is not possible to 
impose one set of values on different historical or cultural
situations. Of course, Marxism recognises its own moral precepts and 
norms, and indeed the socialist ideal is itself founded on a
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particular view of social justice and economic equality which is 
considered to be universally valid. However, in socialist thought the 
rights of the individual are not understood as claims to liberty and 
security which the state may not violate, as they are in western 
liberalism: rights are conferred by the state, and their enjoyment is
dependent upon the continuing fulfilment of one's obligations to the 
state, which in this context means the socialist system.4* Marxism 
thus stresses the duties and responsibilities of the individual to 
society rather than his rights and freedoms within society or his 
claims against the state. The Marxist emphasis is consequently on 
equality rather than liberty, and this is reflected in the 
interpretation of human rights as referring primarily to social and 
economic equality: the Marxist attitude is characterised by its
concern with social and economic rights, such as the right to work, 
the right to health care, the right to housing and so on, as opposed 
to the civil-political rights and freedoms considered so important by 
western liberalism.4,6 Moreover, it is affirmed that the true 
enjoyment of the latter is actually dependent on the basic social and 
economic equality which the socialist system alone is capable of 
providing, and that since capitalism by its very nature violates this 
prerequisite it can never ensure respect for even civil and political 
rights. The exercise of civil and political rights as these are 
understood in western liberalism is, then, decried as meaningless and 
illusory in a class system which is unjust by definition and the very 
essence of which is seen as the perpetuation of privilege and 
exploitation. In other words, it is asserted that capitalism creates 
only an illusion of freedom, because wealth and power remain vested in 
a privileged few in whose interests alone the system operates:
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"Bourgeois theories which abstractly champion 
the 'rights of man' are inherently suspect 
because they also champion the rights of 
universal alienability and exclusive possession, 
and thus they necessarily contradict and 
effectively nullify the selfsame 'rights of man* 
which they claim to establish."*e
Marxism accordingly maintains that the genuine exercise of civil 
and political rights is possible only within the socialist structure, 
where the absence of class distinctions and private enterprise permits 
the meaningful participation of the people in political affairs. This 
does not mean, of course, that these rights are comprehended in the 
same way as they are in the Vest: they are not viewed as inalienable
rights which the state must respect, but as rights which the state 
confers, and as such they exist only to the extent the state permits, 
that is in so far as their exercise does not conflict with Marxist 
ideology. For example, freedom of speech is recognised by the 
Constitution of the Soviet Union, but it does not refer to political 
pluralism, and does not imply a right to criticise the socialist 
system itself,*7 which is regarded as the indispensable foundation of 
all human rights because it secures the socio-economic equality 
prerequisite to their full and true enjoyment.
It can be seen from the foregoing observations that the: Marxist 
concept of human rights differs fundamentally from the western liberal 
notion of inherent and inalienable rights of the individual. Marxism 
does recognise socio-economic rights, which it claims to satisfy, but 
it accepts the idea of civil-political rights only within the 
parameters of socialist legality, that is only in so far as the 
exercise of a particular right is not incompatible with the doctrines 
and goals of Marxist theory as interpreted and applied by the state 
authorities.
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The attitude of many Black African states to human rights is 
representative of the approach adopted by developing nations in 
general, though there are certain features which are particularly 
relevant to Africa. The Third World countries, lagging behind the 
industrialised states of the northern hemisphere in scientific 
achievement, technological capability, social welfare and material 
wealth, not unnaturally emphasise the supreme importance of economic 
development and modernisation: the paramount task of the governments
of the developing nations must be to tackle the massive economic and 
social problems which beset them - the poverty, famine, disease, 
illiteracy, over-population and so on. On this basis, it is claimed 
that in the conditions which prevail in the Third World it is 
unrealistic to expect or demand full enjoyment not only of those 
rights which are essentially dependent on economic prosperity, but 
also of civil and political rights. The argument is that the 
implementation of civil and political rights in fact requires a 
certain level of socio-economic stability -and administrative 
organisation and that, while due respect for these rights will follow 
once the necessary infra-structure has been established, in the 
meantime the governments of under-developed states cannot be expected 
to secure respect for human rights to the same extent as those of the 
industrialised liberal democracies, and they should not, therefore, be 
subject to the same strictures or judged by the same criteria.
Of course, the exercise of many civil and political rights and 
freedoms may be virtually meaningless to the poverty-stricken and 
illiterate masses of the Third World, who have little interest in or 
use for freedom of speech, freedom of information, the right to 
participate in government and so on, at least in the full sense in
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which these terms are normally understood in the West, but who are 
concerned primarily with physical survival. Political liberties may 
indeed be of little consequence in conditions of social and economic 
deprivation. However, this in itself is not a justification for the 
deliberate suppression of civil and political rights by governments or 
for the denial of basic standards of j ustice and humanity: even the
poorest and simplest peasant has a right to practise his religion, 
form and express his own humble opinions, associate with others of his 
choice and otherwise organise his life free from arbitrary or 
unjustified governmental interference. Thus, although the existence 
of a right may not have the same implications as in the West, this 
does not mean that it has no application at all, or that it should not 
be guaranteed by law. Indeed, the peasant's only hope of improvement 
may lie in the opportunity to exercise political rights. Moreover, it 
should also be recognised that there will always be some educated 
persons to whom the entire range of rights is not without substance. 
In view of the genuine problems of administration, communication and 
governmental control in developing nations, some allowances must 
certainly be made with regard to the implementation of civil and 
political rights, but this is a result of the practical difficulties 
and not a reason or excuse for failure to recognise them in law. In 
particular, the conditions in developing nations do not constitute a 
justification for the wholesale and indiscriminate repression of all 
opposition to the regime in power.
Governments of developing countries do, however, perceive an 
incompatibility between economic progress and the recognition of civil 
and political rights, and as a result they maintain not only that 
respect for such rights cannot always be guaranteed, but also that
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their suspension is often necessary in the struggle to improve the 
material conditions of the people. The argument is that the paramount 
goal of achieving economic growth and development demands strong and 
united rule, so that opposition, criticism and even open discussion 
are regarded as disruptive and divisive impediments to progress: the
task of nation-building upon which the governments are engaged 
necessitates powerful leadership which will ensure both national unity
and single-mindedness of purpose, unencumbered by political
fragmentation, alternative policies or dissent in the ranks of the 
educated elite. It is essential for all opposition to be silenced so 
that the government can operate with undisputed authority and the 
minimum of restriction. However, opponents of the government are 
unlikely to acquiesce in this, and the ever-present threat posed by 
dissentient elements creates an atmosphere of distrust and political 
instability, and it is for this reason that governments deem it
necessary to sacrifice civil and political rights.
In accordance with this theory, the concept of democracy has been 
adapted by many African regimes to support the idea of the one-party 
state which, it is claimed, constitutes true African d e m o c r a c y . T h e  
multi-party systems of the liberal parliamentary democracies are
rejected because they are viewed as the product of social conflicts 
which have no relevance to the African situation, and they are in any 
case considered to be ineffectual and thus a hindrance to the strong 
and unified government which the developing African nations require. 
It is essential for the government to exercise sufficient control to 
implement long-term solutions to the problems which exist, untramelled 
by political opposition, and for the diverse elements within society - 
in particular the heterogeneous tribal groups - to be welded together
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in a common purpose rather than be permitted to confront each other in 
the political arena and through polarisation thwart all attempts to 
secure national unity. It is believed that this unity can be best 
achieved by the creation of a single party which in theory represents 
the" will of the people and the national interest. Accordingly, no 
opposition to this party can be tolerated and no alternative 
philosophies may be entertained.
The attitude of the Black African and other developing states 
resembles that of the socialist states, in that the rights of the 
individual are not regarded as fundamental and inalienable, but are 
subordinate to the requirements of the state as interpreted by the 
authorities in accordance with the socio-political ideals embraced by 
the ruling party: the individual has rights and freedoms only within
the context and limitations of a particular ideological position. 
Thus, in one-party states, whether of the left or of the right, there 
cannot be full enjoyment of civil and political rights as these are 
understood in liberal thought, because within a totalitarian system 
rights are conferred by and dependent on the state rather than 
superior to it. In Black African nations, the emphasis is again on 
the collectivity, and this is reflected in the regional convention, 
the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights.
The Islamic view of human rights, too, possesses characteristics 
in common with the two approaches already discussed, in so far as it 
rejects the primacy of the individual and stresses the importance of a 
particular form of social organisation premised on immutable precepts 
with which each individual is required to conform. The Islamic 
approach is of significance because a considerable number of states 
can be described as Islamic states, although it should be recognised
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that- the religious principles of Islam are not always the deciding 
factor in the policy decisions of the governments, just as the 
governments of states within 'Christendom' are not guided necessarily 
by the doctrines of Christian theology.30 nevertheless, the precepts 
of Islam do have a powerful influence at the political as well as at 
the cultural and personal level, and examination of the Islamic 
interpretation of human rights is relevant to the extent that the 
attitudes and policies of a significant number of regimes have been 
formed within the cultural context and against the religious
background of Islam, and in some instances have been directly 
controlled by Islamic teaching.
There are undoubtedly contained in the teachings of the Quran 
concepts and values which appear to correspond to particular 
principles recognised by the liberal idea of human rights.31 It is 
important to appreciate, however, that there exist fundamental 
differences between the conceptual frameworks of the respective 
philosophies which yield quite distinct interpretations of rights. In 
the Islamic view, human rights "constitute obligations connected with 
the Divine and derive their force from this connection."32 Thus, 
freedom of the person "cannot be realized through liberation from 
external sources of restraint".33 Freedom of the individual is 
thought of rather as an inner fulfilment related to obedience to 
divine command, that is, the internal moral perfection of the mind and 
soul:
"The free man of the Quran is a man of virtue
and generosity, and one who has liberated
himself from the coils of evil."34 ■ . ,
Freedom is thus seen in terms of the individual’s role in 
society, and not as the individualistic pursuit of goals which do not
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contribute to the welfare of the community and the benefit of
others.®® The premises on which this attitude rests clearly differ
completely from those of western liberalism:
"The West places more emphasis on rights while 
Islam values obligations. The Western tradition 
posits freedom in order to avoid the outcome of 
a despotic system, while Islam emphasizes virtue 
as a goal to perpetuate traditions of society 
which often support a coercive system. The West 
emphasizes individual interests while Islam 
values collective good."®®
The same writer concludes:
"The Western liberal emphasis upon freedom from 
restraint is alien to Islam."®'7
From a brief survey of these different approaches to human
rights, then, it becomes apparent that the western liberal concept,
which stresses the inherent and inalienable rights of every human
being as an individual, is one which finds little support in
alternative cultural conceptions of the relationship between the
individual and the community of which he forms part. It is much more
usual for pre-eminence to be accorded to the interests of society as a
whole, and for individualism to be regarded as incompatible with the
common good. In this connection, it is interesting to note that there
is no individual character in Chinese signifying "person":
"From the pre-Ching philosophies, the goal of 
self-realization was not the obtaining of 
personal advantage but a rational and moral 
concern for the welfare of other members of a 
family or a community.... In other words, the 
general view of life, for a Chinese person, is
to submerge his ego, to disappear, and to be
absorbed into the universal harmony."®®
In most cultures, then, the individual is seen as an integral 
part of the group, and not as an autonomous entity having rights
separate from the interests of society as a whole, and where the
rights of the individual are recognised at all, they are conferred by
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society and consequently depend upon the fulfilment of obligations to 
society and exist only within the strict limitations imposed by 
s o c i e t y . T h i s  has two important consequences: firstly, a rejection
of the need for limitation and control of government, and secondly, a 
refusal to recognise any role for the individual in international law.
In view of the diversity of attitudes which we have outlined, the 
question arises as to why international human rights instruments 
attract such a broad support. The answer to this appears to lie in 
the moral and political cogency with which the concept of human rights 
is invested: the actual idea of human rights is not easily or lightly
denied:
"There can be no doubt about the rhetorical 
value of the idea of human rights. In 
contemporary politics it ranks alongside such 
ideas as liberty and democracy. A regime which 
protects human rights is good. One which fails 
to protect them, or worse still does not 
acknowledge their existence, is bad."e'°
No matter how ruthless a regime may be, no matter how little 
respect for human rights it displays in practice, no attempt is ever 
made to claim the right to govern without any regard for fundamental 
human rights: to propose a philosophy or ideology which expressly
rejected any idea of human rights would be to invite international 
condemnation and political isolation. Governments, which are always 
sensitive to international opinion, appreciate the political 
disadvantage and loss of credibility involved in the denial of the 
concept of human rights, and it is in order to escape the criticism of 
the international community that even the most brutally repressive 
regimes endeavour to present an image of respectability by endorsing 
the principles of human rights at the diplomatic level.
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The political potency of the idea of human rights rests upon the 
existence of an empirical, though superficial, international moral 
consensus, in terms of which most of the specific rights postulated 
are, as general statements, endued with a validity which is self- 
apparent and irrefutable. To a certain extent this international 
moral consensus is an artificial creation arising out of the
disproportionate influence which western thought and values have 
enjoyed in international affairs, with the result that other states, 
particularly newly independent ones, have felt pressurised into 
adopting social, political and legal norms which do not in fact have 
any real basis in their own historical and cultural experiences, 
levertheless, there does exist a superficial consensus in the sense 
that many human rights, in so far as they remain general and undefined 
propositions, do attract a virtually unanimous cross-cultural support, 
because they express principles which are universally recognised at 
some level, that is they can find some foundation in the cultural
attitudes and values of all contemporary civilised societies. In 
other words, there is a general recognition that human beings ought to 
be treated in accordance with certain principles, though the basis of
this recognition may not lie in the idea of natural rights. This
consensus is probably genuine in relation to certain broad principles 
of justice and equality, but with the majority of specific rights it 
is superficial and illusory: the idea of human rights, like the
concepts of liberty and democracy, is open to a range of 
interpretations and emphases in accordance with diverse socio-cultural 
conditions and ideological perspectives, so that while particular 
human rights maxims may well express sentiments which can be endorsed 
by different philosophical approaches, the precise meaning and effect
of each right is interpreted within a specific cultural and political 
context. In other words, the wide divergence in theoretical 
conceptions of human rights which we have identified does not prevent 
agreement at a superficial level, but the underlying differences in 
the philosophical foundations do inevitably produce entirely distinct 
interpretations of the precise nature, scope and content of each 
particular right. The problem is, then, that human rights are often 
expressed in terms sufficiently general and undefined to permit 
governments of diverse persuasions to formally express support for 
them while maintaining their own subjective understanding of the 
essence of the rights. This situation is in fact exacerbated at the 
diplomatic level by the fact that international human rights 
instruments tend to be somewhat eclectic amalgams arrived at on the 
basis of compromise, with the result that precise definition is 
avoided.ei
The consensus is, then, more apparent than real, and a more 
accurate picture of the dissension which exists necessitates 
penetrating the facade presented by international instruments: the
absence of true agreement can be seen more clearly in such matters as 
voting on specific rights, attitudes towards the implementation of 
international conventions, and especially the whole issue of the role 
of the individual in international law. On the whole, the western 
liberal democracies are far more amenable to international procedures 
for the protection of human rights than are other states, and this 
applies a fortiori to those procedures whereby individual victims of 
human rights violations may petition international authorities in 
order to bring their allegations before the international community. 
The socialist states, in particular, consistently deny that the
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individual has any place in international law, and it is only in 
recent years that the non-aligned states have shown signs of tending 
towards the western view on this question. The inevitable result of a 
rejection of the notion of the inherent rights of the individual vis- 
a-vis the state is a denial of the role of the individual in 
international law, and especially in bringing complaints against his 
government to an international arbiter. Moreover, if there is no 
recognition of the individual's rights against the state, no question 
of conflict arises, and in theory there is no need for international 
involvement in the relationship between the individual and the state.
There is, in fact, a nucleus of western and western-type 
democracies which in general both respect human rights at the domestic
.level and promote their protection at the international level.
Indeed, it is ironic that those states which show the greatest degree 
of respect for human rights can be equated with those which submit to 
international supervision. The European system of human rights 
protection, which is the longest established of the major systems and 
in many ways has proved the most successful, to a great extent owes 
this success to the fact that the Council of Europe is, for the most 
part, composed of such states, parliamentary democracies in which the 
principle of the rule of law is upheld and whose governments have 
(with some notable exceptions) been willing to co-operate with the 
agencies charged with supervising the implementation of the European 
Convention. The Convention recognises in its Preamble that the states 
parties are "like minded and have a common heritage of political 
traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law", and although these 
sentiments are perhaps over-optimistic with regard to the present 
membership of the Council of E u r o p e , i t  is in the political
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homogeneity that the success of the European system of human rights 
protection lies:
"Whatever power and moral authority the 
Convention possesses is a function of the 
democratic values it embodies and state
acceptance of those values. When, for example, 
one compares the European Convention with the 
United Nations human rights system one compares 
a regional system well established and 
flourishing with an international system
tentatively functioning in a highly politicized 
environment that is more hostile, less
democratic, and much more protective of the 
perquisites of sovereign statehood.
The United Nations possesses a more than 
adequate legal basis for an effective 
international human rights system. What is 
missing is a positive commitment to the 
protection of human rights and an institutional 
structure reflecting that commitment...
The sincerity and depth of the commitment 
appears to be one highly important distinction 
between the human rights system of the United 
Nations and that of Europe. The states party to 
the Convention are almost all functioning 
democracies with many shared historical and 
cultural traditions including devotion to the 
rule of law. They have demonstrated their 
willingness to accept restraints upon their 
actions and to be subject to supranational 
controls.
The United Nations on the other hand is 
basically a political grouping comprising the 
entire international community of states, 
exceedingly protective of their sovereignty, and 
divided on the true substance of human rights as 
well as on their importance.
That the European system is as successful as it 
is is in great part due to Europe's libertarian 
and democratic tradition as well as to its 
overall economic and political stability. Other 
areas are usually lacking in these fortunate 
conditions and have a different historical 
precedent and experience upon which to rely. In 
Europe the success of the present system is to 
be found in its past."63
In general, the most consistent supporters of international 
protection of human rights are the Scandinavian states, along with 
other western liberal democracies such as the Netherlands and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and it may be noted in passing that these
states have had a largely Protestant heritage, suggesting that the 
Reformation may have had an important influence on concepts of human 
rights. The countries of southern Europe do not in fact share such a 
strong historical commitment to the idea of inalienable rights, and 
while the political institutions of liberal democracy have been 
adapted in these countries, the underlying emphasis on individualism 
has not been fully accepted* so that rights are perceived as emanating 
from the state, which retains a separate and pre-eminent position.&/t
The states of western Europe, then, along with a number of non- 
European (but westernised) nations such as Canada, Costa Rica and 
Senegal, are often the strongest (and sometimes the only) supporters 
of international procedures proposed within the United Nations, as can 
be seen, for example, from an examination of those states which have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee under article 
41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
under the Optional Protocol.66 This is a clear indication of the 
importance of the philosophical foundations of the liberal view to the 
establishment of effective measures for the protection of human rights 
at international level, and in particular to the creation of 
procedures which involve supervision of national governments by 
international authorities.
As we have noted, western states have been criticised for 
attempting to impose their own values and morality on other cultures 
without taking into account the very different conditions and 
attitudes which prevail in these cultures. Nevertheless, the idea of 
the universal applicability of human rights is, as we have also seen, 
an essential tenet of the western liberal view: fundamental human
rights are so described because they are regarded as inherent and
inalienable, the rights to which every human being is entitled by
virtue of his or her very humanity:
"If there are human rights, they must be 
universal moral rights. They must be universal 
because they are the rights which people have 
simply as human beings irrespective of 
nationality, religion, citizenship, marital 
status, occupation, income or any other social 
or cultural characteristic, and also 
irrespective of sex."e^
In the liberal view, then, fundamental human rights do not depend 
upon the particular cultural context or socio-political system, but 
are universally relevant because they are based on a common humanity. 
This view is founded on the concept of human rights as a series of 
ethical propositions derived from a universal morality, the precepts 
of which are cognisable by every person through innate reason and 
conscience. Reason and conscience may both be suppressed by cultural 
tradition, social prejudices and repression, and political 
indoctrination, so that any given society may fail to recognise basic 
human rights, but the concept of universally valid morality is not 
invalidated by an empirical diversity of attitudes, as its principles 
remain perceptible to "every man who will but seriously consult his 
innate moral sense.
Acceptance of the proposition that there exist fundamental human 
rights which are universally valid is also the indispensable 
prerequisite to the effective protection of human rights on an 
international level: there can only be any real substance to the
international supervision of governments if there can be identified a 
legitimate basis in terms of which genuinely universal human rights 
may be defined. The question to which we must now address ourselves, 
then, is whether any area can be identified which does^ attract 
universal assent and may therefore be the basis of united action: in
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other words, is there any way in which the diverse concepts of human 
rights can be sufficiently reconciled to make international protection 
meaningful?
The foundation of any concept of universal human rights must be
the principle of the essential equality of every human being, that is
the fact that every human life and personality has the same intrinsic
moral value and worth. It is on this premise that the assertion is
made that each human being ought to enjoy the same standards of
security and liberty. This means that there must be no arbitrary
distinctions or ungrounded discrimination in the enjoyment and
exercise of fundamental human rights, a principle which is recognised
as underlying the concept in article 2 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and also in article 2 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which states:
"Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other 
status."es
Furthermore, it is provided in article 4, paragraph 1, of the 
Covenant, which permits derogation from many of its terms in
exceptional circumstances, that such derogation may not involve 
measures which are discriminatory, although it does omit several of 
the categories which appear in article 2.63
The idea of essential human equality and its concomitant of non­
discrimination do, in fact, receive a very wide degree of support in 
the international arena (though not universally at a cultural level), 
particularly in the area of racial discrimination, and while in
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practice there is widespread repression of minority groups, the 
concept of equality may be regarded as a philosophical axiom which 
virtually all governments would support in theory. Certain specific 
rights derived from this principle also attract a broad philosophical 
support: thus, everyone should be recognised as a person before the
law,7,0 and everyone should be treated as equal before the law.71 In 
other words, whatever the laws of a particular state may be, they must 
be applied consistently, without unwarranted distinctions, so that 
everyone enjoys on equal terms the same basic standards of justice, 
the same consideration of his interests, and the same fundamental 
rights.
With these observations in mind, we may endeavour to identify the 
criteria in accordance with which a theory of universal human rights 
might be defined. There are, as we noted earlier, several distinct 
branches within the modern idea of human rights, the major division 
being between socio-economic rights and civil-political rights. The 
criticism has been levelled at western liberals that they are over­
concerned with the latter to the detriment of any concern for basic 
human needs: the socialist states claim credit for the promotion of
social and economic rights both in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural lights, and it is true that they support this category of 
rights and have contributed to its development. However, criticism of 
liberals for lack of concern with these issues is not wholly 
justified: liberalism does not deny that the satisfaction of basic
human needs is of the utmost importance and that real efforts must be 
made to tackle the problems which exist, although it does not accept 
that there is any necessary incompatibility between the pursuit of
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socio-economic development and the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights which justifies the suppression of these rights. Moreover, a 
distinction is drawn between socio-economic rights, which are not 
susceptible of immediate implementation but are dependent on material
conditions and are thus long-term goals for progressive
implementation, and civil-political rights, which can be secured 
simply through government action and legal application. It is on the 
basis of this distinction that the two International Covenants were 
promulgated as separate instruments in 1966, and the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights alone provided for international procedures 
whereby implementation of the provisions by states parties could be 
monitored. A similar division occurs within the European system, with 
the European Convention on Human Rights covering civil and political 
rights, while the European Social Charter deals with socio-economic 
rights.7:2 The liberal stress on civil and political rights is thus no 
more than a recognition of the fact that such rights can be guaranteed 
in a way in which social and economic rights cannot.
It is, then, in the political relationship between the individual
and the state, and the regulation by the state of relationships 
between individuals and groups within society, that fundamental human 
rights capable of being protected by international law must be sought. 
In the liberal view, governments exist primarily to secure effectively 
the equal rights of individuals, and the area of the individual's 
autonomy and exercise of his rights and freedoms should thus be as 
wide as possible, with the authority of the state being 
correspondingly limited. The aim of liberalism is to maximise the 
security and liberty of the individual in society by imposing 
limitations on governmental interference in the life of the individual
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and by maintaining that individual liberty should be subject to
restriction only in so far as it would infringe upon the rights,
freedoms and interests of others, or would be incompatible with the
legitimate claims of the state as guardian of the welfare of the
community as a whole. This idea is recognised in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights:
"In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, 
everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others 
and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare 
in a democratic society."7,3
It is obvious that in a society based on egalitarian principles 
the freedom of the individual cannot be absolute or infinite, but must 
be subject to such limitations as are necessary for the protection of 
the equal and corresponding rights of others and also of the interests 
of society in general, such as national security, public order, public 
health, conservation and so on. Thus, for example, freedom of speech 
- the right to say whatever one wishes - must be balanced against the 
right of others not to be gratuitously slandered, the interests of 
national security, public order and morality and so on, and it may be 
legitimately curtailed in so far as its exercise would violate these 
other valid considerations. Moreover, the same principle applies in a 
positive as well as a negative sense, so that society may not only 
impose restrictions on the individual, but may also make positive 
demands of him for the benefit of the community, although the nature 
of such demands means that there are probably far fewer justifiable 
instances than there are legitimate limitations on freedom. In other 
words, there is less likelihood of infringing other people's rights by 
failing to do something than by actually exercising freedom. It is
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clear, then, that the question of the rights of the individual is a 
complex matter of striking an appropriate balance not only between the 
competing claims of individuals inter se, but also between the rights 
of the individual and the interests of society as a whale. It is 
really one particular aspect of a much wider balancing of interests by 
governments, which may not involve the rights of the individual at 
all: for instance, a conflict may arise between an important economic
enterprise and the protection of the environment, ; ?
Governments have an obvious role in establishing and regulating 
the relative priorities within a state: indeed, this is one of the
primary functions of law. It is clear, however, that wide ideological 
and political differences of opinion will arise regarding the optimum 
resolution of the conflicting interests in society, and that there 
will be little agreement concerning the precise role of the state, the 
limits of the law, and the legitimate extent of the claims of the 
community upon the individual. Furthermore, while the faculty of 
reason may yield general guidelines as to the principles upon which 
society should be organised, it does not always provide definitive - 
solutions to the detailed problems of assessing the weight of 
different considerations: many of the issues which arise require a
value-judgement to be made, and in any case the relative merits of the 
various factors may vary with the circumstances, so that governments 
must be afforded a degree of discretion in their evaluation of the 
force of competing claims. There is, therefore, a function for 
diverse political ideas and emphases, for pressure groups and 
political activists, and for public opinion, andthere is scope for 
changing conditions and shifting perceptions of moral values within
37
society: all these can have an influence on the identification of
priorities by governments. nevertheless, the liberal view asserts 
that while governments may be permitted a certain 'margin of 
appreciation', such discretion is exercisable only within finite 
limits, so that the balancing of rights must always take place in 
accordance with certain immutable principles, irrespective of the 
social attitudes within the state. In particular, there are
limitations on governments in matters affecting individual liberty and 
security: there are rights of liberty and security which cannot be
violated with any justification, but must take priority even when some
legitimate conflicting interest exists. It is in this notion that
western liberalism identifies and defines fundamental human rights.
The actions of state authorities must, then, comply with certain 
standards and principles. Firstly, the infringement of the security 
or liberty of the individual must not be arbitrary, but must be duly 
authorised by law: in other words, the state authorities must
themselves be subject to the laws of the land and must act strictly in 
accordance with those laws. Secondly, as we have already suggested, 
the law must not be applied in a discriminatory manner, that is on the 
basis of irrelevant distinctions such as race, colour and other innate 
characteristics or opinions rather than behaviour, but must recognise 
and respect the essential equality of all persons and give equal 
consideration to the interests of each individual in the determination 
of his r i g h t s . T h i r d l y ,  the law itself must not merely purport to 
confer legitimacy on arbitrary action by the state authorities, but 
must conform to the demands of basic standards of justice. This 
raises again the spectre of natural law, but in general terms it means 
that in the balancing of rights the infringement of personal security
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and liberty must have a rational basis, and must not be vexatious, 
excessive or otherwise unreasonable: essentially, it must not be
disproportionate to the benefits which accrue to others or to society.
Human rights can, in fact, be viewed largely in terms of these 
three principles, that is the majority of rights are not absolute in 
the sense of being categorically exceptionless, but apply only in so 
far as one of the principles is contravened. To illustrate this, we 
may take as an example the right not to be deprived of one's liberty, 
which does not mean that no one should ever be detained or imprisoned, 
but rather that no one should be detained arbitrarily or on irrelevant 
grounds (such as race or religion), or without reasonable cause, 
without a fair opportunity to present a defence, or for a period or in 
conditions disproportionate to the purpose for which detention is 
justified. The notion of proportionality is, of course, a relative 
one, and it is in this area that the greatest divergences of opinion 
are liable to occur. Indeed, even within liberal states there are 
different attitudes regarding the precise extent of the liberty of the 
individual and the corresponding limits on governmental power, and 
these differences sometimes appear to be more than minor variations 
within the boundaries of the margin of appreciation. This makes it 
difficult to deny the validity of restrictions imposed within other 
societies on the basis of their peculiar cultural values and beliefs, 
but liberalism nevertheless in theory accepts only minimal 
governmental intrusion into the life of the individual and, while 
there are certain differences of opinion within the liberal camp, they 
are often differences of degree only, and there is in fact broad 
agreement on most of the major issues, particularly matters of civil 
and political liberty. Liberalism does support the maximisation of
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the security and liberty of the individual by denying governments any 
right to impinge upon these rights except where there is some rational 
and compelling justification for doing so.7e
It should be noted that the requirements of the state may 
fluctuate according to the particular social, economic and political 
conditions within a country. There may arise exceptional
circumstances which present a serious threat to the stability of the 
community, and in such a situation the normal balance of rights may be 
upset, with the result that certain rights of the individual decrease 
in importance and no longer take automatic priority. Liberalism 
accepts that the curtailment or suspension of particular rights may 
become necessary in emergency situations, although this idea 
introduces a further element of governmental discretion and seems to 
reduce the concept of fundamental human rights to a general formula of 
proportionality to the national interest. Certainly the principle of 
proportionality continues to apply in exceptional circumstances, so 
that only those measures which are strictly required to deal with the 
situation are justified, and neither a wholesale suspension nor a 
total or even excessive curtailment of specific rights is envisaged. 
More importantly, however, there remain certain finite limitations on 
governments, and a number of rights may be regarded as inviolable in 
an absolute sense, that is violation of these rights is never 
justified, even in an emergency situation.77
Of course, it is perfectly valid for western political 
philosophers to assert that the entire range of civil and political 
rights enjoyed in liberal democracies should be available to every 
human being in every country, and that their denial cannot be 
justified. In effect, this would amount to a claim that liberal
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democracy is the most just form of political organisation and that its 
adoption universally is the prerequisite to the full enjoyment and 
exercise of fundamental human rights by all people. It has actually 
been suggested that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be 
interpreted as implying this.7-0 However, while it is no less 
acceptable to preach liberal values than it is to propogate the 
doctrines of socialism or any other ideology, it is obviously 
unrealistic, in view of the diversity of attitudes which we have 
outlined, to expect universal support for liberal ideals or the 
liberal interpretation of human rights. Without abandoning their 
personal belief in the rationality and justice of the precepts of 
liberalism and the importance of individual liberties, therefore, many 
western jurists have come to realise that the adoption of a dogmatic 
stance on the human rights issue is not consistent with the political 
realities and is consequently unproductive in terms of the promotion 
of international measures for the protection of human rights. This 
has led to a re-assessment of the concept of fundamental human rights, 
the aim of which has been to "achieve sufficient universality of tone 
and content to engender respect and legitimacy in all parts of the 
world, regardless of cultural heritage or ideological orientation".7,0 
In other words, it has been appreciated that if any progress is to be 
made in the field of international protection of human rights and 
effective machinery is to be acceptable to all governments, the 
cultural and ideological divergences have to be taken into account, 
the absence of consensus on the maximum liberty of the individual must 
be acknowledged, and ethnocentric rights must be eliminated in order 
that there may be identified a central core of genuinely fundamental 
rights which may be regarded as susceptible of more or less universal
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endorsement and implementation. The idea is that not all rights da
depend on cultural or political interpretation, but that there exists
a definable minimum standard which is truly universal in application:
"Human rights, that is universal moral rights,
are 'a minimum common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations’. Nations whose
values and institutions are incompatible with 
the achievement of even this minimum standard 
can then fairly be criticised."130
If such a core of genuinely fundamental human rights could be
defined, international law could concentrate on the prevention of
violations of these rights with some expectation of success, since 
there would in theory be no cultural impediments to their universal 
recognition and the unanimous support of the international community.
On what basis, then, could such 'core rights' be identified and
classified? The elaboration of criteria may be tackled from several
different angles, and in fact a number of writers have attempted to
detail the kinds of rights which they consider relevant. A.J.M.
Milne, for instance, suggests that the first eleven articles of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights might have been more appropriate
than the whole instrument.651 Others have arrived at different, if
often similar conclusions.02 Many actually make specific mention of
the right not to be tortured:
"...torture, cruel punishment, prolonged 
imprisonment without trial and violations 
generally of the life, liberty and security of 
the person. These are sometimes identified as 
violations of "basic" or "fundamental" or "core" 
human rights to distinguish them from the other 
civil and political rights."33
What appears to be involved is a re-definition of the term 
"fundamental" to refer specifically to those rights which are 
essentially human rather than civil or political or even economic or 
social. Such rights are universally valid because they are based on
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the humanity of the individual: the violation of these rights
involves the infliction of unjustified human suffering. The principle 
of humanity is, moreover, an inviolable one, so that rights founded 
upon it may be regarded as absolute. In the idea of the dignity and 
worth of the human person, then, can be found a criterion which serves 
to provide a suitable basis for the definition of truly fundamental 
and universal human rights. Core rights may thus be viewed in terms 
of the protection of the individual against governmental violations of 
basic human decencies.
It is important, of course, not to project western sensibilities 
on to others: it is one thing to argue from a liberal standpoint that
the right not to be tortured is one which cannot be justifiably 
violated, but it is quite another to show that there exists a genuine 
cross-cultural consensus on this. There is a danger of approaching 
the analysis of core rights from a liberal perspective and identifying 
the most important rights in terms of western values, rather than 
making a purely empirical examination of cultural attitudes to the 
question. In particular, the idea of basic human decencies continues 
to display a pre-occupation with the rights of the individual and, as 
we have seen, the individual is not always given priority by other 
societies. levertheless, there does seem to be some kind of intuitive 
or emotive rejection of inhumanity, possibly arising out of a common 
experience of pain and the ability to empathise, and there is some 
foundation to the suggestion that the concept of humanity is a valid 
criterion for classifying core human rights. This is further 
supported by the fact that certain rights which have been recognised 
as non-derogable under international law appear to hold that status by 
reason of their humanitarian basis.
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Only four non-derogable rights appear in all three of the major
conventions: the right to life; the prohibition of torture and other
ill-treatment; the prohibition of slavery; and the prohibition of ex
post facto laws. The European Convention limits itself to those
four,3,4 while the International Covenant on Civil and Political
lights adds the following: recognition as a person before the law;
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and the prohibition of
imprisonment for failure to fulfil a contractual obligation.as The
American Convention includes the first two of these, and also adds a
number of others.33 A single criterion by which non-derogable rights
might be categorised does not clearly emerge,37 and indeed the
conventions display certain inconsistencies, but the concept of
humanity undoubtedly underlies the prohibitions of torture and ill-
treatment and of slavery, which appear in each of the conventions, and
arguably also freedom of thought. Indeed, in a sense these
humanitarian rights may be regarded as unique in that their violation
is not justified in any circumstances whatsoever:
"There is therefore no objection in principle to 
the idea of human rights that are absolute in 
the sense of being categorically exceptionless.
The most plausible candidates, like the right 
not to be tortured, will be passive negative 
rights, that is, rights not to be done to by 
others in certain ways."®3
On the basis of the absolute prohibition of torture in 
international law, it might not seem unreasonable to suggest that 
there exists a genuine consensus against inhumanity sufficient to 
support demands for much stronger measures for the protection of those 
rights founded on this principle at the international level. Many 
writers apparently believe that such a consensus does indeed exist at 
a cultural level,33 and while there may be arguments about the
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precise definition of torture, most of its manifestations can be 
clearly recognised as acts of torture, so that the diplomatic 
consensus can hardly be explained in terms of varying interpretations 
as to the meaning of the right: differences of interpretation arise
only in peripheral areas, and it is normally a straightforward matter 
to identify an act of torture. While in some societies corporal
punishment is endemic, there does exist a clear consensus at the
diplomatic level which indicates at least some degree of cross-
cultural support for action against torture, and this may be relied 
upon to secure more effective international measures for the
prevention of torture.
It is crucial, however, to realise that the protection of core 
human rights cannot be separated from the political environment and 
legal framework within which that protection must be effected. The 
fact is that the prevention of torture requires more than a 
philosophical condemnation of the practice: it depends upon the
existence of legal machinery and procedural safeguards which will give 
effect to the prohibition, within an appropriate constitutional 
framework which can ensure that the legal guarantees are respected and 
operate efficiently. The prevention of torture is, in other words, 
dependent upon the existence within the internal legal and political 
structure of the state of effective guarantees and safeguards, and it 
is when these are absent, curtailed or eroded that the employment of 
torture becomes possible.
It is in this area that ideological differences are of profound 
significance as far as the prevention of torture is concerned. The 
rejection of the western liberal paradigm is much more fundamental 
than a simple rejection of some rights and an acceptance of others:
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it involves entirely different conceptions of the whole relationship 
between the individual and the state, and of the socio-political 
organisation of the state, including the limits of government. The 
western liberal heritage, with its emphasis on individual liberty, has 
developed institutions which are designed specifically to protect the 
individual by means of the limitation and control of government, but 
where there is a rejection of liberal political values and of this 
idea of the limitation of government, there arises a totalitarian 
system of government within which the effective protection of human 
rights cannot be secured, even although there may be cultural and 
philosophical recognition of these rights. Totalitarian systems are 
geared to the implementation and preservation of a clearly defined and 
rigidly adhered to ideology, social philosophy or national cause, 
which is regarded as the essential foundation of the state and from 
which no deviation may be permitted. This national ideology is 
regarded as the basis of legality, and since the function of 
government is simply to interpret and apply the principles of the
ideology, there is a rejection of the concept of independent
restraints on governmental action. Exclusive and virtually unfettered 
power is thus concentrated in the hands of the ruling party, which 
maintains control of all branches of power in order that the will of 
the government may be imposed in every area of public life. Every 
position of responsibility is occupied by someone known to be loyal to 
the party, with the result that no independent authorities exist in 
practice or even in theory to challenge or oppose the actions of the 
government. Qf course, the extent to which any government is 
unrestrained varies greatly, and the foregoing observations are
intended only as a general comment, but the fact is that the fewer the
46
constitutional limitations on government, the less secure is the 
protection of fundamental rights.
The result of such a system is that whether or not the
government's diplomatic support for the prohibition of torture arises 
out of a genuine concern, the political system itself lacks the means 
to ensure that the prohibition is respected. The fact is that the
protection of human rights depends not so much on cultural or
philosophical acknowledgement of human rights as on the development of 
effective machinery within the constitutional and legal structures of 
the state on the basis of such an acknowledgement. This is not to say 
that torture is an inevitable feature of a totalitarian system: the
use of torture is, in fact, normally resorted to under particular
conditions, especially when there arises some threat to national
security, which is of paramount importance to every government, and 
which in this context refers not so much to the territorial integrity 
of the state as to the preservation of the existing political system 
and its social and cultural infra-structure. In this respect, an
intolerant system is certainly open to a wider range of threats than a
pluralistic society in which legitimate political dissension may 
operate to a far greater degree. Indeed, it might be said that 
subversion is a product of intolerance. However, exactly what 
constitutes a serious threat to national security will depend upon a 
number of factors, including the stability of the regime and the
extent and nature of the threat. Some governments may only consider 
special measures necessary if violence erupts and innocent lives are 
endangered, whereas less stable regimes which cling tenuously to power 
without any popular support might regard the discovery of even a few 
dissentient elements as meriting ruthless counter-subversive measures.
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Indeed, the insecurity of such regimes is liable to create a paranoia 
which results in them perceiving threats where none actually exist.
When a threat to national security arises in a totalitarian
system, there are few internal restraints and controls on the
government to prevent it authorising its security forces to employ
repressive methods, including the use of torture if this should be
deemed necessary for the protection of the state, and it is this
absence of governmental limitation that is the crucial factor in
explaining the prevalence of torture in spite of the apparent
consensus. In parliamentary democracies, on the other hand, there are
certain features of the constitutional organisation of the state which
are generally effective in the prevention of torture, and it is
important to identify the relevant principles at this point. Sean
MacBride presents the following analysis:
"■At national level, the most effective 
mechanisms are:
1. A watchful parliament with an effective and 
courageous apposition.
2. A free press which will not hesitate to 
expose injustice.
3. A constitution which spells out the rights 
guaranteed and delimits clearly the powers of 
the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary.
4. An independent judiciary, not subject to 
direct or indirect pressures by the Executive or t 
by parliament, charged with the function of 
upholding the constitution and enforcing its 
provisions.
5. An "ombudsman" directly responsible to par­
liament and/or administrative tribunals with 
full power of investigation of complaints of 
maladministration. ^
These are, broadly speaking, the desirable r
institutions which are necessary to safeguard 
human rights. They may vary in particular
functions, jurisdiction and emphasis in i
different countries; but in our increasingly 
complex society it is the combination of these 
institutions that will most effectively 
safeguard democratic rule and personal 
liberty."30
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The protection of any right which is to be regarded as
fundamental requires firstly its recognition in law in such a way that 
it cannot be lawfully circumvented, but is given force as part of the 
constitutional foundation of the state: in other words, if rights are
to be genuinely fundamental, they must be secured against arbitrary 
governmental erosion or suspension by being embodied in the
constitution of the state or some equally authoritative instrument
such as a constitutional bill of rights. Ideally, fundamental human 
rights should be so expressed that they cannot be overturned by any 
process of law, but exist as the immutable foundation upon which the
state itself is built. However, in practice few states possess such
inflexible constitutional provisions, and it is usually possible for 
even the fundamental law of the state to be altered, albeit through 
special procedures somewhat more rigid than those applying to
legislation generally.5,1 Nonetheless, in so far as it is possible for 
rights to be suspended or abolished within the provisions of the legal 
system itself, these rights cannot be regarded as absolutely
guaranteed by law.
It is imperative also for there to exist legal procedures and
other mechanisms whereby fundamental rights can be enforced:
"Of course, the very best safeguard for the
protection and respect of personal liberty is an 
enlightened government, and democracy. A 
representative, democratically elected
parliament, public discussion, free press, fair 
operation of the mass media and an educated 
public opinion are the very best guarantees for 
the protection of human rights.
But, even in the most enlightened democracy, 
abuse of power by the executive, by the 
administration or even by parliament, may and 
does occur. Such abuses may be incidental; 
they may not have been contemplated when a 
particular law was enacted. They may have been 
anticipated but disregarded because they only 
affected a small number of people. They may 
have been motivated by a good, but mistaken view
of what was for the "caramon good". On the other 
hand, even in a well regulated democracy, abuses 
of power, for political or other improper 
purposes, do occur and have to be guarded 
against.
Accordingly, we have to recognise that, no 
matter how well intentioned or democratic a 
State may be, it is nevertheless necessary to 
provide effective machinery for the protection 
of the rights of the public or of individual 
members of the public.
In parts of the world, where democracy is new 
or is not solidly entrenched, the same problems 
exist, but to a much greater extent. They are 
much more difficult to resolve because there is 
no tradition for the protection of human rights 
under the law, and usually no informed public 
opinion capable of making itself felt."92
As far as torture is concerned, the provision of safeguards in 
the legal system is relevant primarily in relation to the procedures 
of arrest, detention, interrogation, trial, complaints and so on. The 
prevention of torture is, in fact, almost entirely dependent upon the 
recognition and enforcement of a range of other rights, and it is when 
these are rendered ineffective that the use of torture is facilitated, 
even if not directly authorised by the government. It is thus 
impossible to separate the protection of core rights from the 
enjoyment of other legal, civil and political rights. Problems can 
arise in this area, however, because even in democratic systems there 
may appear a threat to national security to which the only response is 
the declaration of a state of emergency involving special measures 
restricting the rights and remedies which are normally available and 
which are essential to the effective protection of core rights, and 
involving also the removal of the usual limitations on the executive 
branch of government, sometimes resulting in the creation of an almost 
quasi-totalitarian system. There is, therefore, a real problem in 
reconciling the doctrine of derogation with the protection of core 
rights.
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The formal recognition of rights and remedies in law must be 
given substance by respect for the rule of law: this means that all
the branches of power and every state authority must act in accordance 
with the constitution and the law, and may not take any arbitrary 
action which has no foundation in law. As long as the rule of law is 
respected in this manner, rights which are expressed in legal terms 
will in general be secure; when the rule of law is ignored, or the 
concept of legality is linked to some criterion external to the law, 
such as the precepts of a particular ideology, the formal recognition 
of rights is merely spurious and without substance. Furthermore, 
where the law itself sanctions the violation of fundamental human 
rights or fails to provide adequate protection, the rule of law 
becomes irrelevant.
The rule of law requires the respect of every branch of
authority:
"In the absence of the rule of law, not only 
universal moral rights but all rights are at 
risk. A government can violate them and treat
many of its citizens as expendable with
impunity. Not that the rule of law can provide 
perfect protection. It cannot do so when judges 
and the police are corrupt. Moreover the law 
itself may violate human rights."33
The rule of law depends ultimately on voluntary respect,
especially by the executive, which controls the armed forces, and
possibly even more importantly by the armed forces themselves. If the 
politicians retain sufficient control over the military, they should 
be able to ensure respect for the rule of law, but in some 
circumstances the armed forces are subject to inadequate supervision 
and virtually able to take independent action. As far as the
executive itself is concerned, the ultimate sanction in a democratic
system is the loss of power at the next election, though of course
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this does not prevent the assumption of power by force and the 
termination of democracy.
In liberal democracies, the rule of law is complementary to the 
constitutional limitation of government, that is the existence of
authorities independent of the executive which have equal
constitutional authority coupled with effective powers to restrain the 
executive and its various subsidiary organs, particularly the security 
forces. It is crucial that no single entity should have control of 
all branches of power within the state: human rights as we have
defined them involve the protection of the individual from
governmental abuses, and the effective protection of human rights thus 
requires the control of government by means of independent restraints. 
In a totalitarian system, the absence of such restraints leaves the 
protection of human rights dependent upon the goodwill of the
authorities, whereas in liberal democracies the limitation of
government has conventionally been achieved by means of a classic 
separation of powers, namely the vesting of legislative, executive and 
judicial functions in separate and independent organs, each having in 
theory equal constitutional status, yet subject to the authority of 
the others. This balancing of powers is intended to prevent any one 
branch from exceeding its constitutional mandate and violating the
rule of law.
The adoption of liberal democracy in totot or even of this 
particular form of separation of powers, is not necessarily the sole 
method of securing effective protection of fundamental human rights, 
but the principle of independent control and limitation of government 
is a prerequisite to the prevention of abuses of power, and the
liberal system has proved the most successful in practice, although
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there are many other relevant factors. There may be a wide range of 
variations more suited to other societies, but the significant point 
is the necessity of restraining influences of an official nature 
within the structure of the state. Where such influences are not 
operating, it is all too easy for the authorities simply to ignore 
constitutional provisions and legal procedures and to embark on a 
policy of repression.
In liberal theory, the executive must remain firmly under the
supervision of a democratically elected parliamentary body responsible
to the electorate. Parliament ought to be free of pressure from the
executive branch, and in this connection the existence of a genuine
opposition is of great importance. The judiciary must also retain
effective control over the actions of both the legislature and the
executive in order to ensure that the rule of law is respected and
that neither the legislature nor the executive attempts to circumvent
the law. While in some countries the judiciary does not exercise the
function of constitutional review of legislation, the protection of
the individual from executive and administrative abuses has in most
liberal democracies been entrusted to an independent judiciary:
“What is most important of all is the 
independence of the Judiciary vis-a-vis the 
Executive.... This has undoubtedly been a bulwark 
for preserving the liberty of the subject 
against the excessive exercise of power by the 
Executive.
Although the judiciary has assumed this role in the past in many 
countries, it would be passible for some alternative independent 
authority to carry out the specific function of protecting human 
rights, and in some states the office of ombudsman complements the 
judicial role. It might be possible to create special commissions for 
the protection of fundamental human rights, although initially the
53
judiciary would probably have to retain a concurrent jurisdiction in
so far as it has built up a certain dignity and prestige which newer
agencies might not command. The important factor in any event is
always the effectiveness of the authority in restraining the executive
and administrative organs of power:
"A constitution, in itself, is only one element ; 
and m y  be valueless unless it can be invoked 
■ ■■■and. enforced. Hany highsounding constitutions 
are valueless because they are ignored, 
misinterpreted, or because the constitutional 
safeguards are not judicially enforceable by an 
independent judiciary. Hence, the importance of 
a fearless independent judiciary charged with
the task of enforcing compliance with the 
constitutional provisions. Hot infrequently, 
high sounding constitutional guarantees become 
illusory unless there is adequate machinery to 
constrain the executive, and even the 
legislature to conform with the provisions of 
the constitution."»s
The principle of independent control is of particular importance 
in liberal democracies when there is an erosion of the normal
safeguards as a result of the introduction of emergency measures. 
Often the effect of such measures is firstly to confer wider powers on 
security forces, secondly to curtail political rights and thirdly to 
free the executive from the usual parliamentary and judicial 
supervision. This facilitates the use of torture by the security 
forces, either with or without the knowledge and approval of the 
government, in the former case as a result of the absence of the 
normal legal safeguards. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, 
that the proclamation of a state of emergency should be accompanied by 
alternative guarantees which will ensure that core rights are not
violated as a result of the suspension of the other rights which help 
to ensure that torture is not employed.
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It should also be noted that less formal pressures and influences 
on governments, such as a free press and general freedom of 
expression, have a very significant part to play in the restraint of 
state authorities. Indeed, the entire range of civil and political 
rights provides a secondary level of limitations. The prevention of 
torture is dependent on the effectiveness of the way in which all such 
factors, official and unofficial, combine to restrain the authorities. 
To sum up, then, the problem of core rights, including freedom 
from torture, essentially involves the protection of the individual 
from government abuses, and the prevention of torture is consequently 
dependent upon the existence within the legal system of the state of 
effective controls over the government and its executive organs. We 
have identified the principal institutions of liberal democracy and 
suggested that they constitute the crucial factor in the effective 
protection of core rights because they establish independent restraint 
of government; conversely, it may be concluded that the rejection of 
the principle of limitation of government creates conditions in which 
the violation of human rights is liable to occur. While western 
liberalism accepts the need for control of government in order to 
protect the individual, other philosophies and ideologies do not 
perceive any requirement for such control, regarding the function of 
government as the implementation of ideological goals rather than the 
promotion of individual liberty, with the result that violations of 
fundamental human rights cannot be prevented. This accounts for the 
discrepancy between the apparent consensus against torture and the 
fact that the practice of torture is regularly employed by 
governments.
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When safeguards are absent, either because the constitutional 
system itself rejects limitation of government or as a result of 
emergency measures, international law assumes responsibility for the 
protection of human rights, but unfortunately the same difficulties 
arise at the international level. There are extensive limitations on 
the value and effectiveness of international law in relation to human 
rights: firstly, international law usually requires acceptance by
governments before it becomes operative in relation to particular 
states, and the fact is that the imposition of international 
supervision is strongly resisted by those regimes which reject the 
concept of limitation of government; secondly, even when governments 
do become bound by international procedures, they are able simply to 
refuse to co-operate or couply with the directions of the competent 
authorities, even when these are legally binding, because the 
structure of international relations lacks effective sanctions by 
which the decisions of international authorities can be enforced. At 
both national and international levels, then, the problem of the 
rejection of the concept of limitation of government is the central 
obstacle, and it is to these matters that we shall be turning our 
attention in this study.
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CHAPTER TWO; HISTORICAL IHTRQPUCTHM
Before proceeding to an examination of the circumstances in which 
torture occurs and the relevance of limitations on government in such 
circumstances, it is important to put the contemporary use of torture 
into perspective by examining the historical development of the 
practice and by considering the issue of the possible justifiability 
of torture, and we shall direct our attention to these matters in this 
and the following chapter.
In 'La tortura giudiziaria nel diritto cornune*, Piero Fiorelli
makes the following statement:
"Dreadful or not, compelling a person through 
violence to admit or disclose something against 
his will is a method of procedure so humanly 
obvious that it proves difficult to imagine an 
age in which it could not have been known."1
In fact, although inhuman punishments seem to have been endemic
to the ancient world, judicial torture (that is, the official use of
coercion for the purpose of judicial investigation) was not a feature
of all early legal systems:
"Although many ancient societies experienced the 
transition from primitive and domestic to 
sophisticated and public systems of law, not all 
of them came to use torture as distinctively as 
did the Egyptians, the Persians, the Greeks and 
the Romans. Some societies, notably those of 
the Babylonians, the Hindus and the Hebrews, 
seem to have developed a system of ordeals that 
never permitted torture to be introduced."2
Our knowledge of early civilisations is, of course, far from 
comprehensive, and it is quite probable that torture was practised 
extra-legally in many societies. Certainly, the absence of 
documentary records cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that 
torture was not used, or as an indication that there existed
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philosophical or humanitarian objections to the employment of torture: 
slavery, cruel punishments and numerous other practices which the 
civilised world today regards as inhumane and barbaric were accepted 
as the norm in early societies, and although doubtless there were 
individuals who from time to time raised objections to such practices, 
the use of violence against human beings was generally considered 
acceptable in a wide range of circumstances. nevertheless, as an 
instrument of public authority, or at least as a judicial mechanism, 
torture has a fairly well defined history.
There are references to the coercive use of torture in Egyptian 
records, and more detailed descriptions have survived from the 
civilisation of Ancient Greece, in which slaves, prisoners of war and 
foreigners could be subjected to torture but citizens, the only class 
with full legal rights, were largely protected.3 However, the legal 
system of greatest historical importance was that of the Romans, 
principally because the Reception of Roman law into the legal systems 
of medieval Europe was partly responsible for the revival and 
institutionalisation of the practice of torture in Europe, Different 
factors were, of course, applicable to the development of torture in 
other areas of the world, and while the historical information on 
civilisations such as those of China, Japan and India makes little 
reference to torture, it does seem clear that torture was employed in 
these societies, at least in practice if not as an officially 
recognised judicial procedure. However, the European experience is of 
particular interest and significance because of the subsequent 
influence of European legal thought in many parts of the world as a 
result of trade and colonial expansion, and it is pertinent to examine 
the development of torture from Roman times.
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The Romans accorded full rights only to citizens: slaves and
foreigners remained outwith the political community, so that there 
were no reservations about denying them any rights and treating them 
as less than human and therefore expendable. Originally, slaves could 
only be tortured when accused of a crime, but later they could also be 
tortured as witnesses: in fact, a slave's evidence was only
considered acceptable if it had been extorted under torture, and even 
then it had no great value. At first, freemen could not be subjected 
to torture in any circumstances, but in the early Empire this 
restriction began to be eroded, and the first step in this process 
related significantly to the political crime of high treason (crimen 
majestatis). Throughout subsequent history, the employment of torture 
has been associated with the investigation of crimes of a political 
nature and the exposure of plots against the state. The Roman 
Emperors themselves often tortured those whom they suspected of 
planning to overthrow them, and such men as Tiberius, Caligula, lero 
and Domitian are renowned for their cruelty, whilst even the milder 
Claudius excepted conspirators from his oath never to torture a free 
man. Some of the later Emperors prohibited the torture of free men, 
but by the end of the 3rd century such torture was permitted in cases 
of high treason, forming part of the Emperor's prerogative. With the 
development of Roman law under the Emperors, then, a new division 
arose between honestlores and humiliores, the latter of whom could be 
tortured.* Initially, the incipient Christian religion provided many 
victims, but with the adoption of Christianity as the official 
religion of the Empire during the reign of Constantine the use of 
torture diminished greatly. Ironically, the Roman Catholic Church was
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to be responsible for the revival of torture on an unprecedented scale 
several centuries later.
After the fall of Rome in the 6th century, the disintegration of 
the sophisticated Roman legal system led to a general deterioration in 
the quality of the administration of justice, and it is unclear what 
the status of torture was within the different societies which grew 
up, although it was certainly employed by the Germanic tribes, and it 
is probable that torture was a widespread if not a common practice 
throughout the Dark Ages. However, its use as a judicial process 
appears to have died out. The use of physical ordeals to determine 
the guilt or innocence of a person suspected of a crime seems to have 
been the norm in many parts of Europe, and "the fact of the accusatory 
process and the undeveloped rules of evidence worked against the 
practical survival of torture until the process of working Roman law 
into the legal culture of northern Europe began in earnest during the 
twelfth century."® It was not until the 13th century, then, that the 
systematic employment of judicial torture re-appeared. From then 
until the 18th century, however, torture formed an integral part of 
the legal systems of most of continental Europe.
Before the Reception of Roman law and the consequent influence 
of Roman law upon the legal systems of Europe, problems had arisen 
with the existing accusatory process when guilt was denied. 
Originally, innocence of a crime could be established by producing the 
requisite number of 'oath-helpers', men of good repute who would vouch 
for the accused.* this was based upon the belief that God would take 
immediate and direct retribution in the event of the oath-helpers 
committing perjury. In secular - as opposed to ecclesiastical - law, 
this procedure was replaced by trial by ordeal, either bilateral (such
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as duelling) or unilateral. Unilateral trial by ordeal involved the 
accused undergoing some physical ordeal, the purpose being to invoke 
the judgement of God, who was relied upon to inflict injury upon the 
guilty whilst protecting the innocent. This was commonly done by 
plunging the accused's bandaged arm into fire or boiling water in 
order to retrieve an object placed therein; if, when the bandages 
were removed, the arm was unhurt, the accused's innocence was proved, 
but any sign of injury was interpreted as an indication of guilt. On 
occasions this procedure seems to have been used for the purpose of 
extorting confessions.
Pope Innocent III abolished trial by ordeal in 1215, replacing 
God's judgement with that of man: ' quasi arbitrium Dei'. Criminal
offences were from that time onward to be tried by human judges as 
God's representatives in the administration of justice and, perhaps 
understandably, the socio-religious attitudes of the time, rooted as 
they were in superstition and fear, were not prepared for such 
uncertain standards: to the people of the 13th century, the direct
intervention of a just, trustworthy and omniscient God was far more 
acceptable than the uninformed decision of an unreliable and fallible 
mortal. For this reason, the innovation required a system of proof 
which would eliminate judicial discretion and reduce the role of the 
judge to one of simply ensuring that the standard of proof had been 
met; in other words, if one man was to be the judge of another, there 
would have to be absolute and abjective certainty of guilt. The 
judge's function was not, therefore, to weigh up the evidence and 
reach a decision as to whether or not the accused was guilty, but was 
rather to ensure that the evidentiary requirements had been satisfied. 
Consequently, circumstantial evidence, no matter how persuasive, was
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insufficient in itself; the level of proof had to be so high that 
there could be no doubts about the guilt of the accused. Lesser 
standards were acceptable for minor offences, but for serious crimes 
meriting blood sanctions the standards had to be very strict, and such 
standards were identified by medieval jurists in Roman law.
The rediscovery of the works of the Emperor Justinian in the 11th 
century had kindled a great interest in Roman law in the universities 
of Europe, initially and principally in Italy, and this academic 
interest was soon superseded by a more practical approach, so that 
relevant principles were extracted from Roman law and applied to 
contemporary legal problems. This borrowing from Roman law - the 
Reception - coincided with the difficulties which had arisen as a 
result of the abolition of the ordeals, and so it was to Roman law 
that the medieval scholars turned for the strict standards of proof 
required by the new system of human judgement.
The basic rule was that a judge could only convict the accused 
when there existed full proof, namely two eyewitnesses or a 
confession. However, this standard of proof is so rigid that few 
criminals would ever be convicted, and it was to overcome this problem 
that the medieval jurists turned to torture, even though this was a 
departure from the Roman law's rules on the use of torture. The 
approach adopted by the jurists was that, although circumstantial 
evidence was always insufficient to secure a conviction, it was 
relevant, so that where only one eyewitness existed or where there was 
a certain amount of circumstantial evidence (indicia) constituting a 
'half-proof', the use of torture was permitted for the purpose of 
obtaining the confession which would confirm guilt by providing full 
proof. Torture was, in fact, virtually essential in view of the
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severe limitations imposed by the requirement of full proof, although 
as we shall see in the following chapter it actually adds nothing to 
the certainty of guilt, and the better course would have been the 
adoption of less strict standards of proof. The step from voluntary 
to coerced confessions occurred very early on in the legal 
development, however, and indeed may have been a mere continuation of 
the ordeals. It may be noted also that to endure torture did not 
establish innocence, and an accused could be convicted at a later date 
if new evidence came to light.
The rise of heresy soon paved the way far the 
institutionalisation of torture, which came to be regarded as the best 
proof of all (.probatio probatissimD. Heretical ideas spread in 
France from the 12th century, and the Roman Catholic Church was 
alarmed into violent reaction and the repression of heterodoxy. 
Heresy constituted a *thought-crime' which was “virtually unprovable 
without confession",e and torture presented itself as a mast useful 
method of countering subversive threats of this nature. numerous 
heretical groups, and also the Jews, suffered at the hands of the 
zealots of the Inquisition, and because denunciation of others was 
required as proof of the sincerity of repentance, the system of 
interrogation and terror spread inexorably. Torture was also employed 
in ordinary criminal cases, but the Church's reaction to the growth of 
heresy undoubtedly acted as a catalyst in the establishment of 
judicial torture in Europe. Some areas such as Sweden, Aragon,
England and, to a lesser extent, Scotland, escaped the introduction of 
judicial torture, but even in these places torture was used extra-
legally. Across the remainder of Europe, it formed part of the normal
judicial process, and as such was an aspect of the inquisitory
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character of the criminal procedure, in which the judge functioned 
also as prosecutor.
Historically, torture has always been resorted to particularly in 
response to subversive threats. Heresy is one example of this, and in 
later years witchcraft became the Church's new obsession. In 1484, 
Pope Innocent VIII's bull ' Sumnis desiderantes affectibus' signalled 
the severe intensification of persecution of witches, and over the 
following two centuries a vast number of suspects were tortured and 
put to death throughout Europe. As with heresy, the secrecy of the 
activities supposedly indulged in led to a belief that there existed 
an organised conspiracy, and desperate efforts to expose and eliminate 
witches resulted in witch-hunting epidemics in many parts of Europe.7
The use of torture was gradually abolished in most parts of 
Europe during the 18th century, although the practice had in fact been 
declining for some time before then. Torture had been abolished in 
England as early as 1640, although the main reason for this seems to 
have been the fact that the criminal process in England did not 
require torture because it did not rely on the strict standards of 
proof demanded by European systems based on Roman law. The practice 
of peine forte et dure3 and extreme forms of corporal punishment did 
continue in England long after the abolition of judicial torture in 
the strict sense, and indeed in most places the infliction of intense 
pain for the purpose of punishment continued for some time after the 
cessation of coercive torture. The abolition of judicial torture in 
continental Europe was made possible by certain developments which 
took place in legal theory and practice, with the result that the 
practice of torture was no longer required to the same extent as it 
previously had been. John Langbein argues that, due to a gradual
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alteration in the law of proof, judges were able to convict and punish 
criminals on the basis of circumstantial evidence, and no longer had 
to rely on torture to obtain confessions.9 In effect, it was 
recognised that the standards of proof were too rigid and that the 
requirement of full proof was unworkable, and accordingly a certain 
degree of judicial discretion was introduced, so that torture was no 
longer essential to obtain a conviction. The manner in which this 
development took place will be examined in more detail in the 
following chapter.
Although the necessity for torture was waning, the 18th century 
abolition also owed much to the advent of the Age of Enlightenment. 
Hot only did this mean a much greater degree of tolerance of ideas and 
beliefs, but it also produced a desire amongst the educated classes to 
raise society from the superstition and barbarity of the primitive 
past to new heights of sophistication and enlightenment founded on 
scientific progress and faith in the power of reason. Existing 
practices were no longer merely accepted without question, but were 
assessed critically and retained only if useful and rational. There 
was thus a rejection of many of the practices associated with the 
past, and this included a positive rejection of the use of torture in 
the judicial process. The 18th century abolitionists, a group of men 
who attacked the institution of torture, recognised that torture did 
not increase the certainty of guilt, as the medieval scholars had 
failed to do, but their arguments were by no means' innovative: 
torture has been criticised from very early times.10 The 
circumstances, however, were new: not only was there a general
climate of enlightened thought and acceptance of human judges, but the 
abolitionists were often in positions in society where they were able
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to directly influence the rulers of Europe, the so-called enlightened 
despots. The importance of the arguments put forward, then, lay not 
in their persuasiveness or rationality, but rather in the fact that 
they were embraced by those who were willing and able to take steps to 
abolish torture. Moreover, the recognition that torture was no longer 
essential to the judicial process meant that there were no procedural 
obstacles to overcome.
At the beginning of the 18th century, Thomasius and Montesquieu 
had pointed to the absence of torture in England and Sweden to support 
their contention that a legal system could function satisfactorily 
without it. The main assault subsequently came from the Verri 
brothers in Milan, Sonnenfels (Councillor to the Empress Maria Theresa 
in Vienna), Voltaire and, most important of all, Cesare, Marchese 
Bonesana Beccaria who, in 1763, published his classic denunciation of 
torture in his book ‘Dei delitti e della pene' (Of Crimes and 
Punishments).11 The book formed a treatise on criminal law and penal 
systems, and it introduced a number of concepts which were very 
influential in the development of juridical principles. Beccaria also 
attacked the practice of torture and, although his arguments were not 
conclusive in every instance, as we shall see in the following 
chapter, they did persuade certain European monarchs to abolish the 
use of torture. Frederick the Great of Prussia had declared a 
complete abolition in 1754 (having ordered a partial abolition in 
1740), and torture was subsequently abolished throughout virtually the 
whole of Europe by the middle of the 19th century.1s
The abolition of torture in Europe was the result of a 
combination of factors which were peculiar to that period of history, 
rather than the novelty or even the validity of the arguments against
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torture. Essentially, the general climate of enlightened attitudes 
meant that there was a greater willingness, in particular on the part 
of political leaders, to accept that the judicial use of torture was 
neither necessary nor desirable. The abolition in fact related 
exclusively to judicial torture, that is the employment of torture as 
part of the process of securing evidence for criminal trial 
proceedings, and to that extent the abolition of torture has been a 
more or less permanent development: it is generally accepted that
torture is not a justifiable method of obtaining evidence, not only in 
Europe, but also within the legal systems of all contemporary 
civilised societies. However, there are other circumstances in which 
many people consider the use of torture to be justified, and while the 
official use of torture in the judicial process has remained 
exceptional since the 18th century, the unofficial and extra-legal use 
of torture has frequently been resorted to, particularly under 
conditions of political instability and unrest when there exists a 
subversive threat to the security of the state.
In western Europe, torture has remained exceptional, due in large 
part to the relatively high level of political stability, and also to 
the influence of liberal thought on the political philosophies and 
institutions of western European states. This is not to say that 
there are not those who would justify the use of torture in certain 
situations, and certainly there are instances of systematic torture 
having been employed, but in general the need for torture does not 
arise, and even when it does, it is possible for more enlightened 
elements to enforce the legal prohibition through democratic 
institutions.
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Outwith western Europe, torture can be linked to the emergence of 
the totalitarian state: the practice emerged in revolutionary Russia
from 1917, and thereafter in the fascist systems of Italy, Spain and 
Germany, and this can be seen as a result of the elimination of a 
law/politics distinction within these systems, as a result of which no 
controls over government action existed.13 Moreover, the nature of 
totalitarian systems is such that opposition is repressed and 
therefore clandestine, so that torture will be required to procure 
information about subversive activities. Torture has been on the 
increase since the Second World War and the subsequent decolonisation 
and granting of self-government to Third World nations, and almost 
invariably it has been employed as a weapon of counter-subversion, 
although its use in ordinary criminal cases is not unknown. By 1960, 
it was a regular, if unpublicised practice in a considerable number of 
countries, and since then a growing number of governments have 
resorted to it.
It appears, then, that the factors which brought about the 18th 
century abolition of judicial torture in Europe may not be relevant to 
the 20th century use of torture. In fact, the modern 'use of torture 
can be distinguished from the historical practice of judicial torture: 
it is not simply a revival of a medieval institution, but is a much 
more sinister and insidious phenomenon involving the abuse of 
governmental power. Modern torture is not a process operated within 
the bounds of the law, but is actually a clandestine instrument of 
government involving violation of the law by national governments, 
which regard the employment of torture as justified in the defence of 
national security. As far as the justification issue is concerned, 
the 18th century arguments were aimed primarily at judicial torture,
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and the question which arises is whether the use of torture in a 
political context might in fact be regarded as an entirely different 
case and accordingly might be considered justifiable. This question 
wil be discussed in the following chapter.
lote on definition
It is important before we proceed further to ask what kinds of 
acts and practices fall within the scope of the term 'torture'. This 
question is of particular significance in the drafting and 
interpretation of international conventions, and many difficulties 
have in fact been encountered in this area. In this study, however, 
it will suffice to indicate the problems which may arise, and to 
suggest a working definition of torture for the purposes of our 
discussion.
There are certain practices which few people would have any 
hesitation in classifying as acts of torture, but there are also less 
obvious cases in which certain of the features commonly associated 
with torture are not present, and the question which then arises is 
what the criteria are for identifying an act of torture. In other 
words, which of the factors characteristic of an act of torture 
actually constitute torture?
The etymology of the word 'torture' is of little assistance: the
Latin noun tortura was derived from the verb tortquere, meaning to 
twist or torment, and while this suggests the broad idea of torment or 
suffering, it is too vague for further inference to be drawn. An 
alternative word, quaestio, referred specifically to the use of 
violence for the purpose of eliciting confessions or other evidence,
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and it is this aspect which is normally recognised as forming the
central idea of torture. At the very least, torture includes "the
infliction of excruciating pain...,for the purpose of farcing an
accused or suspected person to confess, or an unwilling witness to
give evidence or information". 14- The classic notion of torture is
thus one of judicial torture, the employment of systematic violence in
order to obtain evidence for the purpose of criminal proceedings. The
two essential elements to be identified here are <1) the infliction of
intense pain, and (2) the purpose of compulsion: any act which
satisfies these two criteria may be recognised as an act of torture.
It is less clear, however, whether an act which does not have
compulsion as its purpose can be regarded as torture. John Langbein,
in his treatise on judicial torture, is adamant that this type of
torture at least is characterised by its purpose of coercion:
"When we speak of "judicial torture", we are 
referring to the use of physical coercion by 
officers of the state in order to gather 
evidence for judicial proceedings.... No 
punishment, no matter how gruesome, should be 
called torture."1®
Other writers have expressed the view that all torture is
distinguished by its coercive purpose: the legal philosopher, Jeremy
Bentham, understood torture in the following terms:
"Torture, as I understand it, is where a person 
is made to suffer any violent pain of body in 
order to compel him to do something or to desist 
from doing something which done or desisted from 
the penal application is immediately made to 
cease."1e
More recently, Malise Ruthven has adopted a similar approach:
"Although some definitions, both traditional and 
modern, include the concept of punishment in the 
word 'torture', I have generally followed 
Bentham in drawing a distinction between 
compulsive violence (torture) and retributive 
violence (punishment). The essence of the 
distinction is that in the former case the
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victim may have it in his power to stop the pain 
by complying with the wishes of his 
torturers."17
It is quite valid to define torture in terms of purpose, and in 
particular to distinguish coercive violence from punishment: coercion
is related to the victim's response (although he may not always be in 
a position to respond), while punitive violence is related to a prior 
act of the victim and will take place or continue irrespective of the 
victim's response. The distinction between torture and punishment 
can, moreover, be maintained in the historical context: historically,
torture was a normal and integral feature of the judicial process, and 
its use in eliciting evidence prior to conviction could be clearly 
differentiated from retributive violence, which followed conviction 
and in fact often involved different methods. In the past, then, the 
principal form of torture, judicial torture, was essentially coercive 
in its aim, and could readily be distinguished from other 
manifestations of official violence. As we have seen, however, since 
the 18th century abolition of torture in Europe, the practice of 
judicial torture has not been revived, but the use of torture has re- 
emerged as a clandestine and unlawful activity, often taking place 
outwith the context of a trial altogether. Although it remains 
possible to distinguish torture from punishment in purely semantic 
terms, the distinction is no longer a clear-cut one, particularly as 
the same techniques may be utilised for a variety of purposes, and 
from a pragmatic point of view it may not be advisable to regard 
compulsion as an essential criterion in defining torture.
The dual concepts of compulsion and retribution do not, in fact, 
exhaust all the possible uses of violence, and in particular they do 
not cover preventive or, more accurately, deterrent violence. Bentham
82
did perceive this problem, and drew a distinction between prevention
and compulsion in the following terms:
"When Prevention is the end, the abject is 
obscure and remote and distant but permanent and 
general: it is the putting a stop to such
actions of the like kind with the action
punished, as either the delinquent himself or 
others might be disposed to commit on (any)
future occasions that might arise. When 
Compulsion is the end the object is at hand: 
but temporary: it is the giving birth to an
individual act of the individual party only, and 
that upon the individual occasion that is in 
hand. In the first case it is not the
individual pain itself that does the business, 
but the terror produced by the expectation of 
experiencing the like pain in the like cases.
In the latter case, it is the very individual 
pain itself that does the business.”ie
In accordance with this, Bentham restricted his concept of
torture to the infliction of pain with the immediate aim of compulsion
for a limited purpose, while he regarded deterrence as a longer term
goal and thus an aspect of punishment. However, this analysis does
not take account of violence which is employed solely for the purpose
of deterrence, and not for punishment which has an incidental
deterrent effect. The deterrent use of violence is, in fact, a
feature of modern torture:
"[Torture's] function is not only to generate 
confessions and information from citizens 
believed to oppose the government: it is used
to deter others from expressing opposition. For 
those who govern without the consent of the 
governed this has proved to be an effective 
method of maintaining power. To set torture as 
the price of dissent is to be assured that only 
a small minority will act. With the majority 
neutralised by fear, the well-equipped forces of 
repression can concentrate on an isolated 
minority."13
In many cases, the deterrence and intimidation of the victim and 
of the public is secondary to the aim of extorting confessions and 
information, just as deterrence is often a subsidiary purpose of
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punishment. In some instances, however, the infliction of extreme 
pain is purely for the purpose of deterrence or intimidation, and the 
compulsion/retribution dichotomy is not applicable. Bentham himself 
would probably have considered this use of violence as a separate 
category, as the absence of immediacy of result would have excluded it 
from his concept of torture, whereas the lack of retributive purpose 
would have prevented its inclusion in the category of punishment.
It is legitimate to restrict the concept of torture to acts of
coercion, especially as international law prohibits cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment and punishment equally with torture. The major
difficulty in doing so, however, is that the same techniques may in
fact be employed for different purposes, so that the distinctions
become nominal and rather artificial, and the determination of whether
an act of torture has taken place becomes dependent on purely semantic
criteria. For this reason, it would seem preferable from a human
rights perspective to define torture on the basis of the character of
the act rather than on the purposes for which the act is perpetrated.
In practice, the infliction of extreme pain will often be for the
purpose of coercion, simply because it is particularly suited to that
purpose, but from the victim's point of view it seems somewhat
arbitrary to differentiate the application of electric shock for the
purpose of punishment from the application of electric shock for the
purpose of compulsion or deterrence. The fact is that the inhumanity
of the act is precisely the same, and there therefore seems to be no
valid reason for distinguishing two identical acts on the grounds that
they have different purposes:
" Is not the key to torture simply the physical 
or mental suffering deliberately inflicted upon 
a human being by any other human being? In many 
respects the meaning of the term in the common 
usage of most western languages might well
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support suck a question. From the seventeenth 
century on, the purely legal definition of 
torture was slowly displaced by a moral 
definition; from the nineteenth century, the 
moral definition of torture has been supplanted 
largely by a sentimental definition, until 
'torture* may finally mean whatever one wishes 
it to mean, a moral-sentimental term designating 
the infliction of suffering, however defined, 
upon anyone for any purpose - or for no 
purpose."20
As far as the protection of human rights is concerned, it would 
appear that the only criterion for identifying an act of torture 
should be the infliction of intense suffering. Moreover, although 
both Langbein and Bentham mention only physical pain, the concept of 
torture must include also mental, emotional and psychological 
suffering which is deliberately inflicted. Historically, torture 
usually (though not always) involved physical pain, but in modern 
times there has been a very significant increase in the use of 
psychological suffering and manipulation of the mind.
Torture involves at least two parties, so that there is 
intentional infliction of intense suffering upon an unwilling victim 
by one or more persons. Self-inflicted, accidental or voluntarily 
undergone suffering does not normally constitute torture: while it
may seem strange to suggest that anyone would voluntarily submit to 
intense pain or suffering, this situation may arise in certain 
circumstances, the classic example being where an emergency operation 
or amputation without anaesthetic is necessary. In some cases, even 
the infliction of intense suffering without consent might be 
justified, for instance in the treatment of mental illness or drug 
addiction: such cases are, however, exceptional, and would only be
justified if essential for the welfare of the individual.
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As far as the international protection of human rights is 
concerned, the aim is the prevention of torture as employed by state 
authorities, particularly security forces acting with the consent or 
at least indifference of governments. Torture may in some 
circumstances be employed by private individuals such as criminals and 
terrorists, but governments do not normally condone this and indeed 
endeavour to suppress such practices. It is, therefore, when 
governments themselves are responsible for the use of torture that the 
question of human rights arises and international law becomes 
relevant, and for this reason the definition of torture for the 
purposes of international protection of human rights must be 
restricted to acts perpetrated by those for whom a national-government 
has responsibility.21
There need be no malice or cruelty on the part of a torturer, nor 
need there be a motive, but the act must be deliberate, or possibly 
negligent, and any person who willingly participates in or contributes 
to the infliction of torture may be regarded as equally guilty as the 
torturer who actually inflicts the suffering. Thus, for example, 
anyone who supplies instruments of torture or assists in covering up 
an act of torture is just as responsible as the torturer himself.
Torture need not involve prolonged or systematic techniques, nor 
need the methods employed be refined or sophisticated, although all 
these factors may be relevant in establishing whether the requisite 
degree of suffering has been occasioned. Thus, in normal 
circumstances one momentary experience of acute pain would not be 
regarded as sufficient to constitute torture, whereas the 
prolongation, repetition and variation of the pain might exacerbate 
the suffering to such an extent that its application would constitute
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torture. It is possible, nevertheless, for a single act to produce a 
sufficient level of pain to amount to torture.
The great difficulty in defining torture in terms of the level of 
suffering involved is that pain and suffering are subjective phenomena 
which are extremely difficult to measure or monitor with any degree of 
accuracy. This matter will be examined in the following chapter. The 
important point to note here is that the identification of an act of 
torture is essentially a matter of assessing the intensity or severity 
of suffering experienced by a particular individual subjected to a 
specific treatment, thus emphasising the humanitarian aspect of the 
prevention of torture.
In conclusion, then, torture nay be defined as the deliberate
infliction of an intense degree of suffering for any purpose, although
in practice the purpose will often be compulsion. For the purposes of
this study, an adequate working definition of torture is provided in
article 1 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Gruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment:
"...torture means any act by which severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation 
of a public official on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person >
information or confession, punishing him for an 
act he has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating him or other 
persons."22
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CHAPTER THREE: THE JUSTIFICATION ISSUE
The arguments put forward by the 18th century critics of torture 
were essentially to the effect that torture is unjust, irrational and 
unnecessary: in particular, it was recognised that coercive torture
is a test of sensitivity to pain rather than of the veracity of any 
statement which may be elicited from the victim. The question raised 
by the widespread revival of torture in the 20th century is whether 
these arguments were invalid or at least inconclusive, so that while 
they persuaded the 18th century monarchs of Europe to abolish torture, 
they are in fact open to challenge. Moreover, even if the arguments 
can be shown to be conclusive in relation to historical judicial 
torture, at which the 18th century abolition was aimed, there may be 
other circumstances in which the use of torture can be regarded as 
legitimate. In this chapter, we shall look at the various arguments 
against the employment of torture and consider whether they have any 
validity, and we shall also identify the circumstances in which the 
use of torture is in fact regarded as justified by governments.
(a) Confessions - Torture in Judicial Proof
The function of torture in obtaining confessions is essentially 
to supply conclusive proof where there are strong indications that the 
suspect is guilty but insufficient evidence in law to procure a 
conviction. In pre-abolition times, this was one of the principal 
purposes of torture, and it was normal for legal systems to provide 
for the extortion of a confession in these circumstances. nowadays, 
however, few legal systems regard a confession obtained by coercion as
90
admissible evidence, although this does not prevent security forces 
from resorting to torture in practice and presenting to the courts as 
voluntary confessions which have actually been obtained by the use of 
torture, particularly when the security forces are convinced of the 
guilt of the suspect in spite of the absence of admissible evidence.
Sometimes this may be an error of fact, when there is a genuine belief
that the employment of torture will elicit the truth, but more often 
the security forces prejudge the case, decide the suspect is guilty, 
and set about securing the confession which will both vindicate their 
suspicions and provide evidence which can be produced to the court as 
a voluntary statement. While the success of these tactics will depend 
upon the extent to which the judge is prepared to accept confessions 
without further investigation, the issues involved are essentially the 
same as those which arose with historical judicial torture, and the 
arguments of the abolitionists are therefore relevant. In order to 
clarify the issues which are involved, it will be of some value to
consider the thesis proposed by John Langbein, which was mentioned
briefly in the previous chapter.
Langbein asserts that the abolition of torture was made passible 
as a result of the development within the legal systems of Europe, of 
an alternative to the existing 'strict' standards of proof; 
essentially, he argues that this alternative involved the acceptance 
of circumstantial evidence as a sufficient basis for conviction. 
Before considering Langbein's thesis, however, it will be useful to 
reiterate and expand upon the salient features of judicial torture as 
practised in pre-abolition Europe. In the case of serious crimes, 
conviction depended on full proof, that is two eyewitnesses or a 
voluntary confession; rigid adherence to this rule would have been
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virtually unworkable and few criminals would have been brought to 
justice, but rather than relaxing the standard of proof by permitting 
conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the medieval 
jurists turned to torture as the most appropriate method of confirming 
guilt. Thus, when full proof was lacking but there existed certain 
indications of guilt <indicia>, torture was permitted in order to 
establish whether suspicion was justified or not; indicia were 
accorded different values, such as a •quarter-proof, and torture 
could be resorted to when the requisite amount had been accumulated. 
The use of torture thus constituted a confirmatory step whereby mere 
suspicion could be transformed into full proof by means of a 
confession. An accused person was never actually proved innocent by 
his failure to confess under torture; to incur a degree of suspicion 
in itself came to be regarded almost as a crime, so that technically 
it could be said that no innocent person was ever subjected to 
torture; to resist torture was only to 'purge the indicia' , not to 
prove one's innocence, and it was consequently possible to be found 
guilty at a later date. In some circumstances, it was passible to 
repeat torture, and even when this was not permitted, the practice 
arose of 'continuing' torture for several days.
Langbein suggests that certain developments occurred, at first 
especially in France and Italy, which had the unintended and 
unappreciated effect of permitting the gradual abandonment of the use 
of torture. One important development was the introduction of torture 
'under reservation of proofs' (torture avec reserve des preuves en 
leur entier), involving a rejection of the doctrine that failure to 
obtain a confession necessitated the release of the suspect as having 
purged the indicia. A suspect who endured torture without confessing
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could no longer be confident of being released, at least until sucb 
time as fresb evidence became available: instead, judges began to
assume a right to impose a discretionary punishment - poena 
extraordinaria - even in the absence of full proof. In effect, this 
meant the application of sanctions on the basis of a consideration of 
the indicia:
"A new system of proof, which was in fact free 
judicial evaluation of the evidence although not 
described as such, was developed in the legal 
science and the legal practice of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, and confirmed in the 
legislation of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.
This new system of proof developed alongside 
the Roman-canon system. The Roman-canon law of 
proof survived in form, but in the seventeenth 
century it lost its monopoly. Thereafter the 
standards of the Roman-canon law continued to be 
complied with for easy cases where there was a 
voluntary confession or where there were two 
eyewitnesses. But for cases where there was 
neither, the Roman-canon standards no longer had 
to be complied with. That' is to say, in just 
those cases where it had previously been 
necessary to use torture, it now became possible 
to punish the accused without meeting the 
evidentiary standards that had led to torture.
What happened was no less than a revolution in 
the law of proof. Concealed under various 
misleading labels, a system of free judicial 
evaluation of the evidence achieved subsidiary 
validity. This development liberated the law of 
Europe from its dependence on torture. Torture 
could be abolished in the eighteenth century 
because the law of proof no longer required 
it.111
This revolution in the law of proof was a result of the 
displacement of blood sanctions as exclusive punishments for serious 
crimes. Where the blood sanctions continued to be applied, the strict 
Roman law requirement of full proof was adhered to, but in the 
absence of full proof, judges began to pronounce a discretionary 
penalty, less severe than blood sanctions, when they were persuaded of 
the guilt of the accused on the basis of the available evidence, the
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rationale being that the less severe punishment did not require as 
great certainty of guilt, Once this development had taken place, the 
practice of judicial torture was effectively redundant, because it was 
far less trouble for a judge simply to impose a lesser punishment. In 
practice, however, torture continued to be employed for some time.
The original error had been made by the medieval jurists who 
supposed that a confession made under torture confirmed the guilt of 
the suspect. They had assumed that the use of torture provided the 
certainty which the replacement of the ordeals by human judges 
necessitated, and this assumption persisted for centuries thereafter. 
In modern times, there is widespread acceptance of the doctrine of 
free judicial evaluation of all the evidence, and if that idea had 
been adopted by the medieval scholars it is possible that the practice 
of judicial torture would never have emerged on a large scale. In 
those days, however, there was little faith in human judgement, and to 
that extent the legal revolution was dependent on the development of a 
professional and impartial judiciary which could command popular 
respect and acceptance.
The fundamental objection to the employment of torture in 
eliciting confessions is that an admission obtained by coercion is of 
no evidentiary value because it cannot prove the guilt of the person 
making the admission. Essentially, the use of coercion is irrelevant 
to the question of guilt, as it is based on an erroneous rationale 
which assumes that a person will confess under torture only if guilty, 
whereas confession (or, more accurately, self-incrimination) under 
torture depends on tolerance to pain and strength of will rather than 
on the efficacy of coercion in procuring truth. Cesare Beccaria 
appreciated this in his condemnation of the use of torture for the 
purpose of compulsion:
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"This is no new dilemma: the crime is either
certain, or uncertain: if certain, no other
punishment is appropriate than the one
established by law, torture being pointless, 
just as a guilty man's confession would be
pointless; if uncertain, it is wrong to torture 
an innocent man, since by law a man is innocent 
until proved guilty."2
It should be noted that although this observation is valid with 
regard to the operation of the judicial process in mast modern legal 
systems, the problem with pre-abolition torture was that certainty of 
guilt depended upon standards of proof which were too inflexible, and 
few criminals would have been convicted without torture. 
Unfortunately, the use of torture creates the opposite problem, 
however, and many innocent people who 'confess' under duress are 
convicted of criminal offences. In fact, Beccaria assumed that 
certainty of guilt could be established on the basis of circumstantial 
evidence:
"The proofs of a crime can be distinguished as t 
perfect and imperfect. Ve call perfect those 
proofs which exclude all possibility of a man's 
innocence: we call imperfect those by which it
is not excluded. Only one perfect proof is 
required for a condemnation. Of imperfect 
proofs as many are required as will form one 
perfect proof; in other words, although each 
proof of this second kind taken by itself does 
not establish a man's guilt, agreement between 
such proofs on the same matter makes his 
innocence impossible."3
Bentham also rejected the use of torture for the purpose of
obtaining confessions, and did so on the same grounds as Beccaria:
"Either there is sufficient reason to conclude 
the party accused to be guilty, or there is not: 
if there is, the torture is superfluous; if 
there is not, it is unwarrantable."*
Fo matter what the evidentiary requirements of a legal system may 
be, the fact is that torture does not add to the certainty of guilt. 
Torture is a test of endurance to pain and suffering, not a means of
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discovering the truth, and if a confession is made by a victim of
torture, it can never be certain whether it was made because the
person was actually guilty or whether, even though innocent, he was
unable to endure the extreme agonies of torture and made an admission
simply to escape further pain:
"The impression made by pain can therefore 
increase to such a degree that it entirely 
possesses a man under torture and leaves him no 
liberty but to choose the shortest way out of 
his present situation and so escape the 
pain....Thus the innocent man who is sensitive 
to pain will declare himself guilty because he 
believes this will put an end to his torment.
So the very means which, it is claimed, will 
distinguish between innocence and guilt, in fact 
destroys all difference between them.
...Of two men equally innocent or equally 
guilty, the one who is robust and physically 
brave will be acquitted, the one who is feeble 
and fearful will be condemned.
The outcome of torture, then, is a matter of 
temperament and of calculation; it varies with 
each man according to his physical strength and 
response to pain. By this method a
mathematician could solve the following problem 
better than a judge: ’Given the strength of
muscles and the sensibility of nerves of an 
innocent man, find the amount of pain required 
to make him confess that he has committed a 
given crime.'"s
Of the four possible permutations, only one leads to a just 
result:
Cl) an innocent person may be tortured and found to be innocent, 
not because of his innocence in fact, but because he has the fortitude 
to endure torture without ’confessing’;
(2) an innocent person may be tortured and found guilty because 
he cannot endure the pain and makes a 'confession';
(3) a guilty person may be tortured and endure, with the result 
that he is declared innocent;
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(4) a guilty person may be tortured and confess: this is
supposedly the purpose of coercive torture, but although it leads to a 
just result, it is clear that the means are arbitrary, relying on the 
victim's reaction to pain rather than on the fact of his guilt.
One question which might be raised is whether it is any more just
for an accused person to be convicted on less strict standards of
proof. Bentham, for instance, makes the following observation:
"There are few if any cases in which a man can
be put to the torture under the Roman Law, upon
less evidence than would be sufficient to 
convict him by the English. The direct evidence 
of one unexceptionable witness, which would be 
sufficient to warrant the convicting him by the 
English Law, by the Roman Law would only warrant 
the putting him to the Torture. "e'
It could be argued that conviction on lesser evidence is just as 
objectionable as employing torture, because it merely means that the 
accused will be punished on uncertain evidence without having the 
opportunity, albeit arbitrary, of resisting torture and being 
released. The innocent will in effect be convicted summarily without 
being able to show their innocence. However, we have already seen 
that torture is not a valid means of distinguishing the guilty from 
the innocent and that the use of torture is therefore irrelevant to 
the question of sufficiency of evidence. Clearly the excessively 
rigid requirements of Roman law are not viable in practice, and the 
only realistic alternative is to permit conviction on the basis of a 
reasonable degree of certainty after free judicial evaluation of all 
the available evidence. This involves some relaxation of the 
requirement of absolute certainty of guilt, but for the criminal law 
to function efficiently some kind of compromise has to be accepted, 
and this has generally meant permitting conviction on less than 
absolute certainty, for example when guilt is 'beyond a reasonable
97
doubt*. Whatever the shortcomings of this system may be, the 
important point is that the use of torture does not add to certainty 
of guilt.
In conclusion, then, it is apparent that there can be no 
justification for the use of torture for the purpose of obtaining 
confessions. This does not mean that torture is not regarded as 
valuable for this purpose: in situations where investigation or
prosecution agencies are encountering difficulties in securing 
evidence of criminal offences they may find it expedient to resort to 
the employment of coercion in order to obtain confessions which will 
facilitate conviction. The problem is that the torturers are usually 
already convinced of the victim’s guilt, and their aim is to procure a 
confession to supply the evidence which is lacking rather than to 
elicit the truth. They may well believe that the confession 
represents the truth, but often they are not concerned about innocent 
people being convicted, being interested only in securing a 
conviction, even if this means presenting evidence which is actually 
inadmissible in law. In practical terms, this is the basic problem 
with coercive torture, and judges clearly have an onerous 
responsibility to ensure that the circumstances in which confessions 
have been obtained are thoroughly investigated.
(b) Some Minor Uses of Torture
Apart from the extortion of confessions, there are four other 
uses of torture which Beccaria condemned, and Bentham agreed with him 
on three of these, all of which are of mainly historical interest and 
may be dealt with briefly at this point.
Beccaria states:
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“The second motive of torture is to resolve 
contradictions in the evidence of a supposedly 
guilty man - as if the fear of punishment, the 
uncertainty of the verdict, the pomp and majesty 
of the judge, and the ignorant state of guilty 
and innocent alike, were not enough to make it 
probable that innocent as well as guilty would 
fall into contradiction - the innocent man out 
of fear, the guilty man from an endeavour to
shield himself; as if, too, self-
contradictions, common among men in 
tranquillity, were not multiplied in the 
turbulent mind of a man all absorbed in the
thought of saving himself from imminent peril!"'7
Minor contradictions in the evidence of an accused may well
indicate a lack of honesty and undermine his credibility accordingly,
but the use of torture is hardly justified for the purpose of
resolving such prevarication. Major contradictions will nullify the
value of the evidence of the accused, and this will be taken into
account in the evaluation of the evidence, but even in such cases the
use of torture is not justified. The same objections raised in
relation to confessions apply here, though perhaps not to the same
extent, as it could be argued that where major contradictions emerge
it is certain that the accused has lied and the presumption of
innocence may be rebutted. On the other hand, Beccaria does point out
that an accused person may be expected to contradict himself in an
effort to escape his predicament, and this can apply to the innocent
as well as to the guilty. Incidentally, Bentham considered that
contradictions in the evidence of the accused should result in his
conviction.0 It might also be noted that the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Eights provides that an accused person should
not be compelled to testify against himself.®
The third use of torture mentioned by Beccaria is the following:
"Torture, too, is employed to discover whether a 
man is guilty of other crimes than the one he is
charged with. The reasoning goes like this:
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'You are guilty of one crime, so perhaps you are 
guilty of a hundred more..."'10
Bentham suggests that a distinction may be drawn in this case 
between those not yet convicted of the crime and those who have 
already been found guilty, and he suggests that torture might be 
justified in the latter case. This is, however, neither just nor 
logical: it assumes that every person convicted of a crime must have
committed other crimes, and while in many instances this will be so, 
it is clearly a logical impossibility for it to apply in all cases, as 
some criminals must be first-time offenders. The implication is that 
someone who is convicted of a crime forfeits his legal right to future 
protection, with the result that there is no presumption of innocence 
in relation to other crimes of which he is suspected, and indeed there 
is a presumption that he has committed other offences.
If there is evidence that a person has committed other crimes, 
the proper course is for a separate prosecution to be initiated on the 
basis of that evidence, but each charge must be considered on its own 
merits, and guilt of one crime should never be taken into account as 
evidence in a trial for a different crime. The provisions in many 
legal systems prohibiting disclosure of previous convictions until 
after an accused has been found guilty of the current offence is aimed 
at overcoming the dangers of prejudicing the defence in this manner. 
On this use of torture, Ruthven comments that it "barely merits 
argument".11
The final use of torture which we may refer to here is of no 
relevance today. It involved the torture of a person to "purge him in 
some metaphysical and incomprehensible way of infamy".12 Beccaria 
considered that being subjected to torture itself constituted the
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greatest infamy, and both Bentham1 ^  and Ruthven1 fully concur with 
his criticism.
Cc) Eliciting Vital Information - A Putative Justification
While torture as such is rarely defended or justified openly, 
from time to time there does appear in print, particularly in training 
manuals on counter-subversion, a defence of the use of torture in 
certain circumstances. The purpose for which the use of torture is 
usually considered justified is the extortion of information which is 
essential to the forces of order, especially in their task of 
protecting innocent citizens. Such apologias, which do not normally 
mention the rather emotive word 'torture*, characterise the protection 
of society as paramount, and assert that the use of coercion against 
the enemies of the state must be seen as the lesser of two evils. In 
other words, they rely on the contention that the end justifies the 
means, a reasoning which is particularly persuasive when expressed in 
terms of the protection of innocent by-standers from the ruthless and 
barbaric methods of terrorism. In combatting terrorism, security 
forces encounter considerable difficulties in obtaining information 
about the activities of their adversaries, and the argument is that if 
the use of torture is necessary to elicit vital information, then the 
validity of the ultimate purpose is sufficient justification.
Beccaria discusses the employment of torture "to make a criminal 
reveal the accomplices of his crime",1e but this notion may be 
extended to include torture which is aimed at procuring any kind of 
information, as opposed to straightforward confession. Beccaria's 
condemnation of the use of torture for the purpose of discovering the 
identity of the victim's accomplices was based on the following logic:
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"But if we have proved that torture is a bad 
method of discovering the truth, how can it be 
employed to find out who the accomplices were, 
which is one of the truths to be discovered? As 
well suppose that a man who accuses himself is 
not even more likely to accuse others! "1G
Beccaria's reasoning seems persuasive, but it is at this juncture 
that Bentham takes issue with him, mentioning four difficulties:1'7
Cl) Bentham rejects Beccaria's assertion that this use of 
torture involves the punishment of one man for the offence of another; 
he asserts rather that it is for the man's own offence of withholding 
vital information.
(2) Beccaria had thought that the information would be available 
from other sources, but Bentham points out that if this were so it 
would not be necessary to resort to torture anyway.
(3) Beccaria believed that accomplices "generally flee the 
moment their companion has been apprehended",161 so that torture would 
be pointless; Bentham's response, to the effect that they only flee 
because they fear betrayal under torture, is scarcely sufficient 
criticism, the point being that it is the existence of torture and the 
threat it poses that impel the accomplices to flee. The point is not 
critical, however, and in any event it does not apply to all types of 
information.
(4) Although the foregoing points are of interest, they are not 
sufficiently important in themselves to be decisive in this issue. 
The crucial point lies in Bentham's rejection of Beccaria's assertion 
that "we have proved that torture is a bad method of discovering the 
truth". Unfortunately, Bentham's counter-argument has never been 
identified, and it is consequently necessary to speculate, but it is
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possible to infer from Bentham's writings what his attitude must have 
been.
Beccaria concluded from his argument against the use of torture 
in extorting confessions that the same criticisms applied to eliciting 
information. However, he had shown only that torture is a bad method 
of discovering the veracity of confessions, not that torture is 
necessarily a bad method of discovering the truth in all situations. 
In fact, there are two important factors which distinguish the use of 
torture for the purpose of obtaining information. Firstly, it is 
possible to be certain, or at least reasonably sure, that a person is 
in possession of specific information, whereas in the case of 
confession torture is employed precisely because it is not certain 
whether the suspect is innocent or guilty, or in other wards whether 
he has the relevant knowledge or information. Secondly, a confession 
in itself is not verifiable,13 whereas certain types of information 
are. Accordingly, when these two distinguishing features are present, 
it may be suggested that torture is a reliable method of discovering 
the truth: that is, when it is known that a person has particular
information and it is possible to verify the accuracy of any 
information which he divulges, torture may be an effective method of 
obtaining that information.
Beccaria made the point that a person under torture is even more 
likely to accuse others than he is to make a self-incriminating 
statement, and this criticism is valid in so far as it relates to 
information which is inspecific and unverifiable, because the victim 
may then provide fabricated information in order to escape further 
torture. However, when the information required is specific and 
verifiable, this is not possible: for example, the question 'who were
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your accomplices?' would permit the victim to give the names of 
innocent people whom the security farces might then arrest and torture 
in order to obtain confessions, but a question such as 'where is the 
bomb concealed?' would ensure that the victim could not supply false 
information, as the accuracy of any statement can easily be
ascertained:
"...torture is, unfortunately, not always an 
inefficient weapon or, which is perhaps more 
important, it is often considered efficient by 
those who use it or condone it.... it should be 
remembered that some kinds of information (such 
as the whereabouts of caches of arms or
gelignite) are susceptible of independent
verification, and torture may sometimes be an 
effective way of obtaining such information."20
Bentham in fact drew a distinction between the use of torture to 
discover if there were any accomplices and the use of torture to 
discover the identity of accomplices, the difference being that in the 
second case there is certainty that the victim is in possession of the 
required information. However, in both these instances, the 
employment of torture may be condemned on Beccaria's ground that a 
person is even more likely to implicate others than to incriminate 
himself, because even if names are divulged it is not passible to
verify the accuracy of the information.
It might be argued that it is virtually impossible to be
absolutely certain that a person does have information, just as it is 
impossible to know if a confession is genuine. Bentham's utilitarian 
approach is of interest in this connection, because although he 
justified the use of torture only in very limited circumstances and 
formulated rules to govern the administration of torture, he did not 
always demand absolute certainty that the prospective victim possessed 
the required information. The first case in which Bentham justified
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the employment of torture did require certainty, and applied in the 
following conditions:
"... where the thing which a Man is required to 
do being a thing which the public has an 
interest in his doing, is a thing which for a 
certainty is in his power to do; and which 
therefore so long as he continues to suffer for 
not doing he is sure not to be innocent.1,2:1
Bentham thus considered torture to be justifiable in situations 
where the victim definitely possessed information (or, indeed, had 
some other knowledge or ability) and the public had a sufficient
interest in him being compelled to divulge that information or 
otherwise co-operate with the authorities. Certainty to Bentham meant 
proof "as strong as that which is required to subject him to a
punishment equal to the greatest degree of suffering to which he can 
in this way be exposed"22 or "the same strength of evidence.... as is 
requisite to convict a man of a crime for which punishment of that 
kind and degree would be inflicted for the ordinary purpose of 
prevention."2:3 In other words, if it is reasonable to punish a man on 
less than absolute certainty of guilt, then it is reasonable to
inflict torture even if there is some doubt that the victim has the 
information. On this basis, Bentham was able to affirm that the 
victim was not in fact to be regarded as innocent if deliberately 
refusing to co-operate, although he added that it might be proper to 
utilise torture only in the case of persons already convicted of a 
crime for which the penalty was greater than the pain of torture. In 
fact, Bentham formulated a number of rules in relation to this
justification of torture, such as that it should only apply in urgent 
situations when any delay would nullify the effectiveness of coercion, 
and that the benefits of using torture must warrant the resort to such
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extreme measures. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Bentham 
considered torture to be justifiable in certain circumstances.
In Bentham's second case, there is a relaxation of the
requirement of certainty, and the utilitarian logic which he
introduces indicates the potential dangers of justifying the use of
torture. Although Bentham affirmed that instances of his second case
would be "very few",22* the rationale which he invokes forms the basis
of the attitude of those who justify torture today, although their
reasoning is usually much cruder. Bentham suggested in his second
case that torture might be justified in the following circumstances:
"...where a man is required what probably though 
not certainly it is in his power to do; and for 
the not doing of which it is possible that he 
may suffer, although he be innocent; but which 
the public has so great an interest in his doing 
that the danger of what may ensue from his not 
doing it is a greater danger than even that of 
an innocent person's suffering the greatest 
degree of pain that can be suffered by Torture, 
of the kind and in the quantity permitted to be 
employed."2S
Here we have the utilitarian justification of torture: as the
public interest increases in importance, so the requirement for
certainty that the victim has the desired information decreases in 
importance. If this logic were extended to an extreme degree, it
might be proposed that desperate situations justify the torture of 
even tentative suspects in the hope of finding someone who actually 
has information which is relevant, and in practice this is not
uncommon. The Benthamite justification is, however, rather more
restricted in scope.
Bentham demanded that in his second case torture should only be 
employed in the case of persons already convicted of first-rate crimes 
unless the exigencies of the situation would not "wait for a less
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penal method of compulsion".2e He also required that the safety of 
the whole state had to be endangered, and added that the "power of 
employing it ought not to be vested in any hands but such as from the 
business of their office are best qualified to judge of that 
necessity: and from the dignity of it perfectly responsible in case
of their making an ill use of so terrible a power."21'7 Furthermore, 
"as many and as efficacious checks ought to be applied to the exercise 
of it as can be made consistent with the purpose far which it is 
conferred."213 Although these rules were intended to minimise the 
occasions on which the resort to torture could be justified, they are 
rather vague, and they indicate a faith in the discretion of 
governments which in practice has often proved misplaced. However, 
one further proviso added by Bentham is of considerable significance 
in this connection, namely the distinction which he drew between 
offences against individuals and offences against the state, and his 
prohibition on the use of torture in relation to the latter. It is on 
this basis that Bentham concluded that instances of his second case 
would be rare.
Clearly governments are the most appropriate agencies to assess 
when, if ever, the use of torture is justified and necessary, but in 
order to ensure that this authority was not abused Bentham proposed 
that torture should only be employed when the community, rather than 
the state, was threatened, founding his argument on the willingness of 
witnesses to came forward. The public, he suggested, will be reliable 
witnesses only in the case of ordinary (that is, apolitical) crimes, 
because in the case of political offences the public may actually be 
sympathetic towards the offenders: ordinary criminals are "under
every government the standing enemies of the people",23 whereas
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political offenders "may in fact be the best friends and defenders of 
the people”.30 The conclusion reached by Bentham was that torture 
could not be considered appropriate in dealing with political 
problems:
"The danger will always be great, that torture 
if allowed in these cases, may be made 
subservient to the establishment of usurpation, 
or which comes to the same thing of a government 
repugnant to the interests and affections of the 
great body of the people."31
In practice, of course, torture is commonly employed by 
governments for political purposes, and in such circumstances 
governments are not "perfectly responsible". It was in recognition of 
the dangers of such abuses that Bentham excluded the use of torture in 
political cases. Difficulties arise, however, when criminal offences 
are perpetrated against the general public in order to promote 
political goals. This applies particularly to politically motivated 
violence such as terrorism, because it is in response to such threats 
that governments often resort to torture. In such circumstances, it 
can be argued that the crimes are essentially aimed at the public and 
that the motives are irrelevant, so that the use of torture may be 
regarded as justifiable even though it is directed against opponents 
of the government. If this contention is valid, governments may be 
justified in employing torture in counter-terrorism and counter­
subversion on the basis of Benthamite principles. A strict 
utilitarian position would impose further limitations, but the fact is 
that the principles on which Bentham developed his utilitarian 
justification can essentially be applied to the very situations in 
which governments most commonly wish to authorise the employment of 
torture, and the exclusion of torture in the case of political 
offences only partially precludes such an application.
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The classic scenario invoked in support of the assertion that
torture can be justified posits a situation in which a nuclear device
has been concealed and timed to destroy a large city; the only person
who can prevent destruction of the city and of millions of innocent
citizens is in custody but is unwilling to co-operate.352 The
importance and urgency of preventing the catastrophe are obvious, and
many people would no doubt condone the use of coercion without further
question, although a strict utilitarian position would have to impose
further qualifications, such as reasonable certainty that the
prospective victim is in a position to co-operate. The more
safeguards there are, and the more effective the rules which govern
the application of torture, the more convincing appears the argument
in favour of the use of torture in this type of situation. It is
important, however, not to rely too heavily on hypothetical examples
in which all the details are clear and unequivocal:
"Uotice how unlike the circumstances of an
actual choice about torture the philosopher's
example is. The proposed victim of our torture 
is not someone we suspect of planting the 
device: he is the perpetrator. He is not some
pitiful psychotic making one last play for 
attention: he did plant the device. The wiring
is not backwards, the mechanism is not jammed: 
the device will destroy the city if not de­
activated. " 33
It is not that the hypothetical example could never occur; the 
point is that in reality the circumstances are seldom as clearly 
defined as the philosopher might desire. In particular, it is rarely 
certain that the victim is in possession of the required information, 
and the question then is what level of certainty is necessary before 
torture is permissible: is the level of certainty actually in inverse
proportion to the seriousness of the threat, so that in the example 
given the victim might be subjected to torture on the basis of fairly
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tenuous suspicions? It is often the case, moreover, that there is no 
direct relationship between the information sought and a specific 
threat against which definite action can be taken by the authorities, 
so that the employment of torture can only be justified on the basis 
of the general usefulness of the information obtained in responding to 
an inspecific threat. Finally, there is no clear criterion by which 
governments can decide when a threat is of sufficient gravity to 
warrant the resort to torture. Bentham suggested that torture ought 
to be employed only when the safety of the whole state was at risk, 
but the essence of the utilitarian theory is simply that the benefits 
of using torture substantially outweigh the negative factors, and in 
the example given only one section of the community is in fact 
endangered. The torture of one man to save the lives of a million 
others might seem sufficient justification, but what if only a hundred 
or ten lives are at risk? On purely arithmetical grounds, it could be 
argued that the torture of one man to save the lives of two others is 
justified, but this does not take into account the degree of certainty 
required in establishing whether the victim has the information, and 
it ignores the relevance of value-judgements regarding the relative 
worth of the victim and the innocent citizens: thus, it could be
suggested that the torture of one convicted terrorist, or even of 
several terrorists, to save the life of one innocent person might be 
justified.
There are problems, then, in identifying criteria by which it can 
be determined in practice when the use of torture is genuinely 
justified on utilitarian grounds. In strict utilitarian theory, the 
employment of torture would only be permitted in limited and 
exceptional circumstances: in particular, there would have to be
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reasonable certainty that the prospective victim had specific and 
verifiable information, the divulgence of which would enable the 
authorities to take definite action to avert a major catastrophe 
involving the lives or personal security of a significant number of 
people. In practice, the conditions imposed by the philosopher are 
rarely satisfied, but governments are nevertheless prepared to 
authorise the use of torture on the basis of a general utilitarian 
rationale which justifies the employment of any necessary means in the 
defence of national security. The inevitable consequence of this 
unrefined approach is that torture is utilised to obtain non-specific 
intelligence about the activities of subversives from a wide range of 
suspects, with little concern about whether or not it is probable the 
victims actually possess any vital information. The result is that it 
develops into a routine and systematic practice, and under certain 
conditions degenerates into an instrument of repression.
The fact is that torture is frequently resorted to in total
disregard of the conditions and limitations which strict utilitarian 
theory requires, and those who justify it do so on the basis of a 
simplistic rationale which places supreme importance on the defence of 
national security and considers any means as acceptable in pursuit of 
this goal. Torture as it is actually practised, then, cannot be 
regarded as falling within the Benthamite justification. The fact 
remains, however, that there are circumstances in which it is possible 
to justify the use of torture on utilitarian grounds, and it is
important to consider whether there are any other arguments against 
torture in such circumstances.
The justification of an act is not the justification of a
practice, but there is in fact a strong tendency for the use of
111
torture to spread and become institutionalised once the principle of 
justifiability has been accepted:
"History shows that torture is never limited to 
•just once': 'just once' becomes once again -
becomes a practice and finally an institution.
As soon as its use is permitted once, as for 
example in one of the extreme circumstances like 
a bomb, it is logical to use it on people who 
might plant bombs, or on people who might think 
of planting bombs, or on people who defend the 
kind of person who might think of planting 
bombs."34-
This characteristic of torture lends weight to the argument
against the justification of torture on utilitarian grounds, because
the potential consequences of permitting the use of torture may in
fact be more serious than the existing threat. The implications for
society in general may be far-reaching:
"From the point of view of society, the argument 
of torturing "just once" does not hold. Once 
justified and allowed for the narrower purpose 
of combating political violence, torture will 
almost inevitably be used for a wider range of 
purposes against an increasing proportion of the 
population. Those who torture once will go on 
using it, encouraged by its "efficiency" in 
obtaining the confession or information they 
seek, whatever the quality of those 
statements.... What • was to be done "just once" 
will become an institutionalized practice and 
will erode the moral and legal principles that 
stand against a form of violence that could 
affect all of society."3®
The fact is that the suppression of subversive threats is of such 
importance to governments that they frequently resort to the use of 
torture on grounds of simple expediency and on the basis of general 
utility rather than in specific situations in which the utilitarian 
requirements are met, and the result is that the use of torture 
becomes routine rather than exceptional, even though "such incidents 
do not continue to happen":33
"There are not so many people with grievances 
against this government that the torture is
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becoming necessary more often, and in the
smaller cities, and for slightly lesser threats, 
and with a little less care, and so on. ...There 
is considerable evidence of all torture’s 
metastatic tendency."3^
The dangers of the use of torture becoming accepted and
established practice after an initial justification in a specific
instance are identified by Professor Twining, who concludes that this 
constitutes the most persuasive argument against the introduction of 
torture:
"The circumstances are so extreme in which most 
of us would be prepared to justify resort to
torture, if at all, the conditions we would 
impose would be so stringent, the practical 
problems of devising and enforcing adequate 
safeguards so difficult and the risks of abuse 
so great that it would be unwise and dangerous 
to entrust any government, however enlightened, 
with such a power. Even an out-and-out 
utilitarian can support an absolute prohibition 
against institutionalised torture on the ground 
that no government in the world can be trusted 
not to abuse the power and to satisfy in 
practice the conditions he would impose."33
In view of the rarity of situations in which the use of torture
is genuinely justifiable in utilitarian terms, it is not unreasonable
to demand an absolute prohibition:
"An act of torture ought to remain illegal so 
that anyone who sincerely believes such an act 
to be the least available evil is placed in the 
position of needing to justify his or her act 
morally in order to defend himself or herself 
legally. The torturer should be in roughly the 
same position as someone who commits civil 
disobedience. Anyone who thinks an act of 
torture is justified should have no alternative 
but to convince a group of peers in a public 
trial that all necessary conditions for a 
morally permissible act were indeed satisfied.
If it is reasonable to put someone through 
torture, it is reasonable to put someone else 
through a careful explanation of why. If the 
situation approximates those in the imaginary 
examples in which torture seems passible to 
justify, a judge can surely be expected to 
suspend the sentence."33
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It is possible, then, to support an absolute prohibition of 
torture even from a utilitarian perspective. It is clear, however, 
that arguments in support of such a prohibition are not conclusive, 
and that it is possible to put forward a strong case in favour of the 
use of torture in certain limited circumstances. It is must be 
conceded, too, that the suppression of political violence falls within 
the parameters of a utilitarian justification in so far as there is 
reasonable certainty that the victim has verifiable information which 
will enable the security forces to avert a specific threat to the 
public. The use of torture is seldom justified openly by governments, 
but their private reasoning is founded on general utilitarian 
principles, and while the strict requirements of utilitarian theory 
may not be met, the fact remains that a plausible case in favour of 
the employment of torture against political violence can be sustained. 
Arguments against the use of torture may be presented to governments, 
but in philosophical terms the question of justifiability is 
debatable, and governments are quite entitled to reject these 
arguments. Indeed, there is no reason why governments should accept 
the limitations of a strict utilitarian approach at all: why can they
not maintain that the use of torture is warranted even in situations 
which are not clear-cut, for example when there is considerable doubt 
whether the victim has the information or when there is no direct 
relationship between the information and a specific threat? It is 
clear that other considerations must be relied upon in demanding the 
elimination of torture, and in the following section we shall examine 
the most important of these.
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(d) The Inhumanity of Torture
In the preceding section, we concluded that while it is passible
to support an absolute prohibition of torture on purely utilitarian
grounds, it is also possible to put forward a powerful argument in
favour of the employment of torture in particular circumstances, also
on utilitarian grounds. In other words, rational arguments can be put
forward in support of both positions, and in view of this any demand
for an absolute prohibition of torture cannot rely on utilitarian
criteria alone. It is essential, therefore, to recognise that factors
other than the utility value of torture in achieving a given end are
relevant to the issue of justification. In fact, the most potent
argument against the use of torture in any circumstances is the
inhumanity of the act itself:
"Even if torture could be shown to be efficient
in some cases, it could simply never be
permissible. From the point of view of the 
individual, torture, for whatever purpose, is a 
calculated assault on human dignity and for that 
reason alone is to be condemned absolutely.1,40
Essentially, this is an emotional rather than a philosophical 
rejection, and the inhuman character of torture is not necessarily a 
philosophically valid objection in utilitarian terms. Nevertheless, 
it is on this basis that the majority of people condemn torture and 
object to its use, and indeed any philosophical framework which takes 
no account of human dignity and the value of the human person ignores 
a crucial factor which is entitled to full recognition, at least in 
the contemporary civilised world where the principle of humanity 
ostensibly attracts universal support. The international prohibition 
of torture is, of course, founded on the principle of humanity. .
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It lias been suggested that “under certain extreme conditions a
case can be made for resort to physical coercion, provided it is done
professionally without undue violations of human rights and without
degradation."*1 Similarly, Henry Shue, in his discussion of
situations in which the use of torture may be justified, visualises
its infliction in clinical conditions:
"The torture will not be conducted in the 
basement of a smal 1-town jail in the provinces 
by local thugs popping pills; the prime 
minister and chief justice are being kept 
informed; and a priest and a doctor are 
“present. The victim will not be raped or forced 
to eat excrement and will not collapse with a 
heart attack or become deranged before talking; 
while avoiding irreparable damage, the anti­
septic pain will carefully be increased only up 
to the point at which the necessary information 
is divulged, and the doctor will then administer 
an antibiotic and a tranquilizer. The torture 
is purely interrogational."*:2
Shue admits that his scenario is somewhat unrealistic, and indeed 
it is little short of fanciful. It is naive to suppose that torture 
can be inflicted in such a disinterested and clinical manner; to 
imagine torture being applied in well-furnished and comfortable 
;conditions by apologetic and sympathetic torturers is to misconceive 
the function of coercive torture. The purpose of such torture is to 
overcome the mental resistance of the victim, and this frequently 
requires more than the application of "antiseptic" pain; it requires 
the terrorisation and demoralisation of the victim in order to 
intensify his perception of pain and so create the maximum degree of 
psychological pressure. In order to appreciate the function of 
coercive torture more fully, it will be of value to examine the 
relationship between compulsion and the infliction of pain. 
Compulsion, of course, involves forcing a person to act against his 
will and comply with the wishes of others, and pain is utilised as a
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means to this end on the basis that a human being will elect to act
against his will rather than suffer the experience of intense pain.
In effect, the victim is placed in the position of having to choose
between mental capitulation and physical pain, and the rationale of
torture is that the psychological resistance of the victim can be
overcome by the infliction of pain beyond the maximum intensity which
he is able to endure. Pain has been described in the following terms:
"...a sensory experience commanding a response 
which, even when not expressed verbally, may be 
reflected in one's behaviour and often in other 
physical signs. It has long been known 
moreover, that pain has a dual nature, a 
cognitive and an affective component, and that 
sensation and reaction to pain are closely 
interlinked. All of these factors undoubtedly 
play some part in how we physicians judge the 
presence, severity and significance of pain in 
our patients. Nevertheless, in practice, as 
well as in our research, we rely chiefly on the 
patients' verbal expressions of their feelings 
and only perhaps to a lesser degree on their 
behaviour and associated physical signs.
It is extremely difficult to measure or assess levels of pain 
experienced by an individual; pain can to a limited extent be 
objectively measured and monitored by means of respiratory or hormonal 
levels, but only when there is a relationship between the measure and 
the relief of pain. Essentially, pain is a subjective phenomenon, and 
individuals subjected to the same treatment may not experience the 
same 'feeling' or, even if they do, may not respond to it in the same 
way: thus, one person might consider the treatment extremely painful,
while another might regard it merely as an uncomfortable experience. 
Although an individual may be able to make a comparison between 
different levels of pain which he himself has suffered, then, there is 
no way of ascertaining with any accuracy whether two people receiving 
the same stimulus either experience the same sensation or have the
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same perception of it. Much may depend on the individual's previous 
exposure to pain, with which the present experience can be compared; 
thus, someone who has had to suffer a chronic illness may react 
differently to a new pain from someone who has enjoyed a relatively 
pain-free existence.
In most cases of physical trauma, it appears that there is some
objective relationship, so that most people exposed to a specific
treatment may be expected to exhibit a similar physiological reaction:
"The physiology of the human nervous system is 
the same for all human beings regardless of 
race, climate or culture. In general the effect 
of physical torture such as beating, electro­
shock, near-drowning, sleep deprivation and 
drugs will be the same on any human system.
Although cultural conditioning can have 
remarkable effects on resistance to pain, as far < 
example in the case of religious firewalkers,
the result of the infliction of pain against the 
victim's will would seem to be universal at the 
physiological level.
On the other hand, there do occur exceptional instances of both 
hypersensitivity and pain asymbolia (absence of any experience of 
pain) and, even allowing for such aberrant cases, there does appear to 
be a wide variation in individual responses to pain: in one
experiment, electric shocks were administered to a number of
volunteers, and although two described the maximum intensity as 
intolerable, one had no convincing experience of pain at all, while 
those in between the extremes reported pain of varying d e g r e e s . I t  
seems clear, therefore, that while the infliction of physical pain on 
two individuals may produce virtually identical biological effects in 
their bodies, their perception of the pain may well differ to a
significant extent. This diversity of responses to pain-inducing 
stimuli of a physical nature gives an indication of the core of the 
problem: the fact is that pain is not just a physiological reaction:
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"... experience of pain is an extremely complex 
phenomenon in which anxiety, conditioning, 
suggestion and other variables play an important 
part."4e
Thus, even if the physiological effects of a specific type of
treatment are invariable, the individual's actual perception of the
pain will vary according to his mental condition and attitude, which
will have been formed partly by his cultural background, partly by his
own personality, and partly by his knowledge of the circumstances in
which he is to suffer pain:
"...in higher species at least, there is much 
evidence that pain is not simply a function of 
the amount of bodily damage alone. Rather, the 
amount and quality of pain we feel are also 
determined by our previous experiences and how 
well we remember them, by our ability to 
understand the cause of the pain and to grasp 
its consequences. Even the significance pain 
has in the culture in which we have been brought 
up plays an essential role in how we feel and 
respond to it."47’
The phenomenon of physical pain cannot be separated, then, from
the mental state of the individual, because the experience of physical
pain involves an awareness of the whole circumstances which plays a
significant role in determining the perception of pain. One factor
which has a crucial bearing on the subjective perception of pain is
the atmosphere in which pain is experienced:
"There are many studies to show that our state 
of mind - anxious, tense, frightened, depressed, ; 
the environment in which we experience pain - is 
it anticipated or not? - can condition our 
reaction to pain."4S
Clearly, the infliction of pain in a torture-chamber will 
heighten the stress and anxiety of the victim to a much greater degree 
than the incidental infliction of pain by hospital staff in the course 
of medical treatment, and it is in fact for this reason that the 
torturer cannot rely on "antiseptic" pain: coercion requires
119
intensification of pain beyond what the victim is able to tolerate in 
order to overcome his mental resistance, and to achieve this it is 
necessary for the torturer to create conditions in which the victim 
will be anxious and insecure, thus maximising the effectiveness of the 
pain. Tolerance to pain is also related to the state of mind of the 
victim, and it is in fact possible to develop an increased tolerance 
to pain by means of psychological conditioning. Thus, cultural 
influences m y  produce a stoical attitude to pain and m y  even 
emphasise endurance of pain as an indication of mnhood, and military 
training can also strengthen resistance to physical hardship, while at 
a different level the dedicated sportsman will undergo pain for the 
sake of victory or personal satisfaction, and m n y  people will 
voluntarily submit to painful remedies in the course of treatment for 
serious ailments. Attitude of mind is, then, of crucial importance to 
the endurance of pain, and this applies equally when pain is inflicted 
for the purpose of coercion: even in the torture-chamber, the victim
m y  be able to endure the pain because his will and resolve are 
fortified by pride, self-respect, hatred, loyalty to comrades or to a 
particular cause, and so on, and torture m y  thus be conquered 
psychologically if the victim's strength of character and will enable 
him to endure pain even to the point of death rather than yield to his 
torturers. The torturer must endeavour to undermine these mental 
supports by inducing a state of anxiety and insecurity, and this can 
be achieved most effectively by means of disorientation, debilitation 
and degradation. In practice, torture does not consist of a single 
act performed in a detached manner by disinterested torturers, but 
rather involves the creation of an entire atmosphere of insecurity and 
fear in which the infliction of physical pain is combined with adverse
120
conditions to produce a psychological pressure aimed at overcoming the 
will of the victim. To apply torture in any other manner would be 
counter-productive, since it would permit the victim to maintain a 
higher level of mental resistance. Indeed, failure to induce stress 
and anxiety may allow the victim to strengthen his resolve and morale.
The function of torture is, then, to overcome the mental
resistance of the victim: the wi 11 of the victim has to be broken,
and this requires the erosion of the mind's defences in order to bring
about a transition from sub-acute stress (in which the victim remains
defiant) to chronic stress (in which the victim's morale crumbles and
he no longer has the will to resist). This involves inducing a
traumatised state in which physical torture is only one aspect of the
attack on the mind: torture normally consists of a combination of
physical assault, debilitation and demoralisation:
"When physical-torture techniques are dominant 
they are almost always combined with such 
stressors as isolation, sleep deprivation, 
squalid conditions, violation of legal rights 
and lack of knowledge of where one is. When : 
psychological or physiological stressors are the 
main component, physical brutality normally 
exists as a sub-component. "
In some circumstances, psychological techniques alone are
employed, but usually the effects of physical torture are utilised to
assist in the process:
"This debilitation procedure is to introduce the 
corollary of the principle, 'a healthy mind in a 
healthy body'. Damaging the anatomical and 
physiological components of body function 
progressively impairs the working of the brain 
and hastens the collapse of will and morale."so
It is apparent, then, that the application of "antiseptic" pain 
will not be an efficient method of securing compliance.; To
effectively overcome the resistance of the victim, the torturer must
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attack the victim's mind, and this requires the creation of conditions 
which will maximise the anxiety and apprehension of the victim, a 
situation which can best be achieved by a combination of physical 
hardship, emotional trauma and mental stress. No doubt it would be 
possible to differentiate between acceptable "antiseptic" techniques 
and unacceptable practices of a more obviously objectionable nature, 
and impose restrictions on the type and/or level of pain which might 
legitimately be inflicted, but this would both limit the value and 
effectiveness of torture and be unworkable in practice, as a dilemma 
would inevitably arise if the required information was not 
forthcoming: if the end is sufficiently important to justify the use
of torture in the first place, but the use of torture within the 
permitted guidelines fails to elicit the essential information, it is 
somewhat arbitrary to reject intensification of the torture* The 
justification of torture is based on the proposition that the end 
justifies the means, and once that principle is accepted it is 
difficult to maintain a distinction between different means* 
Accordingly, if the use of "antiseptic" pain proves ineffective, there 
will be a powerful temptation to resort ■ to other means, including 
rape, the forced eating of excrement and any other technique which may 
assist in overcoming the victim's resistance.
In modern times, the use of sensory deprivation - the prevention 
of stimuli from reaching the senses - has become increasingly favoured 
as a means of disorientating victims. A simple form of this is 
isolation or solitary confinement of varying types and degrees; a 
very extreme form would be immersion in a tepid, darkened and sound­
proofed bath, a technique which volunteers in one experiment were able 
to endure for an average of only four h o u r s . T e c h n i q u e s  employed
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more commonly in practice include blind-folding or hooding (to prevent 
seeing), continuous loud noise (to prevent hearing), enforced standing 
spreadeagled against a wall (to prevent touch), and also exposure to 
extreme degrees of temperature. Deprivation of sleep and of food and 
water are other variants. During sensory and sleep deprivation, 
hallucinations and disorders in the thought processes occur,
increasing the victim's anxiety and- stress to such an extent that a
psychotic state may be induced within a few days if the techniques are
effectively administered.3:2 The purpose of all such methods, and also 
of emotional and psychological pressures, humiliation and threats, is 
to persuade the victim that the price of resistance is greater than 
that of co-operation by pushing him to the edge of his endurance and 
undermining his will to resist. It should be pointed out, however, 
that while torturers often assure prospective victims that everyone 
does break in the end, this appears to be no mare than further
psychological pressure, as there is in fact no evidence that everyone 
has a breaking point, at least if the will to resist is sufficiently 
powerful. There are many victims who have died under torture rather 
than renounce beliefs or betray friends, and many have also been 
released without succumbing to torture, although in such cases it 
could be argued that insufficient pressure was brought to bear.
Torture includes mental suffering alone, when there is no 
physical pain or only a minimal amount. Such suffering may take the 
form of threats to the victim's family, threats of physical assault or 
execution, mock executions, enforced witnessing of the torture of 
others (especially family and friends), and all forms of deceit and 
humiliation which cause extreme mental anguish. In such cases, the 
victim's system of values may actually render him particularly 
susceptible to certain attacks:
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MTo make a Moslem fall to his knees and kiss the 
cross can be a humiliation and torture for him, 
while the same act for a Christian would not 
be."*3
Similarly, prisoners in STorth-west India were at one time forced 
to touch a pig, and their belief that this would result in harsh 
penalties in the after-life caused greater torment than any physical 
assault. In cases such as this physical farce will often be employed, 
and such violence may itself constitute torture, but where the victim 
actually elects to perform a humiliating act under only the threat of 
violence, this probably constitutes degrading treatment rather than 
torture, unless the intensity of mental or emotional suffering is of 
an extreme degree. Depending on the circumstances, cases of physical 
assault which do not necessarily involve intense bodily pain but do 
occasion severe mental suffering may be regarded as torture: for
example, rape might not involve significant physical pain, and 
castration carried out under anaesthetic might not cause any physical 
pain at all, but in both instances the victim would undoubtedly suffer 
considerable anguish.
In addition to the pain, suffering and stress which a victim of 
torture experiences throughout the period of his detention, there are 
also numerous after-effects which must be taken into account in 
depicting the reality of torture. There may, of course, be physical 
signs and symptoms as a direct result of physical assault, though in 
most instances broken bones will heal and burns and bruises will 
disappear in time. In some cases, the damage may be more permanent, 
for example where a limb has been lost, and other sequelae such as 
pain in joints may become chronic. The most serious category of 
after-effects, however, concerns the neuro-psychiatric problems which
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many torture victims suffer. Torture is aimed at the mind, and it is 
inevitable that the mind will suffer long-term damage as a result.
Investigations carried out by Amnesty International's Danish 
Medical Group on sixty seven Greek and Chilean victims of torture 
revealed the following symptoms, which were displayed from between two 
weeks and two years after the torture had taken place:®* 
mental disturbance (40) 
memory and concentration loss (30) 
sleep disturbance (25) 
headaches (23) 
pain in joints (16) 
impaired hearing (15) 
impaired gait (15) 
abdominal pain (14) 
alcohol intolerance (13) 
cardio-pulmonary symptoms (11)
sexual disturbances (8)
visual disturbances (7)
other symptoms (29)
Sixty per cent of the subjects examined exhibited mental 
disturbance, including neurosis, character change and psychosomatic 
symptoms.&IB This figure rises to seventy eight per cent if sleep 
disturbance, headaches, loss of memory and concentration, and sexual 
problems are also i n c l u d e d . S o m e  relationship was established 
between psychological after-effects and solitary confinement.®'7
The Medical Group suggested that a number of the symptoms they 
discovered were the result of direct cranial trauma, namely loss of 
memory, difficulty in concentration, headaches, impaired hearing and
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sexual disturbance (which also resulted from genital trauma).B& 
Damage to brain cells as a result of physical violence can, then, 
cause mental problems, but the majority of psychological and emotional 
difficulties such as anxiety and neurosis are more directly related to 
the effects of torture as an assault on the mind.
Frantz Fanon recorded a number of after-effects which he linked 
to specific types of torture, and many of these relate to psychiatric 
disorders:s®
(1) after general physical torture: agitated nervous 
depressions; loss of appetite and phobia of physical contact; motor 
instability;
(2) after electric shock: localised or generalised 
cinesthopathies; apathy, aboulia and lack of interest; electricity 
phobia;
(3) after truth serum: verbal stereotype and anxiety;
intellectual or sensory perception clouded; phobia of all private 
discussions; inhibition;
(4) after brainwashing: phobia of all collective discussions;
inability to explain or defend any given position.
In addition, Fanon discovered numerous psychosomatic problems: 
stomach ulcers, nephritic cholic, amenorrhoea, intense sleeplessness 
due to idiopathic tremors, hair turning white, sexual impotence, 
paroxysmal tachycardia, and generalised contraction with muscle 
stiffness.
It is clear, then, that the assault on the mind which coercive 
torture by its very nature involves has serious implications as far as 
the victim is concerned. Mare research is needed, and in fact Amnesty 
International Medical Groups continue to be engaged in work in this
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field: at a seminar held by Amnesty International in 1978, there were
several reports referring to work then in progress, including research
into the after-effects of falanga (beating the soles of the feet) and
the effect of torture on gonadal and sexual functions.eo Such
research is an essential aspect of the international campaign against
torture, particularly in view of the conclusions reached by the Danish
Medical Group after six years of intensive study involving over eight
hundred victims of torture:
"...the psychiatric and psychological after­
effects of torture may be more damaging to the 
victim than the physical effects of the original 
attack."el
It is apparent that the reality of torture is far removed from 
the clinical application of "antiseptic" pain envisaged by Shue. The 
effective administration of torture - and the justification of torture 
is based on its effectiveness - requires humiliation, degradation and 
demoralisation in addition to the infliction of intense pain, and 
subjection to torture will inevitably have very serious effects on the 
victim. It is the essential inhumanity of torture, the unavoidable 
violation of human dignity and decency, which in the final analysis
characterises torture as an entirely unacceptable practice, and indeed
Professor Twining identifies this as torture's "most objectionable 
feature":
"Again and again in accounts by victims and by
others who speak with intimate knowledge of the
problem, the intensity of the pain, and the
seriousness of the after-effects are treated as 
secondary to the denial of humanity (of torturer 
and tortured), and the loss of self-respect, 
which are so often involved in the process. "e:2
In the foregoing discussion, we have concentrated on coercive
torture, but the purpose is actually irrelevant. The inhumanity of
torture lies in the deliberate infliction of unlimited pain and
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suffering on a defenceless human being rather than in the purpose for 
which this is done. The humanitarian view thus emphasises the effect 
of torture on the victim, and insists that no human being should ever 
be subjected to such treatment. Torture does not always have the aim 
of breaking the will of the victim, but the infliction of intense pain 
or suffering on a human being against his will in itself violates the 
principle of humanity because it involves treating people as a means 
to an end. Referring to the use of torture as a deterrent, Shue 
states:
"Terroristic torture is a pure case - the purest 
possible case - of the violation of the Kantian 
principle that no person may be used only as a 
means. The victim is simply a site at which 
great pain occurs so that others may know about 
it and be frightened by the - prospect-.M s®
Torture is by definition the infliction of limitless pain and
suffering, and every form of torture dehumanises the victim by
violating his fundamental human dignity. The dangers of such a denial
of humanity were recognised by Beccaria:
"Liberty vanishes whenever the law, in certain 
cases, allows a man to cease to be a person, and 
to become a thing; then one sees the powerful 
devoting their whole efforts to discovering 
which of all the possible combinations of civil 
life are legally to their own advantage. This 
discovery is the magic secret which changes 
citizens into beasts of burden, and in the hands 
of the strong it is the chain that binds the 
actions of the heedless and the weak."6"*
Shue suggests that torture is objectionable because it violates
what he calls "the primitive moral prohibition against assault upon
the defenseless",eB and in support of this proposition he refers to
the distinction found in the laws of war between combatants and non-
combatants and the prohibition of attacks upon the latter:
"The principle of warfare is an instance of a 
more general moral principle which prohibits 
assaults upon the defenseless."®61
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Torture constitutes a particularly aggravated assault on the 
defenceless because the victim is totally within the power of the 
torturer, and Shue's assessment certainly has some substance. Indeed, 
the humanitarian attitude is probably rooted in the ability to 
identify with the plight of the torture victim.
It has been argued that the defencelessness of the victim is in
itself not a valid criticism of torture, in view of the fact that
other types of assault on the defenceless can be justified:
"It is deceitful to permit artillery or aviation 
to bomb villages and slaughter women and 
children, while the real enemy usually escapes, 
and to refuse interrogation specialists the 
right to seize the truly guilty terrorist and 
spare the innocent."®'7’
The suggestion is that if it is justifiable to bomb innocent non- 
combatants in this manner, then it can hardly be claimed that torture 
is unjustified simply because it constitutes an assault on a 
defenceless victim. The logic is valid, but the deduction that 
torture is justified is not the only possible conclusion: it might
equally be maintained that mass killing of innocent people is morally 
objectionable and cannot be justified. It may be presumed that anyone 
adhering to the humanitarian position would take this view.
The justification of torture requires the rejection of the 
principle of humanity as the decisive criterion for action. Torture 
is in fact often utilised in suppression of certain classes or groups 
within society, and clearly the justification of torture is 
facilitated if the members of such groups can be categorised as sub­
human:
"Regretably, normal people may be brainwashed 
and if our education systems, newspapers, and 
politics teach us from earliest days that 
members of one race, or religion, or political 
belief are not to be regarded as humans like
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ourselves, then it will be normal if we treat 
them inhumanly.,,ee-
This aspect of torture will be examined in more depth in the 
following chapter.
There are, of course, a number of other practices which are
characterised by their inhumanity, for example slavery and extreme
forms of racism. Such practices attract condemnation on humanitarian
grounds equally with torture, but torture does evoke a particular
abhorrence, partly as a result of the extent to which it is used and
partly because it involves extreme degrees of suffering by its very
nature. Slavery and other forms of inhumanity do not necessarily
involve intense pain and suffering for the victim (although in
practice they often do); torture, however, by definition involves the
infliction of limitless suffering, and there is no way in which it can
be inflicted in a humane manner. Torture, especially coercive
torture, is inhuman in essence:
"The purpose of torture is not only to make a 
person talk, but to make him betray others. The 
victim must turn himself by his screams and by 
his submission into a lower animal, in the eyes 
of all and in his own eyes. His betrayal must 
destroy him and take away his human dignity. He 
who gives way under questioning is not only 
constrained from talking again, but is given a 
new status, that of a sub-man.,,es’
We have discussed the effects of torture upon the victim at some 
length in order to indicate the basis on which the humanitarian 
prohibition has been established. It is the desire to protect every 
person from being subjected to extreme suffering which has inspired 
humanitarian concern within those who advocate a total prohibition of 
the practice of torture, and an examination of the effects of torture 
gives some insight into what is actually involved for the victim. 
Those who justify the use of torture focus rather on the motives of
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the torturer and the purpose for which it is employed, and in this way 
relegate the humanity of the victim to a secondary position. Indeed, 
they may even assert that torture can be utilised without being 
inhuman or degrading: for instance, during French • operations in
Algeria, General Massu not only defended the use of torture, but
claimed that it did not degrade the victim, and in order to prove his
point allowed himself to be subjected to electric shock.70
It should be noted that while the inhumanity of torture lies 
essentially in its effects on the victim, the role of the torturer can 
also be regarded as a dehumanising one. In other words, while it is 
true that no human being should be subjected to intense pain and 
suffering, it is also true that no human being should inflict such 
pain or suffering on another human being. From this perspective, even 
an act which did not actually cause human suffering could be 
considered inhuman, and it is important to look briefly at this issue.
The question is whether acts or practices which do not involve 
extrema suffering might still be considered inhuman and classified as
torture purely on the basis of the character of the act. This applies
particularly to those scientific techniques which overcome the will of 
the victim without causing significant pain or suffering: can they
qualify as acts of torture? In fact, such techniques are to a large 
extent dependent upon the attitude of mind of the victim. Hypnosis, 
for example, does not enjoy a high success rate, being effective in a 
limited number of people, and even with them it is not a reliable 
means of obtaining the truth. The polygraph or lie-detector works on 
the principle that an increase in anxiety when telling a lie will 
induce physiological (autonomic) changes in the body, so that blood 
pressure, respiratory rate and galvanic skin response can be monitored
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throughout interrogation and any sharp fluctuations detected by the 
polygraph can be interpreted as indicating an attempt to deceive. 
However, the variety of individual responses and lack of real 
certainty render the process largely ineffective, especially if the 
subject has been trained to resist the technique. The so-called 
'truth drugs', the best known of which is Pentothal, are in fact 
employed regularly in general anaesthetics and also in psychiatry, 
because the administration of precise dosages can induce a state of 
extreme drowsiness in which the patient will talk freely of matters 
which are worrying him. This effect may be of some value in
interrogation, but there is certainly no wonder drug which is 
efficacious in eliciting truth, and the procedure is by no means
infallible. The effectiveness of such techniques is, then, almost 
entirely dependent on the mental state of the victim: if a person
believes that he has been injected with a drug which will compel him 
to reveal the truth, there is a significant probability that he will 
respond accordingly, even if a totally inert substance has been
administered. This is known as the placebo effect,7' and it clearly 
relies on psychology rather than the physiological effects of the 
drug. A similar effect could, in fact, be achieved in different
cultural conditions by the use of black magic, provided the victim was 
convinced in his own mind of the potency of magic.
The enforced application of these techniques may well be regarded 
as objectionable, and in many cases the very awareness that one's mind 
is being interfered with will cause mental anguish which may 
constitute torture even though no physical pain is experienced. It 
remains unclear, however, whether a technique which does not cause 
either pain or intense suffering can be regarded as torture or as
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inhuman treatment. Even when the victim is unaware that his mind and 
will are being tampered with, such practices may be considered at 
least degrading, but they cannot be classified as torture as long as 
the concept of inhumanity remains linked to the experience of the 
victim rather than to the character of the act.
In conclusion, then, the principal factor in support of an 
absolute prohibition of torture is the inhumanity of subjecting a 
human being to intense pain or suffering. Torture by its very nature 
violates human dignity, and if respect for humanity is to be regarded 
as a fundamental and inviolable principle, the use of torture cannot 
be tolerated in any circumstances. The problem is that while the 
humanitarian position is based on the premise that the principle of 
humanity is inviolable, there is in fact no reason why this should be 
accepted universally. Certainly, there is strong support for such an 
approach in international law, but the fact is that in practice there 
are often other interests contending for priority, so that even when 
the concept of humanity is recognised as an important consideration, 
it will not necessarily be given automatic priority by governments: 
if some conflicting interest is identified as being of greater 
importance, respect for humanity may be sacrificed, and once this step 
has been taken it becomes easier to justify the use of torture on 
utilitarian or quasi-utilitarian grounds.
133
Notes
1. Langbein, op.cit., at pp. 11-12.
2. Beccaria, op.cit., at p. 31.
3. Ibid., at pp. 22-23.
4. Bentham, Of Compulsion and herein of Torture, in Twining,
op.cit., at p. 329.
5. Beccaria, op.cit., at pp. 32-33.
6. Bentham, Of Compulsion and herein of Torture, in Twining,
op.cit., at p. 333.
7. Beccaria, op.cit., at p. 34.
8. See Bentham, Of Compulsion and herein of Torture, in Twining,
op.cit., at p. 329.
9. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 
14(3)<g).
10. Beccaria, op.cit., at p. 35.
11. Ruthven, op.cit., at p. 11.
12. Beccaria, op.cit., at p. 31.
13. See Bentham, Of Compulsion and herein of Torture, in Twining,
op. cit. , at p. 332.
14. See Ruthven, op.cit., at p. 11.
15. See Beccaria, op.cit., at p. 35.
16. Ibid.
17. See Bentham, Of Compulsion and herein of Torture, in Twining,
op.cit., at pp. 329-32.
18. Beccaria, op.cit., at p. 35.
19. A confession may be verifiable to the extent that it involves
divulgence of additional information which only a guilty person could 
possess, but this is really separate from the actual confession, which 
is simply an admission of guilt. Where, for example, an accused 
person provides his torturers with details which corroborate his 
confession, such as information about where they can find a murder 
weapon, the confession is in a sense verifiable. In the previous
section, however, we were dealing purely with unqualified admissions 
of guilt.
20. Twining, op.cit., at pp. 350-51.
134
21. Bentham, Of Torture, in Twining, op.cit., at p. 312.
22. See ibid., at p. 313.
23. See Bentham, Of Compulsion and herein of Torture, in Twining,
op.cit,, at p. 322.
24. Bentham, Of Torture, in Twining, op.cit., at p. 313.
25. Ibid., at pp. 312-13.
26. Ibid., at p. 314.
27. Ibid., at p. 315.
28. Ibid.
29. Bentham, Of Compulsion and herein of Torture, in Twining,
op.cit., at p. 337.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Bentham thought that in most instances only convicted ciriminals 
should be tortured since, in his view, other threats would suffice to 
persuade anyone other than a person already facing the maximum penalty 
permitted by law. However, he did add that this rule might not apply 
when the situation could "not wait for a less penal method of 
compulsion". His arguments suggest, moreover, that a person ceases to 
be innocent whenever he withholds information or otherwise refuses to 
co-operate in circumstances where the public has a great interest in 
securing his co-operation. This might lead to a situation in which 
someone not even directly involved could be subjected to torture 
purely on the basis that his co-operation is in the public interest, 
even though he himself is entirely innocent of any offence. It might 
be argued that failure to act in the public interest in itself 
constitutes a moral offence justifying the resort to torture, but such 
a proposition would open the way to all sorts of abuses.
33. Henry Shue, Torture, 7 Philosophy and Public Affairs (1978) 124- 
43, at p. 142.
34. Amnesty International Report on Torture, at p. 26.
35. Torture in the Eighties, at p. 7.
36. Shue, op.cit., at p. 142.
37. Ibid., at pp. 142-43.
38. Twining, op.cit., at pp. 348-49.
39. Shue, op.cit., at p. 143.
40. Torture in the Eighties, at p. 7.
135
41. Kurt Glaser and Stefan T. Possony, Victims of Politics: The
State of Human Rights (Columbia University Press, 1979), at p. 486.
42. Shue, op.cit., at p. 142.
43. Pain: Hew Perspectives in Measurement and Management, edited by
A.W. Harcus, R. Smith and B. Whittle (Churchill Livingstone, 1977), at
p. 5.
44. Amnesty International Report on Torture, at p. 36.
45. See Evidence of Torture: Studies by the Amnesty International
Danish Medical Group (Amnesty International, 1977), at p. 29. 
Volunteers were asked to compare the pain of electric shock with a 
standard pain (ischaemia), and although the quality of pain differed 
(the former being sharp and local, the latter dull and diffuse), the 
subjects were able to make a comparison, and the results indicated a 
variety of subjective experiences: the volunteers described their
pain in different terns to such a degree that it was in fact suggested 
that they actually experienced distinguishable intensities of pain. 
In other experiments, on sensory perception, a wide range of responses 
was also revealed: see Amnesty International Report on Torture, at p.
47, and also Jack Vernon, Inside the Black Room (Pelican, 1966) on 
sensory deprivation experiments generally.
46. Evidence of Torture, at p. 27.
47. Ronald Melzack, The Perception of Pain, in Frontiers of 
Psychological Research, Readings from Scientific American selected by 
Stanley Coopersmith (W. H. Freeman & Co.), at p. 193.
48. "How the Brain Can Ease Your Pain", (Glasgow) Sunday Standard, 23 
August 1981.
49. Carol Ackroyd, Karen Margolis, Jonathan Rosenhead and Tim 
Shallice, The Technology of Political Control (Pluto Press, 2nd 
edition, 1980), at p. 235.
50. Amnesty International Report on Torture, at p. 45.
51. See Ackroyd et al., op.cit., at pp. 237-38.
52. See Vernon, op.cit.
53. Amnesty International Report on Torture, at p. 36.
54. See Evidence of Torture, especially at p. 18.
55. See ibid., at pp. 10 and 19.
56. See ibid., at p. 10.
57. See ibid., at pp. 10 and 16.
58. See ibid., at pp. 12 and 17.
136
59. See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (translated by 
Constance Farrington, Penguin, 1967), at pp. 225-36.
60. See Report of an Amnesty International Medical Seminar:
"Violations of Human Rights: Torture and the Medical Profession"
(Amnesty International, 1978), especially at pp. 11-12.
61. "After-effects of torture 'more damaging' than original attack", 
British Amnesty, Mo. 41, Dec 1980/Jan 1981, at p. 2.
62, Twining, op.cit., at p. 354.
63. Shue, op.cit., at p. 132.
64. Beccaria, op.cit. , at p. 67.
65. Shue, op.cit., at p. 125.
66. Ibid., at pp. 128--29.
67. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare (translated by Daniel Lee, Pall
Mall Press, 1964), at p. 23.
68. Amnesty International Report on Torture, at p. 64.
69. Jean-Paul Sartre, A Victory, prefacing Henri Alleg, The Question 
(translated by John Calder, John Calder, 1958), at p. 24.
70. See Eric Baker, Public Policy and the Use of Torture (Quaker 
Peace and Service in association with Amnesty International, 1980), at 
p. 13.
71. See Amnesty International Report on Torture, at p. 44.
137
CHAPTER POUR: FATIQML SECURITY VERSUS HUKAK.RIGHIS.
While it is possible to support an absolute prohibition on the 
use of torture on humanitarian grounds, the validity of such a 
position obviously depends upon an acceptance of the fundamental 
nature of the principle of humanity, and the fact that torture is 
regularly employed by state authorities in many countries indicates 
that there is actually a widespread rejection of this perspective and 
that there are many people in positions of power who, privately if not 
publicly, are willing to justify the use of torture when they regard 
some other consideration or interest as more compelling than the
protection of human dignity. Such a rejection of humanity as the
determining criterion of political action usually relies on
utilitarian logic, although in practice the rules and safeguards which 
a philosopher might wish to impose are invariably ignored. In this 
chapter, we shall examine the circumstances in which torture is most 
frequently resorted to, indicating in particular the grounds on which 
it is regarded as justified, and we shall thereafter examine the
manner in which the erosion and circumvention of constitutional and 
legal safeguards permits the unlawful introduction of torture by state 
authorities.
An empirical examination of situations in which torture has been 
utilised in the recent past shows that its purpose is primarily 
political. Although in some circumstances the use of torture arises 
as a result of corruption, inadequate control of the police or armed 
forces, or even inefficient criminal investigation techniques, it is 
clear that in the modern world torture is employed principally in the 
suppression of political opposition. Amnesty International's World
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Survey1 indicates that torture was directed against political 
subversion in sixty two of the sixty four countries mentioned, and the 
same pattern emerges from an examination of more recent information,2 
so that it may be concluded that the use of torture is most commonly 
regarded as justifiable when there exists some threat to the security 
of the state.
One of the major responsibilities of every government is the
protection of national security, and this refers not only to the
defence of sovereign territory against external aggression, but also 
to the preservation or, in some cases, the imposition of those social 
values and political ideals which the government (supported by 'the 
Establishment') considers fundamental to the organisation of society. 
In this latter sense, national security involves the essential
character of the existing socio-political system: thus, in a
democratic and pluralistic society, national security is concerned 
with the preservation of democratic institutions and individual 
liberty, whereas in a totalitarian system the concept of national
security is much narrower, referring to a strictly defined form of 
socio-political organisation. In every sovereign state, national 
security is regarded as paramount, because the form of society which 
the government wishes to perpetuate is equated with the very spirit 
and existence of the nation, and consequently if any threat to the 
framework of that society emerges, a conflict may arise between the 
protection of national security and respect for human dignity, and the 
principle of humanity may come under serious challenge as a 
determining factor in political decisions and actions. The same 
applies, of course, when national security is threatened by external
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aggression, but in practice torture is more commonly resorted to in 
response to internal subversion.
The most serious form of internal threat to national security in 
any state is the emergence of violent opposition to the government, 
often in the shape of terrorism, and there does seem to be a 
connection between the increase in the use of torture and the 
development of political violence over the past few decades: Amnesty
International's World Survey, for example, reveals that in half the 
cases referred to torture was directed against subversion which 
manifested itself in guerrilla or terrorist activity.3 While 
guerrilla-type tactics have been employed throughout history, it is 
only in relatively recent times that guerrilla warfare has assumed the 
nature of a recognised theoretical strategy of insurgent groups. The 
description "guerrilla", which means "little war", originated in the 
Peninsular War (1807-14), and referred initially to the activites of 
partisans in enemy-occupied territory, but earlier this century the 
concept was adapted by Mao Tse-tung to apply to revolutionary 
conditions:
"With Mao came the real division between 
partisan guerrilla warfare and revolution­
ary/insurgency guerrilla warfare.... He expanded 
the ultimate in civil-military relations: the
people became the guerrilla army, the army the 
people, still with strict overall political 
control.... Mao's success glorified revolutionary 
guerrilla warfare and the post-Second World War 
years witnessed a widespread scattering of such 
insurgencies.
Mao's ideas were adopted and refined by numerous theorists and 
practitioners of political violence, such as Giap (Vietnam), Hasution 
(Indonesia), Grivas (Cyprus) and Guevara (Latin America), and the 
failure of Guevara's theories of basing forces in the countryside 
subsequently led to the widespread adoption of Carlos Marighella's
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urban guerrilla warfare in appropriate conditions. In the last twenty- 
years or so there has been a dramatic increase in the number of
terrorist organisations, whose motives range from world revolution and 
anarchy through nationalism and religious fundamentalism to counter­
terrorism, and such groups, along with more orthodox guerrilla 
movements, often have a world-wide impact through the international 
mass media, to the extent that they constitute a major factor in
global politics. Political violence in the context of national 
politics is, then, a universal phenomenon, and it is unlikely that the 
problems it creates will disappear while injustice and oppression are 
perceived to exist in society. The sensitivity of governments to
violent subversion must be seen in this context.
The growth in the use of violence for political ends within the 
national sphere has been paralleled by an increase in the use of 
torture, and it is clear that there is a relationship between the 
eruption of political violence and the emergence of torture. 
Political violence on any scale represents a serious threat to
national security, and there can be little doubt that strong counter­
measures will usually be required to protect the public (and the 
state) from guerrilla and terrorist activity. Often this will involve 
the curtailment of civil liberties and the assumption of special 
powers by the government to enable it to deal more effectively with 
the threat:
"For the best defence against terrorism is 
undoubtedly to set up a police state.... where 
anybody can be declared an enemy of the state 
and incarcerated without any process of law.. . . 
it must be obvious that some freedom must be 
sacrificed in order to protect citizens from 
death and intimidation by terror and the very 
fabric of the state from disintegration."®
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It may be possible to defeat terrorism without resorting to the
use of torture, or even without introducing emergency measures, but
historically governments have generally found it expedient to invoke
special powers in order to deal with such a serious threat to national
security. The rationale is that the long-term survival of the state
(that is, the existing system) is of such critical importance that the
imposition of temporary restrictions on the rights and liberties of
individuals is justified, although in fact governments often retain
emergency powers even after any immediate threat has been eradicated,
with the result that repressive practices become institutionalised.
In a sense, the terrorists themselves are responsible for this
situation, because initially it is they who compel governments to take
extreme action. Indeed, it is ironic that the aim of certain
revolutionary groups has been to provoke such a response:
H It is one of the beliefs of terrorists that if 
they succeed in provoking a right-wing coup or 
the enforcement of extreme repressive measures, 
then there must inevitably be a counter-movement 
which will destroy the government and bring
about the revolution. But in both Uruguay and 
the Argentine exactly the opposite has happened.
The right-wing governments brought to power 
because of revolutionary terrorism have crippled 
the terrorist movements in both countries.,,e
Governments will, then, take extreme measures to ensure the
protection of national security against a violent threat, and in most 
cases they may be regarded as justified in doing so, at least within 
certain limits, principally the requirement of respect for core human 
rights. However, if security farces should consider torture a 
necessary weapon in counter-subversive operations, a conflict arises
between their duty to protect national security and their
responsibility to respect human rights, and it is in such situations 
that the priority given by governments to national security becomes
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apparent. Moreover, although the use of torture is not normally 
authorised by emergency legislation, such legislation by removing the 
usual restraints often has the effect of facilitating the clandestine 
use of torture by the security forces, a process which will be 
examined in greater depth at a later stage.
Torture is required by security forces in responding to political 
violence primarily because guerrilla and terrorist strategy relies 
upon secrecy and anonymity, creating for security forces particular 
difficulties in obtaining information as to the enemy's activities and 
in procuring evidence for convictions. The conditions of modern 
combat - the sophistication of equipment available to governments and 
the distribution of weaponry and resources - have virtually ruled out 
the pitched battle of bygone eras, at least in so far as the majority 
of civil conflicts are concerned. Governments regard the provision of 
the most advanced and efficient military arms and technology for their 
forces as a top priority, particularly in the area of counter­
insurgency, and while guerrilla and terrorist groups are often 
supplied with arms of excellent quality by their ideological 
supporters, the state's forces are generally better equipped as well 
as more numerous. Consequently, insurgents are compelled to avoid 
full-scale or open confrontation and rely on specialised tactics. In 
some conditions, guerrilla forces may match the state's military in 
strength and may even control large areas of territory, but conflict 
on this scale is verging on civil war, when the government's de facto 
authority may be in doubt; mare often, revolutionary farces must 
operate within 'enemy' territory, not holding any territorial base 
themselves, but carrying out clandestine activities while living 
within the community. Accordingly, the basic principle of
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revolutionary guerrilla warfare, at least in its initial stages, is 
that the entire body of repressed classes should form an underground 
organisation which can support and shelter the active forces of the 
revolution:
"lasution, and initially Giap and Chinh, agreed 
with Mao Tse-tung that a guerrilla war should 
pass through three broad stages: first, the
clandestine underground structure should be 
created, including the cell network; second, 
these groups should emerge to conduct guerrilla 
hostilities; third, the guerrillas should shift 
to regular operations for the final stage.
During the first phase the insurgency movement 
is most vulnerable, but presents a minimal 
target since it remains hidden; a larger target 
is offered during the second stage, but by 
acting in guerrilla fashion the insurgents can 
be elusive; by the time the third phase is 
reached the guerrillas should be strong enough 
to absorb any counter-offensive."-7
It is essential for the insurgents to be able to live ostensibly
as normal members of society while conducting their business under a
cloak of secrecy, and this requires the co-operation and support of
the community in which they live: in some circumstances, the
guerrillas may receive sympathy and assistance from the population in
general, particularly when an unpopular regime is in power, and the
whole community may become a vast underground network along the lines
of classical revolutionary theory; in other circumstances, the
guerrillas may have to ensure the silence of the people through terror
and intimidation:
"We know that the sine qua non of victory in 
modern warfare is the unconditional support of a 
population....Such support may be spontaneous, 
although that is quite rare and probably a 
temporary condition. If it doesn't exist, it 
must be secured by every possible means, the 
most effective of which is terrorism."°
Guerrilla warfare, then, relies heavily on secrecy, and the same 
is true of urban terrorism:
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"The maxim by Mao Tse-tung that the guerrilla 
should be like the fish in the sea, 
indistinguishable from others and hence hard to 
identify, assumes even greater relevance since 
the urban sea is far more teeming."3
Against an adversary of this nature, conventional military
responses are of little value:
"We still persist in studying a type of warfare 
that no longer exists and that we shall never 
fight again. ... Since the end of World War II, a 
new form of warfare has been born. Called at
times either subversive warfare or revolutionary 
warfare, it differs fundamentally from the wars 
of the past in that victory is not expected from 
the clash of two armies on a field of battle.
This confrontation, which in times past saw the 
annihilation of an enemy army in one or more 
battles, no longer occurs."10
For security forces dealing with revolutionary warfare, then, the 
problems are very different from those faced during more conventional 
conflicts. In fact, the most serious problem is obtaining accurate 
information about the activities and intentions of the enemy, 
particularly when the security forces themselves do not enjoy popular 
support:
"It is we, in spite of ourselves, who have 
imposed this type of war - terrorism in the 
towns and ambushes in the country. With the 
disequilibrium in the forces, the F.L.M. has no 
other means of action. The ratio between our 
forces and theirs gives them no option but to 
attack us by surprise: invisible, ungraspable,
unexpected, they must strike and disappear, or 
be exterminated. The elusiveness of the enemy 
is the reason for our disquiet; a bomb is 
thrown in the street: a soldier wounded by a
random shot: people rush up and then disperse:
later, Moslems nearby claim they saw nothing.
All this fits into the pattern of a popular war 
of the poor against the rich, with the rebel 
units depending on local support. That is why 
the regular Army and civilian powers have come 
to regard the destitute swarm as their 
uncountable and constant enemy. The occupying 
troops are baffled by the silence they 
themselves created: the rich feel hunted down
by the uncommunicative poor. The 'forces of 
order', hindered by their own might, have no
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defence against guerrillas except punitive 
expeditions and reprisals, and no defence 
against terrorism but terror. Everybody, 
everywhere, is hiding something: they must be
made to talk. "11
In such conditions, coercion may be the only means of obtaining 
information, and torture presents itself as a potential solution, not 
only in extorting confessions and denunciations and in eliciting 
otherwise elusive information, but also in discouraging those who may 
be tempted to give assistance to the subversives: just as terrorism
can dissuade people from co-operating with the security forces, so 
torture can function as a general deterrent to those who might 
consider supporting subversive organisations. This is why it is in 
counter-insurgency situations that security forces most often regard 
the use of torture as necessary and justifiable, and in fact most 
printed apologias of torture appear in military manuals dealing with 
counter-insurgency techniques. Occasionally, the use of torture as 
such is openly defended,1-' but more commonly euphemisms such as 
'interrogation in depth' are employed, rendering the proposition a 
little more palatable to the sensitive.
The argument justifying the use of torture in counter-insurgency 
operations is essentially utilitarian in nature, asserting that the 
protection of society - or national security - is of such importance 
that the interests of individuals and even the principle of humanity 
must, if necessary, be sacrificed so that the threat presented by 
subversion can be resisted: if the use of torture is necessary to
combat such a threat, then torture must be seen as the lesser of two 
evils. The importance of maintaining law and order and the ultimate 
morality of preserving the existing socio-political system are thus 
emphasised, and the essential validity of the end is invoked to
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justify any necessary means. This line of reasoning is particularly
persuasive when framed in terms of the protection of innocent lives,
thus placing the rights of individuals in direct conflict:
"Voila pourquoi la torture a continue a etre 
autorise par une cruelle necessite.... pour 
1'indispensable necessite du renseignement 
visant a eviter des drames cent fois plus 
atroces dont seraient victimes les innocents."-l 3
The motives of those who employ torture are contrasted with the 
motives of the terrorists, whose very purpose is to murder and maim 
with a view to overthrowing the existing socio-political order, and 
the legitimacy of the torturers' goal of protecting the innocent is 
identified as the justifying factor. In other words, the potential 
consequences of not employing torture are considered more undesirable 
than the effects of permitting its use, an argument which is most 
effective when there is a direct relationship between the use of 
torture and the protection of innocent lives, as illustrated in the 
following account of an incident which occurred during the Algerian 
conflict:
"The civil Inspector-General Csuper-prefect] on 
special duty in Oran was visited by a member of 
the Commission for the Safeguarding of
Individual Rights. He asked him into his 
office, sat down at his desk, and said, 'We have 
just captured a terrorist, bomb in hand. We are 
convinced that he knows, but will not tell us, 
the names of thirty other terrorists, each of 
whom is preparing to throw a bomb. We can 
either put him through an unpleasant quarter of 
an hour or risk the lives of some 300 innocent
human beings. Which shall we do? Put yourself
in my place and decide.' The visitor stammered,
'Well.... I think.... it might be better...' The 
Inspector-General cut him short. 'You need not 
worry, the decision was taken three months ago.
The citizens of Oran were able to sleep in 
peace."14
Many people might feel inclined to agree with the sentiments of
the Inspector-General, or at least might not feel free to condemn him
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for a decision made in an invidious position, and there is no doubt 
that the argument which he presents, albeit in emotive language, has a 
strong prima facie appeal. However, it should be stressed that the 
reasoning involves an over-simplification of the issues, and a number 
of question marks must be placed over it. For instance, how could the 
Inspector-General be "convinced" that the suspect possessed the 
relevant information? How could he be certain that his men did not 
arrest thirty innocent members of the public purely on the 
unverifiable evidence of that one suspect, given under duress? What 
constituted "an unpleasant quarter of an hour", and what further 
action would have been taken (or was taken) if the required 
information had not been forthcoming at the end of that period? It is 
clear that there is a danger of reducing the whole question of torture 
to a general equation in which the end result is the only relevant 
factor:
"When all is said and done, if it ends in saving 
someone's life, a crack on the head of a man 
caught throwing bombs is not so awful as people 
like to make out."1®
Clearly the argument is by no means unassailable even on 
utilitarian grounds, and a number of other considerations have to be 
taken into account, some of which were identified in the previous 
chapter, nevertheless, it is easy to understand why those responsible 
for security find torture an attractive proposition, especially if 
they are convinced of its effectiveness, and the fact is that many 
people would regard the use of torture as justifiable even in the 
absence of satisfactory answers to the questions posed above. 
Indeed, even if they recognise that torture is not always efficient or 
reliable in eliciting the truth, they may still regard it as useful 
and justify its employment on the basis of a sufficiently high success
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rate. Moreover, it should be recognised that while it is useful for
the security forces to be able to point to specific cases in which
innocent lives are threatened, their principal concern is national
security, and their justification of torture is not limited to such
cases, but in fact extends to the routine employment of torture for
the purpose of procuring general intelligence about the activities of
subversives. The protection of national security is rarely dependent
upon a single incident, but involves an ongoing struggle between the
security farces and the subversives, in the course of which the
security forces constantly require information which can only be
obtained by coercion. While individual acts of torture may have
little bearing on national security, therefore, information which will
be of value in the protection of national security can be obtained by
the systematic employment of torture. The danger of such an approach
is that it oftens leads to the institutionalisation of torture:
"Since most people faced with torture will 
confess to whatever is demanded of them (with 
the possible exception of the tested militants 
belonging to real underground organizations), 
the system becomes self-fulfilling and self- 
extending to the point where the initial aim of 
interrogation gives way to intimidation and 
ultimately to mass terror."ie
The logic relied upon by those who justify the use of torture in 
response to a threat to national security sets the 'good' of the 
existing system against the 'evil' of subversion, and the paramount 
goal of protecting national security is invoked to justify the 
violation of fundamental human rights. National security is presented 
as the supreme value, in the defence of which any means are 
legitimate, so that if undesirable or morally objectionable methods 
become necessary, they must be accepted as 'lesser evils'. It was on
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the basis of this rationale that General Massu, a French officer
involved in the Algerian conflict, was able to conclude:
"A sine qua non of our action in Algeria is that 
we should accept these methods heart and soul as 
necessary and morally justifiable."17
In the case of Algeria, even some of the clergy supported this 
reasoning, likening the use of torture to disciplining a child or to 
painful but necessary surgery. It is apparent, therefore, that those 
who justify torture do so on the basis of the moral validity of the 
end which they have in view. The necessary and crucial implication of 
this approach is the displacement of humanity as a peremptory 
principle of behaviour, and while we have identified national security 
as the ideal which is mast often given priority over the demands of 
humanity, it should be recognised that many people have no real 
humanitarian concern at all and would justify torture for far less 
compelling reasons than the protection of national security.
Another French officer who took part in the campaign in Algeria 
was Colonel Roger Trinquier, whose book ' La Guerre Moderne' has often 
come in for criticism on the grounds that it attempts to justify the 
use of torture in certain circumstances. In fact, Trinquier's 
principal theme is a call for a strategy which would obviate the need 
for the violent suppression of political opposition; he advocates the 
creation of an organisation to ensure political control of the people 
in order to counteract the aims of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, 
and his book contains a number of warnings against the unnecessary use 
of violence and injury to physical and moral integrity. His proposal 
is to secure the support of the community even before the outbreak of 
hostilities, thus depriving potential revolutionaries of their 
essential infrastructure, and he believes that it is failure to adopt 
this course which necessitates violence:
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"And very often, because we have not prepared 
anything, we will be tempted to obtain by 
violence information that a well-organized 
service would have given us without 
difficulty."1®
Trinquier accepts that when his initial strategy has not been
implemented, the use of coercion may prove necessary:
"If the prisoner gives the information 
requested, the examination is quickly 
terminated; if not, specialists must force his 
secret from him. Then, as a soldier, he must 
face the suffering, and perhaps the death, he 
has heretofore managed to avoid." 131
Moreover, while he envisages that the specialists will often be 
able to procure the information without any violation of the 
prisoner's physical or moral integrity, Trinquier adds that "we must 
not trifle with our responsibilities."20 The implication of this 
statement is that he would, in fact, justify the use of torture if 
necessary.
We have seen, then, that torture is commonly resorted to in
response to political violence which threatens the security of the
state, and that the explanation for this lies in the difficulty of
obtaining information about subversive activities coupled with the
importance which governments attach to national security. In some
circumstances, however, torture is employed even when no violent
opposition to the government exists. Torture arises, says Malise
Ruthven, "wherever governments believe themselves, or choose to
believe themselves, to be beset by conspiracies and subversion”,21
and he expands on this assessment as fallows:
"The conspiracy scenario to which this attitude 
gives rise is often the reaction of a regime 
with a weak moral or social base. In such cases 
the varied and disparate manifestations of 
dissent born of evolutionary changes or 
contradictions in the social structure are 
perceived as the result of machinations by a
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'hidden' enemy. The inquisitorial machinery 
with torture at its centre is established to 
'root' the enemy out."22
While terrorist action and other forms of political violence 
constitute an obvious threat to national security, governments can 
also regard non-violent dissent or opposition as a threat sufficiently 
serious to merit the imposition of harsh repressive measures and the 
introduction of torture. This occurs most commonly in unstable 
totalitarian systems, particularly if the government enjoys little 
popular support. In a totalitarian system, all opposition to the 
government is characterised as a challenge to the very fabric of 
society and ipso facto as a threat to national security, and 
activities which would be normal and acceptable within a pluralistic 
system are considered unacceptable and unlawful. Ho dissent is 
tolerated, and as a result any opposition to the government must be 
clandestine by nature. Governments are acutely aware that their 
opponents can only operate on this basis, and this creates a perpetual 
paranoia, as a result of which insecure governments are liable to 
exaggerate the threat of subversion, especially if there is any 
prospect of it developing into political violence. Of course, 
totalitarian regimes may enjoy stability and a considerable degree of 
popular support, and each government's response to non-violent 
opposition will depend upon the particular conditions, but in general 
the less opportunity there is for legitimate apposition, the more 
reason there is to be apprehensive of clandestine opposition. 
Consequently, in an intolerant and insecure system the appearance of a 
few dissenters may be interpreted as indicative of a major conspiracy 
against national security and provoke a harsh repressive reaction,
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whereas in a democratic system it may require a major outbreak of
terrorist activity before the security forces become involved at all.
When non-violent subversive activity is regarded as a serious
threat by a government, the use of torture may be considered
justifiable for the same reasons as in the case of a violent threat:
subversion involves secrecy, and the same problems arise for the
security forces. In fact, secrecy creates fear, and the greater the
secrecy, the more intense will be the fear. The relationship between
secrecy, fear and torture can be seen in the historical use of torture
against heresy and witchcraft, but today it is apprehension of
political subversion which lies behind the institution of torture:
"Under [the Latin American 'Reds-under-the-bed' 
syndrome] a wide range of events and activities 
are seen (often most improbably) as fuelled by 
the 'International Marxist Conspiracy', and the 
Red Menace is used to justify any violation of 
human decency, not excluding the torture of 
small children.... There are revolutionaries, 
idealistic and otherwise; there are terrorists.
But how real is the Red Menace? How much of the 
activity characterised as 'Marxist' is merely 
that which would be normal in a 'free' 
country?.... The scale of the Red Menace may be 
debatable; the scale of the fear of a supposed 
Red Menace is beyond question.... I am suggesting 
that the organised threat to established regimes 
from the left is commonly very small, but that 
it is used as an excuse for widespread 
repression of activity which might well be
applauded."23
It is perhaps inevitable that repressed and exploited peoples
will eventually organise some form of resistance, at least in the
present day political climate in which international revolution is 
fomented around the globe; the down-trodden of the earth are
increasingly exposed to political education and are able to turn to 
Marxism (or some variant thereof) as a unifying force to support their 
struggle for liberation by means of the violent overthrow of the class
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system.2* Morever, Marxist regimes and organisations are more than 
willing to provide arms and assistance for those engaged in promoting 
the revolution. As political awareness is awakened among the 
oppressed, then, the resolve to demand justice crystalises, and as the 
means of revolution become available the eruption of violence follows 
inexorably. According to Frantz Fanon, violence is not only 
inevitable and justifiable, but is actually essential as a "cleansing 
force":2S
"The rebel's weapon is the proof of his
humanity."245
It is against this background of revolutionary propaganda and 
activity that the position of unstable regimes must be viewed. 
Insurrection may erupt anywhere at any time, and this produces an 
acute fear of subversion which leads to intense repression of even the 
most innocuous dissent.
The relationship between the defence of national security and the 
principle of humanity can be seen most clearly when the concept of 
national security is equated with the preservation of a particular 
social order in which the rale af the government is to suppress 
certain sectors of society in order to protect the status and 
privileges of the ruling class, often an elite minority. Vhere wide 
social divisions exist, the preservation of privilege is naturally the 
highest priority of those who enjoy it, and it is understandable for 
them to support the repression of the exploited classes in order to 
ensure that their position and status is maintained. Often the 
justification of such repression is facilitated by the general 
attitude of the ruling classes towards the lower classes, who may be 
regarded as inferior or even as sub-human. The most extreme example 
of this is racism, which involves the dehumanisation of particular
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racial or ethnic groups, an attitude which can be identified in the
Mazi treatment of Jews and non-Aryans and also in the colonialist
mentality of the former imperial powers, as well as in countless
situations throughout history. The essence of such an attitude is
that a supposed racial superiority confers a right to enjoy privilege,
so that distinctions based on race must be maintained. Thus, Jean-
Paul Sartre, referring to racial oppression in Algeria, states:
"It is a bitter and tragic fact that, for the 
Europeans in Algeria, being a man means first
and foremast superiority to the Moslems. But
what if the Moslem finds in his turn that his 
manhood depends on equality with the settler?
It is then that the European begins to feel his 
very existence diminished and cheapened."27
Such dehumanisation, of course, also facilitates the
justification of torture, since if the victim is not seen as a human
being, the infliction of torture appears less objectionable.
Certainly the racialist attitudes of the French during the Algerian
conflict played a significant part in the justification of torture:
"... although.... an Algerian was legally a
citizen of France, he was not a Frenchman,
and.... in the eyes of many Frenchmen, including 
many of those responsible far farming French 
public opinion, he was not even a human 
being."2a
An attitude of racial discrimination is, of course, particularly 
valuable in rationalising the use of torture, in that there are
obvious physical features by which the members of one race may be 
readily distinguished from those of other races, so that a certain 
basis does exist on which a proposed differentiation in treatment 
might be maintained. In fact, prior to the Algerian conflict 
scientific writings had been published in which the view was expressed 
that Arabs were essentially sub-human in a • medical and psychiatric 
sense, that is it was suggested that Arabs were driven by animal
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instincts and did not have the capacity for thought processes enjoyed 
by Europeans.33 When such a belief is held, it is clear that 
humanitarian considerations will be of little concern to those intent
on preserving the socio-political system, and will present no
impediment to the use of torture.
Historically, torture has often been inflicted primarily (and 
sometimes exclusively) on members of the lower classes in society, in
particular those with few rights, such as foreigners and slaves.
However, although racism and similar dehumanising attitudes facilitate 
the rationalisation of torture, the justification of torture is not 
dependent on a denial of the victim's humanity in a scientific sense, 
that is it is not necessary to actually believe the victim is sub­
human. The justification of torture is in fact often based on a more 
subtle form of dehumanisation, in which the humanity of the victim is 
not denied but is simply subordinated to some other principle which is 
considered to be of greater importance. This is borne out by the 
words of one torturer:
"Do you know why we have been in power for six 
years? It is because we relegate the human 
factor to second place."30
This statement pinpoints the crux of the matter: if the
principle of humanity is given absolute priority, the use of torture 
can never be justified, but if it is relegated to second place, there 
is no impediment to the use of torture. We have already identified 
national security as the ideal to which the principle of humanity is 
most often sacrificed, and it is obvious that the dehumanisation 
process can be applied to the enemies of the state, that is to those 
who threaten the existing socio-political order, particularly when 
they employ violent means against innocent people. The reasoning is
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tiiat those who resort to terrorism and political violence are
themselves the worst violators of human rights, and by their
atrocities renounce any claim to respect for their own humanity:
"The usual justification posits a situation
where the 'good1 people and the 'good' values 
are being threatened by persons who do not
respect 'the rules of the game', but use
ruthless, barbaric, and illegal means to achieve 
their 'evil' ends."31
In some circumstances, the introduction of torture can be
prevented, even when there is an erosion of legal safeguards, either 
because the members of the government have personal reservations about 
the use of torture or because there remains adequate democratic 
control over the executive. However, torture is often authorised - 
and therefore justified - at the highest levels of government, and in
many cases this is made possible by the removal or curtailment of
legal safeguards as a result of the proclamation of a state of 
emergency. Indeed, even if the government does not authorise the use 
of torture, the climate produced by the absence of normal safeguards 
often allows the security forces to resort to the clandestine use of 
torture.
When torture is authorised at the highest level, the government's 
justification of torture will clearly be based an the premise that 
national security is paramount, but it will also be necessary to 
persuade all those whose co-operation is required that the interests 
of national security justify the employment of torture. In same 
situations, especially in totalitarian systems, the government may 
already enjoy the full support of the various branches of power, but 
in other circumstances it will have to secure the co-operation of a 
number of different sectors:
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"Policemen, soldiers, doctors, scientists,
judges, civil servants, politicians are involved 
in torture, whether in direct beating, examining 
victims, inventing new devices and techniques, 
sentencing prisoners on extorted false
confessions, officially denying the existence of 
torture, or using torture as a means of 
maintaining their power."32
The co-operation of the security forces is generally essential, 
but the support of other groups may not be necessary, provided they do 
not actively expose and challenge the use of torture. In totalitarian 
systems, this will not usually present any problem, since effective 
control over the different branches of power is already established 
within the political structure. Where democratic institutions remain 
functional within the system, however, the government may find it 
necessary to ensure that the other branches of power are kept ignorant 
of its involvement in the practice of torture. This is often passible 
during a state of emergency because parliamentary supervision of the 
executive is considerably curtailed, while other measures such as 
censorship of the media ensure that any independent agencies will 
encounter difficulties in attempting to confirm suspicions of torture.
Problems may arise with the judiciary, which in many countries 
has a specific responsibility for protecting the individual from 
governmental abuses, although even when the judiciary is independent, 
its members (and, indeed, senior civil servants in other fields) will 
normally tend to be sympathetic towards the government in its defence 
of national security, and consequently may exhibit inherent prejudices 
against those suspected of being enemies of the state. This does not 
mean that judges will necessarily be corrupt or consciously biased, 
but simply that the attitudes which they display towards law and order 
will be strongly influenced by their conservative (that is, pro- 
Establishment) leanings. Judges are usually appointed on the basis of
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their standing as respected figures in society, and their natural 
tendency will be to support the system in which they have risen to 
positions of authority. As a result, they may fail to pursue 
allegations of torture in the belief that terrorists are liable to 
make false accusations against the security forces as a matter of 
course, or because they simply do not believe the claims, or even 
because they consider a degree of compulsion to be justifiable in 
emergency situations. On the other hand, judges may be conscientious 
in their efforts to protect the individual from governmental abuses, 
and although they may find it exceptionally difficult to carry out 
effective investigations into the activities of the security forces, 
their attempts to do so may create embarrassment for the government. 
In such circumstances, the government may find it necessary to 
circumvent judicial interference by assuming direct control of the 
judiciary, either by replacing judges with its own nominees or by 
transferring jurisdiction in political cases to military tribunals.
Governments are normally dependent upon the security farces, 
either the civil police or, more frequently, the armed forces, for the 
actual administration of torture, and indeed the power of the 
government lies ultimately in its control of the security forces. The 
role of the armed farces has traditionally been one not only of 
defending the territory of the state against external aggression, but 
also of protecting the regime in power from internal subversion, and 
the armed farces have thus had a definite function in the suppression 
of unconstitutional political opposition, particularly when this 
function is beyond the capabilities of the police. Both the police 
and the military can, then, be utilised in the defence of the existing 
socio-political system, and it is essential for the government to
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ensure their loyalty to that system by persuading them that the 
defence of the system is the defence of the nation. In other words, 
the members of the security forces must be convinced that national 
security in its broad sense represents the supreme value.
The support of senior military personnel for the existing system 
can normally be secured by the simple expedient of ensuring that only 
those who are politically acceptable and whose loyalty is beyond
question are elevated to the senior ranks, a fairly straightforward 
process since government approval for appointments will invariably be 
required. In class-based societies, senior officers can be drawn 
principally from the upper or privileged strata, and in this way 
advantage may be taken of their predisposition towards the system. 
Thus, in Greece during the 1960's, most of the officer cadets were 
drawn from established conservative and nationalist families, and 
their inherent tendencies were reinforced by making them feel that 
they had been called to purify the nation from undesirable elements.33 
It is, then, a definite policy of governments to ensure that in
officer selection only those of unimpeachable character and
qualifications gain access to influential positions. Moreover, in
industrialised capitalist countries the most senior officers in the
armed forces often have a further vested interest in the preservation
of the system, because they themselves are deeply involved in business 
activities, particularly arms production and sales. This obviously 
makes them reliable supporters of free enterprise and enemies of 
socialism:
"Through their economic links with big business, 
and because of their social and ideological
identification with the status quo, the high- 
ranking officers who control the armed forces, 
conceive their role and that of the officers and 
men under them as that of defenders of the
system." 3/1
The commitment of such men to a particular way of life may be so 
strong that they will stage a military coup in order to preserve the 
existing order rather than permit a democratically elected government 
to implement radical or reformist policies.
In socialist countries, too, the selection process is utilised to 
ensure that only the politically reliable are appointed to promoted 
posts, and in general senior officers will be loyal socialists who 
have displayed a clear grasp of Marxist principles and a strong 
commitment to the socialist system. Any indication of reactionary 
tendencies will result in a static career, if not in dismissal from 
the forces. In responding to a threat to national security, then, 
governments can normally (though not invariably) rely upon the support 
of senior military personnel, and any dissenters can be summarily 
removed or transferred to other posts.
Selection is also an important factor in securing the support of 
the officer corps below the most senior ranks, although it must be 
complemented by political indoctrination; for the lower ranks, a 
combination of indoctrination and discipline is required. The aim of 
political indoctrination is to persuade members of the forces whose
natural inclination may not be to defend the existing socio-political
order that the defence of the nation includes the defence of the 
system. It must be stressed to military personnel that the security 
of the state is paramount, and that any means are justified in its 
protection. In this process, an element of dehumanisation may be 
introduced:
"It wasn't like they were humans. We were 
conditioned to believe this was for the good of 
the nation, the good of our country and anything 
we did was okay. And when you shot someone you 
didn't think you were shooting at a human. They
were a Gook or a Commie and it was okay."33
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The very nature of armed forces suggests the idea of violence,
and in general the members of armed forces will not question the
justifiability of violence and killing. They are not concerned with
the hypothetical niceties of philosophical argument, but must be
prepared to deal with the harsh realities of war, suffering and death.
This is not to say that they necessarily enjoy the use of violence or
have any particular predisposition to warfare: war may be justified
without being glorified. However, in the sphere of military training
the aim is to prepare troops for action, and the concept of humanity
is not one which instructors will regard as useful in achieving this.
Humanitarian considerations will therefore be suppressed, as a result
of which the members of the armed forces will be more likely to accept
the use of torture as justifiable in the defence of national security:
“The reason why the officers and JT. C. 0. ' s, who 
have been before military courts in the last
year, all come from these formations tie. elite 
units] is that they were all at some time
ordered to collect intelligence and to do so "by 
all means available". Mr President, in military 
language the phrase is "to gather intelligence", 
in polite language it is "to push an 
interrogation", in French it is “to torture"
.... I do not know what sort of mental turmoil 
someone who gives an order like this must go
through; but I do know the sense of shock and 
revulsion suffered by those who have to carry it 
out. All the fine ideas and the illusions of 
the young St Cyr cadet crumble into nothing when 
he comes face to face with this stranger out of 
whom he is ordered to drag information..., But 
you will say: "Then why did not the young St
Cyr cadet refuse to carry out the order?"
Because the ultimate end had been so described 
to him that it appeared to justify the means.
It had been proved to him that the outcome of 
the battle depended on the information he 
obtained, that the victory of France was at 
stake. He was caught in the toils of a monster 
whose ethics prescribed that "the end justifies 
the means". It was a crusade and in every age 
crusades have had the same characteristics."3G
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The potency of military training in inculcating a belief in 
national security as the supreme value, in the defence of which even 
the use of torture is justifiable, is indicated by the statements of 
numerous former torturers.37 Often young conscripts have been 
involved, and their impressionability has facilitated the task of 
their instructors, especially in certain Third World countries where 
peasant boys with a limited education and a restricted experience of 
the world have been conscripted and taken away from village life. Of 
course, not everyone is suitable material, and in sane instances only 
'elite' units have been employed as torturers, but the fact remains 
that indoctrination techniques can be extremely powerful, and when 
combined with a strict disciplinary regime they may prove difficult to 
resist.33
The principle of unquestioning obedience to the orders of a 
superior is the cornerstone of military organisation. Great emphasis 
is placed on the absolute necessity of obedience and respect within 
the military hierarchy, and severe disciplinary measures are taken 
whenever the regulations are violated. Political indoctrination in 
itself may not be sufficient to secure the loyalty of the lower ranks, 
and it is therefore necessary to ensure control over those ranks 
through a strict system of military discipline. It is interesting to 
note that in Greece in the 1960's, while officers were exposed to 
extensive indoctrination and also to some physical violence aimed at 
ensuring future obedience to orders, the lower ranks received only a 
little indoctrination but were subjected to systematic physical abuse 
in order to reinforce their obedience.33 In effect, there was an 
attempt to ensure loyalty by means of terror, and when a soldier has 
been conditioned in this way he will find it very difficult to
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disobey, even if ordered to torture. One Greek soldier made the
following statement at his trial:
"I think that in this hurricane of terrorism, 
violence and fear, I tried to participate as 
little as possible. I would rather not have 
participated at all, but it was impassible. ... I 
was caught up in a machine and became a tool 
without any will of my own to resist. I 
remember Spanos threatening a soldier that he 
would ruin his family. The next day the boy 
began to beat prisoners..."*0
The whole direction of military training, then, is to emphasise
national security and play down humanitarian considerations, and this
is clearly conducive to the justification of torture. It is
undeniable that the effects of political indoctrination, combined with
the pressures of military discipline, have been to blame far the
actions of many soldiers. The father of one Greek conscript referred
to the change in his son's attitudes in the following terms:
"We are a poor but decent family, and now I see 
him in the dock as a torturer. I want to ask 
the court to examine how a boy who everyone said 
was 'a diamond' became a torturer. Who morally 
destroyed my family and my home?"*1
The same point was echoed by one of the prosecutors in the Greek
torture trials:
"It is certain....that those morally responsible 
are not in this court.... They are those who, for 
many years, have given thousands of hours
instruction on the fighting of communism without 
sparing even one hour to the defence of
democracy."*2
It should be pointed out that in spite of political
indoctrination and the enforcement of military discipline, there has 
in recent years been a certain disintegration in the composition of 
the officer corps in some non-socialist states: the breakdown of the
selection process within class systems has resulted in the officer 
corps no longer being composed exclusively of those from conservative
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backgrounds. Moreover, both officers and the lower ranks are 
increasingly exposed to external political influences, including 
radical theories, with the result that the armed forces cannot always 
be relied upon by the government. There may be limitations on the 
extent to which the armed forces will support the policies of the 
government, and under certain conditions there may arise serious 
dissent leading ultimately to a revolt, a situation which tends to 
occur with greater frequency in volatile situations in the Third World 
rather than in established democracies. The armed farces, ar even a 
particular section, may seize power and oust the civilian government 
(or the incumbent military regime), and having done so may undertake 
to radically alter the structure of society rather than perpetuate the 
existing system. Revolutionary coups of this nature have, in fact, 
become more common, although it remains the norm for the armed forces 
to support the government against subversion. In conditions of 
political instability, the military may actually be a powerful 
political force, and may become increasingly involved in government on 
the grounds that the armed forces alone are capable of governing 
effectively:
"To the upper echelons of the Army, politicians 
often seem incompetent at managing affairs of 
state, especially where military matters are 
concerned. The ’mismanagement' of government 
results in the Army being presented with 
unwanted tasks, or being subject to unwelcome 
'political constraints' in the execution of its 
tasks. The more the government comes to lean on 
the support of the Army, for example at times of 
severe economic and political crisis, the more 
likely is the Army to consider itself better 
able to carry out the technical business of 
running the country."*3
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This pattern emerges from a number of classic situations, and in 
the following chapter we shall see its application in the developments 
which took place in Uruguay in the early 1970's.
The matter of military training and discipline raises the
question of the responsibility of the torturer. While it might be
asserted that indoctrination amounts to brainwashing which would
permit a plea of insanity (temporary or permanent), it is unlikely
that such a plea would be accepted, although it might be taken into
account in mitigation. The defence of having acted under orders is
perhaps less straightforward, but the clear principle which emerged at
the end of the Second World War was that such a plea cannot exculpate,
unless possibly the torturer was himself subjected to an irresistible
degree of duress. Article 4 of the Nurnberg Principles gives
unequivocal guidance on this point:
"The fact that a person charged with an offence
defined in this code acted pursuant to an order
of his government or of a superior does not
relieve him of responsibility in international 
law if, in the circumstances at the time, it was 
possible for him not to comply with that
order."44
It may be asserted, then, that where an order to violate
fundamental human rights is given, it should be disobeyed, and any
suggestion that some other interest ought to take priority must be
rejected.
It is sometimes suggested that the demands of public morality are 
less exacting than those of private morality, so that someone who 
takes a decision in the public interest must be permitted greater
latitude than would be acceptable if he were acting for personal
reasons. In other words, those in positions of authority who exercise 
power on behalf of others cannot be made to bear responsibility for
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the decisions they make. Thus, for example, the authorisation of the
use of nuclear weapons or biological warfare would not imply moral
guilt on the part of the individual giving the order:
"The exercise of public power is to be liberated 
from certain constraints by the imposition of 
others, which are primarily personal. Because 
the office is supposedly shielded from the 
personal interests of the one who fills it, what 
he does in his official capacity seems also to 
be depersonalized. This nourishes the illusion 
that personal morality does not apply to it with 
any force, and that it cannot be strictly 
assigned to his moral account. The office he 
occupies gets between him and his depersonalized 
acts.,,<4S
If the end result is the only criterion by which the morality of
an act is to be judged, and national security can be characterised as
the supreme value, it is clear that a person authorising the use of
torture in the interest of national security will bear no moral
responsibility for the violation of humanity. However, morality is
not concerned only with results, but also with the manner in which
results are obtained, that is the means, and the position of the
humanitarian is that the principle of humanity is paramount and must
take priority over other considerations, even if these are legitimate:
"If results were the only basis for public 
morality then it would be possible to justify 
anything, including torture and massacre, in the 
service of sufficiently large interests."4G
Those in positions of power who authorise the use of torture are
normally acting in an official capacity and in the public interest,
but article 3 of the liirnberg Principles makes it clear that the
demands of public morality are no less stringent than those of private 
morality, so that such people cannot escape responsibility for their 
actions:
"The fact that a person acted as Head of State 
or as responsible government official does not
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relieve him of responsibility for committing any 
of the offences defined in this code."'47'
So far in this chapter, we have been examining the basis on which 
the use of torture is regarded as justifiable by governments, and we 
may conclude that governments consider the use of torture to be 
justified when they perceive a threat to national security which is 
sufficiently serious to outweigh humanitarian considerations. 
Precisely when this point is reached will depend on the strength of 
the government's commitment to human rights as well as on its 
assessment of the vulnerability of the state. The more sensitive a 
government is to threats to national security, the more readily it 
will resort to extreme measures to protect it, especially if its 
ideological perspective does not emphasise the rights of the 
individual. The fact remains, however, that the practice of torture 
is unlawful in the majority of states, and the question to which we 
must now turn is how the legal prohibition is overcome.
In extreme totalitarian systems, of course, the government will 
face only minor obstacles in introducing torture, as there will be no 
independent authorities which can restrain its actions. In most 
states, however, there do exist certain constitutional institutions 
and legal safeguards which permit the restraint of those in positions 
of power who wish to authorise the use of torture. In fact, the 
prevention of torture is dependent upon the effectiveness of the legal 
and procedural machinery which protects the rights of the individual, 
particularly in relation to arrest, detention and trial, and also the 
constitutional limitation of government which must ensure the 
efficient operation of that machinery, and it is when the 
constitutional balance of power is upset and there is an erosion of 
safeguards that the use of torture becomes possible. Such a situation
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most commonly arises when a state of emergency is declared in response 
to a threat to national security. This involves the introduction of 
extraordinary security measures, and while these do not normally 
legalise the use of torture, their effect in practice is often to 
facilitate the clandestine employment of torture by the security 
forces. An examination of this process will give some indication of 
the relationship between the operation of effective safeguards and the 
protection of fundamental human rights.
The concept of the state of emergency (otherwise referred to as 
'state of siege' or 'state of exception') is one which is fully 
recognised in international law:4® the major human rights conventions 
all permit derogation from most of their provisions in times of public 
emergency. Article 4, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights states:
"In time of public emergency which threatens the 
life of the nation and the existence of which is 
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the 
present Covenant may take measures derogating 
from their obligations under the present 
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with their other 
obligations under international law and do not 
involve discrimination solely on the ground of 
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social 
origin."
The use of torture is, of course, absolutely prohibited under 
international law, but the fact is that the erosion of the normal 
legal and procedural safeguards which a state of emergency involves 
often enables the security forces to resort to the clandestine and 
unlawful employment of torture. The immediate danger lies in the 
suspension of the rights of detainees, but the restriction of 
constitutional and political controls over the executive is also a
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crucial factor. One of the principal effects of a state of emergency
is that extraordinary powers are conferred upon the executive, and
although in parliamentary democracies overall responsibility remains
with the legislature, the effectiveness of this supervisory role may
be seriously undermined, so that the executive and its subordinate
agencies may be liberated from the usual constitutional constraints.
This may be accompanied by interference with judicial independence:
"Without any over-generalization, it may be said 
that the institutions of most of the countries 
in question are frequently characterized by the 
subordination not only of the legislative and 
judicial powers to the executive power, but even 
of the executive power itself to the military 
power.
The greatest threat to fundamental human rights lies in the 
concentration of power in the hands of a single authority which is 
able to exercise complete control over every sector of public life, 
but which is itself not subject to any external or independent 
supervision. It is critical in the prevention of violations of 
fundamental human rights that the actions of the executive should be 
open to challenge by independent authorities which have real power to 
impose and enforce restraints, in the first place constitutionally 
appointed authorities specifically charged with the task of upholding 
the rule of law, but also non-governmental agencies which can apply 
moral or political pressure. The broader the range of influences and 
the more effective they are, the greater will be the degree of 
protection for fundamental human rights; conversely, when such 
influences are absent or ineffectual, the executive will have 
correspondingly greater freedom of action.
In a totalitarian system, the various organs of the state are not 
intended to function as restraints on the government, but are
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subordinate to the government and form an integral part of the 
constitutional infrastructure which is under the direct control of the 
government. In such a system, the actions of the government are 
virtually beyond challenge: the government is essentially above the
law, because it controls the making of law and consequently determines 
the very concept of legality. The only parameters within which it 
must operate are those imposed by the state ideology, which the 
government itself interprets and applies. Every public authority is 
required to act in accordance with the principles established by the 
government, and as a result no constitutional authority exists which 
can challenge the legality of the government's actions. Moreover, in 
a totalitarian system there will be few alternative sources of 
criticism or opposition to the government's policies, since dissent in 
other sectors will not be tolerated. In such conditions, it may be 
unnecessary for the government to invoke special measures to deal with 
a threat to national security, but if such measures are required they 
can be introduced without difficulty.
In liberal democracies, the executive is normally subject to 
parliamentary control, but in a state of emergency this control may be 
significantly curtailed. The introduction of a state of emergency 
usually requires the authorisation or approval of the elected 
legislature,so and although wide powers may be conferred upon the 
executive to enable it to deal with the particular emergency 
situation, parliamentary control is normally maintained, at least in 
theory. In practice, however, the supervisory role of parliament 
often becomes little more than a formality, and the executive is able 
to operate without any real constraints. In such circumstances, the 
executive will often appropriate additional powers and may attempt to
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nullify any remaining parliamentary supervision and curtail the
independence of the judiciary:
"With regard to the legislative power, it 
frequently happens that parliament is suspended 
or even dissolved, either as a result of a coup 
d'etat.,..or through a broad interpretation of 
the laws....The judicial power is placed under 
control. Two methods are generally used to 
secure the co-operation of the judicial power.
One consists in appointing "reliable" judges, 
the other in reducing the powers of ordinary 
courts in favour of those of emergency 
courts.... Similarly, the criteria of competence 
may be modified in two ways: either specific
enactments gradually remove matters from the 
competence of the ordinary courts, transferring 
them to that of emergency courts, or the 
judicial power declares itself incompetent of 
its own accord."61
Often the executive will perpetuate the state of emergency, and 
ultimately it may abolish any remaining democratic institutions, with 
the result that the emergency measures actually become an integral 
part of the constitutional framework.6:2
In effect, when a state of emergency is introduced in a 
democratic system, a quasi-totalitarian state may be created, at least 
in a limited sphere, and the resulting atmosphere of confusion and 
secrecy permits the government to engage in or authorise unlawful 
activities. In such conditions, other restraining influences will be 
important, for example a free press, a strong trade union movement, an 
active ecclesiastical sector and a politically concerned public, but 
in fact emergency measures invariably impose extensive restrictions on 
civil liberties and permit the wholesale suppression of criticism of 
the government, with the result that these potential influences are 
seldom able to function effectively. The erosion of constitutional 
safeguards is normally accompanied, then, by the curtailment or 
suspension of civil and political rights, and it is this combination
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”... circumstances resulting from temporary 
factors of a generally political character which 
in varying degrees involve extreme and imminent 
danger, threatening the organized existence of a 
nation, that is to say, the political and social 
system that it comprises as a State, and which 
may be defined as follows: "a crisis situation
affecting the population as a whole and 
constituting a threat to the organized existence 
of the community which forms the basis of that 
State"."55
It is possible that other types of threat might fall within the 
scope of the concept, such as a serious natural disaster,57 massive 
pollution, an epidemic, or even a purely criminal problem, but in 
practice governments declare states of emergency almost exclusively in 
response to political threats, usually of a domestic nature, and it is 
of course in such situations that human rights issues arise.
It is unclear how serious a threat must be before it qualifies as 
an emergency, but the use of the term "war" in the regional 
conventions indicates that the threat must be on a major scale, 
presenting a high degree of risk to the community, and it might even 
be suggested that only a violent threat to national security is 
sufficient to warrant emergency measures. The United Nations study 
mentioned above identifies four categories of political crisis: 
international armed conflicts; wars of national liberation; non­
international armed conflicts; and situations of internal disorder or 
internal tension.55 Whether or not the fourth category could be 
limited to armed threats and violent activities under the principle of 
ejusdea generis is unclear, but it must be at least doubtful if non­
violent and non-disruptive opposition to a government can justify the 
introduction of emergency measures under international law. The study 
itself is, in fact, concerned mainly with the fourth category,55 and 
in practice states of emergency are resorted to primarily in response
174
to the threat of internal subversion, whether of a violent or non­
violent nature.
The European Court of Human Rights has declared that the natural
and customary meaning of the words "other public emergency threatening
the life of the nation", as expressed in the European Convention, is
"an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the
whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the
community of which the State is composed,"00 and this statement has
clearly influenced the definition formulated for the purposes of the
United Rations study. The study identifies the following
prerequisites:
"1. The crisis situation must be taking place or 
at least imminent. The possibility of invoking 
the derogation clause is subject to a time-limit 
so as to persuade States not to make use of it 
solely for the purpose of prevention without a 
crisis having been declared or for purposes 
other than a return to normal (principle of 
provisional status).
2. The situation of danger must be such that 
the normal measures and restrictions authorized 
by the instruments in normal times manifestly no 
longer suffice to maintain public order.
3. The situation of danger must affect, on the 
one hand, the whole of the population and, on 
the other, either the whole of the territory 
(this being a fortiori the case in a situation 
of external war as provided for, for instance, 
under the Inter-American and European 
Conventions) or certain parts thereof.
4. Lastly, there must be a threat to the very 
existence of the nation, that is to say, to the 
organized life of the community constituting the 
basis of the State, whether this means to the 
physical integrity of the population, to 
territorial integrity or to the functioning of 
the organs of the State (the test applied by the 
European Court since the Lawless Case)."01
This analysis does not seem to take into account situations in 
which the threat affects only particular sections of the community or 
particular territorial areas, with the result that the principle of
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derogation might be excluded where the problem involved, for example, 
nationalist demands for independence, and for this reason the 
definition may be too narrow. The idea of disruption of the ordinary 
functioning of society does appear to be a crucial factor, however, 
and certainly a state of emergency should only be introduced in 
exceptional circumstances involving a major threat and for the 
specific purpose of averting that threat. There is no doubt that 
governments commonly invoke the principle of derogation for political 
purposes when there is in fact no genuine threat to national security, 
but it is clear nevertheless that the situations which we have 
identified as being those in which governments are liable to justify 
the use of torture will often fall within the legal concept of the 
state of emergency, so that the suspension of safeguards which 
facilitates the employment of torture will be entirely lawful.
(b) "officially proclaimed": this requirement is, interestingly,
unique to the International Covenant, its purpose being simply "to 
avert situations of de facto emergency by imposing a rule concerning 
publicity under municipal law."es It may be noted, however, that each 
of the conventions provides that the state should notify the 
appropriate international authority that it has declared a state of 
emergency.<S3 Notification should include the reasons for the 
emergency measures, the nature of these measures, and the provisions 
of the relative convention from which derogation has been made,®* and 
there should also be notification of the termination of a state of 
emergency. These provisions are aimed at establishing some form of 
international supervision over states of emergency, although where a 
de facto state of emergency exists, failure to officially proclaim it 
or to notify the relevant international authority probably does not
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preclude that authority from exercising a degree of supervision.ee; 
However, the powers of the international authorities are actually very 
limited.se
Cc) "measures derogating from their obligations": the effect of a
state of emergency is to release the government from its duty to 
observe the stringent requirements of human rights in order to allow 
it to deal effectively with the particular emergency, the rationale 
being that the increased demands of the public interest justify the 
temporary curtailment of the rights of the individual in a manner 
which would not be acceptable under normal conditions. However, 
derogation does not mean that the application of the relevant 
convention is suspended for the duration of the state of emergency; a 
wholesale denial of fundamental human rights is not envisaged, and 
there remain certain limitations, as we shall see below. 
Furthermore, there are a number of rights from which no derogation is 
permitted, and these of course include the right not to be subjected 
to torture.
Cd) "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation": a state of emergency is justified only when the normal
legal machinery has proved incapable of dealing with a serious threat, 
or at least there are reasonable grounds for believing that it would 
be inadequate, so that extraordinary measures are necessary. The 
concept of derogation has its basis in the theory of self-defence,e-' 
and although governments may be permitted a certain freedom in their 
assessment of what measures are required, the fundamental principle is 
that measures derogating from the international standards are 
justified only in so far as they can be shown to be absolutely 
necessary in countering the particular threat. Moreover, this
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principle applies to each specific measure, so that derogation from 
any single conventional provision is permissible only to the extent 
that it is "strictly required". Essentially, the necessity of any 
particular measure can only be judged on the basis of its 
effectiveness, and although this will not always be a straightforward 
matter, the ultimate test is whether the threat is actually 
eliminated. It is obvious, however, that governments are unlikely to 
terminate a state of emergency on the grounds that the measures have 
failed to eliminate the threat; on the contrary, in such 
circumstances they are liable to become more desperate and impose even 
more severe repressive measures. As a result, a situation may arise 
in which the government is unable to eliminate the threat, but 
requires permanent emergency powers in order to keep it under control. 
Such a situation is not envisaged by the human rights conventions, 
which assume a temporary state of emergency leading to the swift 
elimination of the threat and followed by an immediate return to 
normality:
"The measures involved are provisional by 
nature, so that the constant, specific and 
immediate abjective of the authorities is a 
return to normal."7’'0
The possibility of a chronic situation is not foreseen in the 
conventions, and although the American Convention permits derogation 
only "to the extent and for the period of time strictly required",7n 
this does not actually impose a finite limit on the duration of a 
state of emergency. There are, in fact, many situations around the 
world involving protracted political conflict in which the governments 
are unable to eliminate the threat, but regard emergency measures as 
strictly required to contain it. There is a tendency for governments 
to renew or prolong states of emergency for as long as they perceive a
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threat to exist, and if there is a constant threat to national 
security it is quite possible that the state of emergency will became 
institutionalised. Indeed, in some circumstances governments retain 
emergency powers even after the immediate threat has been eliminated, 
so that they will be in a position to deal swiftly with any new 
threat.
(e) "not inconsistent with other obligations under international 
law": this is a normal provision in international treaties of this
nature, and requires no further comment.
(f) "not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour,
sex, language, religion or social origin": a similar proviso appears
in the American Convention, but there is no equivalent provision in
the European Convention, possibly on the basis that this is a general
principle of human rights and requires no separate specification. The
word "solely" might be interpreted to mean that it is not necessarily
unacceptable for emergency measures to apply only to particular groups
in society, provided there is some legitimate reason for maintaining
such a distinction. Discriminatory measures might be appropriate, for
example, where the threat to national security comes from a specific
section of the community:
"It may well happen that, within the scope of 
the clause of derogation, the measures strictly 
required by the situation involve action 
directed against - or specifically affecting - a 
group belonging, for instance, to a particular 
race or religion (for example, the quelling of a 
riot).
In so far as such action may be described as 
discriminatory, it would not constitute 
discrimination "solely1' on the grounds of race 
or religion.... since it was rendered necessary 
to the extent strictly required by the 
situation. Such, at least, is the prevailing 
interpretation given by doctrine."72
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Thus, if a particular racial group is responsible for a campaign 
of terror against the general public, special measures which affect 
only or primarily that group may be considered legitimate because they 
do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race; the
measures strike at one section of the community not because of the
inherent characteristics of its members, but rather because members of 
that particular group alone are responsible for acts of political
violence. On this basis, a government would be justified, for 
example, in imposing a curfew which affected only members of a 
specific racial group.
It may be noted that the list given in article 4 of the
International Covenant does not correspond precisely with the list in 
article 2, paragraph 1, thus apparently sanctioning derogation which 
is discriminatory solely on grounds of political or other opinion, 
national origin, property, birth or other status.73 The reason for 
these omissions is not entirely clear, especially in view of the fact 
that concepts such as race, colour, national origin and birth overlap. 
Certainly as far as political opinion is concerned, measures to 
protect national security might be expected to affect those holding 
dissenting political views, and similarly restrictions on foreign 
nationals during a time of war would normally be considered perfectly 
legitimate. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether there is any 
significant distinction between the terms of article 4 and 
discrimination on other grounds.
These, then, are the somewhat nebulous criteria upon which the 
validity of a state of emergency depends. The principles of 
international law are generally paralleled in municipal or domestic 
legal systems, although the actual provisions vary greatly from state
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to state.'7* Four types of legislation, which may be employed 
cumulatively, can be identified:"73 <i> conventional emergency 
regimes, in which the introduction of a state of emergency is 
predetermined by law and brought into effect by the executive, subject 
to the control of parliament; civil power is transferred to the 
military, and emergency courts are set up; (ii) vesting with 
legislative power: legislative powers are conferred upon the
executive by parliament, which sets limits on their content, purpose 
and duration; Ciii) submission of emergency powers to legislative 
ratification: as (ii), except that parliament ratifies rather than
authorises; (iv) emergency powers self-assumed by the executive: 
special powers are appropriated by the executive without any 
parliamentary control. It can be seen from this analysis that the
essential feature of states of emergency is the erosion of independent
supervision of the executive branch of government.
In practice, states of emergency are regularly invoked in
circumstances which fail to satisfy the criteria laid down in 
international conventions or even the requirements of national law. 
Thus, there may be no official proclamation or notification to the 
international authorities, and even if this latter obligation is
complied with, governments rarely accept any attempts by the 
authorities to supervise states of emergency. The precise role of the 
international authorities is in any event unclear, and often they are 
unable to do more than comment on whether the prerequisites have been 
met. In this connection, it may be noted that the United Nations Sub- 
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, by resolution 1983/30, decided to include on its agenda an 
item entitled 'Implementation of the right of derogation provided for
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under article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and violation of human rights', and it now draws up an annual 
list of those countries which proclaim or terminate a state of 
emergency and submits an annual report on compliance with the 
international requirements to the Commission on Human Rights.76 The 
Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights has also endeavoured to exercise a degree 
of supervision over states of emergency, especially in its role under 
the reporting procedure, and it has on several occasions criticised 
governments in respect of their abuse of the derogation provisions. 
States of emergency have frequently been abused for the purpose of 
political repression when no significant threat to national security 
has existed, or when the only threat has been legitimate opposition to 
the government, and have often involved the wholesale suspension of 
human rights.
As we have indicated, the transfer of power to the executive 
often creates conditions in which the clandestine use of torture can 
take place, because the removal of the normal constitutional 
safeguards and consequent erosion of the limitation of government make 
it extremely difficult for parliament to exercise effective 
supervision over the executive and control the state of emergency. 
The implementation of emergency measures is normally under the direct 
control of the executive, and for reasons of security parliament may 
be kept in ignorance of counter-subversive operations, as a result of 
which it may be impossible for the elected body to verify suspicions 
of torture. Moreover, this state of affairs may be exacerbated by 
interference with judicial independence and extensive suspension of 
civil liberties, which suppress potential sources of opposition to the
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government. Thus, a ban may be imposed on public gatherings, the 
media may be proscribed or subjected to censorship, trade union 
activities may be restricted, academics and other politically 
unreliable public figures may be summarily dismissed, and so on. In 
the most extreme cases, parliament itself will eventually be suspended 
and full political control will be assumed by the executive.
While the erosion of potential restraints on governmental freedom 
of action produces the conditions within which the security forces are 
able to employ torture, the immediate threat to human dignity lies in 
the suspension or curtailment of the legal rights of those detained 
under the emergency provisions.7”7 Indeed, if these rights are not 
respected, the use of torture may actually emerge even when the 
conditions described do not exist, although in such circumstances 
there remain independent agencies and authorities which can expose 
violations of human rights and ensure that the practice of torture is 
stopped, and it is therefore normally necessary for at least a partial 
erosion of constitutional safeguards to take place. In order to 
identify the rights which are of particular importance in the 
prevention of torture, we shall examine the measures which are 
commonly utilised in states of emergency and relate them to the 
emergence of torture.70
When a subversive threat arises, emergency measures often include 
legislation which defines 'subversion' in very broad terms, so that 
legitimate political activity as well as unconstitutional opposition 
is regarded as unlawful, and other sources of potential dissent, such 
as trade union, civil rights and religious movements are suppressed. 
The nation of complicity is also extended so that, for example, not 
only membership of a proscribed organisation but also public support
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for its aims can be considered illegal.';:r£, Moreover, in some instances 
retroactive legislation is introduced which, permits the detention and 
prosecution of political suspects on the basis of activities engaged 
in prior to the proclamation of the state of emergency, although this 
is a violation of the absolute prohibition on ex post facto laws which 
is recognised in international law.30 The grounds an which political 
suspects may be arrested are often made less stringent than in normal 
criminal cases, and there is almost invariably an extension of the 
minimum period for which a detainee may be held without being charged 
or brought before a magistrate.
It is during the period of initial detention that torture is most
likely to occur, since it is at this time that the security forces are
conducting their interrogation and endeavouring to obtain evidence
against the suspect to substantiate their suspicions. The situation 
is exacerbated when, as is usually the case, the detainee is held 
incommunicado. This may take different forms: firstly, the victim
may be abducted by the security forces, who do not even acknowledge 
that they are holding him - 'disappearances'; secondly, the detention 
may be acknowledged, but the victim is prevented from having contact 
with his family, his lawyer or a magistrate; thirdly, it may be that 
the detainee is permitted to communicate with the outside world, but 
has no access to a judge.31 The effect of such detention is that the 
detainee cannot bring allegations of ill-treatment before an 
independent authority capable of controlling the security farces. Of 
course, access to a judge is relevant only in so far as the judicial 
authority retains a degree of independence: even if a detainee or, as
in the third case, his family or lawyer, are able to bring a complaint 
before the courts, the authority of the judiciary may have been eroded
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to such an extent that the judge is powerless to take any action. It 
is in such circumstances that the opportunity to communicate with the 
outside world is especially important: even if it is not possible for
the detainee’s family, friends or lawyer to initiate proceedings 
through the domestic courts, they can at least publicise his case and 
invoke the assistance of human rights groups, and they may also be 
able to bring the matter to the attention of international 
authorities. It is for this reason that detainees are often prevented 
from having contact with the outside world during the initial stages 
of detention. The overall effect of incommunicado detention, then, is 
that the detainee is denied access to any potentially sympathetic 
party who might be able to take action to secure his release or the 
termination of ill-treatment, and this not only facilitates but 
actually encourages the use of torture. It also creates problems in 
obtaining evidence of torture.
The practice of holding suspects incommunicado is probably the 
single most important factor in the facilitation of torture during an 
emergency situation: a detainee held incommunicado for several days
or even weeks is entirely at the mercy of his interrogators, and the 
temptation to resort to coercion in order to secure a confession or 
other information is obviously considerable, particularly when the 
security farces otherwise face great difficulty in obtaining evidence. 
This is not to say that torture only occurs when the detainee is held 
incommunicado: the security forces may be free to employ torture
during initial detention as a result of ineffective supervision due to 
lack of judicial independence, connivance or even overwork of judges, 
and torture may also occur at a later stage in the criminal process. 
However, it is during pre-trial detention that the security forces are
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most likely to employ torture, because by the time a detainee is 
committed for trial, the evidence has been obtained and the security 
forces have had every opportunity to extort information. After the 
initial interrogation, the purpose of torture is more likely to be 
punitive or disciplinary rather than coercive.33 It may be noted 
that the practice of incommunicado detention has attracted strong 
criticism from the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities over the last few years.633 
The Sub-Commission and its working group on detention have, in fact, 
identified a number of problems with the suspension of legal and 
procedural safeguards, most of which will be covered in this 
discussion.
In certain situations, it is passible for detention without trial 
to be continued indefinitely, so that the detainee is never actually 
charged with an offence and consequently is never brought to trial. 
Preventive detention is a variant of this which is commonly utilised 
by governments for the purpose of neutralising political opposition. 
Prolonged detention, often on tenuous grounds is, of course, entirely 
unsatisfactory,34 yet many regimes find it expedient to ensure the 
permanent suppression of their critics in this manner. In such 
situations, there is no court appearance at which the detainee can 
make a complaint of ill-treatment, and often judicial supervision is 
otherwise inadequate, so that there is little to prevent the security 
forces from torturing detainees.
A further salient feature of states of emergency is the erosion 
of the independence of the judiciary,33 which we have already 
mentioned. The effect of such a development is that even if there is 
a judicial appearance it is futile for a detainee to complain of
186
torture to the magistrate. Where there is independent judicial 
supervision of the security farces throughout detention, or even 
opportunity for judicial review on termination of incommunicado 
detention, a victim of torture or ill-treatment has an opportunity of 
making a complaint to the judge so that, while there will be 
difficulties in carrying out an investigation, some form of protection 
does exist, and this may at least function as a deterrent to the 
security forces. The effectiveness of the protection is, of course, 
dependent upon the impartiality and conscientiousness of the judge, as 
well as upon the extent to which he can enforce his decisions. Where 
the courts are placed under the direct control of the executive and 
judicial independence is compromised, however, a victim of torture 
cannot rely on being given an impartial hearing, and even if he 
succeeds in bringing his allegations to the attention of a judge, the 
judge will be unable or unwilling to take any action.
In totalitarian systems, judicial independence is not fully 
recognised, and the executive is in fact able to exercise control over 
the judiciary, at least indirectly, so that if the executive wishes to 
authorise the use of torture by its security forces, it can ensure 
that there is no interference on the part of the courts. Within a 
parliamentary democracy, on the other hand, the civilian judiciary 
often retains its independence during a state of emergency, and indeed 
the courts may represent a vital safeguard against executive abuses, 
especially when parliamentary supervision has been neutralised. If 
the executive finds it necessary to circumvent the restrictions 
imposed upon it by an independent judiciary, it must either remove 
troublesome judges or transfer jurisdiction in political matters from 
the civilian courts to special tribunals, in particular military
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courts. The civilian courts may well be powerless to resist such a 
move, because the transfer of jurisdiction to special courts is often 
perfectly lawful in terms of emergency legislation, and if this is the 
case the civilian courts have no real grounds for refusing to 
relinquish jurisdiction. Even if they attempt to do so, for example 
by ordering the release of a political detainee, the security forces 
may simply refuse to comply, on the grounds that the judge has 
exceeded his authority.
There is an obvious danger of prejudice when political offences 
fall within the jurisdiction of emergency courts which are directly or 
indirectly subject to the executive, because this means that there is 
no longer supervision and review of the activities of the executive by 
an independent judicial authority. As far as the use of military 
courts is concerned, we have already examined the role of the armed 
forces in the defence of national security, and it is clear that the 
impartiality of such courts in dealing with suspected enemies of the 
state must be in serious doubt. The same applies, however, to every 
type of special court which is not independent of the executive. 
Essentially, the absence of judicial independence deprives detainees 
of the opportunity of invoking the protection of an authority which is 
sympathetic and in a position to restrain the security farces. The 
security forces are aware of this when interrogating detainees, and 
this knowledge increases the temptation to resort to the use of 
torture.
Transfer of jurisdiction often involves the application of 
summary procedures which deny the accused the normal procedural 
rights,5365 and if military procedures are to be applied, martial law 
may be imposed on civilians, further prejudicing the position of the
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accused. Special rules may be introduced whereby the trial takes 
place in camera, the accused is not permitted to speak in his own 
defence or allowed to choose his own lawyer but must accept a military 
appointee, the defence is denied access to material evidence, and 
confessions and other inadmissible evidence are accepted by the court. 
Although the procedural rights of accused persons are not recognised 
as non-derogable in the international human rights conventions, it is 
clear that it was not the intention of the conventions to allow the 
denial of basic standards of justice, and many of the practices 
resorted to during states of emergency must be rejected as unnecessary 
and unjustifiable. In particular, the practice of holding detainees 
incommunicado and the circumvention of independent judicial 
supervision of detention procedures may be identified as unacceptable, 
and there is no doubt that if these practices can be eliminated 
security forces will be more reluctant to utilise torture.
The result of all these emergency measures which we have
mentioned is as fallows: a suspect may be arrested on the basis of
tenuous connections with political activity which is regarded as
unlawful, may be subjected to torture during a prolonged period of 
detention (part or all of which is likely to be incommunicado) which 
may in fact continue indefinitely without trial, and may be unable to 
complain to a judicial authority either because he never appears 
before one or because when he does the judge is under the control of 
the government and consequently unable or unwilling to take any 
action. Even when there does exist effective judicial supervision of 
detention, the practice of incommunicado detention may make it
virtually impossible for a victim of torture to produce proof at a 
later date, as there will be no witnesses to support his allegations
189
and lie may be denied access to any medical records which have been 
kept, while the security forces can ensure that the marks of torture 
have disappeared before they allow him to appear before a judge.
It is in this way, then, that the legitimate curtailment of legal 
and procedural rights in response to an emergency situation can have 
the effect of permitting the practice of torture to arise even though 
it is never sanctioned by law. The authorisation of incommunicado 
detention may even enable the security forces to employ torture 
without the consent or knowledge of the government, although if the 
executive has sufficient control over the security forces it should be 
able to prevent such a situation arising. More often, however, the 
entire judicial process applying to political offences comes under the 
control of the executive through the security forces, and the 
government itself is responsible for authorising or wilfully 
permitting the use of torture.
In the following chapter, the problems which we have identified 
will be examined in relation to the situation which arose in Uruguay 
during the 1970's, when the practice of torture emerged following the 
introduction of a state of emergency in response to a subversive 
threat. Many other situations might have been chosen for the purpose 
of illustrating the same points,®7 but as we shall see there are a 
number of factors which make Uruguay an especially interesting case 
study. In some countries, of course, the absence of effective 
safeguards and constitutional limitations on the power of the 
executive is a permanent and integral feature of the political system, 
and in such conditions the same problems occur, but an examination of 
the breakdown of democratic institutions as the result of the 
introduction of emergency measures gives a more striking and dramatic
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illustration of the relationship between the absence of safeguards and 
the emergence of torture.
It may be concluded that even though the use of torture is 
categorically excluded from the right of derogation contained in the 
international conventions, the prevention of torture becomes 
increasingly difficult as derogation from other conventional 
provisions takes place. The problem is how to resolve this dilemma, 
as it is obvious that, although states of emergency are frequently 
abused, there are situations in which extraordinary measures are 
necessary. Essentially, it would appear to be a matter of ensuring 
that emergency measures are accompanied by adequate safeguards to 
ensure the prevention of violations of core rights without 
substantially prejudicing the position of the security forces. This 
might be partly achieved by an extension of the principle of the 
inviolability of certain rights, by adding to the list of non­
derogable rights®® and by applying minimum levels in relation to those 
rights which can be curtailed or suspended.es' For example, the 
provisions relating to derogation at present appear to permit 
arbitrary detention, but such detention could be subject to certain 
limits, such as that detainees must be charged and brought to trial or 
released within a minimum period.
As far as the prevention of torture is concerned, it is essential 
that there should be effective safeguards for detainees. The type of 
protection which must be provided will be discussed in greater depth 
in Chapter Eight.530 At this point, we may merely reiterate the mast 
important factors. Primarily, the practice of incommunicado detention 
must be severely restricted: it has been said that "nothing could
justify such detention, and even if there were exceptional cases in
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which a justification could be found, such detention should in no 
circumstances exceed 24 hours. W3'* Furthermore, incommunicado 
detention, if permissible, should not mean the exclusion of judicial 
supervision or intervention: detainees ought to have access at all
times to a judge (and also to a doctor), so that communication would 
only be restricted in relation to the outside world. The effective 
supervision of detention by an independent authority (normally the 
judiciary) is absolutely imperative, whether detention is 
incommunicado or not, and if the independence or impartiality of the 
supervising authority is compromised to any degree, for example when 
military tribunals are utilised, then some other independent agency 
must be given specific responsibility for ensuring the protection of 
detainees throughout detention. Moreover, the supervising authority 
must have genuine powers to ensure enforcement of its orders, and 
should also have the right to inspect places of detention and 
interview detainees without prior notice. The effectiveness of such 
safeguards in practice will often depend on the retention of 
parliamentary control over the executive during a state of emergency, 
because otherwise the executive may simply violate the law, ignore the 
constitution and disregard any attempts by the other branches of power 
to impose restraints. It is crucial, therefore, for parliament to 
retain ultimate control over the executive and to have real power to 
terminate the state of emergency should any difficulties arise.
At the present time, there is very little international control 
over the introduction or implementation of states of emergency within 
sovereign states. The Human Rights Committee, as we have noted, has 
made certain observations in connection with the reporting procedure 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but it
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has no real power or authority to supervise states of e m e r g e n c y . I n  
view of the conflict between the protection of human rights and the 
defence of national security, it is clear that governments are not 
best qualified to assess what emergency measures are really necessary, 
and the ideal situation would be for international machinery to be 
created or extended in order to establish effective supervision and 
control over the introduction and implementation of states of 
emergency. However, there is little willingness on the part of 
governments to support such a role for international agencies, even in 
general terms, far less in situations involving a threat to national 
security, and all that international agencies can do is express 
concern and disapproval when abuse of states of emergency becomes 
apparent.
In this chapter, we have seen that governments justify the use of 
torture when they deem it necessary in the defence of national 
security, and that the introduction of emergency measures for this 
same purpose facilitates the employment of torture. In some 
countries, emergency measures are unnecessary because the system 
itself allows the government full freedom of action, but in most 
countries there exist constitutional and legal safeguards which have 
to be overcome before the use of torture can be resorted to. The 
crucial factor is the absence to a greater or lesser degree of 
independent controls over the executive and its security farces, and 
it is when such a situation exists that international law becomes 
relevant in providing a secondary level of safeguards.
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CHAPTER FIVE: URUGUAY - A CASE STUDY
The events which took place in the recent history of Uruguay 
provide a fascinating illustration of the emergence of torture as a 
result of the breakdown of legal and constitutional safeguards during 
a state of emergency introduced in response to a threat to national 
security. Until the late 1960's, Uruguay had enjoyed a certain 
reputation as one of the few healthy liberal parliamentary democracies 
in Latin America: known as 'the Switzerland of the Americas', and
boasting one of the first welfare services in that area of the world, 
Uruguay had to a large extent escaped the military intervention in 
political affairs which is almost endemic to the region. Apart from 
certain isolated incidents, the armed forces had displayed a 
consistent respect for democracy and the rule of law. Within the 
space of only a few years, however, this state of affairs came to an 
abrupt end and a repressive military regime seized power. This 
assumption of power by the armed forces was the culmination of a 
progressive erosion of constitutional control over the executive, 
combined with an increasing reliance upon the military in matters 
affecting the internal security of the state. In this chapter, we 
shall examine in some detail the events which led to the military 
takeover, indicating in particular the processes by which the 
introduction of emergency measures liberated the security forces from 
effective supervision by the appropriate democratic authorities, thus 
facilitating the employment of torture.
The case of Uruguay is also of particular interest because 
Uruguay held an almost unique position in relation to the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
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throughout a large part of the period when emergency measures were in 
force. Prior to the breakdown of democracy in Uruguay, the civilian 
government had actually ratified both the Covenant and the Optional 
Protocol, and indeed successive Uruguayan governments had been in the 
forefront of diplomatic efforts to develop more effective machinery 
for the protection of fundamental human rights. The fact that the 
military regime remained bound by the obligations undertaken by its 
predecessors had a number of important implications. Firstly, when 
the Covenant came into force in 1976, the government of Uruguay became 
obliged to submit to the Human Rights Committee within one year a 
report on the implementation of the Covenant’s provisions in Uruguay: 
no report was in fact submitted until 1982.1 Secondly, under article 
4, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, the government should have informed 
the Secretary-General of the United Rations of the existence of a 
state of emergency in Uruguay and of the provisions of the Covenant 
from which derogation had been made: a somewhat inadequate
notification was received in 1979.2 Thirdly, the ratification of the 
Optional Protocol authorised the Human Rights Committee to deal with 
communications from individuals claiming to victims of violations by 
the government of Uruguay of the rights guaranteed in the Covenant. 
It is in relation to this third aspect that Uruguay occupied a 
position of particular significance: the number of states which have
accepted the procedure established under the Optional Protocol is not 
high,3 and most of those which have are liberal democracies against 
which few significant allegations are made, but in the case of Uruguay 
a repressive regime was subject to the jurisdiction of the Human 
Rights Committee, which actually examined a considerable number of 
communications alleging violations of the Covenant by the government
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of Uruguay, concluding in several cases that torture had taken place. 
These cases will be dealt with in the following chapter.
Democracy was restored in Uruguay in 1985, but the situation 
which existed during the period of military government remains a vivid 
illustration of the problems outlined in Chapter Four.
Uruguay - General Background
The state of Uruguay comprises territory covering some 72,000 
square miles, making it the smallest Hispanic country in South 
America. The lack of gold and silver in the area resulted in its 
initial neglect by European explorers, and it was in fact the 
Portuguese who first established Colonia in the 17th century. The
present capital, Montevideo, was also planned by the Portuguese, but 
was actually built by the Spanish in 1726. It changed hands several 
times before independence was declared in 1808, and Brazil and
Argentina continued to dispute ownership of the territory until full 
independence was eventually recognised as a result of British
mediation in 1828. The early history of the Republic of Uruguay was
marred by ten years of civil war between two rival presidents and 
their supporters, and dictatorship, political intrigue and military 
intervention ensued until the emergence of Jose Batlle y Ordonez as 
President in 1903. During his two terms in office, Uruguay was 
transformed into a modern parliamentary democracy on the Swiss model, 
and Latin America’s first welfare state was created. Only for a brief 
period in the 1930’s was democratic government interrupted.
The population of Uruguay - nearly three million in 19804 - is 
almost entirely of European origin, there being few indigenous
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peoples, and almost lialf the population lives in Montevideo. There is 
a large middle class, about 95% literacy, and although real poverty 
does exist, per capita income is high for Latin America. In general, 
Uruguay may be regarded as one of the more advanced countries in Latin 
America in terms of economic, social and cultural conditions, and it 
has many characteristics in common with western European nations. The 
two traditional political parties are the Colorados (Reds), largely 
supported by the urban middle class, and the Blancos (Whites) or 
Partido Macional (Mational Party), which draws its support mainly from 
the land-owners and the Catholic Church. In 1971, the elections were 
contested also by a third party, the Frente Amplio (Broad Front), a 
coalition of leftist and left-centre groups.
Economic decline commenced in Uruguay in the mid-1950's, when 
falling world market prices for its two most important export 
commodities, meat and wool, led to growing inflation, with consequent 
social unrest and strikes. In response to these difficulties, and the 
even more disturbing appearance of an urban guerrilla movement, the 
government in the late 1960's introduced certain emergency measures 
and, as the situation deteriorated, these were intensified. Although 
the guerrillas themselves were virtually annihilated as a result, the 
armed farces were not prepared to relinquish the powers which they had 
been granted, and subsequently seized control and extended counter­
subversive measures. While the Constitution remained nominally in 
force, its effect was nullified by a series of decrees and 
Institutional Acts which gradually institutionalised military rule. 
In the hope of gaining popular approval for its policies, the military 
government in 1980 submitted its proposals for a new Constitution to 
referendum. These proposals, which would effectively have consolidated
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the role of the armed farces in government, were rejected by the 
people, and after much argument and unrest elections were held in 
November 1984. The new civilian government rapidly re-instated the 
rights which had been suspended, and embarked on the restoration of 
the democratic institutions which had been in enforced abeyance for 
over a decade.
The following discussion examines the course of events outlined 
above from four different angles: the threat which arose, the
response of the authorities, the type of measures employed, and the 
resultant emergence of torture. This will give some indication of the 
causal relationship between the absence of safeguards and the 
emergence of torture.
Ihfi-J^ugaaacos.
Fidel Castro's success in Cuba in 1959 saw communism gain its 
first foothold in the Americas, and the fear that agitation and 
infiltration might lead to further extensions of communist influence 
in the American continent caused considerable consternation throughout 
the hemisphere. The idea was put forward that, as one country fell 
under the yoke of communism, so neighbouring countries would become 
targets for Soviet expansionism and revolution would be fomented 
within them (the so-called 'domino theory'), and the paranoia which 
this notion produced was largely responsible for the ensuing epidemic 
of right-wing military coups in the I960's. Guerrilla movements did 
spring up throughout the continent, with the Cubans providing both 
political education and military training, and although no doubt the 
threat which many of these groups posed to existing regimes was
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exaggerated, it is against this background of persistent fear of 
communist subversion that the politics of Latin America must be 
viewed.
The failure of Che Guevara's theories and his subsequent capture 
and murder in Bolivia persuaded many later tacticians of revolutionary 
violence to abandon the countryside and operate within the cities, as 
we discovered in Chapter Four. In Uruguay, the Movimiento de 
Liberacion lacional (National Liberation Movement) or MLJT appeared as 
one of the earliest of these groups, and to some extent became a 
blueprint for later urban guerrilla movements in other Latin American 
countries. Popularly known as the Tuparaaros (after Tupac Amaru, an 
18th century Peruvian Indian leader executed for rebelling against the 
Spanish), the movement was founded in 1963, principally by Raul Sendic 
Antonaccio, a Marxist former law student who was later imprisoned but 
was released in 1985. The movement originated among the sugar-workers 
of northern Uruguay, but its later strength came from intellectuals 
and the middle classes - students, teachers, lawyers, journalists - 
and it did not attract much support from the lower class workers and 
farmers. Consisting of an estimated nucleus of 300-1,000 activists 
and up to 6,000 supporters, the Tupamaros were the most unified and 
best disciplined of Latin America's urban terrorist organisations, 
having as they did a virtual monopoly on terrorism in Uruguay. The 
movement based its structure on the FLN of Algeria, operating 
underground courts, jails and even hospitals. It was very vague about 
ideological aims, however, and little political philosophy featured in 
its proclamations and manifestos. There was certainly Marxist 
influence, at least in the initial stages, with tendencies towards 
Trotskyism and Castroism, but the immediate goal seems to have been
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the creation of anarchy, the destruction of the existing system in 
order to permit the formation of a new society.
When the guerrillas first began to operate, their activities were 
confined to acts against property: in a series of daring and
spectacular bank raids between October 1964 and the end of 1970, they 
amassed an estimated 2.5 thousand million pesos. Industrial and 
commercial enterprises and broadcasting installations were attacked, 
and a favourite device of the guerrillas was to raid the files of 
private companies in order to procure evidence of corruption, which 
was then forwarded to the courts. Towards the end of the 1960's, the 
Tupamaros began to resort to kidnapping and assassination, and a 
number of policemen were killed in clashes with the guerrillas. Acts 
of terrorism continued after the introduction of emergency measures, 
and although many Tupamaros were apprehended and imprisoned, guerrilla 
activity was apparently directed for a time from within the prisons 
with the connivance of guards, and a number of successful prison 
escapes also took place. However, the intensification of the 
emergency measures and the involvement of the armed farces in response 
to continuing terrorist activity resulted in the guerrilla movement 
being crushed by the end of 1972. Sporadic incidents continued to 
occur, but the Tupamaros' power had been broken, and most of their 
leaders were in prison. When these leaders were tried, often not 
until seven or eight years later, they were given extremely lengthy 
sentences (capital punishment being prohibited under Uruguayan law); 
Raul Sendic himself was sentenced in July 1980 to thirty years' 
imprisonment, with a further fifteen years of special security 
measures. The conditions in which they were held attracted severe 
criticism from human rights organisations, and Sendic's case was in
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fact considered by the Human Rights Committee, which, decided mtejr 
alia that violations of articles 7 and 10 of the Covenant had occurred 
"because Raul Sendic is held in solitary confinement in an underground 
cell, was subjected to torture for three months in 1978 and is being 
denied the medical treatment his condition requires."55
The Political Response and the Erosion of .Democracy.
The Uruguayan Constitution of 1967 provides for a separation of
power between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, and it
contains numerous articles relating to the protection of civil and
political rights. It also provides, however, for prompt security
measures (medidas prontas de seguridad - MPS) in emergency situations.
Article 168<17) vests the following powers in the President:
"To take prompt measures of security in grave 
and unforeseen cases of foreign attack or 
internal disorder, giving an account within 
twenty four hours to a joint session of 
Congress, or during its recess, to the Permanent 
Commission, of the action taken and its motives, 
the decision of the latter bodies being final.
Vith respect to persons, the prompt measures of 
security authorise only their arrest or removal 
from one place in the territory of the country 
to another provided they do not elect to leave 
it. This measure, like the others, must be 
submitted within twenty four hours to a joint 
session of Congress or to the Permanent 
Commission, which will make the final decision;
The detention shall not be at a place intended 
for the incarceration of criminals."
Essentially this provision permits the executive to proclaim a 
state of emergency (through the President) in response to a serious 
and urgent threat, but also ensures that constitutional control is 
retained by the democratically elected legislature by conferring on 
that body ultimate authority to endorse or reject the measures
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introduced. Under the terms of the Constitution, then, Congress is 
intended to have a crucial supervisory role when a state of emergency 
is proclaimed. However, as we shall see, when such a situation did 
arise, Congress consistently supported the use of emergency measures 
against subversion until eventually it no longer commanded sufficient 
authority to enforce a termination of the state of emergency.
President Jorge Pacheco Areco came to power in 1967, and in the 
face of an economic and political crisis he found it necessary to 
repeatedly impose certain restrictions and emergency provisions. As 
the security situation deteriorated, these measures became 
increasingly repressive, particularly after an outbreak of terrorist 
activity in 1970, when the President requested special legislation to 
allow the government to impose a curfew, suspend habeas corpus and 
other civil rights, and authorise the security forces to make arrests 
and searches without warrants and detain suspects without trial. 
Congress duly approved this request, and although there were 
subsequently relaxations of the security measures, the kidnapping of 
the British Ambassador in January 1971 provoked further reaction: the
President sought approval for the re-imposition of a state of 
emergency, with a suspension of civil liberties for ninety days, and 
the Permanent Commission, representing Congress during the summer 
recess, gave its approval, although it restricted the duration of the 
state of emergency to forty days and in fact subsequently refused to 
sanction an extension. In both these instances, the proclamation of a 
state of emergency was a direct response to specific terrorist action, 
and in both instances constitutional control was retained by the 
appropriate authority, which was able to terminate the state of 
emergency when it deemed its continuation unnecessary. However, signs
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of a constitutional crisis soon appeared: when the Chamber of
Deputies® decided by a simple majority (including dissenting members 
of the ruling Colorado party) to lift the remaining security measures 
in order to create a favourable atmosphere for the impending 
elections, the government renewed them by decree the following day, 
and although the Chamber of Deputies voted by 54 votes to 2 that the 
President had acted unconstitutionally, no steps were taken to enforce 
this decision.
The 1971 general elections were contested for the first time by 
the Frente Amplio, under the name Partido Democrata Cristiano, along 
with the two traditional parties. The Frente Amplio coalition 
included the communists and socialists as well as the Christian 
Democrats and various other groups. Voting was compulsory, and the 
result was a narrow victory for the ruling Colorados over the Blancas, 
with the Frente Amplio third. Juan Maria Bordaberry was elected 
President and took office in March 1972.7 In that same month, 
Congress decided to lift the remaining security measures (apart from 
restrictions on media reporting about guerrilla activity) with effect 
from 1 May, and if all had gone smoothly this might have marked the 
end of a period of great instability in the history of Uruguay. 
However, terrorist activity resumed following an election truce, and 
in April 1972 this activity reached a peak with several murders and 
the eruption of street battles in Montevideo between the Tupamaros and 
the security forces. A state of internal war was proclaimed, and 
after twenty hours of debate Congress in joint session decided by 97 
votes to 21 (only the Frente Amplio dissenting) to grant the President 
power to suspend individual liberties and declare martial law areas 
for the next thirty days. This brought the armed forces into action
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and also had the effect of authorising the transfer of jurisdiction in 
political cases to military tribunals. The measures also permitted 
search without warrant, the extension of maximum periods of detention 
without charge, and restrictions on the dissemination of information 
about security operations.
Although the situation undoubtedly warranted exceptional 
measures, and the introduction of a state of emergency was validly 
ratified by the responsible constitutional authority, there in fact 
followed a whole series of prolongations of the state of emergency, 
approved by ever-decreasing congressional majorities. Gunfights 
between the guerrillas and the security forces continued, and strikes 
were called, as a result of which the government in lay 1972 sought an 
indefinite extension of the state of internal war. After forty five 
hours of debate, Congress by a reduced majority of 68 votes to 56 
approved an extension only until the end of June, but although human 
rights violations were by then coming to light and many politicians 
were beginning to realise the threat to democracy, Congress approved a 
further ninety day extension at the end of June. The subsequent 
adoption of a Law on National Security (No. 14,068) permitted the 
termination of the state of internal war on 11 July, but that law 
itself formed the basis of new security measures which regularised the 
involvement of military courts, creating certain new crimes against 
the security of the state (cfe lesa nacional) to be tried, along with 
many other offences, as military crimes. The round-up of the 
Tupamaros continued during the second half of 1972, and many other 
political suspects were also detained, but several hundred identified 
guerrillas and sympathisers remained at large, with the result that
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Congress again renewed the state of emergency at the end of November. 
The vote was 62 to 59.
The real dilemma throughout this period lay in the fact that 
there did exist a serious political crisis which demanded an effective 
response, so that there was no question of the state of emergency 
being entirely unjustified. Congress clearly considered the risks 
involved in the prolongation of the state of emergency to be 
acceptable, and while the majority in the November vote was only 
three, the executive at that point still had congressional authority 
for the security measures upon which it was relying in its counter­
subversive operations. Moreover, the legislative body had adapted the 
Law on National Security, which introduced military justice into the 
normal legal framework of the state. The subsequent political crisis 
might have been averted if the constitutional provisions relating to 
emergency measures had been stricter, for example in requiring a two 
thirds majority, but this does not really alter the principle: there
did exist a serious threat to the organised life of the community, and 
as far as international law is concerned Congress does not appear to 
have been unjustified in approving a state of emergency. The problem 
was that adequate safeguards were not established, with the result 
that effective supervision became increasingly difficult. The ability 
of Congress to control the executive was gradually weakened, so that 
when eventually the executive and the armed forces began to act 
unconstitutionally Congress was unable to take any action.
In February 1973, the armed forces intervened. Although the 
Tupamaros had been defeated, the military had in the course of their 
security operations uncovered widespread corruption and 
maladministration, and they took it upon themselves to investigate
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these and other forms of 'subversion'. This led to conflict with the 
civilian government, and on 8 February army units occupied all radio 
and television transmitters in the capital, demanding the dismissal of 
the Defence Minister and greater powers to combat corruption. Two 
days later, Army and Air Force leaders broadcast a 19-point political 
programme® which President Bordaberry was compelled to accept. The 
demands included the creation of a National Security Council (CONASED) 
as an organ of military supervision and control over the 
administration,3 thus ensuring the permanent involvement of the 
military in the political affairs of the state.
A few days after these events, the state of emergency was 
extended for a further six weeks by the Permanent Commission, and 
although certain stipulations were made regarding the release of 
detainees, it is significant that in the midst of this constitutional 
crisis Congress was not recalled, and the crucial responsibility of 
approving a state of emergency was entrusted to the Permanent 
Commission. Perhaps it would have made no difference in any event, 
because when Congress did have the opportunity of terminating the 
state of emergency, it actually authorised a further two month 
extension, albeit after another lengthy debate and by only 65 votes to 
63. At the same time, a proposal which would have abolished the 
requirement for congressional ratification of emergency measures was 
rejected, but by this stage it must have been increasingly obvious 
that the authority of the elected body was very fragile indeed. When, 
at the end of May, as a result of further defections from the 
government, Congress finally refused to sanction another extension, 
the President continued the state of emergency by decree, and although 
in theory Congress could have overturned this by a simple majority, it
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lacked the courage and will to do so. A month later, the President 
dissolved Congress and replaced it with a Council of State, the 
functions of which were to carry out executive and legislative duties 
and also to draft a plan for constitutional reform to be submitted to 
referendum. The President ruled by decree until the Council of State 
was formed in December 1973.
The dissolution of Congress meant that there no longer existed 
even a nominal constitutional separation of powers between the 
legislature and the executive, and the situation deteriorated even 
further during the following months: municipal and local councils
were also dissolved, to be replaced by honorary officials directly
responsible to the executive, thus ending democratic government at all 
levels. Moreover, increasingly repressive measures were imposed in 
other areas of public life: the trade union confederation was banned,
students were arrested and workers occupying state enterprises were 
forcibly dislodged by troops, while striking bank employees were 
enlisted in the forces, rendering them subject to military discipline, 
and the government authorised the dismissal of private sector
employees on strike. Further factory occupations and street clashes
led to a large number of arrests, and in this way the armed forces 
broke the popular resistance to the dissolution of Congress. The 
general strike ended on 11 July. In the following months, members of 
the Opposition and a large number of students attending the
traditionally left-wing National University were detained, and many 
publications were forced to close temporarily or even permanently. In 
December, fourteen left-wing groups were proscribed, their assets 
seized and their leaders arrested.
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The new Council of State was given responsibility for controlling 
•'the action of the Executive with regard to the respect of the rights 
of individuals”,10 but in view of the fact that its members, though 
civilians, were appointed by the military authorities, it clearly 
lacked sufficient independence to enjoy any credibility in this role. 
In effect, the armed forces had assumed full political control of the 
country through the national Security Council, and this became 
apparent in the subsequent developments. Congressional supervision 
had been removed, and all other forms of restraint had been 
effectively suppressed by the emergency measures, but in 1976 the 
military authorities further consolidated their position by deposing 
President Bordaberry when he became unco-operative. His interim 
replacement, Dr Alberto Demichelli, suspended the planned elections 
before handing over to Dr Aparicio Mendez. Judicial independence had, 
of course, been largely circumvented by the transfer of jurisdiction 
in political cases to military courts, but the civilian judiciary 
retained its independence in other areas and thus represented a 
potential source of difficulty for the government. Accordingly, the 
judiciary was placed under the direct control of the executive by 
Institutional Act lo. 8 in 1977, thus completing the elimination of 
independent limitation of government. These Acts, which were usually 
in direct conflict with the 1967 Constitution (which remained in 
force), were regarded as legitimate modifications of the Constitution, 
and by Act No. 8 the military authorities ensured complete control of 
every branch of power, in effect creating a totalitarian system.
Having completed the destruction of democracy in Uruguay, the 
authorities announced that the disruption which had necessitated 
emergency measures had been brought under control and that the anti­
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subversive laws would be gradually relaxed. A three-stage plan for a 
return to democracy was proposed, involving the formulation of a new 
constitution, presidential elections in 1981, and further elections in 
1986 in which the two traditional parties would participate in the 
normal manner. In the interim, however, the government was to 
continue to pursue its social and economic policies which would, it 
was asserted, bring about the "definitive institutionalization of the 
new Uruguay under the most favourable conditions."11 Military control 
of the government also remained, and while there were signs of an 
increasingly moderate influence within the armed forces, the 
repression continued, and a number of suspect officers were removed.
In 1980, the Political Commission of the Armed Forces (COMASPO) 
submitted its draft proposals for a new constitution to the Council of 
State, which proceeded to frame a 239-article draft constitution. 
This attracted savage criticism, especially from Amnesty 
International, because of its failure to provide adequate guarantees 
for the protection of fundamental human rights,12 and in fact, rather 
than effecting a genuine return to democracy, the draft 
institutionalised the role of the armed forces in the government of 
the country, legitimising practices which had resulted in the 
systematic violation of human rights since 1973. The draft 
constitution provided for the retention of the National Security 
Council, which was to be responsible for all security matters, 
including economic planning and education, and for the creation of a 
Political Control Commission, whose function would be to resolve 
conflicts between the various branches of power. This latter body 
would have had authority to dismiss any civilian official, including 
judges and even the President. In this way, then, the armed forces
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sought to ensure overall control within a 'restricted democracy', in 
which the two traditional political parties would have had a limited 
role, left-wing groups being formally prohibited by the draft 
constitution. Military justice was to continue to apply in the case 
of serious offences against national security, and provision was made 
for three distinct types of state of emergency, which could only be 
terminated by a two thirds majority in Congress. These and similar 
provisions prompted Amnesty International to make the following 
observation:
"... the draft proposals for the new Uruguayan 
constitution do not satisfy minimum legal 
standards, for the protection of human 
rights.... Furthermore, it will provide no legal 
guarantees or safeguards against future gross 
violations of human rights.... similar to those 
that have occurred since the armed forces came 
to power in 1973."13
The proposed constitution was, in fact, rejected in a referendum
held in November 1980 by 945,112 votes (57.2% of votes cast) to
707,182 (42,8%), with a turn-out of over 80% of the electorate.1A
President Mendez described the result as "a defeat for the people
rather than for the Government",13 and while the government accepted
the decision of the people, it affirmed that the process of
"democratic institutionalization" would continue and that every effort
would be made to draw up a new plan. The government's attitude to a
return to democracy at that stage must, however, be viewed in the
light of the following statement made by the Navy's Commander-in-Chief
prior to the referendum:
" If the citizens vote negatively in the 
plebiscite which will take place in November of 
this year, it would mean that they do not want 
the change in the constitution, so the 1967 
constitution will remain in force with the 
modifications which have been introduced through 
the Institutional Acts....the negative vote of 
the citizens to the new constitution would mean
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that there is a general consensus in support of 
the measures taken up to now, so that there is 
no need for a change of Carta Magna.,MS
By interpreting the rejection of the proposals as an endorsement 
of the status quo rather than as an indictment of their policies, the 
military authorities were able to claim popular support for their 
continued involvement in the government of the country. Of course, if 
the proposals had been accepted, the armed forces would have been in 
an even stronger position within the constitutional framework.
A wave of arrests followed the referendum, and tensions increased 
within the armed forces themselves, particularly after a financial 
scandal in April 1981 led to the enforced resignation of a number of 
high-ranking officers. Thereafter, a more moderate line of thought 
began to emerge within the military, and talks with the two major 
political parties and the smaller Civic Union were initiated. Left- 
wing parties and a large faction of the Blancos were excluded, but as 
a result of the discussions the government passed Institutional Act 
lo. 11, which provided for the appointment of a transitional President 
on 1 September for three and a half years, the gradual normalisation 
of non-leftist party activity, and the addition of more members to the 
Council of State, with a broadening of its powers. There were signs 
of a liberalisation, and the moderate General Gregorio Alvarez was 
appointed President. He indicated that a new constitution would be 
submitted to referendum in November 1984, that elections would take 
place at the same time, and that power would be transferred back to 
civilian authorities in 1985. The independence of the judiciary was 
to be fully restored, but political groups opposed to democracy were 
to remain illegal.
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The government embarked upon its programme of liberalisation 
(apertura) by lifting restrictions on political meetings and 
legalising the trade union movement, and in May 1983 there commenced a 
series of discussions between the Political Commission of the Armed 
Forces and leaders of the three lawful political parties.17 It soon 
emerged, however, that there were fundamental differences of opinion, 
as the politicians wished to adopt the 1967 Constitution in its 
entirety, whereas the military authorities did not regard it as 
adequate to deal with subversion.1'3 Essentially, the armed forces 
wished to retain overall political control and were reluctant to 
permit a full return to democracy, and when after seven sessions no 
agreement had been reached, the politicians eventually declined to 
play any further part in the dialogue until certain concessions were 
made. The government responded by announcing the suspension of all 
political activity for up to two years, but reaffirmed its intention 
to implement its programme of democratisation. This provoked a series 
of demonstrations and rallies, followed by strikes at the beginning of 
1984, including a 24-hour general stoppage which attracted fairly 
substantial support and resulted in a decree prohibiting trade union 
activity.
In March 1984, the Minister for the Interior stated that the 
proposed elections were still conditional on agreement being reached 
between the politicians and the armed farces, and talks were in fact 
resumed in July. Although illegal, protests and demonstrations 
continued, and the following month restrictions on political activity 
were lifted to create a suitable atmosphere for the impending 
elections, which proceeded in November, resulting in victory for the 
Colorados (490,719 votes), with the Blancos second (415,600 votes) and
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the Frente Amplio third (285,110 votes). The Civic Union also took a 
small percentage of the vote. Dr Julio Maria Sanguinetti Cairolo took 
office as Presidenton 1 March 1985, when his Cabinet was also sworn 
in. Legal status was immediately restored to all proscribed groups, 
restrictions on the press were lifted, military jurisdiction over 
civilians was terminated, civil rights were restored and all political 
prisoners were released within two w e e k s . T h e  restoration of 
democracy has, then, been achieved in Uruguay, and although it remains 
to be seen to what extent the country's former liberalism can be 
regained, the period of intense repression has ended, and the civilian 
government's commitment to the protection of human rights became 
apparent early in its existence when it ratified the American 
Convention on Human Rights (accepting the inter-state procedure and 
the jurisdiction of the Court) and signed the United Rations
Convention against Torture. However, in December 1986 the government 
also passed a Punto Final (full stop) law, the effect of which was to 
grant immunity to military and police officials in respect of human 
rights violations perpetrated before 1985. This provoked strong
protest and condemnation within the country, and the political 
situation remains fragile. There has also been continuing unrest as a 
result of economic problems, and it may therefore be some time before 
stability returns to Uruguay.
These, then, are the developments which have taken place in
Uruguay over the past twenty years. In summary, the erosion of
restraints on the executive commenced with the declaration of a state 
of internal war in 1972, and after the military intervention the 
fallowing year democratic institutions were gradually neutralised,
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effectively creating a totalitarian system within which the protection 
of fundamental human rights could not he ensured.
The Security Measures in Practice
The security measures employed from 1967 onwards were of 
different types and fulfilled a variety of functions: some were
intended to suppress political activities such as meetings, others 
dealt with potential opposition in specific spheres of public life, 
such as the trade unions, the media and the universities, and others 
related more directly to the procedures of arrest, detention and 
trial. While constitutional control of the executive was being 
nullified, then, a corresponding suppression of other passible sources 
of restraint also took place by means of censorship, the banning of 
unions and political parties, and the detention of suspected opponents 
of the government. Of particular relevance to the problem of torture, 
however, were the emergency measures relating to detention and trial 
procedures, especially those introduced at the time of the initial 
military involvement in counter-subversion. Although torture had been 
employed by the police on a number of occasions during the earlier 
states of emergency, the incidence of torture increased dramatically 
from April 1972, when the government called in the armed forces, and 
one of the principal factors in this was the transfer of jurisdiction 
to military tribunals. The entire procedure for dealing with 
political suspects was, in fact, placed under the control of the 
security forces, with the result that even while there remained a 
degree of congressional authority the clandestine employment of 
torture was possible. Of course, the situation deteriorated after the
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dissolution of Congress, when there no longer remained even nominal 
independent constitutional control of the executive and the security 
forces.
A general pattern emerged in the practices followed by the 
security forces in their counter-subversive operations. Suspects 
arrested by the security forces were normally hooded or blindfolded 
and taken to a military barracks, and were not usually informed of the 
reasons for their arrest. In fact, the emergency provisions, 
especially after the promulgation of the Law on National Security, 
permitted arrest without a warrant on rather tenuous grounds, defining 
offences against the state in very broad terms: these included
attacks on the Constitution, subversive association, assisting such an 
association, assisting members of a subversive organisation, 
association usurping public authorities, assisting associations 
usurping public authorities, and also lack of due respect for the 
flag, mere criticism of the armed farces, and failure to adhere to the 
republican democratic system.20 In certain instances, the legislation 
actually had retroactive effect, contrary to article 15, paragraph 1, 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.21
Arrest on suspicion of involvement in subversive activities was 
normally followed by a period of incommunicado detention, during which 
interrogation took place. In some circumstances, the detainee's 
family were not informed of his whereabouts, and sometimes the 
security farces even denied all knowledge of him. It was at this 
stage, while the detainee had no access to his family, his lawyer or a 
judge, that torture was most likely to occur and did, in fact, occur 
with the highest frequency. Article 192 of the Military Penal 
Procedure Code (which applied to cases before military tribunals)
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provided that, except in exceptional cases, incommunicado detention 
should not exceed two days in duration and, moreover, must not prevent 
communication with a lawyer, attendance at the hearing of witnesses or 
communication in writing with the prison director or the judicial
authorities, Thus, even the military code recognised the importance 
of ensuring that detainees are not isolated from the outside world but 
have access to sympathetic parties, especially an independent
judiciary capable of effectively supervising detention procedures. 
However, the provisions of the military code were commonly disregarded 
in practice, and the security forces frequently held detainees
completely incommunicado for prolonged periods. In any event, even if 
detainees had been permitted access to a judge, the military tribunals 
lacked the independence and impartiality necessary to make them 
effective in the protection of human rights. The transfer of
jurisdiction to military courts thus undermined the protection of 
detainees against ill-treatment by the security forces.
Interrogators are well aware that as long as they hold a suspect 
incommunicado there is nothing to inhibit them in the means they use 
to obtain a confession or information, and we have already seen that 
security forces generally regard torture as justifiable in counter­
subversion. The event takes place in secret, and as long as the 
detainee remains incommunicado thereafter, the matter cannot be 
brought to the attention of an independent authority or the outside 
world: there are no witnesses present, and if there is any
possibility of a judicial investigation, the detainee's court 
appearance can simply be postponed until the marks of torture have 
disappeared. Indeed, if the security farces have denied holding the 
person from the beginning, it does not even matter if death occurs
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accidentally as a result of torture, since they can simply dispose of 
the body and deny all knowledge of the person. It can be extremely 
difficult, then, to prove that torture has taken place when detainees 
are held incommunicado and there is no effective judicial supervision 
of detention.
Incommunicado detention is undoubtedly a most serious threat to 
the protection of fundamental human rights, but any form of detention 
holds risks if there is no satisfactory judicial or equivalent 
supervision. The security forces may be free to employ torture 
because the courts are unable or unwilling to restrain them, and in 
such circumstances the fact that a detainee has access to his family 
or a lawyer may be irrelevant, because they will be unable to obtain 
an effective remedy through the courts. This situation arose in 
Uruguay with preventive detention, including the continued detention 
of those who had served their sentences or whose release had been 
ordered, because there simply did not exist effective judicial or 
other supervision of detention.
The remedy of habeas corpus is an extremely important procedure 
in the protection of human rights. Its purpose is to establish the 
lawfulness or otherwise of the detention of a specific person, and its 
ultimate aim is to secure the release of the person by judicial order 
on the basis that the detention is not in accordance with the relevant 
legal provisions. The success of an application for habeas corpus 
depends, of course, on the independence of the judge and his ability 
to enforce judicial orders. Article 17 of the Uruguayan Constitution 
of 1967 does provide for the remedy of habeas corpus, stating that the 
ruling of a judge granting habeas corpus shall be final, but this 
safeguard was also circumvented during the state of emergency.
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Although the civilian judiciary retained authority to grant habeas 
corpus until 1977, the judges failed to utilise the procedure to 
restrain the security forces: firstly, they accepted the contention
of the military authorities that habeas corpus did not apply to 
persons detained under the security measures, and secondly, they were 
satisfied if it was shown that the detainee was under the supervision 
of another judicial authority," including the military courts.
Detainees committed for trial were normally transferred from 
military barracks to a civilian or military prison, although as a 
result of over-crowding in the prisons many remained in barracks, 
where conditions were generally regarded as worse and where torture 
was used most regularly. Detainees undergoing trial were no longer 
held incommunicado, and might receive brief visits, but this was not a 
guarantee against being subjected to further torture, which at this 
stage was more likely to be punitive or vindictive rather than 
coercive. In some instances, detainees were not committed for trial 
at all, but after a short period of imprisonment were released without 
charge or were simply held without trial. In such cases, the military 
tribunals did not become involved.
The effect of the transfer of jurisdiction from civilian to 
military courts was to undermine judicial independence and 
impartiality, and this was apparent both in the military judges' 
refusal to investigate allegations of ill-treatment and in their 
acceptance of confessions and other evidence clearly obtained by means 
of torture. They thus failed in their duty to protect the rights of 
detainees, and by their refusal to take any action against the 
practice of torture they in effect encouraged the security farces to 
continue using unlawful methods. Moreover, the absence of judicial
224
independence seriously prejudiced the rights of the accused at the 
trial itself. The trial had four stages,23 conducted almost 
exclusively by means of written proceedings which were slow and often 
tortuous: the presumario and the sumario took place before a juez de 
instruccion, the plenario before a juez de primera i list a n d  a, and 
appeal Cor segunda instancia) before the Supremo Tribunal Militar 
(STM). Often a preliminary investigation was carried out by a juez 
sumariante, although this office was based on a provision of military 
law which was never intended to apply to civilians. In practice, this 
initial investigation could take up to a year, depending on the
circumstances. Its main purpose was to obtain a confession, and while 
there is no evidence that the jueces sumariantes were directly 
involved in the practice of torture, it seems unlikely that they were 
unaware of its existence.
Once the evidence - often principally a confession - had been 
collected, the case was passed to a military juez de instruccion, 
whose initial function was to ascertain the validity of the
confession. These judges, whose number was increased to six in 1972, 
were military officers or retired officers, and were not required to 
be legally qualified. They could order the release of the accused 
(but could not necessarily enforce such an order, so that the security
forces might simply return him to the barracks for further torture),
or could issue an indictment if there was a prima facie case. In the 
absence of sufficient evidence, however, a juez de instruccion could 
still prepare an indictment on the basis of his own "moral conviction" 
of the guilt of the accused, a practice which was in blatant violation 
of the most fundamental principles of justice, essentially permitting 
criminal proceedings to be instituted purely on the basis of a
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subjective assessment. Thus, not only could the security farces 
employ torture in an attempt to obtain a confession, but even when 
they were unsuccessful the juez de instruccion could order prosecution 
on the basis of his personal prejudice. In such circumstances, it is 
highly probable that proceedings were instituted against many innocent 
people.
It was when the accused appeared before a juez de instruccion 
that he first had an opportunity of making a complaint about ill- 
treatment to a judicial authority, but the lack of independence again 
meant that it was unlikely any action would be taken. The judge might 
well refuse to instigate an investigation and simply accept the 
confession presented to him by the security forces, and even if he was 
inclined to believe the allegations he faced an almost impossible 
task, partly because of the difficulty of proving torture, and partly 
because the jueces de instruccion actually appear to have had little 
real power: being under the direct control of the military
authorities, they could not function as an independent and impartial 
judiciary, and their duty was not to restrain the security forces <of 
which they were part). It may be noted that the civilian courts, 
prior to introduction of military tribunals, had actually found police 
officers guilty of torture, indicating that they were able and willing 
to fulfil their responsiblity for the protection of human rights.
Once the indictment had been issued, the accused had to find a 
lawyer, although his freedom of choice was severely restricted as a 
result of the harassment, enforced exile and even imprisonment and 
torture of lawyers prepared to defend political suspects. In fact, 
accused persons were often obliged to accept an unqualified military 
officer as counsel. This led to a situation in which the
226
interrogator, the prosecutor, the judge and the counsel for the 
defence were all military officials under the direct control of the 
same authorities, and while there may have been individuals within 
each of these categories endeavouring to ensure that the principles of 
justice were respected, it is clear that the effect of the entire 
process was to undermine these same principles. All those involved 
were members of the armed farces engaged in the common purpose of 
fighting subversion, and if inherent bias against political suspects 
did not prejudice the case for the defence, then the constraints of 
military discipline would certainly do so.
At the presumario stage, it was passible to appeal against the 
indictment, but the three day limit which was imposed and the enforced 
reliance on military defence lawyers ensured that this procedure was 
seldom resorted to. At the next stage, the sumario, the accused was 
again asked by the juez de instruccion to "ratify or rectify" his 
previous statement, in the presence of his lawyer but before any 
consultation. It was possible for the accused to make allegations of 
ill-treatment, but again it was unlikely any action would be taken, 
and if he retracted his confession there was always the risk that he 
would be returned to the military barracks for further torture. 
Witness statements and other written evidence were presented at the 
sumario stage. Throughout the proceedings, the defence was at a 
serious disadvantage in a number of areas: for instance, there were
restrictions on the defence lawyer's contact with the accused and on 
access to the evidence, making it difficult for the defence to prepare 
and state its case in full. Moreover, the judge often had a secret 
report, prepared by the security farces and giving additional 
information obtained by them. The defence was denied access to this
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report, but the information contained in it often played a very 
significant part in influencing the decision of the juez de
instruccion. The entire system was clearly at variance with the
principles of justice and many of its features directly contravened 
international norms, including the right to a fair trial. A further 
problem lay in the practice adopted by the Ministry of Defence of 
referring cases regarded as important or sensitive to selected judges 
who could be relied on to take appropriate action.
The plenario or trial stage took place before one of the jueces 
de primera instancia. The prosecution and the defence presented their 
respective cases and proposed what they considered to be appropriate 
sentences, but the judges adopted the practice of passing sentences in 
excess of those requested by the prosecution (.ultrapetita), another 
clear violation of the principles of justice which in fact led a 
number of prosecutors to resign in protest. About 80%-90% of cases of 
primera instancia were forwarded to the Supremo Tribunal Militar for 
review: both prosecution and defence could appeal, and appeal was in
fact mandatory if the sentence was imprisonment for three years or
more. This provision was originally intended to be a guarantee for
the convicted person, but on some occasions the STM actually increased 
sentences even when only the defence had appealed. The Integrated 
Supreme Court of Justice was empowered to quash convictions by the 
STM, but never did so, and in 1977 was deprived of its power.
Such, then, was the system of military justice which operated in 
Uruguay, involving protracted procedures, denial of the rights of the 
accused, acceptance of evidence obtained unlawfully, and courts 
subject to the control of the military authorities. The entire 
process was, in fact, under the control of the armed forces, and no
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independent authority was established to ensure the protection of 
human rights, with the result that even the few formal safeguards 
which did exist were simply ignored by the security forces. The 
erosion of the legal and procedural rights of detainees and accused 
persons which the emergency measures involved clearly created 
conditions in which the protection of human rights could not be 
ensured, and in particular the practice of incommunicado detention 
combined with the absence of effective independent supervision of the 
security forces facilitated and encouraged the use of torture.
TQEtur.e
Isolated incidents of torture were not unknown in Uruguay prior 
to the proclamation of a state of internal war and the consequent 
involvement of the armed forces in counter-subversive operations, but 
the routine and systematic use of torture only commenced at that time 
and, as we have seen, a causal relationship can be identified between 
the introduction of special detention procedures (including reliance 
on military tribunals) and the emergence of torture. Initially, 
Congress closely monitored the situation, and in 1972 actually 
examined the case of one detainee who had died in detention, 
concluding that death had occurred as a result of torture. This was 
the first - and only - finding by Uruguayan authorities that torture 
had been employed, but it did not prevent the continuation of the 
state of emergency, and by the time the scale of human rights 
violations became known, Congress no longer possessed sufficient 
authority to remedy the situation.
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When the International Commission of Jurists in its Review of
June 1972 asserted that there was "reason to fear that political
prisoners have often been subjected to inhuman treatment" in
Uruguay,2*5 the government responded by announcing that all measures
introduced were constitutional, although it conceded that it was
necessary "to give some articles of the Constitution an interpretation
which was wide, but no wider than the gravity of the situation
demanded...",26 and added:
"The Government has not ordered the use of ill- 
treatment or torture, which would have been 
contrary to the Constitution."2,7
The International Commission of Jurists replied:
"Firstly, we did not suggest in any way that the 
lawful use of force by the authorities is to be 
equated with illegal violence. Secondly, we did 
not suggest that the Government of Uruguay have 
authorised the use of torture. However, we are 
not alone in suggesting that there has been 
illegal use of torture against suspects in 
Uruguay."2e
In the secrecy and confusion created by the emergency measures at 
that early stage, it was difficult to ascertain precisely what the 
situation was, and initially it was assumed that the security forces 
were using torture on their own initiative without the authorisation 
of the government. The nature of the security measures certainly made 
this a distinct possibility, but it subsequently emerged that if the 
government was not actually responsible for ordering the employment of 
torture, it was at least condoning its use by the security forces. A 
United States Churchmen delegation which visited Uruguay in June 1972 
reported that there was indeed "impressive evidence that....both 
physical and psychological torture is practised on political prisoners 
by the Joint Forces (military and police) as part of the current 
repression purportedly aimed at the Tupamaros, but in fact extended
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widely to broad segments of the population for political reasons.
The delegation added that, in reply to frequent questioning, no one 
during its entire visit categorically denied that torture was being 
employed, and a senior government official actually defended the use 
of torture on the grounds of the necessity of protecting national
security.30
Following the intervention of the armed forces, there were even 
fewer constitutional and political restraints on the security forces, 
and allegations of torture increased. In 1974, a joint mission by the 
International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International visited 
Uruguay, and produced an eleven page report in which the conclusion 
was reached that "the widespread torture and ill-treatment of suspects 
is facilitated by defects in the system, by the failure of the
authorities to fallow the procedures prescribed by law, and by the 
lack of adequate judicial and other remedies to enforce these
procedures.1,31 The report criticised the delays in military justice, 
the lack of legally qualified magistrates, and the prolonged periods 
of detention, thus identifying the crucial problems. The report, 
which was updated in 1975 and 1976, made several specific references 
to torture:
"We have received many complaints of torture and 
other ill-treatment. The general view among 
defence lawyers is that almost all persons 
detained in military barracks and some of those 
detained in police stations are still being 
severely ill-treated either during or as a 
preliminary to interrogations. The most
conservative estimate we received was that it 
occurred in about 50% of the cases....The 
Military Judges of Instruction said that
hundreds of complaints of torture had been made 
to them, but they had not found a single case 
proved. The burden of proof lies in such cases 
on the complainant."32
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The human rights organisations clearly recognised that the system 
of military justice imposed in Uruguay, combined with the counter­
subversive measures, was largely responsible for the emergence of 
torture, and their criticism of the government continued until the 
restoration of democracy.33
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also began to show 
concern over the situation in Uruguay, and in 1978 produced a report 
which indicated inter alia that the right to life and to the "security 
and integrity of the person" had been violated, recommending that the 
government "adopt measures necessary to prevent and curb any abuses 
committed against detainees."34 Moreover, as we shall see in the 
following chapter, the Human Rights Committee established under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights considered a 
number of communications relating to Uruguay, concluding in nineteen 
separate cases that article 7 of the Covenant had been violated by the 
government of Uruguay.3e All of these concerned incidents occurring 
after the Covenant came into force in 1976. Specific mention of 
torture was made in eight cases.
In spite of the government's programme of liberalisation in the
early 1980's, allegations of torture continued. In June 1980, for
example, the International Commission of Jurists observed:
"According to recent information, torture 
continues to be used by military interrogators.
Torture methods have been refined. It is 
applied today in a more selective and 
"scientific" manner. Army and police torturers 
are assisted by physicians whose task is to 
supervise the condition of the victim undergoing 
questioning. Mot even prisoners who have stood 
trial and are serving a sentence are exempted °
from this aberrant practice. During 1979 there 
have been several reported cases of people 
withdrawn from their normal places of 
imprisonment to be questioned and tortured in 
military or police units to ascertain whether 
there was any form of political activity or
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evasion plans in detention centres. This 
entails a permanent state of distress and 
anxiety among the population of prisons, aware 
of the risk of being tortured again at any 
time."3e
A further Amnesty International Mission to Uruguay in April 1983
confirmed the continuing use of torture,3-7 and in the section
relating to Uruguay in its publication ’Torture in the Eighties', the
human rights organisation stated:
"The systematic use of torture as a means of 
obtaining information and confessions leading to 
prosecution under Uruguayan security legislation 
has remained a major concern of Amnesty 
International during the period under review."33
There was a reported increase in the use of psychological torture 
in early 1984, but since the return to democracy a year later 
allegations have ceased, clear confirmation of the relationship 
between the emergency measures and the use of torture.
To sum up, then, torture was utilised regularly and routinely in 
Uruguay following the declaration of a state of internal war in 1972, 
and this was a direct result of the imposition of repressive emergency
measures and the erosion of democracy. There is a clear relationship
between the security measures and the emergence of torture, and there 
can be no doubt that it was the suspension of the normal
constitutional and political restraints which permitted the security 
forces to resort to torture, which was usually inflicted for the 
purpose of interrogation, although one of its aims was probably to 
create a general apprehension and insecurity in the minds of potential 
subversives and dissidents. The victims of torture were those 
suspected of harbouring anti-government views or of having any 
connection with one of the many proscribed organisations. It has been 
estimated that at one stage Uruguay had the largest number of
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political prisoners in relation to population in the world, and it was 
claimed that one in fifty citizens had been in prison, while one in 
every four hundred had been subjected to torture.33 The incidence of 
deaths under torture was fairly high, although perhaps not 
disproportionate to the numbers tortured. When death did occur as a 
result of torture, the body was sometimes returned to the victim's 
family in a sealed coffin with strict instructions not to open it: 
those who dared to defy this order discovered the marks of torture on 
the body.40
Methods of torture reported include blindfolding and hooding, 
severe beatings, mock executions and death threats, as well as the 
standard Latin American techniques such as el planton (enforced 
standing), el submarine (half-drowning in water, excrement, urine or a 
combination of these), the picana electrica (cattle prod - often 
applied to the most sensitive parts of the body), and the pau de arara 
(a combination of swaying from a bar - hence 'parrot's perch' - half- 
drowning and electric shock). Another practice developed was the 
caballeter which involved the victim being forced to straddle a wooden 
or iron bar.
Conclusions
From even a cursory examination of the developments which took 
place in Uruguay during the 1970*s, it becomes immediately apparent 
that the emergence of the practice of torture was a direct consequence 
of the introduction of emergency measures in response to a serious 
threat to the security of the state, namely civil unrest which was 
itself due to the disappointment of social aspirations as a result of
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economic decline. While the proclamation of a state of emergency was 
a legitimate constitutional course for the government to adopt in the 
face of the disruption which took place, and was arguably a 
justifiable response to the problems, it is essential in such 
circumstances that adequate and efficient supervision of the 
implementation of the emergency measures should be established in 
order to prevent abuse of the special powers conferred upon the 
government and the security forces. In a state of emergency, the 
maintenance of effective democratic control over the executive and its 
subordinate agencies is crucial in ensuring the protection of 
fundamental human rights, but in Uruguay there was a failure to 
achieve this.
Following the initial introduction of special police powers of 
arrest and detention and the suspension of various civil liberties, 
the operation of democratic and political institutions within the 
Uruguayan constitutional system was not sufficient to prevent isolated 
incidents of torture, but the existence of safeguards undoubtedly 
functioned as a deterrent which dissuaded members of the security 
forces from resorting to unlawful methods of interrogation, and thus 
inhibited the development of torture into a systematic practice at 
that stage. Within any system, of course, individual officials are 
always capable of acting unlawfully, and the complete elimination of 
torture is thus dependent upon the willingness of individuals to 
uphold the rule of law, but the possibility of investigation by one's 
superiors or by a judicial or equivalent authority, resulting in 
exposure, censure and disciplinary action, constitutes a significant 
deterrent, thus helping to prevent torture. The importance of such 
deterrents and of effective safeguards is, of course, correspondingly
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greater when there is a suspension or curtailment of the legal and 
procedural rights of detainees, because in such conditions the secrecy 
created permits the security forces a degree of licence by making 
supervision and investigation more difficult. The relevance of 
constitutional and political safeguards also increases when 
restrictions are imposed on civil liberties.
In Uruguay, the introduction of special powers of detention, 
combined with numerous restrictions on civil liberties, created an 
atmosphere in which the clandestine use of torture was made possible, 
but initially the continuing operation of democratic and 
constitutional restraints on the government effectively prevented 
large scale violations of human rights. As the safeguards were 
gradually eroded further, however, especially after the declaration of 
a state of internal war in 1972, the protection of human rights could 
no longer be guaranteed. The elimination of conventional safeguards 
was not accompanied by the creation of alternative measures sufficient 
to prevent governmental abuses, and the consequence of this failure 
was the erosion of the rule of law, the facilitation of human rights 
violations and the circumvention of the limitation of government which 
led ultimately to the collapse of democracy.
The basic lesson to be learned from Uruguay* s experience is that 
whenever emergency measures are invoked, it is essential for effective 
control over the security forces to be maintained, and this requires 
the political will to ensure that the implementation of the emergency 
measures by the security forces takes place in accordance with the 
law. The responsibility for this lies in the first instance with the 
executive, which has usually been granted special powers to enable it 
to deal with the emergency situation, but executive supervision will
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rarely provide satisfactory guarantees against abuses, because the 
executive itself will normally have requested the special powers and 
is likely to fully support the security forces. In Uruguay, as in 
many similar situations, the executive clearly lacked the political 
will to investigate allegations of torture, and indeed it permitted 
the armed forces an increasingly prominent role in counter-subversion 
until it eventually lost the political authority to enforce its will 
and exercise any control over the security forces. The subsequent 
seizure of power by the armed forces merely compounded this problem, 
as the military authorities made no attempt to impose restrictions on 
the application of the security measures, an indication that the use 
of unlawful methods was condoned at the highest levels,
When the executive lacks the political will to ensure the 
protection of fundamental human rights, the crucial factor is the 
existence and effectiveness of independent limitations on both the 
security forces and the executive itself. There are three main areas 
in which pressure may be brought to bear, namely public opinion,
judicial review and parliamentary supervision, each of which was
systematically suppressed during the crisis in Uruguay. The
restrictions imposed upon the media, the unions, the academic world 
and the political parties ensured from an early date that there would 
be little public expression of criticism of the government's policies, 
although each of these sectors endeavoured to defy the security farces 
and continue political activity. As far as the constitutional 
separation of powers was concerned, parliamentary and judicial control 
over the emergency measures remained relatively effective until the 
proclamation of a state of internal war, when the judicial role was 
severely curtailed as a result of the transfer of jurisdiction to
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military tribunals, a move which deprived the civilian courts of the 
opportunity of reviewing security procedures and monitoring the 
treatment of detainees, and in fact eliminated any independent 
judicial supervision of the security forces. The assumption of 
executive control over the civilian judiciary at a later date merely 
consolidated the position. With regard to parliamentary supervision, 
Congress initially retained control over the state of emergency, and 
exhibited a certain concern for human rights, but it nevertheless 
repeatedly supported the continuation of the state of emergency, even 
after the armed forces became involved, in spite of clear evidence
that abuses were taking place. It might be argued that the state of
internal war was not a situation envisaged in the 1967 Constitution, 
so that Congress ought not to have ratified the security measures
which were introduced, but the fact is that there was substantial 
support for the government within the elected body, and it was only at 
a very late stage that Congress finally refused to sanction a further 
prolongation. Thus, while the fact that only a simple majority 
sufficed for the continuation of the state of emergency may be open to 
criticism, the question is not whether the emergency measures were 
constitutional, but rather why Congress failed to assert its political 
authority over the executive and subsequently lost the will and power 
to do so. The degree of political will within Congress was not
strong, and gradually its constitutional authority waned to such an 
extent that it eventually proved incapable of resisting the 
government, and in due course even the formal role to which it had 
been reduced was terminated. By the time the armed farces took power 
in 1973, both judicial and parliamentary authority had been largely 
neutralised, and after the dissolution of all democratically elected
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bodies there no longer existed an independent constitutional agency at 
any level capable of enforcing restraints on the government in order 
to ensure the security measures were applied in accordance with the 
law and with due respect for human rights. The result was a 
significant increase in the use of torture, directly attributable to 
the erosion of safeguards.
There are, then, two particular areas in which safeguards must be 
maintained during a state of emergency: firstly, there must be legal
and procedural guarantees for detainees; secondly, there must exist 
adequate and effective constitutional constraints on government. Uo 
state can guarantee immunity against the wilful violation of the rule 
of law by the armed forces or the executive with the support of the 
armed forces, but strong democratic institutions and a tradition of 
respect for constitutional authority can constitute powerful moral 
influences which inhibit such action, and it is for this reason that 
the continuation of independent supervision of the executive and its 
agencies must be effectively established when emergency measures are 
introduced. One of the problems in Uruguay was that neither Congress 
nor the judiciary adapted a sufficiently strong stance in monitoring 
the state of emergency, as a result of which the executive enjoyed 
considerable freedom of action, recognised the fragility of 
constitutional restraints and ultimately succumbed to the intoxicating 
effects of power. Overall democratic control of emergency measures 
must always be retained, then, and should be clearly established 
legally and constitutionally. The independence of the judiciary must 
also be ensured, and this means that the use of military tribunals for 
civilian offenders should not be permitted. The authority of the 
judiciary to enforce judicial orders must be firmly established, and
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if there are doubts about the impartiality of the judiciary, an 
alternative independent authority should be empowered to supervise 
detention and trial procedures and given specific responsibility for 
the protection of human rights. The supervising authority should have 
access to all detainees, even (indeed, especially) those held 
incommunicado, so that no one nay be detained wholly at the mercy of 
the security forces but every detainee has an opportunity to complain 
to an independent authority with specific responsibility for the 
protection of his rights. The procedures of arrest and detention must 
not facilitate the employment of torture, but should provide the 
detainee with every opportunity to complain of ill-treatment to a 
judge and also to his lawyer and family, and should ensure that 
effective procedures are available whereby a satisfactory remedy can 
be obtained.
In conclusion, it is clear that the crucial factor in the 
effective protection of core rights is the existence of independent 
authorities with sufficient power to control the government and its 
administrative agencies. Often this power is essentially moral, and 
is consequently open to rejection or resistance, particularly by a 
government which has the support of the armed forces. In such 
circumstances, there may be little that democratic authorities can do 
to enforce the rule of law, as there has effectively been a breakdown 
of the fragile structures which underlie democracy, and it may be that 
only massive public opposition to the government can secure a return 
to democracy. In general, however, governments are reluctant to 
violate the rule of law blatantly, as they do not wish to alienate 
potential sources of support, and because democratic restraints can be 
effective in such circumstances it is imperative that the
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constitutional provisions relating to states of emergency should 
firmly establish independent control of the emergency measures and 
limit the curtailment of the rights of detainees.
In this chapter, we have concentrated on the case of Uruguay in 
order to illustrate the relationship between the absence of safeguards 
and the emergence of torture, and we have used the situation to show 
how the erosion of safeguards opens the way for the introduction of 
torture even when this is prohibitied by law. It is important to 
emphasise, however, that there are many countries in which few or no 
safeguards exist, so that torture can be resorted to freely, and in 
fact it is quite frequently the case that the regimes in such 
countries are afflicted by fear of subversion and consequently are 
liable to justify the use of torture. When such conditions prevail 
within a state, international law becomes relevant, and in the 
following chapters we shall examine the role of international law in 
the restraint of national governments, particularly when there is a 
breakdown or absence of safeguards at national level.
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CHAPTER SIX: IWTEMATTOMi PROCEDURES.
In the foregoing chapters, we have examined the relationship 
between the protection of fundamental human rights and the existence 
of constitutional and legal safeguards within the internal political 
systems of sovereign states, and we have observed that the effective 
protection of human rights is dependent upon the efficient operation 
of such safeguards, particularly in ensuring restraint of governmental 
action by independent authorities. We have also seen, however, that 
the rejection of the doctrine of the inherent rights of the individual 
as the determining principle of political organisation leads to the 
creation of a totalitarian system of government within which there is 
a complete absence of restraining influences, and that even within 
democratic systems a serious threat to national security can provoke 
the introduction of emergency measures which undermine democratic 
institutions. Moreover, we have noted the importance which 
governments attach to the defence of national security, to the extent 
of justifying whatever means they deem necessary, including torture, 
in the elimination of any threat. When a government adopts this 
attitude and there are insufficient restraints within the political 
structure of the state, it is clear that protection of fundamental 
human rights cannot be guaranteed at national level, and it is in 
these circumstances that international law becomes relevant. In this 
and the succeeding chapters, we shall examine the role of 
international law in providing a secondary level of restraints when 
safeguards at national level are inadequate, and in particular we 
shall endeavour to assess the effectiveness of existing international 
procedures in establishing control over national governments before
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going on to consider the prospects for proposed and prospective 
developments.
We have already seen that there are in existence numerous
international instruments relating to the protection of human rights, 
many of which incorporate a prohibition on the use of torture. In 
this chapter, we shall examine the extent to which international law 
has proved capable of fulfilling its role in preventing serious 
violations of human rights by ensuring the protection of the
individual from state authorities. Many international declarations 
and resolutions are not legally binding, and are intended only to 
provide guidelines for governments, but there are also international 
conventions which are binding on states which ratify them, and these 
conventions frequently include provisions for the creation of 
procedures whereby a degree of international supervision may be
established over states parties in their observance of the obligations
contained in the particular convention. These procedures, which are 
usually referred to as 'measures of implementation', have generally 
taken three principal forms: (1) periodic reporting by states on the
steps which they have taken to give effect to the convention in 
national law, (2) inter-state complaints regarding violation of 
rights guaranteed by the convention, and <3) the right of individual 
victims (and, in some instances, other individuals or groups) to bring 
alleged violations of the terms of the convention to the attention of 
the relevant international authorities.
International supervision of states in their observance of human 
rights is potentially of crucial importance. Since governments 
themselves are normally responsible for the violation of human rights, 
it is obvious that the exercise of a supervisory function by an
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international authority with universal jurisdiction would constitute a 
significant factor in the protection of human rights. Gross
violations of human rights are often the result of an absence of 
effective limitations on governmental power, either within the
constitutional framework of the political system itself or because of 
a state of emergency, and in such circumstances international 
supervision of national governments could provide the necessary 
restraints. However, there are major difficulties in establishing 
effective international supervision of national governments. The 
underlying problem is that in general international law, unlike 
national law, is applicable only in so far as each state accepts
specific obligations, and unfortunately the vast majority of
governments are strongly opposed to the very concept of international 
supervision in human rights matters, regarding these as internal 
affairs. This rejection of the idea that a government's treatment of 
its own nationals is a valid object of international law stems largely 
from the fundamental differences in attitude towards human rights 
which were identified in Chapter One: clearly if a government does
not view human rights in terms of claims against the state, and 
consequently sees no need for limitation of government, it will be 
unlikely to submit voluntarily to international procedures which are 
intended to protect the individual by imposing restraints on national 
governments. The result of this is that the application of 
international procedures is dependent upon prior acceptance by each 
state, normally through ratification of the appropriate convention. 
Indeed, the procedures established by international conventions are 
often optional, so that the authority of international agencies to 
deal with particular human rights situations depends upon separate
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acceptance of the procedure by the state in question. Many regimes 
are, of course, unwilling to submit to such measures, thus rendering 
international agencies powerless, because in practical terms human
rights protection can only be made effective at national level and
international agencies have no legal right to interfere without the
consent of the state.
The perennial problem with the international protection of human 
rights, then, is that the governments which prove most willing to
submit to international supervision are those which show greatest 
respect for human rights at national level, while the most brutal and 
repressive regimes generally refrain from accepting international 
procedures which would expose their violations and damage their public 
image. Indeed, it is often the case that there exist adequate 
safeguards within the internal systems of the states which submit to 
international measures, so that while international supervision is by 
no means superfluous there is less probability of the machinery having 
to be invoked. The paradox is, then, that while international 
restraints are all the more essential when internal safeguards are 
lacking, the governments which reject limitations at national level 
are even more vehemently opposed to the imposition of control by 
international agencies, particularly when matters of national security 
are involved.
International measures of implementation are not without value; 
they do provide an additional level of protection when they are 
accepted by governments. Mo government can guarantee absolute and 
comprehensive protection of human rights, and international 
supervision can fulfil a relevant role when domestic procedures prove 
ineffective or where isolated violations of less fundamental rights
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are involved. In other words, when the violation of human rights is 
not an inevitable consequence of the socio-political system and is not 
essential to governmental policies, the government will often be 
willing to accept and implement the recommendations of international 
authorities, especially if it has a genuine desire to establish more 
efficient protective machinery at national level. Moreover, 
international law may be of value in providing a medium through which 
pressure may be brought to bear on regimes which prove unco-operative 
even although they are bound by international legal obligations, for 
example where there has been a change of government after the 
ratification of a human rights convention. nevertheless, it must be 
recognised that the impact of international law in the field of human 
rights is seriously restricted. In particular, international 
obligations cannot be imposed upon governments, so that if the 
systematic violation of core human rights is essential to the 
retention of power by a regime, it can simply refuse to undertake any 
onerous legal obligations. Furthermore, even when a repressive regime 
is subject to the jurisdiction of an international authority, the 
measures of implementation may be rendered impotent by the regime's 
refusal to co-operate or comply with any decisions, the problem in 
this situation being that international law does not possess any 
genuinely effective sanctions and has no executive authority which can 
secure compliance with the decisions of international agencies, with 
the result that very little can be done if a government wilfully 
ignores such decisions.
The decisions and recommendations of international authorities do 
have some effect, but as far as human rights are concerned this is 
largely dependent on diplomatic pressure based on an apparent moral 
consensus about the validity of human rights:
250 5
"Compliance and noncompliance by states with 
their international obligations depend less on 
the formal status of a judgment and its abstract 
enforceability than on the impact of the opinion 
as a force capable of adding to or detracting 
from the legitimacy of specific governmental 
conduct. This latter factor has an important 
bearing on the perception that governments have > 
about the political costs of noncompliance."''
Governments always endeavour to give the impression in the 
international arena that they are concerned with the protection of 
human rights and that they fully respect human rights within their  ^
sphere of influence, and even the most repressive regimes will try to 
minimise the adverse publicity which their violations attract. 
International pressure may succeed in exploiting this sensitivity, *
although where governments consider national security issues to be 
involved even adverse publicity may not be sufficient to prevent gross 
violations of human rights* In such circumstances, international law 
is powerless.
In this chapter, then, we shall examine certain existing <
international procedures in order to assess their effectiveness, 
especially in relation to the prevention and elimination of torture. -
While international measures of implementation may be valuable in
securing the amendment of national laws in relation to less...
fundamental rights, they are tested to their limits when confronted by 
the institutionalised violation of core rights* The following 
discussion is not, therefore, an indictment of international
procedures generally, but is intended only to highlight the severe.
limitations which exist whenever fundamental human rights come i n t o * 
conflict with essential state interests. We shall concentrate on the 
measures of implementation established under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol, and
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also on the procedure set up pursuant to resolution 1503 of the United 
lations Economic and Social Council (ECQSOC). Brief mention will also 
be made of the two major regional systems, but only for the purpose of 
indicating the principal features of the procedures which have been 
developed within these systems, as special considerations obviously 
apply to regional conditions. Particular reference will be made to 
the effect of the various procedures in relation to the situation in 
Uruguay, not only because the recent political and legal developments 
in that country have already been outlined, but also because Uruguay 
has been the subject of consideration under both the Optional Protocol 
and the resolution 1503 procedures specifically in connection with the 
practice of torture. It will in fact be useful as a preliminary to 
note certain facts regarding Uruguay's position in relation to the 
international procedures.
Prior to the military takeover, while parliamentary democracy 
still prevailed in Uruguay, international efforts to develop effective 
protection of human rights were supported by successive Uruguayan 
governments and, indeed, representatives of the Uruguayan authorities 
were actively involved in the preparation of the texts of the two 
International Covenants. Uruguayan governments consistently supported 
the inclusion of effective measures of implementation in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Eights and voted in 
favour of the right of individual petition encompassed within the 
Optional Protocol.2 Uruguay subsequently ratified both Covenants and 
the Optional Protocol on 1 April 1970, and in spite of the collapse of 
democracy in 1973 when the military seized power and embarked on a 
' policy of systematic repression, the Optional Protocol was never 
repudiated as it might have been under article 12 thereof, so that
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throughout the period of military government, the authorities remained 
bound by the provisions of the Protocol as well as by the terms of the 
Covenant itself.
In June 1979, the government of Uruguay sent to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations a notice of derogation3 under article d,
paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which states:
"Any State Party to the present Covenant 
availing itself of the right of derogation shall 
immediately inform the other States Parties to
the present Covenant, through the intermediary
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
of the provisions from which it has derogated 
and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A 
further communication shall be made, through the 
same intermediary on the date on which it 
terminates such derogation.'1*
It should be noted that even if a notice fulfils the requirements 
of the article, it does not affect the prohibition of torture which 
is, of course, absolute by virtue of paragraph 2 of article 4. The 
Uruguayan notice is mentioned here to give some indication of the 
attitude of a regime to its international obligations at a time when 
it was intent on pursuing policies involving the violation of human 
rights, and also to illustrate some of the problems faced by
international authorities seeking to protect human rights.
In several respects, the communication submitted by the Uruguayan 
government fell short of the requirements expressed in article 4,
paragraph 1, of the Covenant, which we examined in Chapter Four. 
Indeed, there was a failure to "immediately inform" the other states 
parties: the notice of derogation was not sent until three years
after the Covenant came into force,® although a state of emergency 
had been in existence for some years prior to that. The Human Rights 
Committee in fact referred to the notice of derogation in its
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consideration of one communication received under the Optional 
Protocol,3 but felt "unable to accept that the requirements set forth 
in article 4(1) of the Covenant have been met."-7 The Committee
explained that in the notice "no attempt was made to indicate the 
nature and the scope of the derogation actually resorted to with 
regard to the rights guaranteed by the Covenant, or to show that such 
derogations were strictly necessary,"® :
In relating the reasons for the derogation, the notice stated:
"This emergency situation, the nature and
consequences of which match the description 
given in article 4, namely that they threaten 
the life of the nation, is a matter of universal 
knowledge, and the present communication might 
thus appear superfluous in so far as the
provision of substantive information is
concerned."®
It continued:
"Nonetheless, my Government wishes both to 
comply formally with the above-mentioned 
requirement and to reiterate that the emergency 
measures which it has taken, and which comply 
strictly with the requirements of article 4(2), 
are designed precisely to achieve genuine, 
effective and lasting protection of human 
rights, the observance and promotion of which 
are the essence of our existence as an 
independent and sovereign nation."10
Finally, the notice intimated:
"Notwithstanding what has been stated above, the - 
information referred to in a r t i c l e 4(3) 
concerning the nature and duration of the
emergency measures will be provided in more 
detailed form when the report referred to in 
article 40 of the Covenant is submitted, so that 
the scope and evolution of these measures can be 
fully understood."11
It is clear from these statements that while the government was 
anxious to stress that its emergency measures were entirely in 
accordance with the requirements of the Covenant, it was not prepared 
to give details of those measures which might have negated its
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unqualified assertions. Uruguay's report under article 40 of the 
Covenant, due in 1977, was not in fact received by the Human Rights 
Committee until 1982.13 It is discussed below.
Leaving aside the vagueness and insufficiency of the notice of 
derogation, it might appear that the Uruguayan authorities were 
willing to honour their obligations under the Covenant in so far as 
they did intimate the position. However, it is essential to view the 
apparent co-operation of the government in context. The provisions 
relating to the right of derogation do not establish any enforcement 
machinery whereby compliance with the requirements of the Covenant can 
be ensured: the Covenant does not create any process by means of
which implementation of emergency measures by national governments may 
be monitored by international agencies, but merely requires formal 
intimation of derogation. Indeed, the Covenant does not empower the 
Human Rights Committee to determine the legality of a state of 
emergency or even to verify the sufficiency of a notice of derogation, 
and there are no sanctions or penalties provided for when a government 
does not supply adequate information or simply fails to submit a 
formal notice. The Human Rights Committee certainly criticised the 
Uruguayan notice of derogation in the course of its proceedings under 
the Optional Protocol, and would no doubt be prepared to express an 
opinion as to the validity of particular emergency measures in 
specific situations if given the opportunity to do so, but the fact 
remains that there is no provision for international supervision of 
states of emergency in the Covenant, and this is a serious deficiency 
because it deprives the Human Rights Committee of clear power to make 
authoritative pronouncements regarding the legality of any particular 
state of emergency. The provisions relating to derogation are thus
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without any real substance, and as far as Uruguay was concerned they 
had little impact on the human rights situation. In fact, the purpose 
of the notice of derogation in 1979 seems to have been to give the 
authorities some basis for contesting the Human Rights Committee's 
right to consider communications relating to Uruguay.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides 
in article 40 for the submission of reports by states parties, while 
in articles 41 and 42 it makes provision for inter-state complaints, 
although the latter procedure requires separate acceptance, as does 
the procedure for individual petition established by the Optional 
Protocol. Accordingly, while all states parties to the Covenant are 
bound to submit reports under article 40, the application of the other 
two procedures depends upon separate recognition of the jurisdiction 
of the Human Rights Committee. The Committee consists of eighteen 
members, who are nationals of states parties to the Covenant (though 
not necessarily of states which have accepted the optional procedures) 
and who are "persons of high moral character and recognized competence 
in the field of human rights".13 They are elected and serve in their 
capacities as individuals and not as representatives of their 
governments, unlike the members of the United Rations Commission on 
Human Rights. The Human Rights Committee is strictly speaking not an 
organ of the United Rations, but is financed by the world organisation 
and submits an annual report to the General A s s e m b l y . T w e l v e  
members constitute a quorum, and decisions are taken by majority.13 
Initially, the Committee met twice yearly, but it now holds three 
sessions each year, although in 1987'only two sessions were held for 
financial reasons.
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In spite of the fact that its members are not government
representatives, and in spite of efforts to eliminate politicisation
of issues, the Human Rights Committee has encountered the problem of
ideological conflict, simply because its members are products of
diverse cultural backgrounds and consequently have differing attitudes
to human rights. The very fact that the Committee has a cross-
cultural representation thus tends to create a disparate approach
which weakens its authority. The East-West conflict has been a
particular problem within the Committee, and while there has been a
degree of willingness to compromise, this has only had the effect of
further undermining the Committee's effectiveness:
"The early practice of the Committee reveals a 
body divided on many issues, including most of 
the important ones; the most contentious 
involve the permissibility of the particular 
restrictions and limitations justified under 
sections of the Covenant."16
A more united front is, however, presented in relation to those
rights which might be considered 'core' rights:
"Although the Committee is divided on the 
interpretation of considerable portions of that 
standard Cie. the minimum standard of the 
Covenant], on issues not implicating distinctly 
"political" freedoms, the division slackens 
somewhat.... Those sections of the Covenant 
dealing with equality and nondiscrimination 
(Articles 2(1), 3, 23(4), and 26) and with
deprivation of liberty and guarantees for 
persons accused of crime (Articles 9, 10, 14,
and 15) hold the most promise of becoming a real 
minimum standard within the theoretical one."17
With these points in mind, we shall turn now to an examination of 
the measures of implementation contained in the Covenant and Optional 
Protocol.
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(a) Article 40 - The Reporting Procedure
Article 40, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights states:
"The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to submit reports on the measures they 
have adopted which give effect to the rights 
recognized herein and on the progress made in - 
the enjoyment of those rights:
(a) Within one year of the entry into force of 
the present Covenant for the States Parties
concerned;
Cb) Thereafter whenever the Committee so 
requests."1®
The purpose of this procedure is to keep the Human Rights
Committee informed of the legislative and administrative steps taken
by states parties to ensure protection of the rights specified in the
Covenant, and it is obvious that the Committee was intended to have
some supervisory function under article 40. It is not entirely clear,
however, what the Committee's powers are, and there has in fact been a
divergence of opinion amongst the members of the Committee as to the
precise nature and scope of its duties. Certain ambiguities contained
in article 40 have still to be resolved, in particular the role of the
Committee under paragraph 4:
"The Committee shall study the reports submitted 
by the States Parties to the present Covenant.
It shall transmit its reports, and such general 
comments as it may consider appropriate, to the 
States Parties. The Committee may also transmit 
to the Economic and Social Council these 
comments along with the copies of the reports it 
has received from States Parties to the present 
Covenant."
Some members of the Committee have asserted that the state's 
obligation terminates once it has submitted its report, and that the 
Committee's only function is to make general comments in its annual
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report to the General Assembly, without referring to specific states 
parties, while other members argue that the Committee's role is to 
make a report of its own on each state report, commenting article by 
article on that state's implementation of the Covenant.19 At the 
Committee's 11th session, in October 1980, a compromise was reached on 
this matter, and it was agreed that "general comments" may relate to 
the application and content of individual articles of the Covenant, to 
the implementation of the obligation to submit reports and guarantee 
rights, and to co-operation between states parties.2:0 The possibility 
of further consideration of issuing a separate Committee report on 
each state's report was left open. In practice, the general comments 
incorporated in the Human Rights Committee's annual reports to the 
General Assembly have not referred to specific countries,21 and this 
limitation on the Committee's powers, self-imposed as a result of 
compromise, represents a serious defect in the reporting procedure in 
its present form, because it deprives the Committee of any opportunity 
to express an opinion as to whether a particular state is giving 
effect to the Covenant or not, although the Committee does publicise 
the identity of states which fail to submit reports. It must be 
recognised, however, that the purpose of the procedure is to establish 
between the Human Rights Committee and each state party a 
'constructive dialogue' within which the protection of human rights 
may be promoted and encouraged, rather than to create a machinery for 
the investigation and exposure of violations.22 The aim is to assist 
and support governments in their efforts to establish more effective 
protection of human rights at national level, and the Committee has 
thus adopted an advisory rather than an accusatory role. It must be 
appreciated, too, that many governments will face genuine difficulties
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in amending existing domestic legislation and practices to bring them 
into line with the requirements of the Covenant, and in sucb 
circumstances a censorious role for the Human Rights Committee is 
unlikely to promote confidence in its support. Nevertheless, there * 
ought to be an effective enforcement procedure which could be invoked 
in situations where human rights are wilfully and systematically 
violated by the governments of states parties to the Covenant, and the 
absence of such a procedure undoubtedly weakens the position and 
authority of the Committee under article 40. While there are 
limitations on the effectiveness of a purely verbal condemnation, an 
authoritative statement by the Committee that a state has violated the 
Covenant could function as a valuable sanction, and the assumption of 
such a power would at least enable the Committee to take some action 
when wilful violations occur.
The Human Rights Committee formulated general guidelines for the 
form and content of state reports at its 2nd session in 1977.523 
Initial reports consist principally of a description of the legal and 
procedural provisions existing in or introduced into the 
constitutional and legal system of the state which give effect to the 
provisions of the Covenant at the domestic level.24 The general 
procedure adopted by the Committee is as follows:2® a representative 
of the state presents the report and is questioned on it by the 
members of the Committee; the representative normally replies orally, 
but may refer questions to his government to answer in writing at a 
later date. When such additional replies are presented by a 
representative, the Committee members generally ask questions on a 
topic-by-topic basis. Reports are not confidential, and the Committee 
has actually adopted the practice of publishing an account of its
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questioning in its annual report. Matters which have attracted the 
attention of the members with some regularity include the status of 
the Covenant in the domestic law of the state and the issue of 
derogation.2e It is at this stage of consideration of reports that 
the Human Rights Committee has the opportunity of conducting a fairly 
thorough investigation into the situation within each state party, and 
the members of the Committee have not only been willing to express an 
opinion as to whether reports indicate adequate protection of specific 
rights,27” but have also repeatedly displayed an interest in the
implementation of the Covenant in practice,2® thus looking behind a 
purely formal compliance with the requirements of the Covenant. 
Moreover, members of the Committee have presented questions in the
light of information emanating from sources other than the reports
themselves.2® The more progressive elements within the Committee have 
in this way been able to make use of the reporting procedure to carry 
out an exhaustive survey of each state and to assess each government's 
fulfilment of its international obligations, and have thus to some 
extent overcome the restrictions imposed by the compromise reached in 
1980. Within its limitations, then, the system has functioned 
relatively successfully, particularly as the Committee's annual report 
incorporates a comprehensive resume of the process in relation to each 
state. This effectively achieves the same purpose as a separate 
Committee report on each state's report, although informal adverse
comment is as far as the Committee can go, even if it is clear that 
the government is making no attempt to implement the Covenant.
The obligation to submit reports has been taken seriously by the 
majority of states parties to the Covenant and, although a 
considerable number of reports are not lodged timeously and in a few
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instances no report has been submitted at all,30 the reports which 
have been considered by the Human Rights Committee have on the whole 
been satisfactory in form and content. Indeed, the Committee has 
commended the thoroughness and clarity of reports in general. The 
reporting procedure thus appears to function reasonably well, at least 
in so far as the actual content and presentation of reports is 
concerned, and some members of the Committee have endeavoured to make 
the procedure as effective as possible in promoting the protection of 
human rights. It is possible that as a result of the positive 
supervisory role assumed by the Committee an important influence may 
be exercised over the governments of states parties, so that more 
effective protection of human rights can be secured within these 
states, and indeed a number of minor successes have been recorded.31 
Nevertheless, the absence of effective sanctions limits the Human 
Rights Committee's power and prevents it having any real impact on 
situations involving systematic violation of human rights, even when 
it is evident from a state's report that such a situation exists. Of 
course, the procedure under article 40 is not intended to deal with 
such problems, being geared rather to a 'constructive dialogue' with 
co-operative governments displaying the political will to make 
progress in the development of human rights protection, and within 
that context the Committee does not require extensive powers. The 
article 40 procedure is not equipped, then, to tackle serious 
problems, and indeed any increase in the powers of the Committee would 
merely act as a disincentive to regimes which have not yet ratified 
the Covenant: the relative success of the reporting procedure within
its goals, both in attracting the support of more than half the 
membership of the United lations and in the high degree of compliance
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with the obligation to report, is undoubtedly due largely to the 
limited nature of the Committee's powers under article 40. The 
procedure has a valuable role in the promotion of human rights 
protection, but as far as the systematic violation of human rights by 
governments is concerned, the most that the Human Rights Committee can 
hope to achieve is to publicise non-compliance with the terms of the 
Covenant. The Committee's powers should certainly be clarified and 
extended to permit at least categoric censure, and the Committee 
itself should maximise its role under article 40, but because the 
procedure is essentially intended to encourage governments rather than 
expose and condemn violations it is important not to make the 
Committee's powers so extensive that governments will simply refrain 
from ratifying the Covenant. While it is desirable that the Committee 
should be able to deal with situations in which a state party is 
wilfully violating human rights, this is not the primary objective of 
the reporting procedure.
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that the reporting 
procedure is very restricted in its scope, and is aimed principally at 
the promotion of internal safeguards and guarantees rather than at the 
investigation and exposure of violations. The limitations of the 
procedure in relation to systematic violations can be illustrated by 
examining what effect, if any, it had upon the situation in Uruguay.
The government of Uruguay ratified the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights in 1970, and the Covenant accordingly came 
into force for Uruguay in March 1976. In accordance with the 
provisions of article 40, paragraph 1, Uruguay's report became due on 
22 March 1977, but in spite of repeated reminders,32 the report was 
not submitted until 29 January 1982, almost five years after the
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original deadline.33 The report is a fairly comprehensive document,
relating the Uruguayan legal provisions which give effect to the
Covenant. By way of introduction, a general statement on Uruguayan
law's conformity with the terms of the Covenant is made:
"All the principles and rights laid down in the 
Covenant already formed part of the Uruguayan 
legal order. It was therefore unnecessary to 
draw up rules to give effect to the provisions 
of the Covenant."3*
The report proceeds to detail systematically the constitutional
and legal provisions which secure protection of each of the rights
guaranteed by the Covenant, and it does appear from the terms of the
report that adequate legal machinery existed in Uruguay at that time
to ensure effective protection of human rights. However, the report
does not attempt to assess the efficiency of the formal safeguards in
practice, and in particular does not comment fully on the effect of
the state of emergency on human rights. Indeed, in the discussion
relating to article 4 of the Covenant (derogation), the report merely
refers to the constitutional authority for the utilisation of
emergency powers without giving any indication that such powers had in
fact been invoked.3S On the other hand, reference is made to
particular aspects of the emergency measures in relation to individual
articles of the Covenant,33 and the report generally draws attention
to the rights from which derogation had been made. Thus, in the
discussion of article 25, the following observation is made:
"The rights, mentioned in this article had 
already been provided for in Uruguayan law when 
the Covenant was adapted. The Uruguayan
Government, however, by virtue of the provisions
of article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and in exercise of the 
prerogatives conferred on it by article 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, informed the other States parties of the 
exceptional situation which it is experiencing,
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as expressly referred to in paragraph 1 of the 
latter article.
...With regard to political rights, the 
measures announced include restrictions of a 
political nature. It must be emphasized, 
however, that they are of an emergency character 
and of limited duration and that the aim of the 
Government is to regularize the political system 
on a permanent basis in order to arrive at new 
democratic institutions which will be both 
republican and representative."37
The report goes on to give a more detailed analysis of the
emergency measures and, referring to the various provisions contained
in international legal instruments which permit derogation,33 states:
"The Uruguayan Government's actions have 
complied fully with these provisions. Uruguay 
has reacted to the systematic violation of human 
rights by terrorists by adopting measures to 
halt the resurgence of subversion. The
restrictions which it has been obliged to adopt 
in certain cases, and which are described in
this report, have been imposed in accordance 
with constitutional provisions long in force in 
the country, as mentioned earlier, namely:
(a) Article 168(17) of the Constitution, which 
authorizes the Executive "to take prompt 
security measures..
(b) Article 31 of the Constitution:
"individual security...".
The Government has also acted in accordance 
with rules laid down in laws such as the 
aforementioned State Security and Internal Order 
Act, Ho. 14,068 of 1972."33
This indicates the government's anxiety to convince the Human
Rights Committee that the measures had been introduced justifiably and
in accordance with both national and international legal requirements.
The report continues:
"The most recent phase of legislative activity 
in Uruguay has taken place within the framework 
of a new concept of the right to security. This 
emerged as a result of the vicissitudes which 
the nation was having to endure in its struggle 
fully to maintain human rights and to repel the 
aggression to which it was being subjected by 
seditious elements.
This new concept of security, viewed as 
something more comprehensive and complex than 
had traditionally been the case, formed the
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basis of Act Ho. 14,068, adapted by Parliament 
in July 1972, called the State Security and 
Internal Order Act. This Act, like the
subsequent Institutional Act Ho. 5 of 20 October
1976 reflects the concept that internal security 
is an integral responsibility of the State that 
allows the enjoyment and free exercise of human 
rights. This integral protection should be
extended to all areas in which such rights are
to apply."4,0
The report did, then, acknowledge that a state of emergency 
existed in Uruguay, and specified in general terms the various rights 
from which derogation had been made, stressing the justification for 
such derogation in terms of security. The report dealt with the 
matter of derogation in purely legal terms, however, without 
attempting to assess the practical implications and effects, and it 
did not provide a detailed account of the circumstances which led to 
the resort to special measures or attempt to analyse the relationship 
between the exceptional situation and the powers invoked to deal with 
it.
The Human Rights Committee duly considered Uruguay's report, and 
an account of its questioning appears in the Committee's annual report 
for 1982.4,1 The representative of the government, in introducing his 
country's report, drew attention to the existence of a state of 
emergency:
"He recognized that....his country had undergone 
a crisis, the effects of which were still being 
felt and which had had a negative impact on 
human rights in the country. It had been
necessary to enact special legislation and to 
suspend some rights, on a strictly temporary
basis, because of the grave situation menacing 
the life of the country. These measures
entailed the dissolution of the national
parliament, the General Assembly, as well as 
derogations from certain rights set forth in the 
Covenant. In particular, restrictions had been 
placed on the right of association and political 
meetings had been banned.
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The Committee conducted a thorough examination of the report, and 
expressed concern and disapproval in connection with a variety of 
matters. In particular, the Committee was critical of the fact that 
the report was based on the terms of the 1967 Constitution, even 
though many of its provisions had been eroded or circumvented for 
almost a decade by the emergency legislation and Institutional Acts. 
Indeed, the Committee showed a particular interest in the state of 
emergency, and requested further information regarding the specific 
rights suspended and the extent to which derogation was strictly 
required. The members of the Committee were unwilling, therefore, 
simply to accept the report before them as conclusive evidence of 
satisfactory protection of human rights in Uruguay, but clearly wished 
to obtain an accurate picture of the situation. They were, of course, 
fully aware that many allegations of violations had been made against 
the government, and their questioning was obviously influenced by the 
independent evidence available to them which suggested the existence 
in Uruguay of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human 
rights. In fact, reference was made to the Committee's own 
consideration of allegations received under the Optional Protocol 
procedure, which on more than one occasion had led the Committee to 
conclude that torture had taken place.A3 In spite of all this, 
however, the Committee was not especially censorious of the 
government, apparently considering that such an approach would be 
counter-productive given the limitations of the reporting procedure. 
In other words, it was felt that the procedure could be utilised most 
profitably to establish a constructive dialogue, and the Committee 
refrained from outright condemnation of the Uruguayan authorities in 
order to gain their confidence.
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The Human Rights Committee seemed reasonably satisfied with the 
initial exchanges, and apparently believed that the Uruguayan 
government genuinely desired to continue discussions with a view to 
improving the protection of human rights in the country. The 
Committee clearly regarded the fact that the long overdue report had 
actually been submitted as a positive sign, and expressed optimism for 
the future:
"The Chairman expressed the Committee’s 
satisfaction at the encouraging replies given by 
the representative of Uruguay and expressed the 
hope that the fruitful and constructive dialogue 
would continue. He informed the representative 
that, in accordance with the decision of the 
Committee on the periodicity of reports, the 
next report of Uruguay would be due in February 
1983 and expressed the hope that this report 
would contain fuller information on all 
questions which had remained unanswered. He 
finally noted the undertaking that the Uruguayan 
authorities would respond fully to the requests 
of the Committee for information in connection 
with communications concerning Uruguay."44
Unfortunately, the Committee's hopes proved ill-founded: not
only did the Uruguayan authorities fail to provide the information 
requested, but the report due in February 1983 had not been submitted 
by the middle of 1987, in spite of numerous reminders.4® However, 
following the restoration of democracy, the Human lights Committee 
received a message stating that the new government intended to observe 
the provisions of all international human rights instruments and 
expressing the appreciation of the Uruguayan people for the "many 
demonstrations of international solidarity at a time when their rights 
had been systematically ignored and violated, including, in 
particular, their appreciation for the close attention members of the 
Human Rights Committee had given to communications from Uruguay."4® 
The Committee was subsequently informed by a note of 25 November 1985
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that an interministerial working group had been established to prepare 
the second periodic r e p o r t . W h i l e  it may be anticipated that the 
new civilian government will submit a full report in due course, then, 
it is clear that the Human Rights Committee was unable to precipitate 
any real improvement in the human rights situation in Uruguay through 
the reporting procedure.
In a sense, Uruguay is a bad example of the operation of the 
article 40 procedure, in view of the military regime's repressive 
policies and activities. The majority of states parties have 
submitted reports (although not always timeously) and entered into 
positive discussions with the Human Rights Committee. Of course, 
formal compliance with the obligation to submit a report is no 
guarantee that human rights are respected in practice; a state’s 
report may point to a plethora of impressive safeguards which conceal 
the true position. It must be reiterated, therefore, that the purpose 
of the reporting procedure is not primarily to permit the exposure and 
condemnation of violations, but is to establish a constructive 
dialogue within which the Human Rights Committee can advise and assist 
governments in implementing the provisions of the Covenant. Such a 
process may well be fruitful provided the government in question is 
co-operative and displays the political will to fulfil its obligations 
in the spirit of the Covenant. Nevertheless, the ultimate aim of 
international measures of implementation is the prevention of 
violations of human rights, and their success must in the final 
analysis be judged on their efficacy in achieving this goal. ; From 
this perspective, the case of Uruguay illustrates the fragility of the 
structure of international law, as it exposes the limitations which 
exist and underlines how dependent the whole system is on the consent
269
and co-operation of governments. As far as tlie situation in Uruguay 
was concerned, the procedure under article 40 of the Covenant did not 
produce any discernible improvement in conditions, but failed to 
persuade the authorities to abandon their repressive policies or even 
to end the practice of torture. In conclusion, therefore, it may be 
said that while the reporting procedure is not without value, it is 
not equipped to deal with major human rights problems, even when the 
state involved is a party to the Covenant. The fact of the matter is 
that very little action can be taken when a government wilfully 
refuses to fulfil its international obligations. Certainly moral and 
diplomatic pressure can be applied by condemnation of repressive 
regimes, but where the violation of human rights is inherent in the 
socio-political policies of a government, it is unlikely that such 
pressure will have any significant result. The reporting procedure 
is, then, incapable of tackling the most serious human rights 
situations.
(b) Article 41 - Inter-State Complaints
Under article 41 of the Covenant, a state party may recognise the 
competence of the Human Rights Committee to consider communications 
alleging violation by that state of any of its obligations under the 
Covenant. The provision relates only to allegations made by other 
states parties which have accepted the procedure.40 Briefly, articles 
41 and 42 establish the following procedure: if the matter is not
satisfactorily resolved between the two states involved, the Committee 
must seek firstly to secure a friendly solution "on the basis of 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms",40 in which event
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its report shall be confined to "a brief statement of the facts and of 
the solution reached".30 If such a solution is not forthcoming, the 
report shall be confined to a "brief statement of the facts", with the 
written submissions and a record of the oral submissions of the 
parties appended thereto.31 In either case, the report of the 
Committee is to be transmitted to the states parties concerned.32 If 
the parties are not satisfied with this, the Committee may, with their 
consent, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission, which shall make 
available its good offices with a view to obtaining an amicable 
solution.33 If such a solution is reached, the Conciliation 
Commission is empowered to make a report with a brief statement of the 
facts and the solution reached;34 failing this, the report may only 
state "its findings on all questions of fact" and "its views on the 
possibilities of an amicable solution."33
Unlike the procedure under article 40, this system is an 
accusatory one involving specific allegations of violations of the 
Covenant by states parties, and its ultimate purpose is to secure a 
remedy. The principal aim of the procedure is, however, to obtain a 
negotiated settlement rather than to publicise violations and censure 
governments, and the Committee^ powers are therefore very limited. A 
brief statement of the facts of the case by the Committee might be 
effectively utilised to indict the government in question and thus 
increase international pressure on the government, but this appears to 
be as far as the Committee could go. Any further action requires the 
express consent of the state, and even if such consent is given and an 
ad hoc Conciliation Commission is appointed, its powers are not any 
greater than those of the Committee itself. The procedure is, then, 
dependent not only on initial acceptance by governments, but also on
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their continuing co-operation in the conciliation process, and because 
of the limited aims of the procedure the powers conferred on the Human 
Rights Committee are not extensive. For this reason, the procedure is 
unlikely to have any significant impact on serious human rights 
situations.
It remains to be seen to what extent the Human Rights Committee 
will be prepared to utilise and develop the article 41 procedure to 
tackle serious violations of human rights and exert pressure on the 
governments of states which have accepted the procedure. Article 41 
came into force on 28 March 1979, but although rules of procedure were 
adopted by the Committee that same year,se no case has yet been 
referred to the Committee, and it is impossible to pass judgement on 
the effectiveness of the procedure, even within its restricted goals. 
It does seem clear, however, that the limited scope of the procedure 
and the requirement of constant co-operation will render the process 
ineffectual in so far as the prevention of systematic violations is 
concerned, even when the particular regime is subject to the 
provisions of article 41. The problem is that if the Committee were 
to be granted wider powers, the effect would probably be to dissuade 
governments from accepting the procedure, and as it is only twenty one 
states had recognised the jurisdiction of the Committee under article 
41 as at 24 July 1 9 8 7 , a further indication of the reluctance of 
governments to expose themselves to potential criticism by an 
international agency. Uruguay has not yet accepted the procedure.
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(c) The Optional Protocol - Individual Petition
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights came into force along with the Covenant in 1976. It 
provides that states parties to the Covenant may recognise "the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications 
from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims 
of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in 
the Covenant."se There exist a number of specific rules relating to 
this procedure, both in the Optional Protocol itself and in the 
Provisional Rules of Procedure adopted by the Human Rights 
Committee,53 and we shall look at these briefly.
If a communication is not p r i m  facie inadmissible,50 the 
accused state must be given an opportunity to comment on 
admissibility, and no decision declaring a communication admissible 
may be made until the state has been afforded this opportunity.51 
Either party - the individual or the state - may be requested to 
provide information relevant to the question of admissibility.522 Once 
a communication has been declared admissible, the Human Rights 
Committee must bring it to the attention of the state, which within 
six months must submit "written explanations or statements clarifying 
the matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that 
State."63 This information is made available to the petitioner, who 
has six weeks in which to comment upon - it.64 Thereafter, the 
Committee considers the merits of the case "in the light of all 
written information made available to it by the individual and by the 
State Party concerned."66 It subsequently forwards "its views", which 
are not legally binding,66 to the individual and the state.67 At any
time prior to the final adoption of its views, the Committee may also 
express an opinion on whether "interim measures may be desirable to 
avoid irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged violation.
The right of individual petition is potentially the most 
significant aspect of international measures of implementation. 
Inter-state procedures may be of value in certain circumstances, but 
they do leave the fate of the individual in the hands of governments, 
whereas the right of individual petition gives the victim himself 
direct access to international authorities which can seek to secure a 
remedy for him. The whole issue of human rights concerns the 
relationship between the individual and the state, and if the 
government itself is able to perpetrate violations because there are 
no effective safeguards available at the domestic level, it is 
essential far the individual to have some recourse at the 
international level without having to rely on the goodwill of foreign 
governments. Of course, it is necessary for the international 
authorities to have some influence over national governments in order 
for the right of petition to be effective, and we have already seen 
that such influence is usually very limited. This is true also of the 
Human Rights Committee, with the result that the general limitations 
which we have identified also affect the Optional Protocol procedure. 
The first problem is that the procedure is optional, and at present 
only thirty eight states have accepted it.es* Secondly, the powers 
conferred on the Committee are far from comprehensive, and its views 
are not legally binding.70 Thirdly, as few governments are prepared 
to accept direct international intervention in domestic affairs, the 
Optional Protocol does not provide any sanctions which the Committee 
could invoke to enforce its views even if they were binding. In spite
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of these limitations, however, the Committee has shown a willingness 
to develop the petition procedure and utilise it to express an 
unequivocal view that specific articles of the Covenant have been
violated by the governments of states parties to the Optional 
Protocol. This was apparent at an early stage in the Committee's 
existence:
"The Committee's "views" are not legally 
binding. However, the Human Rights Committee 
has asserted a rather wide discretion as to the
scope and contents of its "views": in the one
case concluded so far, relating to Uruguay, the 
Committee expressed far-reaching opinions on the 
substantive question whether the human rights
set forth in the Covenant have been violated and 
on the duty of the state to take remedial
action."71
This observation applies equally to subsequent cases, and it does 
appear that the Committee is willing to make as full use as possible 
of its powers under the Protocol to ensure the maximum effectiveness 
of the procedure. Thus, while the views of the Committee may not be 
legally binding, it has not been reluctant to state categorically that 
accused governments have indeed failed to ensure respect for 
particular rights, and in this way it has been able to put some
pressure on the governments concerned. These governments may, of 
course, choose to ignore the views of the Committee with impunity, but 
at least the Committee is able to publicly censure regimes which 
violate human rights and in this way apply moral and political 
pressure. Only the most insensitive regimes can remain impervious to 
strong and consistent condemnation by an international agency of such
eminence, although ultimately no action can be taken if governments do
ignore the Committee's views, since the procedure depends on the co­
operation of governments and their willingness to comply with the 
Committee's recommendations. As with the procedures already
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discussed, the limitations of the petition system are exposed when 
political will on the part of the government is lacking.
The Human Rights Committee commenced its consideration of 
communications under the Optional Protocol at its 2nd session, in
1977, and in its annual report for 1987732 the Committee stated that 
since that time a total of 236 communications had been submitted to 
it. Final views had been adopted in 77 cases,'73 in 68 of which the
Committee had concluded that violations of the Covenant had taken
place.74 Article 6 of the Optional Protocol requires the Committee to 
"include in its annual report....a summary of its activities under the 
present Protocol", and although the actual consideration of
communications must take place in camera in terms of article 5, 
paragraph 3, the Committee reproduces its final views in its annual 
report, and in this way has been able to publicise the violations of 
human rights by states parties.
Of the 68 cases in which the Committee concluded that violations 
had taken place up to the end of its 30th session in July 1987, 42 
concerned alleged violations of the Covenant by the government of 
Uruguay, the other 26 relating to Suriname (8),75 Zaire (5),75 
Madagascar (4),77 Colombia <3),73 Canada (2),73 Netherlands 
(2),3°Mauritius (l),31 and Venezuela (l).322 Apart from the cases 
involving Suriname, only 6 of these cases included allegations of 
violations of article 7 of the Covenant.33 However, alleged 
violations of article 7 were involved in 34 of the 42 cases against 
the government of Uruguay,34 and the Human Rights Committee concluded 
in 19 of these that violations had in fact occurred,35 although 
torture was mentioned specifically in only 8.35
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Of the 15 cases involving Uruguay in which allegations of 
violation of article 7 were not substantiated, three related to events 
which had occurred prior to the Covenant entering into f o r c e , w h i l e  
in three others the allegations were considered too general.33 In one 
case, the Committee concluded that article 6 (the right to life) had 
been violated, and considered it unnecessary in such circumstances to 
inquire whether any other articles had been violated.33 In another 
case, the Committee was unable to find that no violation of article 7 
had taken place,30 and noted that the state had failed to show that 
it had ensured protection of the individual's rights in accordance 
with article 2 of the Covenant.31 Indeed, six members of the 
Committee indicated that in their opinion a violation of article 7 had 
occurred.32 In none of the cases did the Committee explicitly state 
that the allegations were unfounded,33 and in fact in a number of the 
cases in which no violation of article 7 was established the Committee 
did conclude that there had been a violation of article 10, paragraph 
I,34 which relates to inhuman treatment,33 but seems to require a 
lesser degree of severity than article 7, being applied in particular 
to unacceptable conditions of detention.
It is clear that the petition system succeeded in enabling 
victims of human rights violations in Uruguay to bring their plight to 
the attention of an international authority, and although a percentage 
of communications was rejected as inadmissible on technical grounds, 
the Human Rights Committee was able in a number of cases to reach the 
definite conclusion that article 7 of the Covenant had been violated. 
Moreover, the regular submission of communications containing 
allegations of ill-treatment and torture gave a clear indication of 
the situation within Uruguay, and the consistent findings of the
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Committee confirmed the existence of a systematic practice of torture 
and ill-treatment in Uruguay. Indeed, in several cases, the Committee 
actually referred to earlier cases in which it had established that a 
practice of ill-treatment existed at Libertad prison.‘ae The Committee 
has thus taken its role under the Optional Protocol seriously, and was 
not averse to stating categorically that the Uruguayan authorities had 
violated numerous articles of the Covenant, including article 7, and
by expressing such an unequivocal condemnation of the military 
regime's activities it was able to apply some pressure in spite of the 
lack of co-operation.
The Committee's determination to make the procedure effective was 
indicated in its attitude towards the cases involving Uruguay. 
Firstly, the Committee refused to accept the government's attempts to 
challenge admissibility, either on the ground that domestic remedies 
had not been exhausted or because the particular matter was being 
examined by the Inter-American Commission an Human Rights. The
Committee did not consider that the Uruguayan appeal system offered an
effective remedy, and although in some instances it required 
withdrawal of petitions previously submitted to the Inter-American 
Commission before proceeding with its own consideration of 
communications, it did not regard communications submitted to the 
Inter-American Commission by unrelated third parties as constituting 
the same matter. Secondly, the Committee was quite prepared to
formulate its views on the basis of the petitioner's allegations, 
particularly if witness statements were produced and torturers
named,97 when the government failed to supply satisfactory responses. 
The replies of the government, when provided at all, invariably failed 
to supply detailed information (other than details of arrest, charge
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and sentence) and often were limited to attacks upon the Committee's 
powers and integrity or consisted of "denials of a general character 
offering no particular information or explanation".90 The Committee 
rejected general refutations of specific allegations as insufficient, 
and in fact placed the burden of proof on the state to show that the 
allegations had been adequately investigated and appropriate action 
taken. This approach was adopted on the basis that where the 
government has access to information which the victim or his 
representatives may be unable to obtain, it would be unfair to place 
the onus of proof on the petitioner.09 It was this attitude that 
enabled the Committee to reach definitive (though non-binding) 
decisions regarding the violation of the Covenant by Uruguay, since it 
accepted as fact those allegations which had not been specifically 
refuted. Indeed, the Committee went further, by asserting that the 
government was under an obligation to provide the victims with a 
remedy including, where appropriate, release from detention and 
compensation, and to ensure that similar violations did not occur in 
the future. It may also be noted that in a number of earlier cases, 
the Committee considered whether article 4 of the Covenant was 
applicable, thus permitting derogation, but concluded in each instance 
that there were no submissions which justified derogation.100
The decisions of the Human Rights Committee are undoubtedly of 
considerable significance in the development of international measures 
for the protection of human rights, and the Committee has certainly 
endeavoured to make the petition procedure more than a formality. The 
condemnation of a government by an authoritative international agency 
in a series of cases involving similar allegations constitutes an 
important moral and political influence, and its value should not be
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under-estimated. However, optimism must be tempered by a recognition 
that severe limitations remain: the human rights situation in Uruguay
showed no significant improvement in spite of the views expressed by 
the Committee over a number of years, and even in individual cases 
remedies were only forthcoming in a few instances involving less 
critical rights. Repression and torture continued, and the Committee 
remained powerless to enforce its decisions and secure effective 
protection of human rights. Of course, the Committee's views are not 
binding, and even if they were there is no enforcement machinery to 
ensure their implementation, and these are two of the ever-present 
problems in the protection of human rights by means of international 
law. The other major problem is that the great majority of repressive 
regimes are not parties to the Optional Protocol at all, and are 
therefore not subject to the attentions of the Human Rights Committee 
in this area. In a sense, the Uruguayan case is something of an 
anomaly, and is perhaps not a good illustration of the working of the 
petition procedure which, like the other procedures we have discussed, 
can be effective and valuable within its limitations, when the 
government concerned is willing to co-operate with the Committee and 
comply with its recommendations. This is more likely when non­
fundamental rights are involved, and there have in fact been some 
successes in such cases, even in relation to Uruguay.10! It is 
essential, then, that a petition system should exist, because even 
though it may be impotent in more extreme cases, it can fulfil an 
important role in a limited sphere. Moreover, while the procedure did 
not produce any discernible results in Uruguay, it did permit exposure 
and condemnation of the government in the international arena, which 
might not have been possible otherwise, and it may be that the
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consistent criticism was a factor in the restoration of democracy in 
Uruguay. Nevertheless, the effect of the procedure in such situations 
is clearly very restricted, and while the Committee's views may have 
some influence, the Committee is not capable of direct intervention to 
protect the rights of the individual, even if the government is bound 
by the terns of the Optional Protocol.
The petition procedure is potentially a very important aspect of 
the international protection of human rights, but it can achieve 
genuine results only within the limitations imposed by the strictures 
of international relations and political attitudes which demand non­
intervention in internal affairs and reject the idea of direct 
supervision of national governments by international authorities. The 
limitations are the same as those which we have already identified in 
relation to the two procedures mentioned above, and are indicative of 
the general limitations on international law.
(d) ECOSOC resolution 1503
The procedure established pursuant to resolution 1503CXLVIII) of 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council is of particular 
interest and significance because it does not rely upon the prior 
consent of the state, but can be invoked even in the case of the most 
repressive and brutal regimes which consistently refuse to accept any 
of the optional procedures established by international conventions 
and, indeed, often decline to ratify such conventions at all. In 
spite of the considerable potential of such a procedure, however, it 
has not been utilised to any great effect in practice and, in fact,
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has probably been less successful and valuable than the more
restricted Optional Protocol procedure.
In order to appreciate the implications of resolution 1503, it is 
necessary to trace briefly the historical developments which preceded 
its adoption.102 In 1959, the Economic and Social Council adopted 
resolution 728F(XXVIII), in which it requested the Secretary-General 
of the United Rations to compile lists of communications concerning
human rights, "however addressed", for the members of the Commission
on Human Rights,103 recognising, however, that the Commission had no 
power to take action in relation to such communications.10* The 
purpose was simply to keep the Commission informed of the thousands of 
communications which were being received each year from people who 
mistakenly assumed that the Commission had authority to intervene in 
order to protect human rights, so that it could discharge its 
functions more intelligently.
In 1967, as a result of the increasing influence of the newly
independent Asian and African members of the United Rations, the 
Economic and Social Council authorised the Commission on Human Rights 
and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities "to examine information relevant to gross violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, as exemplified by the policy of 
apartheid as practised in the Republic of South Africa and in the 
Territory of South West Africa.... and to racial discrimination as 
pracised notably in Southern Rhodesia", as disclosed in communications 
received under resolution 728F.103 The Commission was empowered, 
moreover, to "make a thorough study of situations which reveal a 
consistent pattern of violations of human rights.... and report, with 
recommendations thereon, to the Economic and Social Council".1oe
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Thus, although it had been recognised in resolution 728F itself that 
the Commission had no authority to act upon the connnuni cat ions 
received, the anti-apartheid lobby succeeded in persuading the 
international community that certain particularly objectionable 
violations of human rights, namely apartheid and racial 
discrimination, warranted extraordinary measures, and the Commission 
was accordingly authorised not only to examine relevant situations, 
but also to make recommendations to the Economic and Social Council on 
the basis of its investigations.
In 1968, there reported a working group set up by the Sub- 
Commission to "analyse the possibilities of an appropriate procedure 
for making a careful study of communications relating to the 
prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities".'°7‘ The 
report concluded that, the existing procedures being unsatisfactory, 
new machinery ought to be created. It was this necessity which led to 
the eventual adoption by the Economic and Social Council of resolution 
1503CXLVIII) on 27 May 1970.
Resolution 1503 authorised the Sub-Commission to appoint a 
working group of up to five of its members to meet once a year for up 
to ten days immediately prior to the Sub-Commission's session in order 
to "consider all communications, including replies of Governments 
thereon, received by the Secretary-General under Council resolution 
728F(XXVIII) of 30 July 1959 with a view to bringing to the attention 
of the Sub-Commission those communications, together with replies of 
Governments, if any, which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of 
gross and reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms within the terms of reference of the Sub-Commission".10S The 
Sub-Commission must thereafter consider these communications and any
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replies "and other relevant information" in private session in order 
to decide whether to refer to the Commission "particular situations 
which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably- 
attested violations of human rights".1051 The Sub-Commission may 
declare communications inadmissible under its own rules of
procedure110 or may request the working group to reconsider them.
The Commission on Human Rights may set up its own working group 
to make a preliminary study of a situation referred to it. The 
function of the full Commission is to examine the situation and 
ascertain whether it merits a "thorough study....and a report and 
recommendations thereon" to the Economic and Social Council111 or,
alternatively, whether an ad hoc committee should be established to 
carry out an investigation, although this requires the "express 
consent" and "constant co-operation" of the state concerned.11SS 
Consideration by the Commission under resolution 1503 is
confidential,113 and it is not passible to comment an the actual
process, but it appears that the Commission invites an accused 
government to send a representative.114
Although the procedure under resolution 1503 does not provide for 
a binding decision, it is potentially an extremely important aspect of 
the international protection of human rights: a system whereby
serious violations of human rights can be investigated and condemned 
by an international agency, irrespective of the country involved, 
clearly has a unique position among the various international 
procedures, in so far as it does not rely upon prior acceptance by the 
state. Moreover, in theory the Commission’s recommendations could 
ultimately result in r action by the Economic and Social
Council by virtue of its general powers under the United Rations
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Charter. The procedure was intended to invoke the threat of such 
action as its ultimate sanction, but the political constraints within 
the United Rations make it highly improbable that the Economic and 
Social Council would ever be able to proceed with effedive 
action except in the case of weak and politically isolated regimes. 
Indeed, no situation has ever been referred to the Economic and Social 
Council by the Commission on Human Rights under resolution 1503,111 s 
with the result that no regime has yet been subjected to public 
censure under that procedure. The provision that action envisaged 
must "remain confidential until such time as the Commission may decide 
to make recommendations to the Economic and Social Council"lie 
prevents any direct public condemnation prior to that stage, and by 
depriving the process of the only sanction available it obviously 
restricts the value and impact of the earlier stages of the procedure.
The potential of the resolution 1503 procedure has not been
realised for a number of reasons. One of the major problems has been
the confidentiality rule, which was initially interpreted as
precluding any mention in public meetings of a state which was being
considered under resolution 1503, thus preventing any public statement
condemning the violation of human rights in such states, even under an
entirely different procedure. Subsequently, this rule was relaxed to
some extent, so that it now applies only to decisions taken under the
resolution 1503 procedure and relative confidential material, but the
consideration of situations under resolution 1503 remains strictly
confidential, and it seems highly likely that this reduces the
effectiveness of the system, although this view has been challenged:
"The main usefulness of the procedure is 
twofold:
a) confronting the human rights situation in a 
given country within the framework of the 
confidential procedure may facilitate the
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r.nminni gei nn1 e eventual decision to deal with, it 
in public session.... most "country oriented"
(public) procedures have been preceded by a 
decision of the Sub-Commission to forward 
communications to the Commission within the 
framework of the confidential procedure;
b) situations in countries neglected by world 
public opinion can be brought to the attention 
of the Sub-Commission - and eventually the 
Commission - within the framework of the 
confidential procedure, although it is highly 
unlikely that these organs would ever address 
themselves to these situations if there was no 
such procedure.
However, since the adoption of ECOSGC 
resolution 1503<XLVIII> of 27 May 1970, a 
tremendous development has taken place in the 
form of new public procedures. Particularly the 
"thematic" procedures, which grew out of the 
"country oriented" procedures - to which 
development the confidential procedure 
contributed substantially - could decrease 
somewhat the importance of the confidential 
procedure. The "thematic" working group and 
special rapporteurs can act much more swiftly 
than the organs involved in the confidential 
procedure. The confidential procedure probably 
suffers more from its inability to react 
immediately on urgent information and from the 
difficulty of breaking through the majority 
requirements of the Sub-Commission's Working 
Group on communications, than from its 
confidential nature."117
In spite of these observations, the fact remains that the 
confidentiality of the resolution 1503 procedure prevents 
publicisation of the gross violations which it uncovers and may even 
have the effect of sheltering governments from the sanction of public 
opinion. For this reason, the public procedures have often been 
preferred.
A further weakness of the resolution 1503 procedure results from 
the composition of the Commission on Human Rights, The fact that the 
members of the Commission are representatives of their respective 
governments means that there is a far greater sensitivity to political 
pressures than, for example, in the Human Rights Committee. The
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Commission thus often appears to place political considerations above 
the protection of human rights, and indeed on occasions it seems to 
have little genuine concern with the promotion of effective protection 
of human rights. This was apparent in early 1982, when Theo van 
Boven, the Director of the United Nations Human Rights Division, 
resigned in protest over the attitude which the Commission was 
displaying. Mr van Boven had always been a staunch supporter of a 
more assertive role for the Commission, and had carried out his duties 
with "imagination, courage, frankness and a deep personal concern for 
the victims of human rights violations",1'1® but many governments are 
opposed to such an approach, and the Commission did not respond to Mr 
van Boven's example, in spite of the efforts of some of its members. 
The fact is that the majority of governments are apprehensive of any 
increase in the powers of the Commission or the creation of more 
effective machinery which might lead to future embarrassment, and 
accordingly they instruct their representatives on the Commission to 
strongly resist any attempts to develop procedures of this type. 
These factors may help to explain the Commission's failure to utilise 
the resolution 1503 procedure effectively, and also its reluctance to 
refer situations to the Economic and Social Council. Thus, although 
the adoption of resolution 1503 was itself a significant breakthrough, 
the political constraints to which the Commission is subject have 
ensured that the procedure cannot function to its full potential. The 
fact that the members of the Commission cannot act independently means 
that political and ideological considerations impede progress in the 
development of its role.
The attitude of the Commission has also led it into conflict with 
the Sub-Commissi on, which is less susceptible to the vagaries of
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political interests (its members not being government representatives) 
and has consequently been able to adopt a more objective and sincere 
approach to the protection of human rights. However, the Sub- 
Commission's functions under resolution 1503 are limited, and although 
it has endeavoured to carry out its duties conscientiously, the 
Commission's ineffectiveness has deprived the whole procedure of any 
real impact. Indeed, the Commission has been critical of the Sub- 
Commission's attitude and has censured it far exceeding its mandate. 
Of course, the Commission's own powers under resolution 1503 are not 
extensive, and it is fettered by the confidentiality rule, but it does 
seem that the Commission has not done as much as it might have done to 
ensure that the system made some contribution to human rights 
protection, and its failure to refer any situations to the Economic 
and Social Council does indicate an absence of will to deal firmly 
with serious human rights problems. It may be that in confidential 
exchanges with governments the Commission has had successes in 
securing respect for human rights, but this must be open to doubt, 
particularly in view of the fact that a number of situations have been 
examined by the Commission over several years without any apparent 
sign of improvement. Thus, while the intentions behind resolution 
1503 were laudable, the restrictions imposed by the confidentiality 
rule and the absence of any real powers meant that the system was 
never likely to achieve much, and the lack-of motivation^on the-~part 
of the Commission has ensured that this has been the case. Even if a 
situation were referred to the Economic and Social Council, the 
political implications would probably prevent action being
taken.
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The resolution 1503 procedure was initially put into operation in 
1972, and at first the Sub-Commission acted rather tentatively, 
referring back to its working group the communications which had been 
forwarded to it, on the grounds that they were not accompanied by 
government replies. This seemed to misinterpret the requirement for 
government replies "if any".113 In 1973, the Sub—Commission did refer 
a number of situations to the Commission,120 but the Commission 
failed to consider these, deciding instead to create a working group 
of its own to meet prior to the Commission's fallowing session. The 
Sub-Commission referred several more situations to the Commission in 
1974,121 and added others the following year, at which time the 
imminent entry into force of the Optional Protocol led to some doubt 
about the future of the resolution 1503 procedure, which was to be 
reviewed "if any new organ entitled to deal with.... communications 
should be established within the United Nations or by international 
agreement,"122 In 1976, the Sub-Commission adopted a resolution
requesting the Commission to recommend that the Economic and Social 
Council review the resolution 1503 procedure, since the Optional
Protocol had come into force.123 Some sponsors suggested that the 
entire system might be abolished, indicating the opposition which 
existed to the non-optional procedure, but arguments were also put 
forward in favour of the continuation of the procedure as 
complementary to the Optional Protocol, and the resolution 1503 
procedure has in fact been retained. It may be noted that the Human 
Rights Committee has stated that the two systems are
distinguishable.124-
In 1978, the President of the Commission on Human Rights
announced that the Commission had decided in private session to take
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action under resolution 1503 in connection with the situations in nine 
countries, including Uruguay, and this practice of naming states under 
consideration has been followed since 1978.12e Uruguay remained under 
constant consideration between 1978 and 1984, but it appears that the 
only action taken by the Commission was to request the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations to use his good offices to try and 
influence the Uruguayan authorities. In violation of the
confidentiality rule, the Uruguayan government welcomed the 
Commission's co-operative attitude in a declaration in the newspaper 
El Dia,12e indicating the ineffectiveness of the procedure and its 
total failure to bring about a change of attitude in the government.
Certain interesting developments took place in 1979 in relation 
to the Commission's consideration of the situation in Equatorial 
Guinea, when confidential material was de-classified and the matter 
was opened up for public debate under resolution 1235. In June 1975, 
certain "individuals from Switzerland" had addressed a communication 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations alleging violations of 
human rights by the government of Equatorial Guinea,1:5,7 and further 
material had subsequently been forwarded. The initial communication, 
consisting of five chapters,12® included references to the 
constitution and laws of the country, a list of persons allegedly 
assassinated, statements by individuals, copies of press articles and 
a report by a visiting French lawyer. It provoked a thirteen page 
response from the government, which claimed to know who had sent the 
communication and denounced it as politically motivated, contrary to 
the Sub-Commission's rules on admissibility.129 However, the Sub- 
Commission referred the situation to the Commission, and the 
government again supplied observations, stressing its rejection of the
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Commission's competence to take action. In 1977, the Commission 
apparently requested the government to allow a visit by a 
representative of the Secretary-General, and the following year it 
invited the government to send its representative to appear before it, 
but neither of these proposals was accepted by the government, and in 
1979, as a result of the government's total failure to co-operate any 
further, the Commission decided to discontinue its consideration of 
the situation under resolution 1503 and deal with the matter in public 
debate.130 The decision to de-classify the confidential material was 
endorsed by the Economic and Social Council,131 and the Commission 
subsequently appointed a special rapporteur to carry out a thorough 
study of the situation.13S The Commission made certain
recommendations to the Economic and Social Council under resolution 
1235, but by that time the regime against which the allegations had 
been made had been overthrown.
The Equatorial Guinea case provides a striking illustration of 
the limitations of the resolution 1503 procedure. Essentially, the 
confidentiality rule meant that the sanction of public condemnation 
could not be invoked throughout the period in which the situation was 
under consideration, yet no progress could be made relying on more 
diplomatic means, and in the end it proved necessary to resort to an 
alternative procedure so that pressure could be put on the government 
by means of adverse publicity. The problems created by the 
confidentiality rule have led to disillusionment over resolution 1503, 
and although the Commission has continued to utilise the system and 
publicly identify states under consideration,133 it does not appear 
to have had much success in persuading governments to respect human 
rights. The Commission has not acted as envisaged in resolution 1503,
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but has preferred to enter into a confidential dialogue with the 
government in question, relying on the "implied threat of an 
unfavourable report to the ECOSOC as a means of pressuring the 
government to improve the human rights situation in its country. 
Consequently, a government which 'co-operates' with the Commission, by 
continuing a discussion with it, avoids condemnation."134 Clearly the 
threat of a report to the Economic and Social Council does not carry 
much weight, particularly in view of the Commission's reluctance to 
take this step: the procedure is thus regarded by some almost as a
protection for repressive regimes, and it is for this reason that 
increasing use has been made of the public procedure and special 
rapporteurs. In fact, several non-governmental organisations have 
questioned the value of submitting communications under resolution 
1503.
In the fifteen years during which the resolution 1503 procedure 
has been operational, it has achieved very little in preventing the 
continuation of gross violations of human rights, even in those 
situations which the Commission on Human Rights has endeavoured to 
deal with. Certainly as far as the situation in Uruguay was 
concerned, the Commission's consideration of the situation for several 
consecutive years did not result in any discernible improvement and, 
as with Argentina, it required a change of government to remove 
Uruguay from the Commission's agenda. The fact is that, given the 
present structure of international political relations, the impact of 
international human rights procedures relies heavily on public opinion 
and the resultant pressure which may be exploited at the diplomatic 
level, and for this reason public discussion under resolution 1235 has 
been of more value and effect than the Commission's activities under
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resolution 1503, which the confidentiality rule has rendered virtually 
impotent. Of course, it should be stressed that the resolution 1235 
procedure is also of limited value, largely because of the political 
composition of the Commission and the lack of effective enforcement 
machinery. Certain members of the Sub-Commission have actually voiced 
doubts as to the value of an inter-governmental agency such as the 
Commission in the field of human rights protection, in view of the 
conflict of interest which arises between the protection of human 
rights and loyalty to national governments. In spite of this, 
however, the Commission has discussed a number of situations in its 
public deliberations, and while its ability to take substantive action 
is curtailed by the usual limitations, it has been able to put 
pressure on governments through this process.
The Commission on Human Rights has also appointed several special
rapporteurs to examine particular types of violation, including a
special rapporteur an torture, who submitted his first report in
1986,13S recommending that "governments should ratify the Convention
against Torture and in the meantime should enact laws giving their
judicial authorities jurisdiction to prosecute and punish persons who
have committed torture."1se He also recommended that:
"-all judicial systems should contain 
provisions under which evidence extracted under 
torture cannot be admitted;
- incommunicado detention should be kept as 
short as possible and should not exceed seven 
days;
- habeas corpus or amparo procedures should be 
strictly respected and should never be 
suspended;
- interrogation of detainees should only take 
place at official interrogation centres, and
- all security and law enforcement personnel 
should be provided with the Code of Conduct for 
Law Enforcement Officials and receive 
instruction on its requirements."13,7
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The report indicates that the rapporteur sent information on 
allegations of torture to thirty three governments (naming only those 
already on the Commission’s agenda), and also made urgent appeals to 
eight governments.13'3 The rapporteur's mandate was extended for a 
further year on 13 March 1986, and it remains to be seen whether this 
office will be able to achieve success where the longer-established 
procedures have failed.
To sum up, then, in spite of the potential of the resolution 1503 
procedure, the system has proved virtually a complete failure, having 
had little discernible effect on the continuing violation of human 
rights by governments. In particular, it had no significant impact on 
the situation in Uruguay, Moreover, while the resolution 1235 
procedure does not suffer from the limitation of confidentiality, it 
too has had only a limited success in preventing grass violations of 
human rights, and it has certainly not proved an efficient means of 
tackling such violations. Finally, the recent appointment of a 
special rapporteur on torture, while it is encouraging in indicating 
some genuine concern on the part of the Commission on Human Rights and 
will no doubt fulfil a useful role, seems unlikely to be the answer to 
the problems which we have detailed. While the rapporteur's mandate 
will not be restricted to states which have accepted his jurisdiction, 
he will have no real executive powers to support his recommendations, 
and in the final analysis he will be unable to ensure the protection 
of individuals from being subjected to torture.
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(e) The Optional Protocol and Resolution 1503
In this section, our purpose is simply to point out the principal 
differences between the procedures discussed in the two preceding 
sections, in order to identify factors which have proved advantageous 
or disadvantageous to the effective protection of human rights. The 
overall objectives of the two systems are, of course, quite distinct, 
although ultimately both are concerned with securing full protection 
of human rights. The Optional Protocol procedure is first and 
foremost a petition system whereby an individual victim of a violation 
may seek a remedy through an international tribunal, namely the Human 
Rights Committee, whose function is to promote respect for human 
rights by advising the government in question that it considers there 
has been a violation of the terms of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. While the finding of a violation implies 
that the government is under an obligation to ensure that similar 
incidents are not occurring and will not occur in the future, it is 
possible for the violation to be an isolated one, so that there is no 
question of an administrative practice or governmental policy, and in 
such a case the Committee's views that a violation has occurred will 
not necessarily constitute a general indictment of the government's 
attitude to human rights, particularly if a remedy is promptly 
supplied. Of course, where the Human Rights Committee concludes in a 
number of cases relating to the same state and involving the same 
rights that violations have taken place, it can clearly be inferred 
that a policy of systematic violation exists within that state.13-' 
Thus, even though the individual petitioners may fail to obtain 
satisfaction, the Committee's views may increase general pressure on
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the government. This is not, however, the primary purpose of the 
petition system, and such a result is incidental to the aim of 
securing a remedy for the particular victim.
The resolution 1503 procedure, on the other hand, is not 
principally concerned with obtaining a remedy for individual victims 
who submit petitions to the United Nations, but is aimed rather at the 
underlying situation, the general socio-political climate which 
permits or causes serious violations of human rights to occur. The 
aim of the resolution 1503 procedure is to challenge the repressive 
policies of governments with a view to precipitating a change of 
attitude towards human rights, leading to a cessation of gross 
violations of human rights. Consequently, even if communications are 
received from individuals - and in practice virtually all are 
submitted by non-governmental organisations14-0 - they will not be 
considered under resolution 1503 unless they reveal a consistent 
pattern of gross violations of human rights.141 The procedure is not 
concerned with isolated incidents, but is intended to confront major 
human rights problems which require decisive and radical action by the 
international community. Of course, the ultimate beneficiaries of 
such action are individuals, but the process is restricted to the most 
serious situations, and to this extent it is not equipped to deal with 
certain areas which are covered by the Optional Protocol. In other 
ways, however, resolution 1503 is wider in scope than the Optional 
Protocol, and it is important to consider these differences.
Firstly, the Optional Protocol is more restricted with regard to 
the source of the communication: under the terms of the Protocol,
communications must emanate from victims of human rights violations, 
or at least from someone acting on their behalf and having a
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sufficient link,14E whereas the Sub-Commission's rules of procedure 
under resolution 1503 permit communications from "a person or group of 
persons who, it can be reasonably presumed, are victims..., any person 
or group of persons who have direct and reliable knowledge of those 
violations, or non-governmental organizations acting in good faith in 
accordance with recognized principles of human rights, not resorting 
to politically motivated stands contrary to the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations and having direct and reliable knowledge 
of such violations."14-3 Knowledge may even be second-hand.144- 
Moreover, there need be no relationship between the person submitting 
the communication and the state against which the allegation is made, 
whereas under the Optional Protocol communications may only relate to 
persons over whom the state in question has "jurisdiction".14-3 These 
distinctions reflect the different aims of the two procedures: 
resolution 1503 is concerned with serious situations in which more 
than the fate of an individual is at stake, and is consequently less 
strict about the source of information. In fact, a person or group
submitting a communication plays no further part in the proceedings,
and does not even have a right to be informed of the outcome.
Secondly, resolution 1503 is wider with regard to the range of 
rights covered: the Optional Protocol refers specifically to the
rights detailed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,14G but resolution 1503 does not contain any limitation other 
than its requirement for there to be a consistent pattern of gross 
violations. It is not entirely clear whether this was intended to
refer to the scale on which the violations occur or to the type of
right involved, although the reference to apartheid and racial 
discrimination indicates that the problem must attain a certain level
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in terms of geographical or numerical extent. On the other hand, the 
appointment by the Commission on Human Rights of special rapporteurs 
to examine particular types of violation suggests that the type of 
right may also be relevant. It is possible that only the most serious 
violations of human dignity were intended to fall within the scope of 
resolution 1503, thus excluding purely civil and political rights, and 
this would of course severely limit the application of the procedure. 
Such an interpretation seems unwarranted, however, and it would be 
more appropriate to regard large-scale violations of any right as 
gross violations. As we have seen, the Commission on Human Rights has 
adopted a dual approach, examining individual states as well as 
studying particular rights.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the procedure under resolution 
1503 may be invoked against any state whatsoever, apparently even one 
which is not a member of the United Rations.14,7 The Optional Protocol 
is, of course, applicable only to those states which have recognised 
the competence of the Human Rights Committee to consider 
communications relating to them. This is the most serious limitation 
on the procedure established under the Protocol, and although an 
increasing number of governments has accepted the Committee's 
jurisdiction, a large majority has as yet failed to do so, and many of 
the world's most repressive regimes are not subject to the supervision 
of the Committee, which is powerless to take any action against them. 
It is clear, then, that an optional procedure is not capable of 
securing comprehensive protection of fundamental human rights.
There is a fourth area in which resolution 1503 appears to be 
superior, at least in theory: the powers conferred by resolution 1503
are broader than those of the Human Rights Committee under the
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Optional Protocol. The Committee's views, which are its ultimate 
authority, are not legally binding, and their function is really to 
put moral pressure on the government in question, whereas the 
resolution 1503 procedure can theoretically result in 
action being taken by the Economic and Social Council or the General 
Assembly. However, even if this stage in the process should be 
reached, it is highly improbable that such action would ever be taken, 
because of the political implications. Moreover, the confidentiality 
rule means that there can be no public criticism of a government prior 
to this stage, and the Commission on Human Rights in any event appears 
to lack any real will to utilise the procedure to full effect. In 
practice, therefore, the broader powers of the Commission have proved 
to be of little value. The Human Rights Committee, on the other hand, 
has shown itself prepared to make full use of its limited powers under 
the Protocol, and has not been reluctant to censure governments in 
respect of their human rights violations. In this way it has been 
able to publicise violations and embarrass governments, although the 
actual effects have been negligible, and it must always be borne in 
mind that the Committee has been able to achieve this only in the case 
of a few states. It remains to be seen what course the Committee 
would take if dealing with one of the world's political powers. 
Nevertheless, the attitude of the Human Rights Committee has been much 
more positive than that of the Commission on Human Rights, which has 
effectively enervated the resolution 1503 system, and there can be 
little doubt that the explanation for this difference lies in the 
composition of the two bodies. The major problem with the resolution 
1503 process is that it is open to the dictates of political 
expediency and the pressures of governmental interference: the
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activities of the Commission are ultimately determined by governments 
which, as we have seen, are extremely defensive of * their sovereignty 
and on the whole strongly opposed to any increase in international 
involvement in internal human rights matters. For this reason, any 
proposal to strengthen international machinery is doomed to failure in 
the Commission's debates. It is true that some confidential decisions 
have been taken under resolution 1503 and that public examination of 
states is passible under resolution 1235, but the fact remains that 
the nature of the United Hations has prevented the development of 
these systems into effective mechanisms.
It is clear that both the procedures discussed in this section 
suffer from severe limitations, and that both could be significantly 
improved. In particular, the Optional Protocol system would have a 
much greater impact if it were mandatory, while the resolution 1503 
procedure would benefit from the elimination of excessive 
confidentiality and the transfer of responsibility to a non­
governmental agency. The powers of the respective bodies could also 
be extended to advantage. In fact, the optimum solution might be the 
creation of a single independent authority with extensive powers of 
investigation, which could examine isolated incidents or general 
situations in any state and pronounce authoritatively whether any 
violation of human rights has taken place or whether a consistent 
pattern of gross violations exists. Of course, there is a complete 
absence of political will to create such an agency, and in particular 
there is opposition to the establishment of any process which is 
mandatory, so that it is of the utmost importance that existing 
procedures should be developed to their full potential, yet even this 
aspiration is frequently frustrated by political considerations. The
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existing measures are not without value, in spite of their restricted 
application, and they do fulfil a role in the protection of human 
rights, each covering a specific aspect of protection, and it may be 
that at present the best that can be hoped for is a range of measures 
of varying degrees of potency, so that strong optional procedures can 
be applied to states which accept them, while less co-operative 
regimes can be monitored through less onerous (and therefore less 
objectionable) machinery. In the final analysis, however, this 
entails resignation to the fact that it is not possible to ensure
effective protection of human rights by means of international law.
(f) Regional Systems
A comprehensive consideration of the procedures and practices of 
the two major regional systems of human rights protection, namely the 
European and Inter-American systems, is outwith the scope of this 
study, but it is nonetheless essential to mention them briefly at this 
point in order to indicate the measures provided for in the relevant 
conventions and to inquire whether these have proved any more
successful than the United Rations procedures.
The European Convention on Human Rights has been in force for 
many years now, and numerous important developments have taken place 
within the framework created by it. The Convention establishes a
system of inter-state complaint,1*® and also provides for the
consideration of petitions "from any person, non-governmental 
organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a 
violation”.1*3 However, a petition may only be considered by the 
European Commission on Human Rights if it relates to a state which has
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recognised the competence of the Commission to deal with such
petitions.1®° If the Commission fails to secure a "friendly
settlement" of the matter, it makes a report stating whether it 
considers a violation has taken place.1®1 The case may be referred to 
the European Court of Human Eights1®2 by the Commission itself or by 
states parties under certain conditions.1®3 The decision of the Court 
is final and binding.1®*
The European system has in general functioned satisfactorily, and 
this is largely due to the "common heritage of political traditions,
ideals, freedom and the rule of law"1®® which has produced similar
constitutional institutions and political structures within the states 
of western Europe: a high proportion of the member states of the
Council of Europe are parliamentary democracies in which the rule of 
law is respected and in which there exists a genuine desire to defend 
the liberty of the individual and to promote the effective protection 
of fundamental human rights. The recognition of many of the rights 
enshrined in the European Convention was often an integral feature of 
the political evolution of western European nations, and concern for 
civil and political rights has been a principal aspect of the 
political heritage of these nations, so that the governments of
western Europe are by nature defenders of the democratic institutions 
and the rule of law which support these rights. There is, therefore, 
a more uniform conception of human rights and the manner in which they 
ought to be secured than can be achieved within the more cosmopolitan 
and eclectic atmosphere of the United Nations. This is not to say 
that violations of human rights do not occur in liberal democracies;
however, violations are often isolated incidents or at least do not
occur as systematic patterns involving core rights, and for this
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reason governments are usually not averse to modifying their laws and 
practices in order to bring them into line with international 
standards as established in the Convention and interpreted and applied 
by the Commission and Court. Where democratic processes and 
institutions are permitted to function properly, then, it is unlikely 
that any violations of the Convention which do occur will have 
resulted from policies which the government considers critical, so 
that the problem may be rectified without major revision of 
ideological goals or political strategies. Furthermore, the attitude 
of western European governments makes them more amenable to 
supervision by international agencies, and the high level of 
compliance with the decisions of such agencies has been the foundation 
of the success of the European system.
While democratic institutions inhibit governments from pursuing 
repressive policies involving serious violations of human rights, so 
that consistent patterns of gross violations do not normally occur in 
western liberal democracies, there are circumstances in which a 
breakdown of democracy can take place and constitutionally elected 
authorities can be replaced by a repressive authoritarian regime. 
When this happens, the ultimate dependence of the European system on 
voluntary respect for the rule of law becomes apparent. The most 
striking example of this in recent years was the military takeover in 
Greece in the late 1960's.
The junta which seized power in Greece embarked upon a course of 
repression which involved the violation of numerous provisions of the 
European Convention, and certain states brought the situation to the 
attention of the European Commission on Human Rights under the inter­
state procedure. The Commission found inter alia that torture had
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been employed systematically.1 se The problem in this instance, then, 
was not the reluctance of the international authority to condemn a 
government, but rather the lack of effective sanctions by which its 
decision could be enforced. Certainly, Greece could have been 
expelled from the Council of Europe, and this option was considered, 
but it is unclear what positive results this could have achieved. In 
fact, the junta pre-empted such action in any event by withdrawing 
from the Council of Europe, effectively producing the same result: 
the Greek government was no longer bound by the terms of the 
Convention, and apart from a degree of political embarrassment was 
more or less free to pursue its repressive policies. Thus, although 
the European system certainly permitted a clear condemnation of the 
violations perpetrated by the Greek authorities, the lack of co­
operation exposed the limitations which exist even within what is 
probably the most advanced and successful system in the world. When a 
government adopts policies which involve the violation of human 
rights, and is consequently unwilling to comply with the 
recommendations of an international authority, the European system has 
to contend with the problems familiar to other international 
procedures.
The question of torture also arose in relation to northern 
Ireland, and although the European Court disagreed with the Commission 
over the definition of torture and decided that the practices involved 
amounted only to inhuman treatment,1 there was a condemnation of 
the government of the United Kingdom in respect of its violation of 
article 3 of the Convention. However, the practices in question had 
been stopped by the government some years prior to the Court’s 
decision and, while that decision is important in so far as it
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provides guidelines as to the meaning of article 3, it was not 
instrumental in ensuring prevention of ill-treatment. On the other 
hand, the initial international concern over the practices does appear 
to have influenced the government in its decision to terminate the use 
of the 'five techniques'.
The European system is significant and successful, then, but only 
within certain limits and under particular conditions. Essentially, 
it is the high degree of willingness to conqply with the findings of 
the supranational authorities which makes the system effective, and in 
view of the fact that violations of core rights often result from 
governments pursuing policies they regard as essential, there must be 
some doubt about the ability of the system to produce results when 
such a situation arises.
The American Convention on Human Rights came into force in 
1978,16Q and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which it 
established has so far not dealt with any contentious cases, so that 
it is too early yet to make any valid assessment of the effectiveness 
of the system.1SS> The American Convention actually takes the converse 
approach to that adapted in the European Convention, making the right 
of individual petition mandatory and the right of inter-state 
complaint optional.ieo Separate acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court is also required.161 The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has, however, been functioning for some 
time: in 1960, the Council of the Organization of American States
adopted the Statute of the Commission, which was established as "an 
autonomous entity of the Organization of American States",16=2 but 
when the amended OAS Charter came into force in 1970, article 51 
designated the Commission an organ of the Organization. Prior to the
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entry into force of the American Convention on Human Rights, the 
Commission's responsibilities in relation to the protection of human 
rights were based on the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man 1948,1G3 but it was subsequently empowered to consider 
communications from individuals,1®4 and now operates under the 
Comnvention and a new Statute, although it retains its original 
jurisdiction over all OAS members.
The Inter-American Commission*s procedures are somewhat more 
flexible than those of its European counterpart. In addition to its 
duties under the Convention, the Commission may adopt a more direct 
approach to the protection of human rights, and may in fact take 
action on its own initiative. It may send emergency telegrams or 
otherwise approach governments when matters of some urgency arise, and 
it may also seek authority to conduct an on-site investigation, on 
which it may issue a report even without the consent of the government 
concerned. The Commission is thus able to deal with a wide range of 
issues and problems outwith the scope of the American Convention on 
Human Rights.
There are differences between the political composition of the 
OAS and that of the Council of Europe, and the observations which we 
made in relation to Europe are not relevant to the Americas, where 
governments are not so willing to comply with the findings of the 
Inter-American Commission, especially when it operates outwith the 
terms of the Convention. nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties 
in securing the co-operation of regimes which are often extremely 
repressive and hostile, the Inter-American Commission has played a 
very important part in the development of human rights protection in 
the hemisphere, and has addressed itself to a large number of
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situations. In some cases, it has been able to secure protection, 
while in others it has been powerless, impeded like the European 
Commission and other agencies by the lack of effective sanctions to 
enforce its decisions.
The Inter-American Commission did, of course, show concern over 
the situation in Uruguay, and attempted to pressurise the government 
on several occasions. In 1977, the Commission, having examined
information relating to the case of a Uruguayan allegedly tortured to 
death, passed a resolution declaring that there were strong 
indications that the victim had died as a result of violence and 
recommending that the government investigate these allegations and 
inform the Commission of the measures taken to prevent a
recurrence.1ss The Uruguayan authorities rejected the competence of 
the Commission to deal with the matter, and refused to provide the 
requested information regarding the death in custody on grounds of 
national security. As a result, the Commission included the 
resolution in its annual report to the OAS General Assembly,1 which
called on the government to comply with the recommendations of the
report.
One of the main themes of the 9th General Assembly of the OAS, in 
October 1979, was the violation of human rights, and a report was 
presented noting some improvements but concluding that no real 
breakthrough had been achieved. A resolution condemning violations in 
Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay was approved by 19 votes to 2 (with 5 
abstentions). The resolution urged the government of Uruguay to 
consider inviting the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to 
visit the country and, in the meantime, to "implement comprehensively 
the measures recommended by the Commission in its previous report."1G-7
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Despite these efforts, the situation in Uruguay remained unchanged, 
although the consistent pressure from the OAS no doubt contributed to 
the restoration of democracy.
Criticism from within the context of a regional organisation is 
probably more effective and useful than criticism in international 
systems where the application of universal standards often means the 
imposition of foreign ideas. Of course, it is not so much the
geographical proximity which is relevant as the homogeneity, the 
similarity in political and social outlook, but even when this 
affinity exists, regional systems are still dependent upon the 
willingness of governments to fulfil their international obligations 
and co-operate fully with the appropriate authorities: even in
regional systems states retain their essential sovereignty and cannot 
be compelled to take any action against their will.
(g) Conclusions
The conclusions which can be drawn from the discussions in this 
chapter are fairly obvious: international procedures as they
presently exist suffer from limitations of an extensive nature, and 
rarely fulfil their primary function of restraining national 
governments and preventing the violation of human rights unless these 
governments happen to be willing to implement the recommendations and 
decisions of international agencies. When there is a refusal to 
comply with the directions of such agencies, they are powerless to 
ensure the protection of human rights, and this situation is 
exacerbated by the limited scope of their mandate as well as by the 
optional nature of most procedures. As far as the situation in
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Uruguay was concerned, none of the international measures which we 
have mentioned produced any discernible modification of the policies 
of the government, although most of them were applicable. They may 
have been of some influence in the eventual restoration of democracy, 
but they patently failed to protect the fundamental rights of 
thousands of individuals throughout the 1970's, and ultimately this is 
the criterion by which international procedures for the protection of 
human rights must be judged.
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A/42/40), Chapter IV. The information in this chapter takes account
of developments up to the Committee's 30th session (July 1987). When 
framing its first set of general comments, the Committee stated: "The
purpose of these general comments is to make Cthe Committee's] 
experience available for the benefit of all States Parties in order to 
promote their further implementation of the Covenant; to draw their 
attention to insufficiencies disclosed by a large number of reports; 
to suggest improvements in the reporting procedure and to stimulate 
the activities of these States and international organizations in the 
promotion and protection of human rights."
22. See Report of the Human Rights Committee 1981, Annex IV.
23. See Report of the Human Rights Committee 1977 (UN document
A/32/44), Annex IV. These guidelines apply to initial reports. The
Committee adopted guidelines for subsequent reports in 1981: see
Report of the Human Rights Committee 1981, Annex VI.
24. It should be noted that some governments have made reservations 
regarding particular articles of the Covenant.
25. See Fischer, op.cit., at p. 145, and also Review of the 
International Commission of Jurists, No. 20, June 1978, at p. 25.
26. The Committee has regularly requested information relating to the
following matters: (i) the steps taken to publicise the Covenant;
(ii) the status of the Covenant in national law; (iii) data available 
to show progress in the enjoyment of human rights; (iv) sex equality, 
treatment of minorities and indigenous populations; (v) types of 
punishment and prison conditions; (vi) detention of non-criminals, 
such as the mentally ill; (vii) freedom of expression; (viii) 
freedom of association; (ix) self-determination; (x) administration 
of justice; (xi) prohibition of war propaganda and advocacy of
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racial/religious hatred; (xii) emergency powers: see Review of the
International Commission of Jurists, No. 31, Dec 1983, at pp. 43-44.
27. See Fischer, op.cit., at p. 151.
28. See ibid., at p. 144.
29. See ibid., at p. 146.
30. For the most up-to-date list, see Report of the Human Rights
Committee 1987, Annex IV.
31. See Fischer, op.cit., at p. 152.
32. Reminders were sent on 30 September 1977, 22 February 1978, 29
August 1978, 17 April 1980 and 29 August 1980: see Report of the
Human Rights Committee 1981, Annex III.
33. For the report, see CCPR/C/1/Add.57.
34. Ibid., at p. 1.
35. See ibid., at p. 11.
36. With regard to article 7, the following statement is made at p. 
12 of the report: "In Uruguay, physical coercion is specifically
prohibited by article 26 of the Constitution and by article 7 of the 
Act No. 14,068....In general, the right to physical integrity is fully 
and satisfactorily assured by the provisions and guarantees of 
Uruguayan legislation and by the normal functioning of the competent 
national bodies." The report goes on to indicate that torture had 
been abolished in 1829, and makes reference to various articles of the 
Penal Code under which prosecution of torturers could take place.
37. Ibid., at p. 25.
38. The report refers at p. 26 to article 29 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, article 4(1) of the Covenant, and article 
XXVIII of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
Uruguay had not at that stage ratified the American Convention on 
Human Rights.
39. CCPR/C/1/Add. 57, at p. 27.
40. Ibid.
41. See Report of the Human Rights Committee 1982, Annex III, at
paras. 269-97.
42. Ibid., at para. 266.
43. See pp. 275-78, infra.
44. Report of the Human Rights Committee 1982, Annex III, at para. 
297.
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45. See Report of the Human Rights Committee 1987, Annex IV. 
Reminders were sent on 10 May 1984, 17 May 1985, 14 August 1985, 20 
Hovember 1985, 6 May 1986, 8 August 1986, 1 May 1987 and 24 July 1987.
46. See Report of the Human Rights Committee 1985, at p. 4.
47. See Report of the Human Rights Committee 1987, Annex IV.
48. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 
41(1).
49. Ibid., article 41(l)(e). See also sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c),
(f) and (g).
50. Ibid., article 41(l)(h)(i).
51. See ibid., article 41(1)(h)(ii).
52. See ibid., article 41(l)(h).
53. See ibid., article 42(1)(a). See sub-paragraph (b) and 
paragraphs (2)-(10) for the composition of the Commission and its 
procedure.
54. See ibid., article 42(7)(b).
55. Ibid., article 42(7)(c). The report will also contain the 
written submissions and a record of oral submissions. See also sub- 
paragraph (d): " If the Commission1 s report is submitted under sub- 
paragraph (c), the States Parties concerned shall, within three months 
of the receipt of the report, notify the Chairman of the Committee 
whether or not they accept the contents of the report of the 
Commission."
56. See Report of the Human Rights Committee 1979 (UM document 
A/34/40), Annex III.
57. See Chapter One, note 65, supra.
58. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, article 1. The same article states: "Mo
communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a 
State Party to the Covenant which is not a party to the present 
Protocol." It may be noted that some European states have made
reservations to exclude the application of the Protocol where the
matter is covered by the system established under the European 
Convention. Those states are Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Morway, Spain and Sweden.
59. Provisional Rules of Procedure were adopted at the Committee's 
1st session, in 1977: see Report of the Human Rights Committee 1977,
Annex II. Although the Optional Protocol itself permits
communications only from alleged victims, Rule 90(b) of the Rules of
Procedure provides that a communication may be submitted on behalf of 
a victim by someone having a sufficient link where the victim is for 
some reason unable to communicate with the Human Rights Committee. On 
procedure generally, see M.E. Tardu, Human Rights: The International
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Petition System (Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, lew York, 1979), in 
which the Rules of Procedure are reproduced in Binder II, Annex IV.
60. The grounds for rejection of a communication as inadmissible are 
specified in article 3 of the Optional Protocol: they are that the 
communication is anonymous, or is an abuse of the right of petition, 
or is incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant. The Committee 
will also reject a communication if it emerges that all available 
domestic remedies have not been exhausted (articles 2 and 5(2)(b)) or 
if the matter is being examined under another international procedure 
(article 5(2)(a)), although these facts may not be apparent from the 
communication itself.
61. See Rule 91(2) of the Provisional Rules of Procedure.
62. See Rule 91(1) of the Provisional Rules of Procedure.
63. Optional Protocol, article 4.
64. See Rule 93(3) of the Provisional Rules of Procedure.
65. Optional Protocol, article 5(1).
66. The General Assembly in fact specifically preferred "views" to 
"recommendations'1 or even "suggestions".
67. See Optional Protocol, article 5(4).
68. Rule 86 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure.
69. See Chapter One, note 65, supra. The majority of decided cases 
relate to Uruguay.
70. A further drawback is the length of time which usually elapses 
between submission of the communication and the adoption of final 
views by the Committee. This may be several years.
71. Tardu, op.cit., Binder II, Part I, Chapter I, at pp. 11-12.
72. See Report of the Human Rights Committee 1987, Chapter V.
73. See ibid.
74. The nine cases in which no violation was found related to 
Communications Hos. R. 9/40 (v. Finland), R.13/58 (v. Sweden), R.12/50 
(v. Canada), R.14/61 (v. Finland), 55/1979 (v. Canada), 75/1980 (v. 
Italy), 89/1981 (v. Finland), 180/1984 (v. letherlands) and 198/1985 
(v. Uruguay).
75. See Communications las. 146/1983 and 148-154/1983.
76. See Communications Hos. 16/1977, 90/1981, 124/1982, 138/1983 and
157/1983.
77. See Communications Hos. 49/1979, 115/1982, 132/1982 and 155/1983.
78. See Communications Hos. R.11/45, R.15/64 and R.11/46,
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79. See Communications Bos. R.6/24 and R.7/27.
80. See Communication Bos. 172/1984 and 182/1984.
81. See Communication Bo. R.9/35.
82. See Communication Bo. 156/1983.
83. See Communications Bos. R.11/45 (v. Colombia), 49/1979 (v.
Madagascar), 124/1982 (v. Zaire), 115/1982 (v. Madagascar), 138/1983 
(v. Zaire) and 156/1983 (v. Venezuela). Article 7 was found to have 
been violated in Bos. 49/1979, 124/1982 and 115/1982, and torture was 
mentioned in Bo. 124/1982. As far as Communication Bo. R. 11/45 is 
concerned, the Human Rights Committee stated: "It is not necessary to
consider further alleged violations, arising from the same facts, of 
other articles of the Covenant. Any such violations are subsumed by 
the even more serious violations of article 6." Article 6 concerns 
the right to life. The same view was expressed in the cases relating 
to Suriname.
84. See Communications Bos. R.l/5, R.2/9, R.2/8, R.l/4, R.l/6,
R. 2/11, R.7/28, R.7/32, R.8/33, R.9/37, R.10/44, R.12/52, R.14/63,
R. 2/10, R.7/30, R.17/70, R.18/73, R.6/25, 66/1980, 84/1981, 74/1980, 
80/1980, 88/1981, 43/1979, 92/1981, 105/1981, 107/1981, 83/1981,
103/1981, 85/1981, 110/1981, 123/1982, 139/1983, 147/1983. The other 
cases involving Uruguay were Communications Bos. R.7/31, R.8/34,
R.13/56, R.13/57, 77/1980, 106/1981, 108/1981 and 109/1981.
Communications Bos. R.7/31, R.13/57, 77/1980, 106/1981 and 108/1981
involved the right to a passport, and the first was in fact
discontinued after a passport was issued. The Human Rights Committee 
concluded in relation to Communications Bos. R.13/56 and 109/1981 that 
there had been a violation of article 10 of the Covenant, which 
relates to humane treatment.
85. See Communications Bos. R.l/5, R.2/8, R.l/4, R.2/11, R.7/28,
R.8/33, R.9/37, R.12/52, R.14/63, R.7/30, R.18/73, R.6/25, 74/1980,
80/1980, 88/1981, 107/1981, 110/1981, 139/1983 and 147/1983.
86. See Communications Bos. R.l/5, R.2/11, R.12/52, R.14/63, 74/1980, 
107/1981, 139/1983 and 147/1983. In Bo. 139/1983, torture is actually 
mentioned in connection with violation of article 14 rather than
article 7.
87. See Communications Bos. R.l/6, 105/1981 and 103/1981. Certain of 
the allegations in Communication Bo. 66/1980 also fell into this 
category, and indeed in a number of cases much of the alleged ill- 
treatment had taken place before the Covenant came into force and thus 
could not be taken into account by the Human Rights Committee unless 
the effects of the ill-treatment continued thereafter. In Bos. 
105/1981 and 103/1981, it was alleged that because the victims
remained imprisoned on the basis of confessions obtained by torture 
prior to the Covenant entering into force, article 7 continued to be 
violated, but this was not accepted by the Committee. The same
argument was put forward in Communication Bo. 80/1980, which also 
involved subsequent violations. In a number of cases in which the 
Committee found that there had been violations of article 7, it did 
not specifically mention torture, apparently because torture (as
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opposed to ill-treatment) had taken place prior to the Covenant 
entering into force: see, for example, Communications Nos. R.1/4,
R. 8/33, R.6/25 and 110/1981.
88. See Communications Nos. R.7/32, R.2/10 and 66/1980. In No. 
R.2/10, the author failed to supply further information or produce 
witnesses to substantiate the allegations.
89. See Communication No. 84/1981.
90. See Communication No. R.2/9.
91. Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights states: "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes
to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status."
92. See the Appendix to Communication No. R.2/9. One member gave a 
separate opinion with which five others associated themselves.
93. The other cases relate to Communications Nos. R.10/44, R.17/70, 
43/1979, 92/1981, 83/1981, 85/1981 and 123/1982.
94. See Communications Nos. R.10/44, R.2/10, R.17/70, 66/1980,
43/1979, 92/1981, 105/1981, 83/1981, 85/1981 and 123/1982.
95. Article 10(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights states: "All persons deprived of their liberty shall
be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of 
the human person."
96. See, for example, Communications Nos. 92/1981 and 105/1981, in 
which reference is made to the Committee's views in relation to the 
earlier Communications Nos. 66/1980 and 74/1980, the information from 
which enabled the Committee to conclude that "a practice of inhuman 
treatment existed at Libertad prison during the period to which the 
present communication relates."
97. See, for example, Communications Nos. R.2/9, R.1/4, R.1/6, 
R.2/11, R.12/52 and 110/1981.
98. This wording, or variations of it, were regularly employed by the 
Committee in its views on cases relating to Uruguay.
99. In Communication No. R.7/30, the Human Rights Committee stated at 
para. 13.3: "With regard to the burden of proof, this cannot rest
alone on the author of the communication, especially considering that 
the author and the State party do not always have equal access to the 
evidence and that frequently the State party alone has access to 
relevant information. ... In cases where the author has submitted to the 
Committee allegations supported by substantial witness 
testimony.... and where further clarification of the case depends on 
information exclusively in the hands of the State party, the Committee 
may consider such allegations as substantiated in the absence of
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satisfactory evidence and explanations to the contrary submitted by 
the State party." Cf. the Committee's final views on Communication
lo. 107/1981.
100. See Communications Hos. R.2/8, R.l/4, R. 1/6, R.2/11, R.7/28,
R.7/32, R.8/33, R.9/37, R.10/44 and R.12/52,
101. For example, consideration of Communication 3Jo. R.7/31 was
discontinued fallowing the issue of a passport to the petitioner.
102. See generally Louis B. Sohn and Thomas Buergenthal,
International Protection of Human Rights (Bobbs- Merrill, 1973), at
pp. 771-855.
103. See ECOSOC resolution 728F(XXVIII), para. 2(a) and (b). The
text of the resolution is reproduced in Sohn and Buergenthal, op.cit., 
at pp. 771-72.
104. See ECOSOC resolution 728F(XXVIII), para. 1.
105. ECOSOC resolution 1235(XLII), para. 2. The text of the 
resolution is reproduced in Sohn and Buergenthal, op.cit., at pp. 774-
75.
106. ECOSOC resolution 1235(XLII), para. 3.
107. Sub-Commission resolution 10(XX).
108. ECOSOC resolution 1503(XLVIII), para. 1. The text of the
resolution is reproduced in Sohn and Buergenthal, op.cit., at pp. 841-
44. With regard to the limitation to the terms of reference of the 
Sub-Commission, while it is apparent that the whole system relating to 
gross violations was motivated by the concern over apartheid and 
racialism, the jurisdiction of the Sub-Commission does seem to have 
been extended to cover other gross violations, and it now appears to 
be generally accepted that its competence extends beyond the two
specific areas mentioned. Sub-Commission resolution KXXIV), which 
governs its procedure under resolution 1503, states in para. Kb) that 
communications are admissible when "there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that they may reveal a consistent pattern of gross and 
reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of 
apartheid..." The word "including" would seem to indicate that the 
practices mentioned do not constitute an exhaustive list.
109. ECOSOC resolution 1503(XLVIII), para. 5.
110. See Sub-Commission resolution KXXIV). The text of the 
resolution is reproduced in Sohn and Buergenthal, op.cit., at pp. 852-
53.
111. ECOSOC resolution 1503(XLVIII), para. 6(a).
112. See ibid., para. 6(b).
113. See ibid., para. 8.
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114. This appears from the Equatorial Guinea case, in which 
confidential material was subsequently de-classified. Far a 
discussion, see pp. 290-91, infra. See also Tardu, op.cit., Binder 
II, Part I, Chapter II, at pp. 26-36.
115. The situation in Equatorial Guinea was eventually referred to 
the Economic and Social Council under resolution 1235: see Commission 
on Human Rights resolution 15(XXXV) of 13 March 1979. In 1985, the 
situations in Argentina and Uruguay were also made public, but this 
was at the specific request of the respective governments.
116. ECOSOC resolution 1503(XLVIII), para. 8.
117. Marc J. Bossuyt, The Development of Special Procedures of the
United Rations Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights: Law Journal, 
Vol. 6 (1985), 179-210, at pp. 184-85. See also pp. 183-84.
118. See Review of the International Commission of Jurists, Ho. 28,
June 1982, at p. 33.
119. See Sub-Commission resolution 1(XXIV), para. 1(b). The Hew York
Times of 21 September 1972 reported that three countries were
involved: see Review of the International Commission of Jurists, Ho.
9, Dec 1972, at p. 6.
120. According to the London Times of 24 September 1973, the
countries involved were the United Kingdom (regarding northern
Ireland), Portugal (regarding its overseas territories), Iran,
Indonesia, Burundi, Tanzania, Brazil and Guyana: see Review of the
International Commission of Jurists, Ho. 11, Dec 1973, and also Tardu, 
op.cit., Binder II, Part I, Chapter II, at p. 22.
121. According to Reuters, Chile, Israel and Uganda were added to the 
list, and there was also supplementary material relating to Brazil and 
Indonesia. Ho action was taken in the case of Cuba, and there was 
uncertainty as to the legal position in relation to South Vietnam, 
which was not a member of the United Rations: see Review of the
International Commission of Jurists, Ho. 13, Dec 1974, at p. 29.
122. ECOSOC resolution 1503(XLVIII), para. 10.
123. See Review of the International Commission of Jurists, Ho. 17,
Dec 1976, at p. 27.
124. See Report of the Human Rights Committee 1978 (A/33/40), Ch. IV, 
at para. 582.
125. The situations in the following states have been considered by 
the Commission on Human Rights between 1978 and 1986:
1978 Bolivia, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Malawi,
Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Uganda, Uruguay
1979 Bolivia, Burma, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Malawi, Paraguay, 
Republic of Korea, Uganda, Uruguay
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1980 Argentina, Bolivia, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, 
Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Uganda, Paraguay, Uruguay
1981 Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Central African Republic, 
Chile, German Democratic Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Japan, Mozambique, Uganda, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, Republic of Korea
1982 Afghanistan, Argentina, German Democratic Republic, Haiti,
Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Republic of Korea
1983 Afghanistan, Argentina, German Democratic Republic, Haiti,
Paraguay, Uruguay, Indonesia (concerning East Timor), Iran, 
Turkey
1984 Albania, Benin, Haiti, . Indonesia (East Timor), Paraguay, 
Philippines, Turkey, Uruguay (It was announced that 
Afghanistan, Argentina, Malaysia and Pakistan were no longer 
under consideration.)
1985 Albania, Haiti, Paraguay, Philippines, Turkey, Zaire (It 
was announced that Benin, Indonesia, Pakistan and Uruguay were 
no longer under consideration.)
1986 Albania, Haiti, Paraguay, Zaire (It was announced that 
Gabon, the Philippines and Turkey were no longer under 
consideration.)
For the foregoing information, see Bossuyt, op.cit., at p. 182, 
and Review of the International Commission of Jurists, Ho. 36, June 
1986, at pp. 25-26.
126. El Dia of 7 March 1980, referred to in Review of the
International Commission of Jurists, Ho. 24, June 1980, at pp. 34-35.
127. For a discussion of this case, see Tardu, op.cit., Binder II, 
Part I, Chapter II, at pp. 26-36.
128. The five chapters were (1) General Features; (2) Political
Development; (3) the Institution of the Dictatorship; (4) Deliberate 
Violations of Human Rights; (5) Conclusions and Action Requested.
129. See Sub-Commission resolution KXXIV), para. 3(c), The 
government’s reply also reviewed the country's history and dealt with 
the current situation and certain of the specific allegations: see 
the discussion in Tardu, op.cit., Binder II, Part I, Chapter II, at p.
28.
130. A further communication had by that time been submitted by the 
International University Exchange Fund consisting of an 80 page report 
by a visiting anthropologist.
131. See Tardu, op.cit., Binder II, Part I, Chapter II, at p. 35.
132. See ibid., at p. 25, and Commission resolution 15(XXXV).
133. See note 125, supra.
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134. Review of the International Commission of Jurists, Ho. 28, June 
1982, at p. 35.
135. See UN document E/CN.4/1986/15, and also Commission resolution 
1985/33.
136. See Review of the International Commission of Jurists, No. 36,
June 1986, at p. 23.
137. Quoted in ibid,, at p. 23.
138. See David Weissbrodt, The Three "Theme" Special Rapporteurs of 
the UN Commission on Human Rights, 80 American Journal of
International Law (1986) 685-99, at p. 693.
139. The Human Rights Committee has no remit to draw conclusions 
where several cases relate to the same situation, but it has in its 
consideration of certain communications referred to previous cases and 
taken account of its findings in these: see note 96, supra.
140. See Review of the International Commission of Jurists, No. 28,
June 1980, at p. 35.
141. It is not clear whether this restricts the procedure to
communications which actually contain information revealing a 
consistent pattern, or whether a pattern may be revealed as a result 
of a number of communications emanating from unrelated sources and 
relating to separate incidents which together indicate that a 
consistent pattern of violations exists. In practice, the former 
situation is invariably the case.
142.
Human
See Optional Protocol, articles 1 and 2, and Rule 90(b) 
Rights Committee's Rules of Procedure.
of the
143. Sub-Commission resolution KXXIV), para. 2(a).
144. See ibid., para. 2(c).
145. See Optional Protocol, article 1.
146. See ibid.
147. See Sub-Commission resolution KXXIV), para. 1(b).
148. See European Convention on Human Rights, article 24.
149. Ibid., article 25(1).
150. See ibid. For the procedure, see articles 25-32. Of the member
states of the Council of Europe, only Cyprus has not accepted the 
procedure. For the member states, see Chapter One, note 62, supra,
151. See European Convention on Human Rights, article 31.
152. See European Convention on Human Rights, article 46, on the 
jurisdiction of the Court. If a case is not submitted to the Court,
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the Committee of Ministers decides whether a breach has occurred: see
article 32.
153. See European Convention on Human Rights, article 48. See also
article 44.
154. See ibid., articles 52 and 53.
155. Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights.
156. See Denmark, Norway and Sweden v. Greece ('The Greek Case'),
12 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 1969, Part II.
157. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, Report of the European Commission
on Human Rights, 19 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 1976, 512-949; and Ireland v. United Kingdom, Judgement of the 
European Court of Human Rights, Series A: Judgements and Decisions,
Vol. 25, Judgement of 18 January 1978.
158. See generally on the OAS system: Handbook of Existing Rules
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System (OAS document 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.65, Doc.6, updated 1 July 1985).
159. See Buergenthal, op.cit., on the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights generally. The Court is currently dealing with three cases of
alleged 'disappearances' in Honduras. For the members of the OAS and 
those which have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, see Handbook 
of Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American 
System.
160. See American Convention on Human Rights, articles 44 and 45.
Only eight states have accepted the inter-state procedure: see
Chapter One, note 65, supra.
161. See American Convention on Human Rights, article 62. Only eight 
states have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, which has fairly 
wide powers in terms of article 63.
162. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
article 1.
163. For text, see Brownlie, op.cit., at pp. 389-95.
164. On these developments, "see Sohn and Buergenthal, op.cit,, at pp. 
1284-93. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was empowered 
to consider communications by the incorporation of several new 
articles into its Statute in 1966, and the procedures were governed by 
its revised Regulations.
165. See Uruguay - Deaths Under Torture 1975-77 (Amnesty 
International, 1978), at pp. 10-11.
166. See ibid. In January 1978, the OAS voted against accepting an 
invitation by the government of Uruguay to hold the General Assembly 
there.
167. See Keesings Contemporary Archives, 14 March 1980, at 30139B.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AGAINST TORTURE
In December 1984, the General Assembly of the United Nations 
adopted in resolution 39/46 a Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and one year 
later the Organization of American States adopted a similar 
instrument, an Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish 
Torture, to be followed by the adoption of a Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
by the Council of Europe in 1987. These were the first conventions to 
be promulgated at the international level dealing specifically with 
the problem of torture, and in this chapter we shall examine the 
provisions of the three instruments, identifying their goals and the 
difficulties which they are likely to face in achieving those goals. 
Ve have seen that there are significant limitations on the 
effectiveness of existing international procedures, and that the 
protection of fundamental human rights in practice depends largely on 
the safeguards which operate within the internal legal and political 
system of each state, so that it is of great importance to consider 
how these more recently developed instruments propose to tackle the 
problem of preventing torture by international means, and in 
particular whether they introduce any new measures of implementation. 
Before, we turn to these questions, however, we shall trace the 
development of the three instruments in their respective spheres.
At its 32nd session, in 1976, the UN Commission on Human Rights 
had before it a written statement submitted by Amnesty International 
calling upon the Commission to study the possibility of drafting a 
convention which would, inter alia, declare torture to be a crime in
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international law. The General Assembly of the United Nations 
subsequently requested the Commission to draw up a draft convention 
against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, and to submit a progress report to the General Assembly at 
its 33rd session.1 The Commission commenced its consideration of the 
matter in 1978 on the basis of two alternative proposals, one 
submitted by the government of Sweden, the other by the International 
Commission of Jurists on behalf of the International Association of 
Penal Law, and requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
to transmit all relevant documents to the governments of member states 
and to the specialised agencies for their observations.a
On the recommendation of the Commission, the Economic and Social 
Council authorised the establishment of a working group to meet 
immediately prior to the Commission's 35th session, in 1979, for the 
purpose of preparing concrete drafting proposals. The working group 
duly considered the Swedish draft in the light of comments received 
and approved, with certain reservations, four articles. The Economic 
and Social Council authorised the working group to meet again prior to 
the Commission's 36th session in order to complete its consideration 
of the draft convention,3 but although several more articles were 
adopted, there remained substantial areas of disagreement, 
particularly in relation to the concept of universal jurisdiction over 
torturers and the question of implementation,4 and the working group 
was accordingly authorised to meet again the following year, prior to 
the Commission's 37th session.3 The General Assembly requested the 
Commission to complete the drafting of the convention as a matter of 
urgency, with a view to submitting it together with proposals for 
effective implementation to the Assembly at its 36th session,3 but
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the Commission thought it advisable to continue consideration of the 
draft, as there remained some dissension within the working group on 
the question of implementation, and no further consensus was 
forthcoming on the issues which were causing difficulty. The Economic 
and Social Council, on the Commission's recommendation, accordingly 
authorised further meetings of the working group in 1982,T 1983,® 
and 1984,® when the final text of the convention was adopted by the 
General Assembly. It came into force on 26 June 1987.
Parallel developments within the Organization of American States 
commenced in 1978 when the General Assembly of the Organization 
requested the Inter-American Juridical Committee to prepare a draft 
convention defining torture as an international crime in co-operation 
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Eights.10 The Juridical 
Committee duly appointed a rapporteur, whose preliminary report formed 
the basis of subsequent discussions, and member states were invited to 
forward copies of their domestic laws prohibiting torture, together 
with their suggestions as to the matters which should be included in a 
convention. However, only a handful of governments responded.
At its regular meeting in July-August 1979, the Juridical 
Committee had before it two alternative drafts, in addition to the 
documents mentioned above. A working group was set up to study these, 
and a draft convention was prepared, although there was insufficient 
time at that meeting for the full Committee to discuss the proposals. 
In accordance with the request that the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights should be consulted, that body in December 1979 approved 
a Draft American Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of 
Torture. This was transmitted to the Juridical Committee, whose 
Preparatory Commission studied the draft article by article, using
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firstly the replies to a questionnaire distributed amongst members of 
the Committee, and secondly a study prepared by the Office of 
Development and Codification of the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the 
General Secretariat, which compared the IACHR draft and the working 
group's preliminary draft, as well as the proposals submitted to the 
United Rations by Sweden.
The Inter-American Juridical Committee approved a Draft 
Convention Defining Torture as an International Crime on 6 February 
1980, and presented it along with a Statement of Reasons to the 
General Assembly,11 which decided by AG/RES 509 of 27 November 1980 
to forward the draft and Statement of Reasons to member states for 
their observations and comments. Only six governments replied, 
however, and the General Assembly subsequently extended the mandate of 
its Permanent Council in order to enable it to continue its study of 
the text.12 By AG/RES 644(XIII-0/83), the General Assembly requested 
the Permanent Council to submit the draft convention to the Assembly 
at its 14th regular session in 1984, but the convention was not 
adopted until the following session in 1985.13
The European Convention had its origins in proposals made by the 
President of the Swiss Committee Against Torture in 1976, which were 
subsequently adopted by the International Commission of Jurists and 
the Swiss Committee in the form of a draft Optional Protocol to the UR 
Convention against Torture (which had not been adopted at that 
time).1* The government of Costa Rica in fact submitted this draft to 
the UR Commission on Human Rights in 1980, and it appears to have had 
some influence on the final text of the UR Convention. In Europe, the 
Legal Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe requested the International Commission of Jurists and the
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Swiss Committee to draft a European Convention against Torture based 
on the draft Optional Protocol, and the Parliamentary Assembly 
forwarded the proposals to the Committee of Ministers on 28 September 
1983. The convention was finally adopted in 1987.1S The aims of the 
European Convention are somewhat different from those of the UH and 
OAS Conventions, its principal purpose being to enable international 
authorities to visit places of detention in order to detect and 
prevent torture, a method based upon the activities of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross. This aim is rather more 
limited than the aims of the other instruments, and the European 
Convention will to a certain extent require to be dealt with
separately in the following discussion.
There are, then, three recent international conventions dealing 
specifically with the problem of torture, and there is no doubt that 
this represents a major advance in the evolution of international 
measures for the protection of fundamental human rights. The 
conventions deal with one of the most basic and essential of all human 
rights, an absolute right which is not dependent on political or 
cultural factors, and the credibility of international law in the
field of human rights will to a considerable degree be tested by the 
success or otherwise of these instruments. It is with this in mind 
that we shall turn to an examination of the texts of the three
conventions.
The UM and OAS Conventions are not, in fact, particularly
ambitious, but to a large extent accept the limitations on 
international law which we have already identified. They do not 
attempt to overcome the difficulties which face existing international 
human rights conventions in a radical manner, but rather endeavour to
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achieve full effectiveness within accepted limits, although they do 
also introduce certain novel features aimed at ensuring a wider degree 
of protection. All the conventions will, of course, apply only to 
those states which become parties to them, so that one of the 
principal obstacles to the effective international protection of human 
rights, namely the inability of international law to impose 
obligations on unconsenting governments, remains, with the result that 
regimes which employ torture can simply refrain from ratifying the 
conventions, or at least from accepting any optional measures of 
implementation. International supervision cannot be imposed upon such 
governments, and the conventions offer no solution to this problem, 
but rather aim to promote the prevention and suppression of torture 
primarily through those states which will become parties, in the first 
place by encouraging them to adopt internal safeguards and in the 
second place by establishing international supervision over them. The 
paradox is, of course, that most governments which authorise or 
tolerate the use of torture will not ratify the conventions, and to 
this extent it does not appear that the new conventions can expect any 
greater success than that enjoyed by existing human rights 
instruments. The conventions do, however, attempt to tackle the 
problem of torture in non-contracting states in one indirect way, and 
this may prove to be their most significant contribution to the 
elimination of torture: bath the UI and OAS Conventions employ the
technique of classifying torture as an international crime, so that 
torturers can be apprehended, prosecuted and punished by states 
parties even if the offence took place in the territory of a non­
contracting state and involved nationals of non-contracting states. 
This approach is similar to that adopted in the conventions relating
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to terrorism, and although it is an important and necessary step in 
tackling torture in states which are not bound directly by
international agreements, it must be recognised that it does have
limited value in practice.
The UN and OAS Conventions recognise that in view of the
limitations on international law torture can be most effectively 
prevented at national level, and one of the principal aims of both
instruments is to promote the adoption of safeguards in domestic 
legislation and practice by those states which become parties. The 
imposition of an international obligation to adopt domestic measures 
might be regarded as superfluous, since any government which is 
prepared to ratify an international convention against torture and 
submit to international supervision is likely to have a genuine desire 
to prevent torture, so that even if adequate safeguards do not already 
exist within the national legal system, the government could easily 
introduce them without undertaking international obligations to do so. 
Indeed, the probability is that only states which have adequate 
domestic safeguards will ratify the conventions, while regimes which 
require supervision will refrain from doing so. Nevertheless, the 
conventions have some value, even apart from their recognition of 
torture as an international crime: they not only establish
international guidelines and definitive standards against which the 
conduct of all governments can be measured, but also create legally 
binding obligations which cannot be ignored lightly, and thus fortify 
domestic law. Moreover, these obligations are backed up by
implementation machinery which provides for the constant monitoring of 
states parties in the fulfilment of their responsibilities and there
is, therefore, an additional level of independent supervision of
\
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governments which would not be possible if they were simply left to 
deal with torture unilaterally, lo national system is perfect, and no 
government can provide absolute guarantees against future violations, 
so that the supervision of states by international authorities is 
important in permitting not only encouragement and assistance but also 
criticism and censure on the basis of norms established by the 
conventions. Furthermore, both the UI and OAS Conventions create 
procedures whereby allegations of torture can be investigated with a 
view to obtaining a satisfactory remedy, and although these apply only 
in the case of states which have accepted them, they do represent a 
level of protection over and above the safeguards established at the 
national level. Such procedures can come into operation when domestic 
measures have failed to ensure proper protection against torture, and 
although ultimately international law possesses no enforcement 
machinery to secure the compliance of governments, the measures of 
implementation are essential to give substance to the obligation of 
governments to prevent torture through domestic means. We shall 
examine the various measures of implementation in due course.
One question which arises in relation to measures of 
implementation is whether they should be mandatary or optional. The 
problem is that the inclusion of mandatory measures in international 
conventions is liable to dissuade a considerable number of governments 
from ratifying them, whereas if measures are optional, conventions 
will attract a greater degree of support, although only a minority of 
governments will accept the optional provisions. In the latter case, 
however, the danger is that governments may be able to create a facade 
of respectability by ratifying conventions without submitting to the 
implementation machinery, and this has to be balanced against the
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value of such regimes being parties to international conventions. 
Certainly, it does seem an unacceptable compromise to exclude measures 
of implementation altogether in the hope that a larger number of 
government will ratify the convention: it is just as futile to have
an ineffectual instrument accepted by a large number of states as it 
is to have an effective one supported by only a handful of states 
which in any event do not permit the use of torture. The optimum 
solution appears to lie in the adoption of a selection of measures, 
incorporating both mandatory provisions which will prove acceptable to 
as wide a range of governments as possible without being totally 
ineffective, and also more far-reaching measures of an optional 
character which will permit the creation of effective procedures 
without discouraging governments from ratifying the convention itself. 
This course was adopted in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and has been followed in the UR Convention, although 
in both instruments the optional procedures are actually fairly 
limited in scope and the powers of the supervisory agencies are not 
extensive.
The procedures established by the UR and OAS Conventions will 
apply only to those states which have accepted them, either by 
ratifying the relevant convention itself in the case of mandatory 
measures or by separate acceptance in the case of optional measures, 
and their value is accordingly restricted to their effect in relation 
to those states. While these limitations must be recognised, there 
are some situations in which the procedures might be invoked to some 
effect: firstly, the use of torture may arise in a state with a
liberal government which has ratified the convention; secondly, a 
liberal government of a state party may be overthrown by a repressive
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regime which nevertheless remains bound by the terms of the 
convention; thirdly, even governments which in fact authorise the 
clandestine use of torture may find it expedient to ratify 
international conventions, as the humanitarian basis of the 
prohibition of torture creates a considerable degree of moral 
pressure, and failure to ratify might be seen as an indication that 
the government condones the use of torture or at least is unconcerned 
about the problem - this applies more forcibly to the torture 
conventions than to human rights instruments generally. While the 
conventions may not have a direct impact on the problem of torture, 
then, the imposition of an obligation to prevent and punish torture at 
the domestic level, supported by international measures of 
implementation does have some value within the same limits that apply 
to existing human rights instruments. It is essential, therefore, for 
the procedures to be utilised effectively and for adequate powers to 
be conferred on the responsible authorities so that they can make 
unequivocal decisions and, if possible, take enforcement action or at 
least exert moral and political pressure on offending governments.
Although the UI and OAS Conventions both create machinery for 
monitoring states parties, they recognise that, given the realities of 
the international political system and the consequent rejection of 
international control of national governments, the prevention of 
torture must be achieved primarily at the domestic level by means of 
internal legal and constitutional safeguards, because it is only at 
that level that the requisite restraints can function effectively and 
political limitation of government can be secured. For this reason, 
states parties are required to adopt appropriate measures to ensure 
that the employment of torture is made illegal and punishable, and
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that there exist adequate procedures for investigation and the
provision of satisfactory remedies. The basic obligation undertaken 
by states parties is to ensure the prevention and elimination of 
torture.ie The UN Convention provides that each state party shall 
take "effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other 
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its 
jurisdiction."17 The OAS Convention provides for states to "prevent 
and punish torture" in accordance with the terms of the convention:13 
states parties undertake to "take effective measures to prevent and 
punish torture within their jurisdiction."13 The effect of both 
instruments is similar, then, and may be compared also with the
provisions of articles 3 and 4 of the 1975 UN Declaration.20 The 
principal aim of the instruments is to impose a formal obligation to 
introduce domestic measures which will prevent or at least impede the 
employment of torture and will ensure the effective investigation of 
allegations with a view to the prosecution of torturers and the
provision of a remedy for victims. As the conventions are aimed 
essentially at governmental torture, it is clear that such an 
obligation will only be undertaken (or at least implemented) by 
governments which possess the political will to eliminate torture and 
which it may be supposed are not involved in the clandestine use of 
torture. Thus, the purpose of the measures is principally to prevent 
the future introduction of torture.
The UN and OAS Conventions give only general guidelines as to the 
type of measures which governments ought to introduce, and do not
specify the precise manner in which these measures should be applied. 
Although certain principles will be of universal validity, there is 
clearly some scope for the influence of social, cultural and
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historical factors within different legal systems. Moreover, the 
conventions appear to envisage the adoption of measures only within 
existing political structures, assuming that the constitutional 
framework of the state itself will not require modification but will 
ensure the effective functioning of any measures introduced. However, 
as we saw in an earlier chapter, if there is insufficient limitation 
of government in constitutional terms, legal and administrative 
provisions can be circumvented with relative ease, and it is therefore 
imperative that the adoption of measures aimed at preventing torture 
should take place within a political system which secures effective 
limitation of government. In view of the widespread philosophical 
rejection of this concept, however, it is highly unlikely that any 
government will accept constitutional reconstruction as being an 
appropriate matter for international law or conventional obligations.
Torture is most likely to occur during detention, and it is in 
this area that legal and judicial safeguards are most important, both 
to prevent torture arising and to provide machinery for investigation, 
complaint and remedial action whenever the preventive measures fail. 
The TO Convention deals with the question of detention in one general 
provision:
"Each State Party shall keep under systematic 
review interrogation rules, instructions, 
methods and practices as well as arrangements 
for the custody and treatment of persons 
subjected to any form of arrest, detention or 
imprisonment in any territory under its 
jurisdiction, with a view to preventing any 
cases of torture.
There is no corresponding provision in the OAS Convention to this 
article, which is based on article 6 of the 1975 UN Declaration. The 
TO Convention does not give any specific indication of the measures 
which would be appropriate in preventing the use of torture during
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detention, but leaves each state party free to decide on the precise 
measures which it will adopt in order to give effect to these
provisions. Guidelines have been laid down in a non-binding 
instrument, the Draft Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, which will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight, but this instrument has not yet been 
adapted. It would have been preferable in view of the importance of 
safeguards in the area of detention if more specific obligations had 
been incorporated in the convention itself, or at least if reference 
had been made to these Principles, but the convention restricts itself 
to imposing a general obligation regarding the adoption of effective 
measures, and this is a significant defect in the convention.
One provision which is aimed at the prevention of torture
concerns the instruction of those who may be faced with the choice of
whether or not to employ coercion. It is important that those who are
liable to find themselves in such a position should be fully aware of
the prohibition on the use of torture, and the UF Convention deals
with this point in the following manner:
"Each State Party shall ensure that education 
and information regarding the prohibition 
against torture are fully included in the 
training of law enforcement personnel, civil or 
military, medical personnel, public officials 
and other persons who may be involved in the 
custody, interrogation or treatment of any 
individual subjected to any form of arrest, 
detention or imprisonment."22
A second paragraph adds:
"Each State Party shall include this prohibition 
in the rules or instructions issued in- regard to 
the duties and functions of any such persons."23
The OAS Convention contains a similar provision.2A The subject
of the training and instruction of those who may be involved in law
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enforcement and detention procedures has attracted. a considerable 
degree of attention, particularly within the United Nations, and it is 
widely felt that the promulgation of codes of conduct can make a
significant contribution to the elimination of torture. This matter 
will be discussed in more depth in Chapter Nine. The provision 
relating to the training of officials has two aspects: firstly, it is
important for those involved in detention to be aware of the 
prohibition on torture so that they are unable to plead ignorance or 
rely on a putative defence of justification, and secondly, there is 
educational value, in that humanitarian attitudes may be encouraged as 
a result of the influence on the individual's moral consciousness. As 
far as the training of military personnel is concerned, of course, 
influences of this kind are likely to be resisted by the military 
hierarchy as being inconsistent with the aims of military training and 
indoctrination which we discussed in Chapter Four. In theory,
however, there should be no objection to instruction in humanitarian
ideals in the course of military training, in view of the absolute
nature of the prohibition on torture.
The draft convention prepared by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights included an interesting proposal which was not retained
in later OAS drafts and has no parallel in the UN Convention:
"In the education programs and through the mass 
media the States Parties bind themselves to 
carry on campaigns on the necessity of
preventing and suppressing torture."2®
This involves much wider goals than the training of public 
officials. It refers to influencing public attitudes by means of 
government propaganda, the promotion of humanitarian ideals in an 
active manner, not only in the normal educational sphere, but also in 
more generalised public education programmes aimed at inculcating an
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awareness of human rights principles. Such a project would, of 
course, be highly ambitious and would require the full support and 
commitment of the government, and the prospects for such government- 
sponsored human rights campaigns are limited, but there is no doubt 
that the role of education in the elimination of torture is of great 
significance.
Preventive measures are not infallible, and when they fail there 
must be effective procedures for the thorough and impartial 
investigation of allegations, resulting in the prosecution of 
torturers and others responsible for torture and in the provision of 
satisfactory remedies for victims. The UU and QAS Conventions in fact 
put more emphasis on this aspect than on prevention, although of 
course the existence of efficient machinery of this nature can 
function as a deterrent to potential torturers. Both instruments 
oblige states to create machinery which will deal effectively with 
incidents of torture which arise, but again the provisions are 
expressed in fairly general terms. The basic and most clearly defined 
provision is aimed at ensuring that acts of torture are actually 
recognised as criminal offences in the domestic law of each state,as 
and that suitable penalties are imposed when the offence has been 
c o m m i t t e d . T h i s  is essential in order to avoid the problems 
experienced in Greece in the 1970‘s, when the absence of a specific 
crime of torture resulted in alleged torturers having to be charged 
with a range of alternative offences such as “insults", “abuse of 
authority" and “bodily injury",2,3 In this connection, it is important 
for the precise scope of the offence to be made clear, and the US' 
Convention thus provides that the offence should include “an attempt 
to commit torture and....an act by any person which constitutes
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complicity or participation in torture. ,,3S’ Attention should also be
drawn to article 3 of the OAS Convention, which defines those "guilty
of torture" as follows:
"The following shall be held guilty of the crime 
of torture:
a. A public servant or employee, who acting in
that capacity orders, instigates or induces the 
use of torture, or who directly commits it or 
who, being able to prevent it, fails to do so.
b. A person who at the instigation of a public 
servant or employee mentioned in subparagraph
(a) orders, instigates or induces the use of
torture, directly commits it or is an accomplice 
thereto."
This provision is similar to the corresponding one in the UN 
Convention, which is, of course, limited to acts "inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity."30 Both
provisions extend to the acts of those who are not public officials, 
but only where there has been some involvement of a public official. 
An alternative OAS proposal was in fact in even wider terms. The 
point at issue here is whether or not only the acts and omissions of 
public officials should be regarded as offences for the purpose of the
convention. While it is important for the crime of torture to be
defined as broadly as possible in domestic legislation in order for
the state authorities to be able to ensure effective and comprehensive
protection, international law is concerned only with acts for which 
the state bears some responsibility, and international procedures are 
intended to come into operation only in such cases.
Another major provision which appears in both instruments 
concerns the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture. This 
involves two separate issues. Firstly, it implies that the use of
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torture cannot be justified in any circumstances: in practice,
torture is often resorted to in response to exceptional conditions,
particularly when there is a threat to national security, but the use
of torture in such situations is contrary to established principles of
international law. Derogation from the prohibition of torture is not
permitted by the general human rights instruments, and the same
principle is re-affirmed in the UN Convention:
"No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, 
whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other 
public emergency, may be invoked as a 
justification of torture."31
The OAS Convention contains a similar provision:
"The existence of circumstances such as a state 
of war, threat of war, state of siege or of 
emergency, domestic disturbance or strife,
suspension of constitutional guarantees,
domestic political instability, or other public 
emergencies or disasters shall not be invoked or 
admitted as justification for the crime of 
torture."3S
The commentary on the original OAS draft made the following
observation:
"Codified public international law, both
worldwide and at the inter-American level, 
limits, by treaties or conventions on human 
rights, the actions of the State in cases or 
situations such as those described, because
experience has proven that in such instances 
there is a marked tendency by the authorities of 
the State to violate basic human rights."
It is clear, then, that torture must remain a criminal offence 
even during a state of emergency, and that the existence of 
exceptional circumstances cannot justify the employment of torture.
The second aspect of the justification issue relates to the
defence of having acted under orders from a superior. In this
connection, the UN Convention states in unequivocal terms:
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"An order from a superior officer or a public 
authority may not be invoked as a justification 
of torture."33
Again the OAS Convention has a similar provision, and again
the original commentary on the article makes a pertinent observation:
"This principle has been fully recognized by the 
most accepted theories of penal international 
law and was defined, at world level, as a 
principle of international law when the 
Nuremberg Statutes were promulgated."
The defence of having acted in pursuance of orders cannot, then, 
exculpate a person accused of torturing.
A further provision aimed at discouraging the use of coercion by
interrogators concerns the inadmissibility of evidence which has been
obtained under duress:
"Each State Party shall ensure that any 
statement which is established to have been made 
as a result of torture shall not be invoked as 
evidence in any proceedings, except against a 
person accused of torture as evidence that the 
statement was made."3B
The corresponding provision of the OAS Convention is article 10,
which states:
"lo statement that is verified as having been 
obtained through torture shall be admissible as 
evidence in a legal proceeding, except in a 
legal action taken against a person or persons 
accused of having elicited it through acts of 
torture, and only as evidence that the accused 
obtained such statement by such means."
Once torture has been recognised as a criminal offence and 
appropriate penalties have been established, it is essential to ensure 
that investigations are carried out whenever there is any indication 
that the offence has been committed, and the UN Convention accordingly 
provides:
"Each State Party shall ensure that its 
competent authorities proceed to a prompt and 
impartial investigation, wherever there is 
reasonable ground to believe that an act of
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torture lias been committed, in any territory 
under its jurisdiction."33
This article precedes the corresponding provision on complaints
by victims because it was felt that the state rather than the
individual should bear the primary responsibility for the prevention
of torture.3-7 While the order of the articles is merely symbolic, it
is important that the state should have a legal obligation to
investigate suspected incidents of torture even when no formal
allegation has been made,33 since it is always possible that victims
will be unable to bring their plight to the attention of the relevant
authorities, either through fear or because death occurs during
torture. The OAS Convention deals with the matter in the second
paragraph of article 8:
"Likewise, if there is an accusation or well- 
grounded reason to believe that an act of 
torture has been committed within their 
jurisdiction, the States Parties shall guarantee 
that their respective authorities will proceed 
properly and immediately to conduct an 
investigation into the case and to initiate, 
whenever appropriate, the corresponding criminal 
process."
While the state has a responsibility to initiate investigations 
whenever there is reason to suspect torture has taken place, it is 
also essential that a victim of torture should have "the right to 
complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially examined 
by" the competent authorities,33 and indeed that other individuals 
and groups having knowledge of torture should be able to bring this to 
the attention of the appropriate authorities. The relevant provision 
of the UIT Convention is actually restricted to the consideration of 
allegations made by victims themselves, although the same limitation 
does not appear in the Draft Body of Principles for the Protection of 
All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. It may be,
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however, that article 12 of the Convention is intended to cover
complaints emanating from sources other than the victims of
violations.
It is, of course, imperative that victims should be allowed to 
bring their complaints before the competent authorities without 
impediment, and for this reason the UI Convention contains a provision 
intended to encourage those having knowledge of torture to come 
forward:
"Steps shall be taken to ensure that the 
complainant and witnesses are protected against 
all ill-treatment or intimidation as a
consequence of his complaint or any evidence
given. ,,4-°
Of course, the effectiveness of investigation procedures will 
depend largely on the will, integrity and authority of those entrusted 
with the task, and if torture has in fact been approved at the highest 
levels of government there may be attempts to influence or frustrate 
the investigators or to stage a cover-up. For this reason, it is 
crucial that the agency responsible for the protection of human rights 
and the conduct of investigations should be entirely independent of 
the government so that it can carry out its duties impartially and 
conscientiously. Moreover, it must have full access to information 
and constitutional authority to take appropriate action. Indeed, it 
should be empowered to undertake investigations on its own initiative, 
without government approval.
The right of a victim to have his case examined refers in the 
first instance to domestic procedures, but if these prove ineffective 
or inadequate, or are exhausted without a satisfactory remedy being 
obtained, the question of international procedures arises. This 
aspect is mentioned in the third paragraph of article 8 of the OAS 
Convention, which states:
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"After all the domestic legal procedures of the 
respective State and the corresponding appeals 
have been exhausted, the case may be submitted 
to the international fora whose competence has 
been recognized by that State."
In a sense, this provision is superfluous, as it merely states 
that international procedures m y  be invoked when they are 
applicable.41 The OAS Convention does not create any new complaints 
procedures relating specifically to torture. The UR Convention, on 
the other hand, establishes several new procedures, including a
petition system whereby a Committee against Torture will be empowered 
to consider communications from or on behalf of individuals claiming 
to be victims of torture.42 However, this procedure requires separate 
acceptance, and will not always be available to victims even when the 
state concerned is a party to the convention. In such circumstances, 
it m y  be that a petition can be submitted to the Human Rights 
Committee under the provisions of the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or, 
alternatively, that regional procedures will be applicable. There
will, however, be situations under both the United Rations and the
Inter-American systems in which it is not. possible for the victim to 
invoke international procedures.
The purpose of such procedures, whether national or
international, is to procure a satisfactory remedy for the victim,
firstly by ensuring that the torture does not continue or recur, and
secondly by providing compensation, at least in cases which involve
public officials. The effects of torture can be extremely damging,
and justice demands that reparation should be mde. Accordingly, the
UR Convention provides:
"Each State Party shall ensure in its legal 
system that the victim of an act of torture
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obtains redress and has an enforceable right to 
fair and adequate compensation, including the 
means for as full rehabilitation as possible.
In the event of the death of the victim as a 
result of an act of torture, his dependants 
shall be entitled to compensation."4-3
The UN Convention is, as we have seen, restricted by the terms of 
the definition of torture in article 1 to acts of torture committed or 
permitted by public officials, and the definition in the OAS 
Convention has the same effect.44- In practice, torture is usually 
perpetrated by officials of the state, and the intention is that the 
state should bear vicarious liability for such acts.
The victim* s right to bring a complaint and to receive
compensation and relief is one aspect of the matter. The other
concerns the torturer. It is imperative that whenever it is
established that an act of torture has taken place, criminal
proceedings should be instituted against those persons alleged to be
responsible, always assuming there exists sufficient evidence in law
to merit a prosecution. This principle is stated in article 10 of the
1975 UK Declaration:
"If an investigation.... establishes that an act 
of torture appears to have been committed, 
criminal proceedings shall be instituted against 
the alleged offender or offenders in accordance 
with national law..."
Article 8 of the OAS Convention has the same effect,4-3 and 
although the UN Convention does not have a provision of this precise 
nature, it does define torture as a criminal offence which states 
parties undertake to punish as well as to prevent.43 It is in this 
connection that the question of jurisdiction arises. The primary 
responsibility of states parties is to ensure that their courts have 
jurisdiction over acts of torture on normal grounds so that
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prosecution can take place, and the relevant provision of the UN 
Convention states:
"Each State Party shall take such measures as 
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction
over the offences referred to in article 4 in
the following cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any
territory under its jurisdiction or on board a
ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of 
that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State 
if that State considers it appropriate.
The normal situation envisaged by the convention involves acts of
torture which have taken place within the territory of a state party,
which institutes criminal proceedings against the alleged torturers.
However, one of the principal objects of both the UN Convention and
the OAS Convention is to define or classify torture as an
international crime, and this essentially involves an extension of
criminal jurisdiction, in accordance with which the authorities of
states parties are empowered to prosecute and punish torturers even
when the act took place in the territory of another state and involved
nationals of another state.AS In other words, the conventions aim to
establish universal jurisdiction. This is effected by article 5,
paragraph 2, of the UN Convention:
"Each State Party shall likewise take such 
measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over such offences in cases where 
the alleged offender is present in any territory 
under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite 
him pursuant to article 8 to any of the States 
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article."*®
The concept of universal jurisdiction is linked to the principle 
of extradition: where possible, the state should extradite an alleged
torturer to any other state which has a preferable claim to
jurisdiction, namely a claim based on one of the grounds listed in
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article 5, paragraph 1, and it is only where there is no extradition
arrangement or for some reason extradition is not requested or granted
that a right to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the alleged
torturer's physical presence in its territory is conferred on the
state. The state in fact has a responsibility to prosecute if it does
not extradite:' states parties to the convention must, therefore,
- either extradite an alleged torturer for trial or alternatively
institute criminal proceedings themselves, exercising jurisdiction on
the basis .of the convention, an approach which has been employed in a
number of other international treaties, notably those relating to
terrorism and hi-jacking. This principle - aut dedere aut judtcare -
is expressed in article 7, paragraph 1, of the UI Convention in the
following terms:
"The State Party in the territory under whose 
jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed 
any offence referred to in article 4 is found 
shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if 
it does not extradite him, submit the case to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution. "so
The UI Convention also lays down a number of rules governing the
apprehension of suspected torturers, providing in article 6, paragraph
1, for example:
"Upon being satisfied, after an examination of 
information available to it, that the 
circumstances so warrant, any State Party in 
whose territory a person alleged to have 
committed any offence referred to in article 4 
is present shall take him into custody or take 
other legal measures to ensure his presence.
The custody and other legal measures shall be as 
provided in the law of that State but may be 
continued only far such time as is necessary to 
enable any criminal or extradition proceedings 
to be instituted."
There must, then, be an immediate inquiry into the facts,®1 and 
the suspect must be assisted in "communicating immediately with the
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nearest appropriate representative of the State of which he is a 
national, or, if he is a stateless person, with the representative of 
the State where he usually resides."®2 States with a claim to 
jurisdiction under article 5, paragraph 1, should be notified that the 
person is in custody, and should be advised of the circumstances which 
warrant detention, and they should subsequently be informed of the 
findings of the preliminary inquiry, and also whether the detaining 
state intends to exercise jurisdiction.®3 This procedure provides an 
opportunity for those states to request extradition, failing which the 
detaining state will be obliged to exercise its residuary jurisdiction 
and bring the accused torturer to trial.
The initial duty imposed by the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare is, as we have stated, to extradite an alleged torturer to 
another state so that he may be tried under the most appropriate legal 
system, and we shall therefore examine this aspect before turning to 
the question of the prosecution of torturers on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction. In this connection, it will be useful to mention some 
of the principles relating to the law of extradition. Extradition is 
in most cases granted only when a treaty of extradition is in force 
between the two states concerned, although in some cases states grant 
extradition on the basis of their internal laws, even when no treaty 
exists. Extradition treaties often exclude "political offences" from 
the scope of their terms, so that a fugitive whose offence can be 
considered political may be able to escape extradition. There is, 
however, no general right of asylum under international law at 
present, though in some situations expulsion may be contrary to 
international law, with the result that a constructive right of asylum 
may be constituted.
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With, a view to facilitating the apprehension and extradition of
suspected torturers, the UK Convention makes the following provision:
"The offences referred to in article 4 shall be 
deemed to be included as extraditable offences 
in any extradition treaty existing between
States Parties. States Parties undertake to 
include such offences as extraditable offences 
in every extradition treaty to be concluded 
between them." ®‘£l-
The effect of this provision is to ensure that, as far as states
parties are concerned, alleged torturers should always be extradited
to the state which has the closest connection with the offence (and
thus the most valid claim to jurisdiction), provided there is an
extradition treaty in existence. Moreover, it is further provided:
" If a State Party which makes extradition \
conditional on the existence of a treaty
receives a request for extradition from another 
State Party with which it has no extradition 
treaty, it may consider this Convention as the 
legal basis for extradition in respect of such 
offences. Extradition shall be subject to the 
other conditions provided by the law of the 
requested State."®0
Thus, even when no formal treaty is in force, states parties may
rely on the convention as an implied extradition agreement between
them on the basis of their mutual acceptance of its provisions.
States parties are empowered,®® therefore, even in the absence of an
extradition treaty, to extradite an alleged torturer to another state
party which has a preferable claim to jurisdiction, and the scope of
the provision is further extended by a third paragraph, which adds:
"States Parties which do not make extradition 
conditional on the existence of a treaty shall 
recognize such offences as extraditable offences 
between themselves subject to the conditions 
provided by the law of the requested State."®7-
On the basis of the foregoing provisions, it should always be 
possible for one state party to extradite to another, thus
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facilitating the prosecution of torturers. The importance of these 
provisions lies in the fact that evidence of torture will in general 
be more readily available in the state in which the offence was 
committed rather than in a state in whose territory the torturer 
happens to be, perhaps quite fortuitously, and which may otherwise 
have very little connection with the matter. It is clearly preferable 
that the trial should be held in the state where the torture took 
place, but if this is not possible, for example if it is a non­
contracting state with which the state party has no extradition 
arrangement, the jurisdiction of another state party having some 
alternative connection (namely, the nationality of the torturer or 
victim) should be preferred. Accordingly, it is provided in the TO 
Convention:
"Such offences shall be treated, for the purpose 
of extradition between States Parties, as if
they had been committed not only in the place in 
which they occurred but also in the territories 
of the States required to establish their
jurisdiction in accordance with article 5, 
paragraph 1."
The overall effect of article 8 of the UK Convention is to permit 
(and, except under paragraph 2, require) extradition from a state 
party in whose territory a suspected torturer is apprehended to 
another state party which has a better claim to jurisdiction. Of 
course, if there is an extradition treaty with a non-contracting 
state, this will prevail if that state's claim to jurisdiction is 
preferable to the competing claim of a state party. The convention 
does not actually require extradition in every instance, but if a
request for extradition is for any reason refused, the requested state 
immediately comes under an obligation to institute criminal
proceedings against the alleged torturer in terms of article 5,
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paragraph 2, and article 7, paragraph 1, of the convention. The same 
applies if no request is made.
The purpose of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare is to 
ensure that no 'safe haven' is available within the territory of any 
state party,S3 and the provision is primarily obligatory rather than 
permissive. In general, however, states parties will be obliged to 
extradite, either in terms of article 8 of the convention, which 
covers the question of extradition between states parties fairly 
comprehensively, or under separate extradition arrangements with non­
contracting states, and they may be expected to comply with these 
obligations. The main significance of the principle of aut dedere aut 
judicare lies, then, in the relationship between contracting and non­
contracting states which have no extradition arrangements (assuming it 
is not passible to extradite to another state party under the terms of 
the convention): in such circumstances, a state party which
apprehends a suspected torturer will be obliged to institute criminal 
proceedings against him on the basis of universal jurisdiction. The 
same applies, of course, if extradition is for any reason refused in 
spite of an obligation to extradite.
While the principle of aut dedere aut judicare is essentially 
obligatory in nature, the concept of universal jurisdiction is also 
permissive: the right to exercise jurisdiction purely on the basis of
physical custody of the accused is in fact the essential factor in 
categorising torture as an international crime. Again, the 
significance of universal jurisdiction lies largely in the 
relationship between contracting and non-contracting states which have 
no extradition agreement, as states parties will normally wish to 
extradite to other states which have a preferable claim to
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jurisdiction. When extradition is not possible, universal
jurisdiction enables states parties to institute proceedings even 
though the offence was committed in the territory of another state and 
involved nationals of another state.
We have assumed that extradition will normally be preferable to 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction, but in fact this may not be 
the case: since torture is usually authorised by governments, it may
actually be undesirable to return an alleged torturer to his own 
country, because this may have the effect of allowing him to escape 
punishment. In other words, a repressive regime may seek extradition 
of one of its officials, not for the purpose of punishing him, but 
rather to prevent his prosecution in the other state. In these 
circumstances, which may arise even between states parties to the 
convention, the requested state may prefer to refuse to grant 
extradition and institute criminal proceedings itself on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction. It is in such cases, whether or not there is 
an extradition treaty, that the principle of universal jurisdiction is 
of greatest significance, and it is in this somewhat limited sphere 
that the use of torture by regimes which refuse to ratify 
international conventions can be tackled through international law.
It should be noted that the terms of the US' Convention are 
unclear on the question of universal jurisdiction: article 7,
paragraph 1, imposes an obligation to prosecute "in the cases 
contemplated in article 5", and article 5, paragraph 2, establishes 
jurisdiction where the state party "does not extradite.... pursuant to 
article 8", but article 8 applies exclusively to extradition 
arrangements between states parties, and it might be inferred that 
universal jurisdiction can only be assumed by a state party when
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extradition is not granted to another state party which has a claim to 
jurisdiction, and not when only a non-contracting has such a claim; 
in other words, universal jurisdiction may apply only if at least one 
state party has a claim to jurisdiction and extradition to that state 
is not granted. On the other hand, it can be argued that if no other 
state party has a claim to jurisdiction, extradition cannot take place 
"pursuant to article 8", so that universal jurisdiction can be 
exercised, and article 6 seems to indicate that any suspected torturer 
may be apprehended with a view to being either extradited or 
prosecuted. It is clear in any event that the effect of the 
convention would be seriously compromised if the principle of 
universal jurisdiction were to be limited to cases involving only 
states parties: in general, it may be anticipated that those states
which ratify the convention will be prepared to extradite to other 
states parties, with the result that prosecution on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction would be virtually non-existent. A restrictive 
interpretation of the convention would actually prevent states parties 
from exercising jurisdiction in situations where extradition to a non­
contracting state is not granted, and would in effect create safe 
havens within the territory of states parties for torturers from those 
very states which are otherwise beyond the scope of the provisions. 
It would, however, be possible for a state party to prosecute on the 
basis of universal jurisdiction in some circumstances where a non- 
contracting state has a claim to jurisdiction but no extradition 
agreement is in force: for example, if torture takes place in a non-
contracting state and is perpetrated by a national of that state, but 
the victim is a national of a state party, a second state party which 
apprehends the torturer can establish jurisdiction if it does not
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extradite to the first state party, since it has "not extradited 
pursuant to article 8". It seems unreasonable, therefore, to assert 
that jurisdiction cannot be exercised simply because the victim is not 
a national of a state party, that is where there is no connection with
any state party. To accept this would limit the application of
universal jurisdiction to cases involving at least one state party 
with a claim to jurisdiction. It must be assumed, then, that the true 
intention of the convention is to establish universal jurisdiction 
over all torturers, so that states parties which apprehend torturers 
and cannot or do not wish to extradite may proceed with prosecution, 
irrespective of where the crime was committed and also irrespective of 
the nationality of the torturer and the victim. The value of the 
convention in fact depends largely on the recognition of torture as an 
international crime in this sense.
There are certain practical difficulties in classifying torture 
as an international crime, and it has been suggested that this is not 
an appropriate course in relation to a crime which is not
international by nature.eo Certainly, there are potential problems in 
the area of evidence,®1 and in view of the fact that it is difficult 
to prove torture at the best of times, the establishment of universal 
jurisdiction might be considered of limited value. The dangers are 
recognised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 7 of the UK Convention, 
which are intended to ensure that the normal standards of justice are 
maintained.®2 Article 9, paragraph 1, also acknowledges the problems, 
and encourages co-operation and assistance between states parties in 
the prosecution of alleged torturers, "including the supply of all
evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings."
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In practical terms, no proceedings can be brought under the 
principle of universal jurisdiction unless and until a suspected 
torturer actually enters the territory of one of the states parties to, 
the convention. Thus, while states parties are obliged to prevent 
torture and to ensure that acts of torture are punished when they do 
occur, the practice of torture in non-contracting states, where it is 
more likely to be a result of government policies, is unaffected by 
the convention except in so far as the concept of universal 
jurisdiction permits states parties to take action against torturers 
from non-contracting states. This system is entirely dependent on 
such torturers visiting the territory of a state party to the 
convention. The problems which arise are obvious: firstly, a
sensible torturer can easily avoid travelling to the territories of 
states parties to the convention; secondly, a torturer may visit the
territory of a state party without divulging his true identity; and
thirdly, even if a suspected torturer can be identified and
apprehended, there are substantial difficulties in obtaining 
sufficient proof to ensure a conviction: it is often difficult to
obtain evidence in the country in which torture takes place, as there 
may be no witnesses or medical records to support the victim's 
allegations, but these problems are clearly compounded when trial 
takes place in a country which may have little connection with the 
incident. There are particular problems in identifying those 
indirectly responsible for torture, that is those who authorise it 
without physically participating: even if they can be identified,
political considerations may inhibit a state party from taking action, 
and indeed a visiting dignitary may have diplomatic immunity.
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There are, nevertheless, certain situations in which torturers 
could be apprehended and prosecuted by virtue of the application of 
uinversal jurisdiction,®3 for example where there has been a change 
of regime and former torturers are compelled to flee the country and 
enter the territory of a state party to the convention. Indeed, 
torturers may take the risk of travelling abroad in the belief that 
they will not be identified or, if they are, that no action will be 
taken. Such a situation arose in a case in the United States, in 
which a former Inspector-General of Police from Paraguay was sued in a 
civil action for damages while visiting the United States as a 
tourist,®4- the allegation being that he had tortured and murdered a 
named person in Paraguay. The decision of the district court, which 
was concerned solely with the question of jurisdiction and did not 
examine the facts, was that American courts lacked jurisdiction 
because torture of a foreign national by a national of the same 
country did not violate the statute in question. The Court of 
Appeals, however, reversed this decision, concluding that the district 
court did have jurisdiction (although it did not give an opinion on 
the question of whether the case should be dismissed on the grounds of 
forum non conveniens), and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
The Court of Appeals accepted that in the past a nation's treatment of 
its own nationals had been outwith the scope of international law, but 
asserted that "today a nation has an obligation under international 
law t o . respect the right of its citizens to be free of official 
torture."®® In the opinion of the Court, "certain fundamental human 
rights are now guaranteed to individuals as a matter of customary 
international law."®® In support of this, the Court referred to the 
fact that torture is prohibited in international treaties, and noted
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that no government claims the right to torture its own nationals, 
concluding on that basis that torture is to be considered contrary to 
international law, even in the case of states which are not parties to 
human rights conventions, especially when no dissent or reservation 
has been expressed.67 The fact that the law of Paraguay itself 
prohibited torture and recognised it as a tort was also taken into 
account by the Court.
It is significant that the Court of Appeals was prepared to allow 
jurisdiction to be exercised on these grounds, even though there was 
no convention against torture then in force. Had the United States 
been party to such a convention, of course, criminal jurisdiction over 
the alleged torturer could have been established. It must be borne in 
mind that this was a civil action for damages, and that the alleged 
torturer had clearly failed to anticipate any difficulty in visiting 
the United States, but the case does give an indication of the 
potential benefits of universal jurisdiction. The final outcome of 
the action was somewhat disappointing: although a substantial sum in
respect of damages was awarded in 1983, the torturer had by then 
returned to his own country, and it is unlikely that he will risk 
venturing into American territory in the foreseeable future.e£3
Another illustration of circumstances in which a torturer might 
be apprehended can be seen in the capture of Captain Astiz of the 
Argentinian armed forces on the island of South Georgia by British 
troops during the Falklands conflict in 1982. Various human rights 
groups had previously identified Astiz as having been involved in 
torture during the 1970's, and he was in fact wanted by several 
governments for questioning in connection with the disappearance of 
their nationals in Argentina. However, the situation was covered by
355
the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, which effectively protected 
Astiz, and he was subsequently repatriated. It is unclear what the 
position would have been if the convention against torture had been in 
force and applicable, particularly as the alleged offences had
occurred several years earlier and did not relate to the Falklands 
conflict.
There is a further aspect of extradition which involves not the
torturer but rather potential victims of torture: there is a
principle, first enunciated in article 3, paragraph 2, of the
Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees 1933,
which forbids extradition or return of persons to any country where
they would be in danger of persecution.esi Some authorities on
international law suggest that this principle (non-refoulement) has in
fact become a principle of customary international law, but although
the UR Declaration on Territorial Asylum 1967 supports this
proposition,70 most authorities accept that the right is moral rather
than legal. The UR Convention against Torture, however, expresses the
principle as a legal obligation in relation to torture:
"Ro State Party shall expel, return C'refouler*'')
or extradite a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture."'71
Refoulement is not only prohibited in the case of extradition, 
but in any situation in which a person - not necessarily someone who 
has committed an offence - is in the territory of a state party and is 
liable to be forcibly returned to another country, possibly even when 
he is not lawfully in that territory but is merely seeking asylum.
Article 3 of the UR Declaration on Territorial Asylum states that no
one who is seeking asylum "shall be subjected to measures such as
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rejection at the frontier or, if he has already entered the territory 
in which he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to any state 
where he may be subjected to persecution." This virtually confers a 
right to asylum, although the Declaration is not legally binding, and 
it is extremely doubtful if a legal right to be granted asylum exists 
in international law. As far as the UN Convention is concerned, 
however, states parties are legally bound not to return a person to a 
country where he is in danger of being tortured.
Refoulement is prohibited by the UN Convention where there are
"substantial grounds" for believing that the person in question would
be in danger of being tortured, and it would therefore appear
insufficient simply to show that torture is practised in the state
concerned. The word "would" was actually substituted for the original
"may",'712 indicating that the particular individual must himself be in
real and direct danger. 73 However, it is further provided in article
3 of the UN Convention:
"For the purpose of determining whether there 
are such grounds, the competent authorities
shall take into account all relevant 
considerations including, where applicable, the 
existence in the State concerned of a consistent 
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of 
human rights.1,74
This seems to indicate that the existence of a systematic
practice of torture within a state could be regarded as sufficient 
grounds for invoking the principle of non-refoulement.
The working group which drafted the UN Convention at one stage 
proposed that when a request for extradition is refused on the ground 
of non-refoulementf the refusing state should itself institute
criminal proceedings against the fugitive in respect of the crimes for 
which extradition is sought.76 However, although a number of
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alternative suggestions were put forward, no agreement was reached on 
this matter, and there is no provision in the convention which 
requires states to prosecute in these circumstances. There are 
obvious difficulties in following such a course, although if the 
offence itself is torture the state would actually be obliged to
institute criminal proceedings in accordance with the maxim aut dedere 
aut judicare.
The final paragraph of article 13 of the OAS Convention deals
with non-refoulement as follows:
""Extradition shall not be granted nor shall the 
person sought be returned when there are grounds 
to believe that his life is in danger, that he 
will be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, or that he will 
be tried by special or ad hoc courts in the
requesting State."
This provision seems to be limited to cases involving the
extradition of alleged torturers, and if extradition were to be
refused in such circumstances, the state would of course have to
prosecute under the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. Otherwise,
the article is wider than the corresponding provision in the UN
Convention, as it is not restricted to the threat of torture. Article
15 of the OAS Convention, which was in fact a new provision in the
final text, should also be noted:
"No provision of this Convention may be 
interpreted as limiting the right of asylum, 
when appropriate, nor as altering the
obligations of the States Parties in the matter 
of extradition."
In this connection, attention should be drawn to article 22,
paragraphs 7 and 8, of the American Convention on Human Rights, which
creates a legal obligation to grant asylum:
""Every person has the right to seek and be 
granted asylum in a foreign territory, in
358
accordance with the legislation of the state and 
international conventions, in the event he is 
being pursued for political offenses or related
common crimes. In no case may an alien be
deported or returned to a country, regardless of 
whether or not it is his country of origin, if 
in that country his right to life or personal 
freedom is in danger of being violated because 
of his race, nationality, religion, social 
status, or political opinions.1
In the European sphere, it has been suggested that either 
extradition or expulsion to a country where torture is known to be 
practised might in itself be considered a violation of article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (prohibition of torture), at 
least if there was cause to believe that the particular individual was 
in immediate danger of being subjected to torture on his return.7'® It
has been suggested in the past that extradition treaties between
states members of the Council of Europe and states in which torture 
occurs should be revised in order to take these factors into account, 
and the Committee of Ministers was recommended to establish this 
principle in a European Convention on Extradition. Moreover, in 1967, 
the Council of Europe actually adopted a non-binding Resolution on 
Asylum to Persons in Danger of Persecution, the terms of which do not 
differ materially from those of articles 2 and 3 of the UU Declaration 
on Territorial Asylum.
These, then, are the principal substantive provisions of the UM 
Convention against Torture and the Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture. Both adopt a similar approach, laying 
down international guidelines so that states parties can introduce 
appropriate domestic measures for the prevention and suppression of 
torture and establishing universal jurisdiction in order to tackle 
torture on a broader front than has previously been possible. Both 
instruments are fairly general in expressing the measures which should
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be taken by government, but both endeavour to establish a degree of 
international control over states parties by providing for a system of 
monitoring governments in the implementation of their obligations, and 
in the case of the UET Convention there are also created certain 
procedures for dealing with incidents of torture which do arise.
We have already identified the serious limitations which afflict 
international measures of implementation: firstly, in that regimes
which most require supervision seldom submit to it; secondly, in that 
international authorities are rarely equipped to carry out genuinely 
effective investigation and pronounce binding decisions; and thirdly, 
in that no effective enforcement machinery exists. We have further 
indicated that in view of these limitations the prevention of torture 
must be achieved primarily at national level by means of internal 
safeguards. However, the fact that the effect of existing procedures 
is severely curtailed by the present realities of international 
politics does not necessarily mean that international measures of 
implementation have no value at all; rather, it means that a more 
radical approach is needed in the creation and enforcement of 
international procedures for the protection of human rights. Indeed, 
it is only because of the limitations resulting from international 
political conditions that domestic safeguards assume such 
significance: ideally, the protection of human rights should be
secured at international level, so that objective standards can be 
applied universally. Such a situation is not possible, however, as 
long as the concept of the sovereign state does not permit 
international authorities to exercise effective restraint of national 
governments in the field of human rights. It would be a revolutionary 
breakthrough if procedures could be established which applied
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universally and did not depend upon the consent of each state, hut in 
view of the fact that such a development is highly improbable, the 
most that can realistically be achieved is the fortification and full 
utilisation of the existing range of procedures, so that they will 
have real value in confronting human rights problems as they are 
gradually accepted by an increasing number of states. At the same 
time, however, it is essential for steps to be taken with a view to 
discouraging the use of torture by governments which reject 
international supervision. The question which now concerns us, then, 
is whether the UI and OAS Conventions introduce any novel measures of 
implementation or develop the existing range of procedures into a more 
effective and comprehensive system for the specific purpose of 
preventing torture.
The basic procedure established by both instruments is a
reporting system whereby states parties keep the relevant authorities
informed of the measures which they have introduced in implementation
of their obligation to prevent and punish torture. The OAS Convention
thus provides in article 17 for states parties to n inform the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights of any legislative, judicial,
administrative, or other measures they adopt in application of this
Convention."-7"7 The UH Convention requires states to report to the
newly created Committee against Torture. '7e The relevant provisions
are contained in article 19:
"1. The States Parties shall submit to the 
Committee, through the Secretary-General of the 
United lations, reports on the measures they 
have taken to give effect to their undertakings 
under this Convention, within one year after the 
entry into force of the Convention for the State 
Party concerned. Thereafter the States Parties 
shall submit supplementary reports every four
years on any new measures taken and such other
reports as the Committee may request.
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2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall transmit the reports to all States 
Parties.
3. Each report shall be considered by the
Committee which may make such general comments 
on the report as it may consider appropriate and 
shall forward these to the State Party
concerned. That State Party may respond with 
any observations it chooses to the Committee.
4. The Committee may, at its discretion, decide 
to include any comments made by it in accordance 
with paragraph 3 of this article, together with 
the observations thereon received from the State 
Party concerned, in its annual report made in 
accordance with article 24. If so requested by 
the State Party concerned, the Committee may 
also include a copy of the report submitted 
under paragraph 1 of this article."
This article creates a reporting system which is clearly based on 
the similar procedure existing under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.79 The reporting process is, in fact, the 
convention's principal method of ensuring that international 
supervision over states parties is established, and the aim is clearly 
to encourage a constructive dialogue whereby the Committee against 
Torture can support and advise governments in their efforts to prevent 
torture, rather than to expose acts of torture and condemn governments 
for their failure to fulfil their obligations. Ultimately, of course,
the purpose of reporting is to ensure that states parties are taking
steps to eliminate torture, and there is some opportunity for censure, 
both in the general comments transmitted to the state and in the 
annual report, but the scope is somewhat limited, and the main value 
of the system lies in the dialogue between the Committee and each 
government. The effect of the procedure is likely to be very similar 
to that of the reporting system operating under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and it is therefore unlikely 
to have any significant impact on the problem of systematic 
governmental torture.
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The OAS Convention does not specifically create any other 
measures of implementation, but simply refers in general terms to the 
procedures already functioning within the Inter-American sphere.6’0 
The UK Convention, on the other hand, creates three further 
procedures, all of which are intended to come into operation when 
torture has actually taken place. These include inter-state complaint 
and individual petition procedures similar to those established under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 
Optional Protocol and, as with these instruments, separate acceptance 
of the procedures is required.
Article 21, paragraph 1, of the UK Convention permits states 
parties to declare that they recognise "the competence of the 
Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a 
State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its 
obligations" under the convention, but restricts the application of 
the provision to the consideration of communications from states 
parties which have made such a declaration.®1 Procedural rules are 
laid down in sub-paragraphs <a) to (h), the effect of which is broadly 
comparable to the effect of the equivalent procedure created in 
articles 41 and 42 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights which, of course, has not yet been utilised.32 It is 
clear from the small number of governments which have accepted the 
Covenant's inter-state complaint system that governments generally do 
not favour this type of procedure, and in view of the fact that the 
provision in the Convention also requires separate acceptance there 
can be little optimism about its effect on regimes which actually 
utilise torture. The fact that only limited action can be taken in 
any event merely serves to underline this.
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Article 22 of the UI Convention deals with the right of
individual petition, and again the procedure is similar to the
equivalent system already existing under the Optional Protocol.
Paragraph 1 of article 22 states:
“A State Party to this Convention may at any 
time declare under this article that it 
recognizes the competence of the Committee to 
receive and consider communications from or on 
behalf of individuals subject to its 
jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a 
violation by a State Party of the provisions of 
the Convention. lo communication shall be 
received by the Committee if it concerns a State 
Party which has not made such a declaration.,,e®
Paragraphs 2 to 7 contain procedural rules which are essentially 
the same as those applying to the Optional Protocol procedure, and it 
may be expected that the Committee against Torture will act as 
responsibly and to the same effect as the Human Rights Committee has 
done.
The relationship between the procedures created by the UR 
Convention and existing procedures is unclear. It is possible that in 
the future an individual subjected to torture may have the option of 
addressing his complaint to the Human Rights Committee or the 
Committee against Torture, and while it would probably be preferable 
for the specialist agency to deal with the matter, it remains to be 
seen whether the Committee against Torture will in fact be able to 
establish itself as an effective and authoritative body. Its initial 
success will, of course, depend on the states which accept its 
jurisdiction.
The UR Convention does make use, then, of the type of measures 
which are already functioning in international law, applying them to 
the specific issue of torture. It is clear, however, that such 
measures are unlikely to have a significant impact on the critical
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problems, in view of the limited success of the international
procedures presently operating. Certainly, the powers of the
Committee against Torture are no more extensive than those of the
Human Rights Committee in so far as the inter-state and individual
petition systems are concerned. However, the UH Convention does
establish a new procedure of considerable significance in article 20:
"1. If the Committee receives reliable
information which appears to it to contain well- 
founded indications that torture is being
systematically practised in the territory of a 
State Party, the Committee shall invite that 
State Party to co-operate in the examination of 
the information and to this end to submit
observations with regard to the information 
concerned.
2. Taking into account any observations which 
may have been submitted by the State Party 
concerned, as well as any other relevant 
information available to it, the Committee may, 
if it decides that this is warranted, designate 
one or more of its members to make a 
confidential inquiry and to report to the 
Committee urgently.
3. If an inquiry is made in accordance with 
paragraph 2 of this article, the Committee shall 
seek the co-operation of the State Party 
concerned. In agreement with that State Party, 
such an inquiry may include a visit to its 
territory.
4. After examining the findings of its member 
or members submitted in accordance with 
paragraph 2 of this article, the Committee shall 
transmit these findings to the State Party 
concerned together with any comments or 
suggestions which seem appropriate in view of 
the situation.
5. All the proceedings of the Committee 
referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 of this article 
shall be confidential, and at all stages of the 
proceedings the co-operation of the State Party 
shall be sought. After such proceedings have 
been completed with regard to an inquiry made in 
accordance with paragraph 2, the Committee may, 
after consultations with the State Party 
concerned, decide to include a summary account 
of the results of the proceedings in its annual 
report made in accordance with article 24."
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This provision clearly constitutes a major innovation in the 
development of measures for the prevention and suppression of torture 
by international law, as it establishes a general procedure whereby an 
international authority will be empowered to conduct a thorough 
investigation into suspected systematic torture on the basis of 
"reliable information" from any source. Moreover, while the provision 
stresses the importance of securing the co-operation of the government 
involved, and the effectiveness of the system will undoubtedly be 
enhanced when such co-operation is forthcoming, the application of the 
procedure is not dependent on separate acceptance by states parties 
(although article 28 does permit states to opt out), nor does the 
conduct of an inquiry actually require the co-operation of the state. 
It was clearly felt that, in view of the gravity of the problem of 
systematic torture, there had to be a process by which the Committee 
could take action on its own initiative whenever such a situation came 
to its attention. Such a provision is far-reaching, and as such would 
have been liable to discourage governments from ratifying the 
convention had it not been for the escape clause in article 28. 
Unlike the various optional procedures, however, this provision puts 
the onus on governments to specifically reject it, thus increasing the 
moral pressure to accept the procedure. It is easier for 
governments to refrain from accepting optional measures than it is for 
them to positively reject a procedure clearly intended to promote the 
elimination of torture, and it might have been of value to employ the 
same formula in the case of the optional procedures.
Article 20 requires the Committee to seek the co-operation of the 
state in the examination of the information it has received and during 
an inquiry, and indeed "at all stages of the proceedings", but it does
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not appear to prevent the Committee carrying out an inquiry if the 
state refuses to co-operate, although a visit to the territory of the 
state does depend on agreement, for obvious r e a s o n s . T h e  initial 
aim of the procedure is, of course, to achieve a solution through 
dialogue, and co-operation is encouraged by the confidentiality rule, 
but while confidentiality may be important during an inquiry, it is 
essential in view of the adverse effect of confidentiality on the 
ECGSOC resolution 1503 procedure that if torture has occurred the 
Committee should have the right to make its findings public at the 
conclusion of the inquiry, especially if the government fails to take 
appropriate action. It is not clear what steps could be taken if a 
government simply ignored the findings of the Committee, although 
paragraph 5 requires only consultation, not approval for inclusion of 
a summary account in the annual report, and the Committee could 
presumably express public condemnation in this way. Indeed, as such 
public criticism is the only real sanction available to the Committee, 
this course may be the only viable one when a government is found to 
have authorised systematic torture and shows no signs of terminating 
the practice. The Committee should, however, have been specifically 
empowered to censure governments when a violation has been 
established. It would also be valuable for there to be a presumption 
that a government which fails to co-operate has condoned the use of 
torture, and ideally a similar presumption should be extended to a 
failure to ratify the convention, or at least to a refusal to accept 
the procedure, but this is obviously an unrealistic aspiration. In 
fact, while the Committee may be able to utilise the article 20 
process to condemn governments and expose violations, the purpose 
really seems to be the institution of amicable discussions, and it is
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perhaps unlikely that the Committee will utilise the procedure without 
the full co-operation of the government concerned.
The procedure established by article 20 is clearly of great 
significance, as it allows investigation of systematic torture on a 
broad basis, but it remains to be seen haw effectively the Committee 
against Torture can apply it.
One of the most interesting aspects of the inquiry procedure
created by article 20 of the UR Convention is the provision relating
to visits to the territories of states parties. The opportunity to
investigate allegations of torture by this means is a crucial factor
in the detection and prevention of torture by international agencies:
"Experience has shown that on the rare occasions 
when humanitarian bodies have had free access to 
places where people were being held by the
authorities, the number of allegations of
torture and ill-treatment has diminished 
significantly."ee
In 1979, the International Commission of Jurists suggested a 
draft Optional Protocol to the UR Convention which would have provided 
for the creation of a committee of experts with authority to send 
delegates both on a regular and on an ad hoc basis to -any place of 
detention in the territory of .any state party to the Protocol.07 The 
committee would have had wide powers of investigation, and would have 
prepared confidential reports which would only have been made public
if some unresolved dispute had arisen with the government involved.
%
This proposal was based on the success of the methods employed by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, and the idea was adopted, 
although in a rather modified form, in article 20 of the UR 
Convention. In that article, visits do require the agreement of the 
state, since in practice it would normally be impossible to arrange a
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visit without the co-operation of the authorities. It might have been 
useful if the provision had been supported by a presumption that if 
access was refused the government has failed to ensure the prevention 
of torture.
The fundamental aim of the European Convention is to ensure the
prevention of torture and ill-treatment by establishing a system of
access to places of detention. The convention proposes to strengthen
the protection of detainees by creating a European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
empowered to make visits to places of detention within the territories
of states parties in order to examine the treatment of detainees.es
States parties agree to permit such visits by the Committee's
representatives,39 including experts and interpreters,30 and the
Committee may organise both periodic visits and "such other visits as
appear to it to be required in the circumstances."91 The Committee is
obliged to co-operate with the national authorities,32 and must
notify the government of its intention to carry out a visit, but
thereafter its delegates may visit any place of detention without
further intimation.33 The reason for this flexibility is to ensure
'there is no opportunity for a 'clean-up' operation at any particular
location, and while it is obviously still possible for security forces
to take steps to eradicate signs of ill-treatment as soon as they
become aware of the possibility of a visit, the existence of the
procedure itself constitutes a disincentive to ill-treatment. For
this reason, the state is required to provide the following facilities
to the Committee:
"a. access to its territory and the right to 
travel without restriction;
b. full information on the places where persons 
deprived of their liberty are being held;
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c. unlimited access to any place where persons 
are deprived of their liberty, including the 
right to move inside such places without 
restriction;
d. other information available to the Party 
which is necessary for the Committee to carry 
out its task.
In order to ensure that the Committee is able to procure the 
fullest information, it is provided that it may "interview in private 
persons deprived of their liberty"3S and "communicate freely with any 
person whom it believes can supply relevant information.,,£,e Direct 
interviews with and examinations of detainees are clearly an essential 
feature of the procedure, since they are the principal source of 
evidence of ill-treatment.
The system depends, of course, upon the co-operation of the 
government concerned, since access to its territory and to places of 
detention remain under its control, and it is not difficult for the 
authorities to place sufficient obstacles in the way of the Committee 
to frustrate its activities. In fact, article 9 of the convention 
provides that in exceptional circumstances the authorities may make 
representations against a visit "at the time or to the particular 
place proposed" on grounds of "national defence, public safety, 
serious disorder in places where persons are deprived of their 
liberty, the medical condition of a person or that an urgent 
interrogation relating to a serious crime is in progress." While 
paragraph 2 of the same article makes it clear that it is intended 
agreement should be reached to "enable the Committee to exercise its 
functions expeditiously", the provision does seem to give governments 
something of an escape clause. However, within the European sphere 
there is probably sufficient respect for the rule of law to ensure a 
fairly high degree of compliance with the requirements of the
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convention, and if the provision of access can be secured the 
procedure will undoubtedly have a significant effect in preventing 
torture. The value of the system lies in the fact that if free access 
is permitted, there is little possibility of torture and ill-treatment 
remaining undetected, and the threat of exposure will act as a 
deterrent to the security forces.
Having completed its visit, the Committee will prepare a report 
of the facts, "taking account of any observations which may have been 
submitted by the Party c o n c e r n e d . T h i s  report will be transmitted 
to the state party with any recommendations and suggestions for 
improvements considered necessary by the Committee.30 This procedure 
is based on that employed by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross,-5'3 and rather than seeking confrontation it is intended to 
procure a constructive role for the UN Committee based on confidence 
in its impartiality and integrity. For this reason, information 
gathered by the Committee, its report and consultations with the state 
party remain confidential,100 and it is only if the state fails to 
co-operate or refuses to improve the situation that the Committee may 
decide to make a public statement on the matter,101 although it will 
also publish its report if requested by the state.102 The aim of the 
procedure is not, then, primarily to condemn governments and publicise 
the use of torture, and publicity is actually avoided in the first 
instance on the grounds that such an approach puts governments on the 
defensive and is likely to discourage co-operation by antagonising 
them. Ultimately, however, if the procedure fails to ensure the 
protection of detainees, it is essential for there to be some form of 
sanction, and the provision for a public statement fulfils this 
function.
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The provisions of the European Convention are much wider than 
those of the UN Convention in the matter of access to places of
detention, but in view of the high level of compliance with 
international obligations within the European sphere, it is unlikely 
that the more extensive nature of the provisions will have an adverse 
effect on support for the European agreement. On that basis, the 
provision is of great significance, because it permits more direct 
monitoring of states than is otherwise possible, and it also allows
publicisation of torture. The provision of access to places of
detention is a new development which could potentially revolutionise 
the protection of detainees from torture. However, the process still 
requires initial acceptance by governments, and outwith the European 
sphere there is little prospect of similar procedures being widely 
supported. Moreover, the effectiveness of the procedure does depend
on continuing free and immediate access to every place of detention in 
order to ensure that detainees cannot be transferred elsewhere prior 
to a visit and torture equipment cannot be concealed. If such access 
is possible and detainees can be interviewed and examined, a
commission of inquiry should be able to establish if torture is being 
employed. However, national governments can obviously restrict access 
quite easily, or can at least cause delays which will invalidate the 
whole point of the process, and since it is probable that governments 
which condone torture will employ such tactics, the system needs a 
provision that if any obstacles are placed in the way of the 
commission it may be presumed that torture is being used. Such a 
provision would allow for the establishment of a commission whose 
activities did not depend entirely on the co-operation of governments. 
In the final analysis, however, it must be conceded that a system of
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visits to places of detention in practice will often be unworkable and 
will generally be of limited value, particularly in view of the fact 
that many governments will refuse to submit to such a procedure.
These, then, are the provisions of the three international 
instruments which address the specific issue of torture. The European 
Convention attempts to tackle the problem in one particular area, 
while the UIST and OAS Conventions adopt a much broader approach. Their 
principal contribution to the prevention of torture lies in the 
recognition of torture as an international crime, although this deals 
with only a relatively minor aspect of the issue. Both instruments 
utilise existing types of measures, and the UI Convention does 
introduce a new inquiry procedure, but essentially they contain no 
radical new approach to the problems of governmental torture, and in 
effect they recognise the limitations of international law by 
emphasising the importance of domestic safeguards. In conclusion, 
none of the instruments solves the fundamental problems which face 
international efforts to prevent and suppress the practice of torture, 
in particular the problem of imposing on repressive regimes an 
obligation to submit to international supervision and ensuring that 
effective action can be taken when the prohibition of torture is 
wilfully violated.
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CHAPTER EIGHT; THE PROTECTION OF DETAIHEES
In the last chapter, we concluded that while the recently adopted 
UH Convention and OAS Convention introduce certain novel measures, and 
in particular establish universal jurisdiction over the crime of 
torture, they do not overcome the fundamental difficulties which face 
efforts to deal with the problem of governmentally approved torture 
through international law. Indeed, it is implicitly recognised in 
both instruments that the nature of the international legal system 
seriously impedes the operation of international law in the field of 
human rights, so that in practice the existence of adequate legal 
safeguards at national level emerges sis the critical ' factor in the 
protection of fundamental human rights. In other words, the 
instruments accept that in practical terms the control and restraint 
of state authorities can only be achieved within the context of 
national legal frameworks. Both instruments accordingly encourage the 
adoption of effective measures within the legal system of each state, 
and while they endeavour to establish international supervision over 
governments in their implementation of the obligations created, they 
recognise that it is in the domestic sphere that action must be taken 
if the practice of torture is to be eliminated without a radical re­
structuring of the existing international legal system based on state 
sovereignty. Apart from laying down a number of general principles, 
however, they do not give any-indication of the measures which should 
be adopted, thus leaving each government free to decide on the 
appropriate form of safeguards. This is an unfortunate omission, 
because the inclusion of more definite guidelines would have been
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beneficial. In this chapter we shall endeavour to identify some of 
the measures which might have been specified.
We have previously indicated that the elimination of torture by 
means of internal measures involves action on two levels, firstly on 
the constitutional plane, where there must be effective limitation of 
government, and secondly in the legal sphere, where there must exist 
adequate safeguards for the protection of detainees. The
effectiveness of such safeguards is ultimately dependent on efficient 
constitutional restraint of government, but interference in 
constitutional arrangements is not currently a function enjoyed by 
international law, and in this chapter we shall assume a basic degree 
of limitation of government and concentrate on the question of legal 
and procedural safeguards for the protection of detainees. The use of 
torture occurs almost invariably during some form of detention, and it 
follows that a major factor in the elimination of the practice of 
torture is the creation and enforcement of effective safeguards in 
relation to the procedures of arrest, detention, trial and 
imprisonment. It is, therefore, primarily in these areas that 
governments must take "effective legislative, administrative, judicial 
or other measures to prevent acts of torture."1 This was recognised 
by the United Nations in 1975 when the whole question of torture was 
first under serious consideration, and the Commission on Human Rights 
was requested by the General Assembly to formulate a Draft Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment. This instrument, which has not yet been 
adopted,2 lays down specific guidelines on the measures which promote 
the effective protection of persons deprived of their liberty. 
Although it is not intended to create legally binding obligations, its
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provisions are highly significant, and the value of the UN Convention 
would have been enhanced by the incorporation of a reference to the 
principles. In fact, the principles may be read in conjunction with 
the convention, as they clearly express the type of measures envisaged 
by it, and while the principles will not be legally binding, they do 
establish standards for the guidance of governments in the 
implementation of their obligations under the convention, and it is 
likely that the Committee against Torture will take note of them when 
studying state reports. Ideally, the principles should also be 
binding, but we have seen that the value of an international 
obligation to adopt domestic measures depends ultimately on the 
political will of the national government concerned: where such a
will exists, the government may be expected to refer to the principles 
voluntarily, whereas if no political will exists, it is unlikely that 
the imposition of a legal obligation would be of any real effect. 
Nevertheless, it is regrettable that the relationship between the 
Draft Body of Principles and the UN Convention has not been clearly 
stated.
Before we proceed to an examination of the Draft Body of 
Principles, attention should be drawn to the work of the UN Sub- 
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, which has been involved in the preparation of most of the 
instruments which deal specifically with the problem of torture and 
indeed has spent considerable time and effort in examining an agenda 
item entitled 'Question of the Human Rights of Persons Subjected to 
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment' . In 1981, the Sub-Commission 
set up a working group on detention to consider this matter in greater 
detail, and in its first report the working group highlighted a number
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of areas of concern.3 Subsequently, the Sub-Commission adopted in 
resolution 1982/10 certain principles in relation to detention, many 
of which echo the sentiments of the Draft Body of Principles. In 
1983, moreover, the working group produced further recommendations, 
for the most part based on the study of states of emergency by Mrs 
Questiaux,* many of which were adopted in Sub-Commission resolution 
1983/30. Reference will be made to these resolutions where 
appropriate.
There is some duplication in the various instruments which have
been adapted or are still under consideration by the United Nations,
and although this is inevitable to some extent, the co-ordination
might have been better. The Swedish government made the following
comment on the Draft Body of Principles:
"To a large extent, these draft principles 
reproduce, although often in an amended form, 
principles which can already be found in other 
human rights instruments."®
In fact, the principles are more specific and detailed than the 
existing instruments dealing with torture, and it is because they in a 
sense interpret and particularise the provisions of these instruments 
that the principles are of such significance. The Draft Body of 
Principles is not a code of conduct, and does not refer to any 
particular profession, although it does contain certain principles 
which appear, albeit with a different emphasis, in codes of conduct 
and other international instruments. The primary function of the 
Draft Body of Principles is to deal in a comprehensive manner with the 
whole question of safeguards in the field of detention, and while its 
purpose is not limited to the prevention of torture, this is clearly 
its principal objective. The adoption of the principles will be a 
notable step in the development of international measures against
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torture, not because it will have any direct impact on governmental 
torture, but rather because it will provide a clear set of guidelines 
which will add a degree of precision and clarity to the somewhat vague 
terms of the UN Convention, and will establish norms against which the 
progress and sincerity of governments can be assessed. As we have 
indicated, it would have been preferable if the convention had made 
specific reference to the Draft Body of Principles, as this would have 
conferred greater authority on the principles.
Certain terms employed in the Draft Body of Principles are 
defined: "arrest" means "the act of apprehending a person under the
authority of law or by any compulsion by any authority"; "detention" 
is "the period of deprivation of personal liberty from the moment of 
arrest up to the time when the person concerned is either imprisoned 
as a result of final conviction for a criminal offence, or released"; 
and "imprisonment" means "deprivation of personal liberty as a result 
of final conviction for a criminal offence". The term "judicial 
authority" is also effectively defined, in Principle 3, as an 
authority "under the law whose status and tenure should afford the 
strongest possible guarantees of competence, impartiality and 
independence".
A number of basic principles of a fairly general nature are laid
down in the Draft Body of Principles, and the fundamental axiom is
stated in Principle 1:
"All persons under any form of detention or 
imprisonment shall be treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person."
This principle, which is based on paragraph 1 of article 10 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, expresses 
the sentiments underlying the Draft Body of Principles, the overall
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aim of which is to ensure respect for the doctrine of humanity. This 
is supplemented by Principle 4, which provides that the principles are 
to apply to all persons without distinction of any kind,e but does 
not preclude the special protection of certain vulnerable categories.7 
Provisions of this nature are generally incorporated in international 
human rights instruments.e
Principle 5 specifically prohibits torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of detained or imprisoned
persons, rejecting any putative justification of such practices:
"No person under any form of detention or 
imprisonment shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. No circumstance whatever may be 
invoked as a justification for torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.,,£>
No definition of the terms employed is provided, but the word
"torture” would appear to have the meaning attributed to it in the
1975 UN Declaration, reference to which is made in a footnote. The 
prohibition of torture is, of course, a general principle of human 
rights which is recognised and incorporated in all the major 
instruments. Principle 19, paragraph 3, is also relevant in this 
connection:
"No detained or imprisoned person shall, even 
with his consent, be subjected to any medical or 
scientific experimentation which may be 
detrimental to his health."10
Principle 2 provides that the fact that rights do not appear in 
the Draft Body of Principles, or are restricted therein, does not 
permit the curtailment or annulment of these rights if they are 
recognised in the domestic law of any state.11 This is to ensure that 
the instrument is not invoked as a justification for limiting existing 
rights.
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Principle 6, paragraph 1, states:
"States shall prohibit by law any act contrary 
to the rights and duties contained in these 
Principles, make any such act ■ subject to
appropriate sanctions and conduct impartial
investigations upon complaints."
The purpose of this provision is to encourage governments to give 
legal substance and authority to the principles, which can only be 
fully effective in the prevention of human rights abuses if they are 
activated by adoption into the positive law of states. The principle 
is stated as an obligation, but it has been observed that the 
imposition of such an obligation is incompatible with the "informal 
and advisory nature of United Nations guidelines", and it has been
suggested that the text should merely indicate that governments ought
to take account of the principles in the formulation of their domestic 
laws.12 However, while it is true that the Draft Body of Principles 
is intended to provide a non-binding code of safeguards, the principle 
of incorporating safeguards in national laws and practices is an 
essential aspect of human rights protection, and it is desirable that 
the importance of such action should be stressed. In fact, it is not
unusual for non-binding instruments to express their provisions in
imperative terms, and indeed most of the principles contained in the 
Draft Body of Principles are framed in a similar fashion. The effect 
of paragraph 1 of Principle 6 is, therefore, simply to emphasise that 
if states wish to ensure that the principles are respected, they must 
invest them with the force of positive law, so that appropriate action 
can be taken when they are violated.
Paragraph 2 of Principle 6 has also attracted criticism. It 
provides:
"A person who has reliable knowledge of any such
violation shall report the matter to the
superiors of the authorities or other persons
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concerned with the arrest, detention or 
imprisonment and, where necessary, to
appropriate authorities or organs vested with 
reviewing or remedial powers."
Article 8 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials is 
referred to, but the principle stated here is much wider than the 
corresponding provision in that Code, imposing upon every individual 
an obligation to report to appropriate authorities any violation of 
the principles contained in the Draft Body of Principles. A number of 
states have voiced objections to this provision, suggesting that the 
duty should be imposed only in the case of a public official,13 or a 
"law enforcement officer or correctional officer".1-1. Doubts have been 
expressed regarding the practicability of requiring private 
individuals to report on violations which have come to their
attention,15 and indeed it is questionable whether it would be
competent to create such an obligation in a set of international
guidelines for states, but on the other hand it has been suggested 
that the provision should be expressed in terms of a governmental 
obligation to penalise those who violate the principles and to require 
individuals to report any violation to the authorities.15 It would 
also be possible to impose an obligation on states to permit
individuals to report violations. Of course, whether the individual 
has a duty or a right to report, it is only relevant to the extent 
that the violation in question is recognised as a specific criminal 
offence in the law of the particular state. In other words, the
principle which has been violated must be legally enforceable under
domestic law so that the appropriate authorities are able to take 
action on the basis of the information which they have received.
The purpose of Principle 6 as a whole is to ensure that 
violations of the principles are brought to the attention of the
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appropriate authorities and thereafter fully investigated so that 
effective remedial action can be taken. It is important that the 
authorities conduct a thorough and impartial investigation whenever 
there is reason to believe that a violation has taken place, and this 
is the effect of paragraph 1 of Principle 6, which may be compared 
with article 12 of the U$ Convention. The obligation of the 
individual, whether legal or moral, is subsidiary to the 
responsibility of the state, which is required to take action when a 
violation is reported. The individual seems to have no further role 
after bringing the matter to the attention of the authorities, and 
there is no indication of what steps might be taken if no remedy were 
forthcoming or if the principle in question were not expressed as a 
legally enforceable right in the law of the state. It might, 
therefore, have been of value to confer on individuals a right, if not 
an obligation, to pursue the matter further in such circumstances. 
However, the right to petition an international authority would 
require enforcement machinery which is not appropriate in view of the 
non-binding nature of the Draft Body of Principles, which in fact 
assumes that both the state and the individual will fulfil their 
respective obligations.
The remainder of the principles contain more specific provisions 
regarding the creation of safeguards intended to ensure the fullest 
degree of protection for persons deprived of their liberty. ¥e have 
associated the practice of torture with detention, especially 
prolonged incommunicado detention, and have identified the absence of 
legal rights and procedural remedies during the processes of arrest 
and detention, along with the erosion of adequate supervision by 
independent authorities, as critical defects which facilitate the
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clandestine use of torture by security forces. The Draft Body of 
Principles tackles these problems from a number of angles, and it is 
to this aspect that we shall now turn, bearing in mind that most of 
the provisions apply equally to imprisonment after conviction.1'7
One of the fundamental principles in the protection of detainees
is that the same authority should not be responsible for every aspect
of criminal procedure - arrest, detention, interrogation,
investigation, prosecution, judgement, implementation of sentence,
investigation of complaints and so on. There must be a separation of
functions in order to avoid a conflict of interests, and in particular
the government must not be able to manipulate the entire process to
its own ends. Several functions may be performed by a single agency
without prejudicing the position of detainees, so that in practice
there will often be overlapping of varying forms and degrees, but
certain functions must be kept separate in the interests of justice,
and Principle 8 deals with this point:
"The authorities responsible for arresting the 
suspect and keeping him in detention shall as 
far as possible be distinct from those entrusted 
with the investigation of the case. Both
authorities shall be under the control of a
judicial or other authority."
The first sentence raises certain difficulties, because in many 
countries the police are in fact responsible for the initial 
investigation as well as for arrest and detention, 10 and it may be 
that a complete distinction of these particular functions is not 
essential.'1'3 On the other hand, it has been proposed that the
authorities involved should be independent as well as distinct,^-0 and
it has also been suggested that the staff of places of confinement 
should to the greatest extent possible be distinct from the 
authorities carrying out the investigation.31 Essentially, the
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purpose of Principle 8 is to ensure the welfare of detainees during 
the dangerous investigation stage, when interrogation takes place, and 
it aims to achieve this by keeping the investigating agency and the 
detaining authority separate. In effect, the detaining authority 
would be responsible for the protection of detainees and might be 
required to play an active role in the protection of human rights by 
monitoring interrogation procedures and intervening when necessary in 
order to prevent excesses and abuses. It can thus be seen that the 
separation of the two authorities could have a beneficial effect in 
the protection of detainees. The same goal might be achieved in other 
ways, for example by having independent observers present during 
interrogation, but the important point is that the detainee should 
never be left entirely at the mercy of the security farces or any 
other agency. In most legal systems, however, the protection of 
detainees is not ensured directly through such a separation of 
functions, and often the only remedy of the individual is to petition 
the courts. Overall supervision of detention by a judicial or other 
authority is essential at all times, and the second sentence of 
Principle 8 recognises this, but it is undoubtedly also important for 
the various functions relating to arrest, investigation and detention 
to be kept under the control of distinct agencies as far as is 
practicable.
An interesting proposal put forward by the United States delegate 
suggested that the distinction ought to be between the 
arresting/detaining authority and the prosecuting agency.2:2 The idea 
is that the police would arrest and detain the suspect, and could 
carry out the initial investigation, but the decision to prosecute, 
the assimilation of evidence and the conduct of the trial would be the
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responsibility of a different agency, the rationale being that this 
would counteract any temptation on the part of the security farces to 
attempt to extort evidence or a confession in order to make sure of a 
conviction. However, even if the roles were kept distinct, there 
might still be a tendency for the security forces to be over-zealous 
in procuring evidence for submission to the state prosecutor, and it 
would therefore still be valuable to retain some form of independent 
supervision of detention. Indeed, the optimum solution appears to lie 
in a separation of all three functions - detention, investigation and 
prosecution. Each of these, of course, involves the defence of law 
and order, and it is always possible for collusion to arise, but the 
more responsibility is diversified, the less probability there is of 
this occurring.
Fundamental to the effective protection of the individual during 
detention is the existence and effective operation of an independent 
authority specifically charged with the task of ensuring that the 
legal rights of detainees are not circumvented and that no one is 
subjected to any form of ill-treatment. This authority must carry out 
its duties conscientiously and must have real power to exercise 
supervision and secure compliance with its orders, supported by 
constitutional arrangements which prevent governmental interference. 
Effectively, this requires the operation of some form of 
constitutional limitation of government, but as we have seen this 
question is not dealt with in the Draft Body of Principles.
The protection of detainees has in many countries been entrusted
to an independent judiciary, and Principle 3 reflects this:
"Any form of detention or imprisonment and all 
measures affecting the human rights of a person 
under any form of detention or imprisonment 
shall be ordered by or be under the effective 
control of a judicial or other authority under
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the law whose status and tenure should afford 
the strongest possible guarantees of competence, 
impartiality and independence..."23
It should be stressed that the judicial supervision of detention 
does not refer only to an initial approval of the lawfulness of the 
detention, but requires a continuing and perpetual monitoring of both 
the lawfulness and the conditions of detention.24 While the 
separation of functions can assist in the protection of detainees, 
there has to be an authority with ultimate responsibility for the 
protection of detainees, and it is for this reason that Principle 8 
provides that both the arresting and the detaining agencies must be 
under the control of a judicial or other authority. This authority 
must have the capability of securing the release of any detainee who 
is being held unlawfully and of ensuring the protection of any 
detainee who has been or is likely to become a victim of a violation 
of human rights, whether the detention is lawful or not. It must, 
therefore, have constitutional status and genuine power to enforce 
compliance with its orders.
The independence of the authority from the government is a 
critical factor, as this avoids a conflict of interests and encourages 
impartiality. It would have been useful in this connection if the 
Draft Body of Principles had indicated that military tribunals and 
courts are unable to guarantee satisfactory protection for detainees 
under their jurisdiction because of their lack of real independence 
from the government, so that in all cases involving civilians the 
jurisdiction of civil authorities ought to be retained, even if 
martial law is to apply, at least when political offences are 
concerned. This matter is, in fact, dealt with in resolution 1982/10 
of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities, which recommends:
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"...that the principle that military 
jurisdiction should be limited to military 
offences and personnel should not be waived even 
in states of emergency, that accused persons 
brought before military tribunals should have 
independent legal defenders and that there 
should be a right of appeal to a civilian court 
against severe sentences..."2®
The effectiveness of supervision of detention depends on the
independence of the supervising authority, and if for any reason that
independence is neutralised or curtailed, serious doubts will be cast
on the authority's ability and will to uphold the legal rights of
detainees. On the other hand, if an authority which is specifically
given the task of protecting human rights enjoys independence and
genuine power and carries out its duties in a diligent and
conscientious manner, effective protection can be achieved. A number
of the principles rely for their effect on the idea of the independent
authority capable of taking effective action, and the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has in
fact made a special study of this matter.2®
Detention should, of course, always be in accordance with the
relevant laws,2-7 and it is therefore imperative that the law itself
should clearly recognise fundamental human rights and provide
adequately for their protection. Judicial authorities, however
independent and powerful, can only operate within the strictures of
the laws which they are required to apply, and if the laws of the land
sanction the violation of internationally recognised human rights,
the judicial role will be nullified. For this reason, core rights
must be guaranteed constitutionally in such a way that they cannot be
suspended or annulled in any circumstances. If this is the case, then
a strong independent judiciary will be in a position to ensure the
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effective protection of detainees. If, however, the government is 
able to circumvent constitutional guarantees, the protection of human
rights cannot be ensured. The effectiveness of the judiciary, then, 
depends ultimately on factors outwith the scope of the Draft Body of 
Principles, namely the establishment of constitutional arrangements 
which ensure the irrevocable recognition and legal protection of 
fundamental human rights. nevertheless, the existence of an
independent authority with specific responsibility for the supervision 
of detention and adequate powers to undertake this responsibility, is 
the single most important factor in the protection of detainees.
A number of principles relate to the safeguards which should
apply to the process of arrest and detention. Principle 10, for
example, states:
"Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at 
the time of his arrest, of the reasons for his 
arrest and shall be promptly informed of any 
charges against him or the grounds for his 
detention.,,:2:0
This is a precautionary measure against arbitrary arrest, freedom 
from which is a right recognised in article 9 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political lights.39 Principle 12 adds a further 
safeguard:
"A detained or imprisoned person shall 
immediately be provided, by the authority 
responsible for his arrest, detention or 
imprisonment, with information as to and an 
explanation of his rights and obligations 
relating to his arrest, detention or 
imprisonment and how to avail himself of his 
rights."30
The purpose of this provision is to ensure that detainees are 
made aware of their rights so that they are able to bring any 
procedural irregularities or ill-treatment to the attention of the 
appropriate authorities. It is obviously important that detainees
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should have some knowledge of the rights and remedies available to
them, since otherwise they may through simple ignorance fail to avail
themselves of the procedures which are intended to secure their
protection. In this connection, Principle 13 deals with the question
of language difficulties:
"From the moment of his arrest or as soon as 
possible thereafter, a detained person who does 
not adequately understand or speak the language 
used in proceedings at which he is present is 
entitled to have the free assistance of an 
interpreter. If the furnishing of free
assistance of an interpreter meets with 
insurmountable technical or financial 
difficulties in a given State, provision shall 
be made to enable a detained or imprisoned 
person to avail himself of the services of an 
interpreter.1,31
This provision conflicts with the terms of article 14, paragraph 
3(f), of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 
the second sentence of Principle 13 has in fact attracted some 
criticism.32
A further procedural safeguard is the practice of making every
arrest and detention public, and the importance of this principle has
been recognised on several occasions by the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: for
example, it is provided in paragraph 2 of Sub-Commission resolution
1982/10 that "the names of detainees should be publicly announced."33
Principle 14 of the Draft Body of Principles is in similar terms:
"Immediately after arrest and after each 
transfer from one place of detention to another, 
a detained or imprisoned person shall be 
entitled to notify or to require the authority 
concerned to notify members of his family of his 
arrest or detention or of the transfer and of 
the place where he is kept in custody. If a 
detained or imprisoned person is a foreigner or 
a refugee he shall be informed without delay of 
his right to notify or to require the authority 
concerned to notify a consular post or the
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diplomatic mission of his country, or the office 
of the competent intergovernmental organization.
Any such communication so addressed shall be 
forwarded by the said authorities without 
delay."SA
Essentially, this provision is aimed at preventing the problem of 
'disappearances', which have become a common occurrence in certain 
countries: the security forces simply abduct a suspect and then deny
that he is being detained. Of course, the requirement to publicise 
arrests would not overcome this, but where the requirement had 
initially been complied with, it would deter the security forces from 
subsequently refusing to acknowledge the detention. Principle 14 does 
not permit unrestricted communication between the detainee and his 
family, but simply requires that he should be permitted to notify 
members of his family of the fact of his detention and the place of 
detention. The right to communicate with the outside world is, 
however, established in Principles 15, 16 and 17, which we shall
examine in due course.
It is during the initial period of detention that the use of 
torture is most likely to occur, since interrogation usually takes 
place at this time, and Principle 33 accordingly provides that 
detainees should make a judicial appearance at the earliest 
opportunity:
"A detained person suspected or accused of a 
criminal offence shall be brought before a 
judicial or other authority promptly after his 
arrest. Such a person shall have the right to 
make a statement before such an authority 
concerning the treatment received by him while 
in custody. The authority before which the 
arrested person is brought shall decide without 
delay upon the lawfulness and necessity of 
detention. No person may be kept under 
detention pending investigation or trial except 
upon the written order of a judicial or other 
authority. "3S
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The effect of this principle is that an arrested person may not 
be held indefinitely while the security forces make further 
investigations or until a confession can be obtained, but must be 
presented as soon as possible before a judge or equivalent independent 
officer, who must approve in writing any continuation of the detention 
in accordance with the law. If the detention is not lawful and 
necessary, the detainee must be released forthwith. Moreover, if the 
detainee has been subjected to ill-treatment since his arrest, the 
judicial examination gives him an opportunity of making a complaint, 
which should be fully investigated by the judge with a view to 
providing a remedy.3S The role of the judiciary, already established 
in Principles 3 and 8, is thus confirmed in Principle 33.
The practice of incommunicado detention, that is denying 
detainees contact with the outside world and/or access to a judicial 
authority, especially in the immediate post-arrest period when
interrogation takes place, has been strongly criticised by the Sub- 
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of.
Minorities, whose working group on detention indicated in its first
report that "nothing could justify such detention, and even if there
were exceptional cases in which a justification could be found, such 
detention should in no circumstances exceed 24 hours. The Sub-
Commission itself reaffirmed these sentiments in paragraph 5 of 
resolution 1982/10, which states that "the practice of holding persons 
incommunicado should be discouraged and should be forbidden for 
periods exceeding 24 hours from the moment of arrest."33 However, by 
minimising the period between arrest and the judicial appearance, 
Principle 33 seems to preclude the use of incommunicado detention 
altogether as far as access to a judicial authority in the immediate
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period after arrest is concerned, although it might be possible for a 
detainee to be held incommunicado after the initial appearance if 
judicial supervision procedures were ineffective.
Principle 9, paragraph 1, of the Draft Body of Principles 
provides:
"Before an order of detention is issued, the 
person concerned shall be given an opportunity 
to be heard. He shall have the right to defend 
himself or be assisted by counsel as prescribed 
by law."35'
Several states have commented that this principle must refer to a 
formal detention order issued in writing by the judicial or other 
authority in terms of Principle 33 in respect of a person who has 
already been arrested, rather than to a warrant for arrest, in which 
case it would be strange and impractical to allow the suspect a 
hearing beforehand.AO The effect of these two principles, then, is 
that there should be a judicial appearance or preliminary hearing as 
soon as practicable after arrest, as indicated in Principle 33, so 
that a judicial authority can determine the lawfulness and validity of 
the detention and decide whether to remand the suspected or accused 
person in custody or order his release. At the hearing, the detainee 
must be given an opportunity of challenging the lawfulness of his 
detention, although there need not be a full inquiry into the matter, 
and he may also complain of any ill-treatment, which should result in 
an immediate investigation.
In those cases in which the judge approves the detention, the 
appearance of the detainee establishes the judicial role at an early 
stage. Thereafter, of course, the judicial or other authority must 
exercise continuing supervision, and this is provided in paragraph 3 
of Principle 9:
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"There shall be a review of the lawfulness and 
necessity of the detention by a judicial or 
other authority ex officio at regular 
intervals."
This provision is designed to ensure that the lawfulness of the
detention will be constantly monitored by the responsible judicial
authority, but should be extended to specifically include the
conditions of detention and the welfare of detainees. Furthermore,
although the provision refers to review at regular intervals, it is
essential that the supervising authority should be able to intervene
at any time and that the detainee or, if he is unable, those who are
prepared to espouse his cause, should have access to the supervising
authority for the purpose of initiating proceedings to secure his
release or to obtain a remedy in the event of his ill-treatment.
These matters are dealt with in Principle 28, paragraph 1 of which
relates to proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of the detention: .
"A detained person, his counsel, or, if the 
detained person is unable to do it himself, a 
member of his family or any citizen who has a 
reliable knowledge of the case shall be entitled 
at any time to take proceedings before a 
judicial or other authority to challenge the 
lawfulness or necessity of his detention and to 
obtain his release without delay if it is 
unlawful.1,41
Paragraph 2, which is expressed in similar terms, relates to
violations of the principles in general, and refers in particular to
complaints of torture or ill-treatment:
"A detained or imprisoned person, his counsel, 
or, if the detained or imprisoned person is 
unable to do it himself, a member of his family 
or any citizen who has a reliable knowledge of 
the case shall be entitled at any time to take 
proceedings before a judicial or other authority 
to prove that he has been subjected to torture 
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
or that he has been denied any other right 
contained in these Principles, and to seek 
relief. "A3:
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These two provisions establish firstly the right of a detainee or 
his legal representative and secondly the right of his family to 
institute judicial proceedings with a view to obtaining a court order 
either procuring his release or ensuring protection of his rights. 
Principle 28 also introduces a third aspect, however, the right of any 
citizen having reliable knowledge of the situation to initiate 
proceedings. Such a provision could clearly have significant 
implications in the protection of detainees, as it would permit non­
governmental human rights organisations to take direct action in the 
courts of the state concerned, but the concept conflicts with accepted 
principles regarding locus standi, and the provision may not be 
retained in the final text.AS This would be rather unfortunate, 
because the protection of core human rights may be considered of such 
magnitude that the interest of the person initiating proceedings 
should be irrelevant, and if human rights groups were permitted to 
become involved in domestic legal processes on this level, the basis 
of protection of human rights would undoubtedly be strengthened.
It should be noted that paragraph 2 of Principle 28 provides that 
the petitioner has to prove that the detainee has been tortured or 
ill-treated. It would seem more appropriate, however, to require that 
a thorough investigation should be carried out when prima facie 
evidence of torture is presented to the judicial authority, since the 
difficulties in proving torture are obvious and the burden of proof is 
an onerous one. In this connection, it has been suggested that two 
additional paragraphs should be inserted in Principle 28, establishing 
the principle that "government authorities holding a person 
incommunicado assume the burden of justifying such treatment and of 
proving that all reasonable measures were taken to prevent that
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person’s illness, injury, disappearance, death, or other harmful 
experiences while detained or imprisoned,”4-4 Proceedings under 
Principle 28 should in any event be "simple, expeditious and at no 
cost", and the detaining authorities "must without delay produce the 
detained or imprisoned person before the reviewing authority."4® It 
is essential that no impediment should be put in the way of judicial 
supervision, so that a remedy can be provided at the earliest possible 
opportunity.
Principle 29 is also pertinent to the question of complaints:
"1. A detained or imprisoned person, his 
counsel, or, if the detained or imprisoned 
person is unable to do it himself, a member of 
his family or any citizen who has a reliable 
knowledge of the case shall have the right to 
make directly and in confidence a request or 
complaint regarding his treatment to the 
authorities responsible for the administration 
of the place of detention and to higher 
authorities.
2. Every request or complaint shall be promptly 
dealt with and replied to without undue delay.
If the request or complaint is rejected, or in 
case of inordinate delay, the complainant shall 
be entitled to seek redress from a judicial or 
other authority."4®
This principle complements, and to some extent duplicates the
terms of paragraph 2 of Principle 28. It refers to an initial
complaint to the detaining authorities, but preserves the right of the 
detainee to take the matter further, again emphasising the crucial 
role of the judiciary or other independent supervising authority.
Ideally, the initial complaint should be sufficient to obtain
satisfaction, but if the situation is not resolved by the detaining 
authorities it is essential that the right of the detainee to appeal 
to an independent authority should not be prejudiced.
The provisions of Principles 28 and 29 give an indication of the 
importance of the right to communicate with the outside world.
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Protection of detainees after a written detention order has been
issued is the responsibility of the judicial authority, and provided
effective supervision is established at that stage and detainees
themselves have access to the supervising authority, it may be
permissible to prevent communication with the outside world. However,
such a practice should be strictly controlled because of the risk of a
breakdown in judicial supervision, and access to the outside world
should be maintained as a secondary safeguard, so that in the event of
the detainee being unable to institute proceedings others can take
action on his behalf. Communication with the outside world refers
principally to the provision of access to a lawyer, and this right is
contained in Principle 15:
"1. A detained person shall be entitled to have 
legal assistance as soon as passible after the 
moment of arrest.
2. If a detained person does not have legal
assistance he shall be entitled to have a lawyer 
assigned to him by a judicial or other
authority, without payment by him if he does not
have sufficient means to pay.
3. A detained person shall be entitled to 
communicate with a lawyer of his own choice 
within the shortest possible period after 
arrest."
Although the judicial examination should normally take place 
promptly after arrest, there will clearly be situations in which a 
time lapse is unavoidable, and it is essential that in this 
intervening period the detainee should have a right to consult with 
his lawyer. The importance of communication with a lawyer at an early 
stage is that the detainee can be informed of his rights by an
independent party who also has specialist knowledge enabling him to 
activate the appropriate legal machinery if the detention is unlawful, 
if there is a delay in bringing the detainee before a judge, or if 
there has been ill-treatment of the detainee. The provision does not,
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however, confer a right to communicate freely with the lawyer, so that 
the detainee might not be protected against torture which took place 
after the initial consultation. Principle 16 is relevant in this 
connection:
"1. A detained person shall be allowed ample 
opportunity for consultations with his counsel.
2. Written messages between a detained person 
and his counsel shall not be censored, nor shall 
the transmittal thereof be delayed.
3. Interviews between a detained person and his 
counsel may be within sight, but not within the 
hearing, of a police or other law enforcement 
official.
4. The right of a detained person to be visited 
by and to communicate with his counsel may not 
be suspended or restricted save in exceptional 
circumstances, to be specified by law, when it 
is considered indispensable by the judicial or 
other authority in order to maintain security 
and good order in the place of detention.
5. The communications between a detained person 
and his counsel mentioned in this principle 
shall be deemed privileged.
While this provision establishes the detainee's right to 
communicate with his lawyer, paragraph 4 contains a significant 
limitation on this right, effectively permitting the denial of access 
to a lawyer in certain circumstances, and although the circumstances 
must be exceptional, this term is sufficiently vague to allow wide 
interpretation. However, the suspension or restriction of the right 
must be authorised by the judicial or other authority, so that the 
prevention of communication would only be possible after the initial 
judicial appearance, when judicial supervision had been established. 
This is a critical proviso, and while Principle 16 in a sense permits 
judicially sanctioned incommunicado detention, the situation should 
not arise in which access to both the judicial authority and the 
outside world is denied. It is imperative, however, that the judicial
405
authority should closely monitor the situation throughout any such 
period.
Principle 17 refers to the complementary right of a detainee to
communicate with members of his family:
"A detained or imprisoned person shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to communicate with the 
outside world, and in particular to be visited 
by and to correspond with members of his family, 
subject to conditions and restrictions to be 
specified by law for the purposes of detention 
and for the maintenance of security and good 
order in the place of "detention.
This right is also subject to limitation, and there is in this 
case no requirement that suspension of the right must be authorised by 
the judicial authority. It is thus left open to the security forces 
themselves to impose restrictions, both before and after the initial 
judicial hearing, and it would have been preferable if the provision 
had required judicial approval. nonetheless, it is clear that the 
circumstances in which the right to communicate with the outside world 
can legitimately be restricted are exceptional, and the effect of 
Principles 15, 16 and 17 together is virtually to prohibit the
practice of preventing contact with the outside world between arrest 
and the initial judicial hearing, and also after detention has been 
approved by a judge, except when it has been specifically authorised 
by him, in which event there should be regular judicial review of the 
situation, and strict monitoring should be established. It is 
especially important that the detainee should make frequent 
appearances before the supervising authority.
The right to communicate with the outside world is of particular 
relevance if judicial supervision is ineffective. It is clearly not 
practical for detainees to make frequent court appearances for the 
purposes of monitoring their condition, and unless arrangements can be
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made far regular visits by judicial representatives or other 
independent agencies, it is possible for security forces to refuse 
detainees access to the courts, and it is in such circumstances that a 
detainee’s lawyer or relatives may be able to take action. Even if 
they are unable to obtain a remedy through the courts, they may be in 
a position to bring the matter to the attention of human rights 
organisations or international authorities. The principle of 
communication with the outside world is very important, then, and has 
been recognised by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities in paragraph 2 of resolution 1982/10, 
which provides that "every person who is arrested or detained should 
be entitled to be visited by members of his family and a lawyer of his 
choice, preferably within 24 hours after arrest and regularly 
thereafter."-50 In effect, this right of access creates independent 
monitoring of the. health and well-being of the detainee, and while it 
is not by an official agency, it provides the opportunity to take the 
matter up with the appropriate authorities.
Principle 25 is of considerable significance:
"1. Places of detention shall be visited 
regularly by qualified and experienced persons 
appointed by a competent authority distinct from 
the authority responsible for the administration 
of the place of detention.
2. A detained or imprisoned person shall have 
the right to talk with the persons who visit the 
place of detention in accordance with paragraph 
1 without the staff of the institution being 
present, subject to the conditions required for 
the maintenance of security and good order in 
the place of detention."51
We saw in the last chapter that this concept of visits to places 
of detention by independent agencies is regarded as one of the most 
valuable methods of ensuring the protection of detainees, and it is 
clear that such a system can create an important safeguard against
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abuses, especially when the detainee is not otherwise permitted 
contact with the outside world. It should be noted that Principle 25 
does not specifically confer responsibility for visits on the judicial 
authority, and in fact the intention seems to be that the responsible 
agency should be separate from the judicial authority as well as from 
the detaining authority, so that the system should be effective even 
when judicial supervision proves inadequate. Of course, the value of 
the system ultimately depends on the agency actually gaining access to 
places of detention on demand and possessing sufficient powers of 
enforcement, but in fact Principle 25 does not confer any real powers 
on the agency responsible for visits, so that it would appear any 
action would have to be taken through the courts. Nevertheless, the 
concept remains an important one, and the Sub-Commission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has endorsed it;®3 
Furthermore, while the detainee's right to communicate with his lawyer 
and his family may be suspended for security reasons, there can be no 
justification for the suspension of visits by an independent agency 
whose specific role is to ensure full respect for fundamental human 
rights, and whose activities cannot be regarded as in any way 
prejudicial to security or the administration of justice.
No specific guidance is given in the Draft Body of Principles as 
to the acceptable length of pre-trial detention, that is detention 
which has been approved by a judicial authority. Certainly, the 
accused should be "entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to 
release",®3 although this concept is somewhat vague and it has been 
suggested that "without undue delay" might be more appropriate.®* As 
far as the prevention of torture is concerned, there does not appear 
to be any objection in principle to fairly lengthy periods of
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detention, provided effective judicial supervision is maintained, but 
obviously it is desirable that trial should take place as soon as 
possible. When detention is ordered far the purpose of further
investigation rather than to await trial (as Principle 33 permits), 
the same principles apply, and detention should be as brief as 
possible in order to minimise the period within which coercion may be 
employed for the purposes of interrogation.
Principle 35 provides for provisional release:
"A detained person suspected or accused of a 
criminal offence shall, except in serious cases 
provided for by law, be given an early 
opportunity to obtain his provisional release, 
with or without financial guarantee or subject 
to other reasonable conditions. No detained 
person shall be denied the possibility of 
obtaining provisional release solely on account 
of lack of financial guarantee."4545
The terms of Principle 7 should also be noted in this connection:
"Persons convicted of a criminal offence shall, 
save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated 
from all other detained persons, who shall be 
subject to separate treatment appropriate to 
their status as unconvicted persons.
When a detainee sustains injury as a result of ill-treatment, 
adverse conditions or the act or omission of a public employee, there 
should be an enforceable right to compensation.457 If death occurs 
during detention or immediately after release, or if a person 
"disappears", an inquiry should be held by the judicial or other 
authority, "either of its own motion or at the instance of a member of 
the family of such a person or any citizen who has a reliable 
knowledge of the case."45’3 Dependants of a person who dies as the 
result of a violation of the principles should also have a right to 
compensation,453 and access to the relevant records should be made 
available for the purpose of a claim.450
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The question of access to records brings us to another important
matter covered by the Draft Body of Principles. It is of considerable
value in the protection of detainees for official records to be kept
throughout each stage of arrest, detention and imprisonment, because
the information can be crucial at a later date. Principle 11,
paragraph 1, thus provides:
"The reasons for and the time of the arrest and 
of taking an arrested person to a place of
custody as well as that of his first appearance 
before a judicial or other authority, together 
with the names of the law enforcement officials 
concerned and the identification of the place of 
custody, shall be duly recorded in such form as 
may be prescribed by law."
While these records will provide an invaluable source of evidence 
for any judicial inquiry, it is also important that copies should be 
made available to the detainee and his legal representative.en 
Principle 11 cavers the period between initial arrest and the 
appearance before a judicial authority, and an accurate record of 
events at this stage is valuable in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
records will disclose whether the detention has been lawfully made and 
whether the detainee's legal rights have been respected, in particular 
by indicating the period of time which has elapsed between arrest and 
the judicial hearing. Secondly, the records may constitute an
essential aspect of evidence of ill-treatment, in particular by 
identifying the officials who were responsible for carrying out the 
arrest and conducting the investigation; indeed, an awareness of
their identifiability may actually inhibit security officers from 
being over-zealous in interrogation. Thirdly, while the significance 
of records does depend on their being accurately and faithfully 
maintained, and it is passible far them to be falsified or even
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destroyed, the existence of alterations or inconsistencies or the
disappearance of the records could raise a presumption that violations 
of the detainee's rights have occurred, and a thorough inquiry could 
be ordered on that basis.
There may be some danger in revealing the identities of law 
enforcement personnel in records to which detainees are to have
access, since this may create some risk of reprisal, and it has 
therefore been suggested that identification symbols such as numbers 
might be more acceptable.03 It should also be noted that records of 
the type referred to in Principle 11 are not in fact kept in a number 
of states, whilst in others a copy is not provided to the detainee.03
Records of the investigation stage are of particular value, since
the use of coercion is most likely to arise during this period, and in
this connection it may be noted that the presumption of innocence is
established in Principle 32:
"A detained person suspected or accused of a 
criminal offence shall have the right to be
presumed innocent until finally proved guilty 
according to law and shall be treated as such by 
all concerned. The arrest and detention of such 
a person pending investigation and trial shall 
be used only for the necessities of the 
administration of justice on grounds and under 
conditions specified by law. The imposition of 
any restrictions upon a person so detained which 
are not strictly required for the purposes of 
the detention or for the maintenance of security 
and good order in the place of detention shall 
be forbidden.
This provision indicates that a period of detention pending
investigation should not be utilised for the purpose of trying to
procure a confession from the detainee, and Principle 19, paragraph 2,
specifically prohibits the use of coercion during interrogation:
"Ro detained person while being interrogated
shall be subjected to violence, threats or 
methods of interrogation which impair his 
freedom of decision or his judgement."
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It is further provided that no detainee “shall be compelled to 
testify against himself",es and that any evidence obtained in 
contravention of the principles (presumably Principles 5 and 19 in 
particular) shall not be admissible in any proceedings against the 
detainee.ss It is clear from these provisions that the use of 
coercion is not permitted by the Draft Body of Principles.
Principle 20 refers to the keeping of records during
interrogation. Paragraph 1 of Principle 20 states:
"The duration of any interrogation and of the 
intervals between interrogations as well as the 
names of the officials who conducted the 
interrogation and of other persons present, 
shall be duly recorded in such form as may be 
prescribed by law."
This provision complements Principle 11, and covers every 
interrogation, whether before or after the first judicial appearance. 
Again, the detainee should have access to the records,e7 which may be 
of particular value in substantiating his allegations of torture or 
ill-treatment. The records would, of course, not only give an account 
of the conduct of the interrogation, but would also assist in the 
identification of those involved, so that proceedings could be taken 
against them.
Medical records are also valuable in establishing whether a
detainee has been subjected to ill-treatment, and the Draft Body of
Principles covers this aspect. Medical attention must, of course, be
provided promptly when required, in accordance with general
humanitarian principles:
"The medical officer at the place of detention 
shall see and examine a detained or imprisoned 
person promptly after his admission and 
thereafter as often as necessary. The official 
responsible for supervising the detention of a 
person needing medical care shall take immediate
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action to meet the needs of the person in
custody for medical attention. "<ss
In addition to providing medical attention when required, then, 
the authorities should ensure that a medical examination is made (or 
at least offered) at the commencement of detention, so that when the 
detainee is released or is given a subsequent check-up, any 
significant deterioration in his health or condition which might be 
attributable to torture or ill-treatment can be detected from a 
comparison of his present condition with the details disclosed in the 
records of the initial examination. Principle 21 refers to a 
mandatory examination of each detainee at the commencement of
detention, and also to the provision of medical care whenever 
necessary, but it does not provide for regular check-ups, and does not 
confer upon detainees a right to demand an examination. In order to
avoid the situation in which the security forces simply prolong the
detention until any signs of ill-treatment have disappeared, then, it 
is important for regular examinations to be available, especially if 
access to the outside world is being denied. While such examinations 
could be carried out by medical officers employed by the authorities, 
it would obviously be preferable for detainees to be examined by a 
doctor of their choice, and Principle 22, paragraph 1, makes provision 
for this:
"A detained or imprisoned person shall also have 
the right to be examined by a physician of his 
own choice available under the existing general 
system of health care, at his request or at the 
request of his counsel or of a member of his 
family, subject only to reasonable conditions to 
ensure security and good order in the place of 
detention and to avoid undue delay in the 
investigation. Me-'
Several states have indicated that they do not in fact permit 
detainees to choose their own doctor, so that examination is carried
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out by an officially appointed medical officer, and this will normally 
be acceptable provided the doctor retains his independence and 
respects the principles of medical ethics70 and does not merely abet 
the security forces in perpetrating violations of human rights. These 
dangers are recognised in Principle 22, which is designed to overcome 
them by providing for access to a doctor of one's choice as the most 
effective guarantee of impartiality, although the proviso does limit 
the right and could have the effect of preventing detainees from
obtaining evidence to support allegations of ill-treatment. Of 
course, if effective judicial supervision is operating, access to an 
independent doctor may not be necessary, and indeed regular 
examinations under the control of the judicial authority may be the 
most effective method of ensuring protection. However, where the 
judicial supervision is not effective, free access to an independent 
medical practitioner provides an additional safeguard complementary to 
the right of access to a lawyer and to members of the detainee's
family.
These, then, are the main provisions of the Draft Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment. There are also a number of miscellaneous 
provisions relating to such matters as the provision of educational 
materials,7"' discipline,7:2 and support for the dependants of
detainees,73 but the greater part of the draft instrument is
concerned with the measures which must be put into effect in order to 
ensure the efficient protection of detained and imprisoned persons 
from violation of'their fundamental human rights. This analysis~has 
concentrated principally on the rights of detainees and the problems 
of their protection rather than on the rights of convicted persons
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simply because the pre-trial period has been identified as the one in 
which there is the highest probability of torture occurring, but it 
should be borne in mind that those serving prison sentences are also 
vulnerable to ill-treatment and are entitled to the same degree of 
protection. Many of the principles do, in fact, apply to imprisoned 
persons. 'yA-
The Draft Body of Principles covers the problem areas which we 
identified in our discussion of states of emergency, and deals with 
the specific dangers which often facilitate the use of torture. The 
purpose of the principles, then, is to indicate the measures and 
safeguards which states must adopt if they wish to ensure the 
protection of detained and imprisoned persons. The implementation of 
these provisions will normally be effective in achieving this goal, 
provided each branch of authority is able to carry out its functions 
without interference from the government. The Draft Body of 
Principles is not intended to resolve questions of constitutional 
separation of powers and the limitation of government, but rather 
establishes certain principles of action which are prerequisite to the 
effective protection of detainees and encourages governments to adopt 
them into national law. In the final analysis, however, the 
principles cannot guarantee effective protection if they can be 
circumvented by totalitarian regimes, and this problem must be 
overcome in other ways. In other words, the Draft Body of Principles 
supplies only the machinery, and the efficient operation of the 
machinery must be ensured through other means.
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26. A special rapporteur, Mr Singhvi, was appointed to prepare a
Study on the Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors 
and Assessors and the Independence of Lawyers by ECOSOC decision 
1980/124, Commission on Human Rights resolution 16(XXXVI) and Sub- 
Commission resolution 16(XXXIII). He presented three progress
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reports: see UI documents E/CI.4/Sub.2/481 and Add.1,
E/CI.4/Sub.2/1982/23 and E/CI.4/Sub.2/1983/16. A final report was 
later submitted, and in 1987 Mr Singhvi presented to the Sub- 
Commission a Draft Universal Declaration on the Independence of 
Justice, which was remitted to governments for comments: see Review
of the International Commission of Jurists, lo. 39, Dec 1987, at p. 
29.
27. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 
9(1), and also Principles 33 and 9(3).
28. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
articles 9(2) and 14(3)(a).
29. Article 9(1) of the Covenant states: "Everyone has the right to
liberty and security of person. lo one shall be subjected to 
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31. Cf. International Covenant on-Civil and Political Rights, article 
14(3) (f), and note also article 14(3) (a).
32. See UI document A/35/401, Replies of Sweden, at para. 12, and 
Ukrainian SSR, at para. 10. Cf. also Reply of United Kingdom, at 
para. 11, and note UI document A/35/401/Add. 1, Reply of USA, at para.
14.
33. See also Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 1981, at para. 158, where 
it is proposed that "every arrest must be made public". See also Sub- 
Commission resolution 1983/30, at para. 3(a): "Any arrest followed by
remand in custody should be made public without delay or at least be 
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one member of the working group on detention suggested that such a 
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provision already existed in Rule 7 of the UI Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners, "and that it would be quite sufficient 
if such a rule were actually applied. It would be an improvement if 
the name of the police officer responsible for each arrest was also
included in such a register." See paragraph 15 of the working group's
1981 report.
34. It has been suggested that the provision should be extended to 
include "other persons of his confidence": see UI document A/35/401,
Reply of Austria, at para. 7.
35. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article
9(3).
36. Cf. paragraph 13 of the 1981 report of the Sub-Commission's
working group on detention: "Several speakers mentioned the problems
that arose at the stage of arrest and interrogation by the police
418
before the person was charged. In those speakers' view, it was 
essential that an arrested person should have the possibility, from 
the moment of his arrest, of appealing to a legal authority which 
would reach a decision concerning the reasons for and duration of the 
detention." The remedy of habeas corpus and equivalent procedures are 
important in this connection: see Sub-Commission resolution 1983/30,
at para. 3(a).
37. See paragraph 10 of the working group's 1981 report. One member 
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incommunicado for more than 48 hours." See Report of the Sub- 
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
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39. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
articles 9(3) and (4), and 14(3)(b) and (d).
40. See UM document A/35/401, Replies of Austria, at para. 4, Sweden, 
at para. 9, and United Kingdom, at para. 8, and UM document 
A/35/401/Add.1, Reply of USA, at para. 10.
41. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 
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43. See UM document A/35/401, Reply of Miger, at para. 5. Cf.
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44. See UM document A/35/401/Add. 1, Reply of USA, at para. 31, and
see also the discussion at pp. 388-89, supra.
45. See Principle 28(3).
46. Cf. UM Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
Rule 36.
47. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article
14(3)(b) and (d). Mote that in some states there is no right to legal 
aid, or it is available only in the case of serious offences.
48. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article
14(3)(b).
419
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Principle 18, which states: "If a detained or imprisoned person so
requests, he shall as far as possible be kept in a place of detention 
reasonably near his usual place of residence so as to facilitate 
visits from members of his family."
50. Cf. Sub-Commission resolution 1982/10, para. 6: "detained
persons should always have access to their defence lawyers 
and.... defence lawyers should be free from fear of arrest for 
defending their clients."
51. Cf. UF Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
Rule 36.
52. See Sub-Commission resolution 1982/10, para. 11, which states:
"there should be independent inspections without prior notice, of 
places of detention, and interrogation centres."
53. See Principle 34. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, article 9(3), and also article 14(3)(c). See also 
Sub-Commission resolution 1982/10, paras. 3 and 4, in which the Sub- 
Commission recommended that "all Governments adopt legislation whereby 
every person who is arrested or detained should be tried, preferably 
within three months after arrest, or should be released from detention 
pending further proceedings" and that "as a minimum measure all 
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54. See UF document A/35/401, Reply of Hungary, at para. 4.
55. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 
9(3).
56. Cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 
10(2)(a).
57. See Principle 31(1). Reference is made to article 9(5) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is in fact 
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states in paragraph 1: "A detained or imprisoned person or, in the
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The provision is not specifically limited to acts involving public 
officials, but compensation is probably only due where the state has 
vicarious liability for the act: cf. the 1975 UF Declaration and the
UF Convention against Torture, both of which restrict the definition
of torture to acts involving public officials.
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or disappearance of a detained or imprisoned person occurs during or
shortly after the termination of his detention or imprisonment, an
inquiry into the cause of death or disappearance shall be held by a 
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62. See UI document A/35/401, Reply of Austria, at paras. 5 and 6.
63. See UI document A/35/401, Reply of United Kingdom, at para. 9, 
and UI document A/35/401/Add. 1, Reply of USA, at para. 12: both 
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64. Cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 11(1); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 14(2).
65. Principle 19(1). Cf. International Covenant on Civil and 
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the words "or against any other person" should be added: see UI 
document A/35/401, Replies of Byelorussian SSR, at para. 10, Ukrainian 
SSR, at para. 10, and USSR, at para. 17.
66. See Principle 23. Cf. UI Convention against Torture, article 15, 
and the OAS Convention, article 10. lote, however, that some states 
have objected to this principle on the grounds that the courts under 
their jurisdiction have freedom to evaluate evidence. Paragraph 10 of 
Sub-Commission resolution 1982/10 is relevant to this, stating that 
"confessions by detainees, in order to be authentically admissible, 
should be made only before an independent legal person such as a 
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67. See Principle 20(2). It has been suggested that detainees should 
see and sign the records: see UI document A/35/401, Replies of 
Byelorussian SSR, at para. 11, Ukrainian SSR, at para. 14, and USSR, 
at para. 18.
68. Principle 21. Cf. UI Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, Rules 24 and 25, and also the Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials, article 6.
69. Cf. Sub-Commission resolution 1982/10, para. 7, which states: 
"every detainee should be examined, preferably by a doctor of his own 
choice, within 48 hours after arrest and regularly thereafter." 
Paragraph 2 of Principle 22 provides for records of medical 
examinations to be kept and made available to the detainee or his 
representatives.
70. For a further discussion of this matter, see Chapter line, infra.
421
71. See Principle 24. Cf. Sub-Commission resolution 1982/10, para. 
8.
72. See Principle 26.
73. See Principle 27.
74. See Principles 1, 2, 4, 5, 19(3) on general principles and
prohibition of ill-treatment; 3, 6, 12, 25, 28(2), 28(3), 29 on
independent supervision and complaint procedures; 14, 17, 18 on
communication with the outside world; 21, 22 on medical treatment; 
and a number of others: 24, 26, 30, 31 and part of 13. It has also
been suggested that Principles 16, 20 and 27 should be extended to 
cover imprisoned persons: see UI document A/35/401, Eeplies of Sweden
and Ukrainian SSR, and UI document A/35/401/Add.1, Reply of USA.
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CHAPTER HIE: CODES OF CQIDUCT AID ETHICS
In this chapter, we shall examine the role and significance of 
codes of professional conduct which have been developed with a view to 
tackling the problem of torture at a very basic level, namely by 
influencing the moral consciousness of individuals who may be required 
to carry out acts of torture. The role of the police in the 
protection of human rights was studied as early as 1963, and the 
involvement of other professions in torture was discussed on a wider 
basis both at the 1973 Conference for the Abolition of Torture and at 
the Fifth United Rations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders. The promulgation of codes of conduct, not 
only for law enforcement personnel but also for other professions 
which may come into contact with the practice of torture, was 
identified as an important factor in the elimination of torture, and 
several codes have been produced by various international 
organisations.
The aim of codes of conduct or cades of ethics is to promote the 
elimination of torture by means of a direct moral influence on the 
members of those professions which are likely to become embroiled in 
the practice of torture. Essentially, this involves an appeal to the 
conscience .and to professional honour, although in certain 
circumstances the moral norms established by a code may be given 
substantive effect in disciplinary procedures operated by the 
appropriate professional association or even in positive law. Codes 
of conduct are in themselves no more likely to bring about the 
elimination of torture than are international conventions since they, 
too, are open to abuse and disregard, and even when a professional
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association has power to impose disciplinary sanctions there are 
limits to the effectiveness of such cades, especially if the law does 
not support such associations and members are able to continue 
practising their profession even if formal recognition is withdrawn, 
nevertheless, codes of conduct do constitute an important contribution 
to the development of a comprehensive set of measures aimed at 
preventing torture. It is clear from our examination of international 
measures that the elimination of torture must be tackled by a variety 
of means on as broad a front as possible, and while codes may not 
achieve spectacular or even discernible results, they do have a 
specialised role to play, particularly in providing clear and 
definitive standards for the members of professions which may be faced 
with moral dilemmas, and they are therefore necessary instruments in 
any strategy to eliminate the practice of torture.
One function of codes of.conduct is to provide a reference point 
for any individual who may seek guidance as to his moral duties in a 
particular situation, especially when he has been asked or ordered to 
take part in the torture or ill-treatment of detainees. The solution 
to the moral decision he faces may not appear to him as 
straightforward as it does to a neutral and disinterested observer who 
is able to take an academic view of the dilemma, and for this reason 
it is important that the appropriate ethical principles should be 
unequivocally stated for and readily accessible to all members of his 
profession. Confronted with a moral dilemma, "the individual will 
look for concrete orientation points to guide his behaviour",1 and it 
is therefore essential that in these circumstances there should exist 
strong humanitarian influences. The pressures from other quarters 
will often be powerful - the pressure to obey orders, fear of losing
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one's employment, the influence of colleagues, and so on - and these 
must he countered by a clear objective standard which establishes the 
individual's duty and will support him in adopting a moral stand 
against prohibited practices. Indeed, the humanitarian principles 
embodied in codes of conduct ought to be stressed during the training 
and instruction of the individual so that they can have an educational 
value in preparing members of the relevant professions in advance for 
difficult situations by inculcating a strong respect for humanity.
The other important aspect of codes of conduct relates to the 
establishment of standards of professional behaviour. When
individuals wilfully violate these standards, a formal code of conduct 
ensures that they cannot attempt to justify their actions or deny 
being aware of their moral and professional responsibilities: the
existence of a code may thus inhibit members of a profession from 
becoming involved in the violation of human rights even though they do 
not personally have any respect for humanity, and in any event a code 
permits disciplinary action or at least moral condemnation. Where 
there exists a professional association which has power to withdraw 
recognition of an individual's membership of that profession or 
otherwise censure him in respect of a violation of professional 
ethics, a code provides a clear basis for such action. National 
associations often have sufficient control over their members to be in 
a position to take action of this nature, and if they are supported by 
the courts and the government the existence of a code can make an 
effective contribution to the elimination of torture. However, if 
governmental torture is involved, the powers of professional 
associations may be limited, especially if the authority of the 
judiciary has been compromised, and the individual may be able to
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continue acting unlawfully with governmental protection even if 
official recognition as a member of the profession is withdrawn.
A number of associations have formulated guidelines on the 
functions and responsibilities of their members at national, regional 
and international level, and often the purpose of such codes has been 
to ensure the non-involvement of members in torture and ill-treatment. 
Within the United nations sphere, two codes of particular relevance 
have been adopted, and before examining their provisions we shall 
relate their development prior to adoption.
The United lations first became concerned with the question of 
torture in 1973 when a resolution proposed by Sweden was unanimously 
adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 3059(XXVIII). This 
rejected any form of torture and provided that the whole issue of 
torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment should 
be examined at a future session.2 The following year, the General 
Assembly adopted, again unanimously, resolution 3218(XXIX), which 
aimed to strengthen safeguards for detainees and also referred the 
question of torture to the Fifth United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. At the same time, 
the World Health Organization was asked to prepare an outline of the 
principles of medical ethics relevant to the protection of persons 
subjected to detention and imprisonment against torture.
The Fifth United Hations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
the Treatment of Offenders, held in Geneva in September 1975, 
approached the problem of torture from two angles: firstly, the
drafting of a declaration against torture, and secondly, the 
formulation of a draft Code of Police Ethics. The declaration was, of 
course, adopted by the General Assembly in December 1975 as resolution
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3452(XXX), and the Convention against Torture was adopted in 1984.
Progress on the draft Code of Police Ethics, however, was initially 
impeded, primarily because of an attempt to confer upon police 
officers a right to disobey orders and a duty to protest if a
violation of human rights was involved. The General Assembly 
requested the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control to continue 
its work on the elaboration of the draft code,3 and at its 31st 
session invited the World Health Organization to prepare a draft code 
of medical ethics relevant to the protection of persons subjected to 
any form of detention or imprisonment.A The Committee on Crime 
Prevention and Control duly produced a draft code of police ethics, 
which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1979 as the Code of 
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials.5 At the same session, the 
General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to circulate the 
draft code of medical ethics prepared by the World Health Organization 
and to submit a report,5 and the following year it noted the report 
and requested the Secretary-General to renew his invitation for 
comments and suggestions and to submit a revised report to the
Economic and Social Council."7 This revised report was published in
March 1981, and the Economic and Social Council recommended that the 
General Assembly should take measures to finalise the code.3 At its 
36th session, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to 
circulate the revised draft principles amongst member states for 
further observations, and postponed consideration of the matter until 
the following year,3 when the code of medical ethics was finally 
adopted in resolution 37/194. 10
We shall examine firstly the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials, the importance of which is indicated in the following 
observation:
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"The police and other security forces are the 
most prone to find their profession and 
expertise perverted in the service of
torture."11
It is in the field of security that torture is normally regarded 
as justifiable, and it is therefore the police and other security 
forces who are usually required to employ torture. Moreover, we have 
seen that members of the security forces are exposed to influences 
which may render them more susceptible to persuasion that the use of 
torture is justifiable and necessary in certain circumstances, and 
their sense of the dignity and worth of the human person may be 
suppressed by indoctrination. The members of the security forces are 
trained in violence, and as a result they may be more easily convinced 
of the necessity of torture than, for example, a doctor, whose 
training will have emphasised the well-being of the human person even 
if he is not already predisposed towards such an attitude.
The United Nations General Assembly clearly recognised the 
dangers which may arise in the training of security personnel when it 
adopted the Code, and recommended that governments should consider 
incorporating the Code in national legislation as a body of principles 
to be observed by law enforcement officials. The Code may thus be 
regarded as a method of implementing the provisions of article 10 of 
the UN Convention against Torture, which refers to the training of, 
inter alia, law enforcement personnel, without giving any specific 
indication of the manner in which instruction should be given.
The eight articles of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials are fairly straightforward and, as they are accompanied by 
explanatory comments, it will not be necessary for us to add extensive 
observations. Article 1 provides simply that law enforcement
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officials “shall- at all times fulfil the duty imposed upon them by
law, by serving the community and by protecting all persons against
illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility
required by their profession."12- The basic obligation of the law
enforcement officer is, then, to respect and uphold the law.
normally, this obligation will include a duty to ensure respect for
fundamental human rights, as violations of such rights will be
regarded as illegal acts, but the article does not take into account
the possibility of the law itself failing to recognise and protect
human rights. The over-riding duty of law enforcement officials in
this connection is, however, expressed in article 2:
" In the performance of their duty, law 
enforcement officials shall respect and protect 
human dignity and maintain and uphold the human 
rights of all persons."
Although the commentary on article 2 refers to a number of the 
major human rights instruments, a problem may arise if certain rights 
are not in fact recognised in the positive law of a particular state, 
since there may then be a conflict between the requirements of 
national law and the principles of human rights expressed in 
international instruments. In these circumstances, the law
enforcement official will not be sure whether he should or can invoke 
international instruments to support his refusal to assist in acts 
which national law permits but which violate international human 
rights standards. It is unfortunate that this area of doubt has been 
left, because although the code is not a binding instrument in itself, 
it would have been of value if it had specified or referred to 
particular core rights and stated that respect far these must always 
take precedence over national positive law and professional 
requirements in dictating the actions of law enforcement officials.
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It is essential that the responsibilities of such officials in
relation to the protection of fundamental human rights should be
stated unequivocally, so that they are able to recognise when their
orders are incompatible with internationally agreed minimum standards.
This can only be achieved in the case of rights which are truly
universal, but in such cases it may be contended that a law
enforcement official is entitled to follow the international principle
rather than the national law. In practice, it might prove extremely
difficult to enforce this view in national courts.
There should be no doubt, however, in relation to torture and
ill-treatment, which are dealt with in a separate article:
"Ho law enforcement official may inflict,
instigate or tolerate any act of torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, nor may any law enforcement official 
invoke superior orders or exceptional 
circumstances such as a state of war or a threat 
of war, a threat to national security, internal 
political instability or any other public
emergency as a justification of torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."'13
Although this provision does not actually confer a right to 
disobey orders, it virtually imposes a moral obligation to refuse to 
participate in torture, even if national law should permit the use of 
torture, on the basis of internationally endorsed standards which 
prohibit the employment of torture in absolute terms. The duty of law 
enforcement officials is thus established clearly and 
uncompromisingly: their primary responsibility is to the principles
of humanity rather than to national law or the orders of a superior. 
The principles expressed in the Code may thus be regarded as taking 
precedence over national law, at least in moral terms. The
absoluteness of the prohibition of torture is, of course, a well-
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established principle, and the provisions of the Code echo the terms 
of article 3 of the 1975 UI Declaration and article 2, paragraphs 2 
and 3, of the UI Convention. While these instruments deal with the 
obligations of the state, however, the Code stresses the 
responsibility of the individual, and it establishes clearly that the 
duty of the law enforcement official is to respect fundamental human 
rights rather than accept putative justifications of torture or obey 
the orders of a superior which are at variance with the principles of 
human rights. The duty of the individual remains a moral one, 
however, and the Code could not be invoked in judicial proceedings to 
justify a failure to obey orders unless it had been incorporated into 
national legislation and given the force of positive law.
Article 3 of the Code at first glance appears to involve a
potential incompatibility with the foregoing obligations, as it
permits the use of force in certain circumstances:
"Law enforcement officials may use farce only 
when strictly necessary and to the extent 
required for the performance of their duty."
This provision might conceivably conflict with the prohibition of 
torture and ill-treatment. However, article 5 makes it clear that no 
exceptional circumstances can ever justify the employment of torture 
or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the 
provision is clearly not intended to constitute an exception to 
article 5. It is not, therefore, a vindication of the use of coercion 
in interrogation, and cannot be interpreted as sanctioning any act 
which would violate the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment. In 
fact, the provision applies only to the use of such force as is 
necessary for the prevention of crime or in the process of arrest and 
detention,1,4 and the commentary on the article indicates that the
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principle of proportionality is relevant in this connection. In view 
of the terns of article 5, then, it may be concluded that while 
article 3 permits the use of limited force far certain purposes when 
absolutely necessary, it cannot be relied upon to justify any use of 
force which would constitute a violation of the prohibition of torture 
and ill-treatment. In other words, any use of force must fall short 
of the levels of pain and suffering required to establish torture or 
ill-treatment.
Article 6 of the Code states:
"Law enforcement officials shall ensure the full 
protection of the health of persons in their 
custody and, in particular, shall take immediate 
action to secure medical attention whenever 
required."
This is a general principle, which is also recognised in 
Principle 21 of the Draft Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. Article 6 does 
not, however, indicate who may decide when medical attention is 
necessary, that is whether an examination ought to be granted at the 
request of the detainee or whether law enforcement officials should 
have discretion in deciding when medical attention is required. Law 
enforcement officials are not normally qualified in medicine, and the 
most appropriate course would appear to be to provide medical 
attention on request, at least if there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that such attention is genuinely required. A further 
difficulty is that lower-ranking officials may not have any authority 
to take appropriate action, and more specification of the duties of 
such officials in these circumstances is desirable.
These articles together express the fundamental duties of law 
enforcement officials with regard to the protection of human rights
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and, in particular, the prevention of torture. The three remaining
articles of the Code relate to respect for confidentiality,16 acts of
corruption,1S and opposition to and reporting of violations of the
Code or of national law.1T Article 8 states:
"Law enforcement officials shall respect the law 
and the present Code. They shall also, to the 
best of their capability, prevent and rigorously 
oppose any violations of them.
Law enforcement officials who have reason to 
believe that a violation of the present Code has 
occurred or is about to occur shall report the 
matter to their superior authorities and, where 
necessary, to other appropriate authorities or 
organs vested with reviewing or remedial power."
The commentary adds:
"This Code shall be observed whenever it has 
been incorporated into national legislation or 
practice. If legislation or practice contains 
stricter provisions than those of the present 
Code, those stricter provisions shall be 
observed."1 ei
The major drawback with a Code of this nature is that while it
can lay down guidelines and define the moral obligations of
individuals, it cannot impose legal duties on them in respect of their 
relationship with the state. The purpose of the Code is to provide a 
clear statement of the ethical standards required of law enforcement 
officials, but its enforceability depends upon its being embodied in 
national law, with the result that the effectiveness of the Code is 
ultimately in the hands of governments. Moreover, the Code cannot 
confer rights on law enforcement officials, thus leaving them 
vulnerable if they invoke its provisions to justify a refusal to 
accept national laws or superior orders. It is obvious that without
the backing of the law the individual's moral stance is likely to be
futile, if not a risk to his personal security.
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The Cade of Conduct far Law Enforcement Officials is in essence a 
standard-setting instrument, and its importance lies in its assertion 
of the principles applying to the behaviour of law enforcement 
officials in the execution of their duties. . While the Code is not 
legally binding, and may not have a direct effect in preventing 
torture, it represents a declaration of international standards of 
professional conduct, and thus permits the exposure and unequivocal 
condemnation of violations of human rights in so far as these are the 
result of a failure to fulfil the requirements of the Code. Moreover, 
the Code may both influence and support law enforcement officials in 
carrying out their duties.
It is appropriate at this juncture to mention Draft Principles 
for a Code of Ethics for Lawyers, Relevant to Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which were presented to 
the United Nations by Amnesty International, and which have had some 
influence on subsequent developments.15' The legal profession has a 
duty to uphold and protect human rights and to protest when these are 
violated, and the various branches of the legal profession have 
particular responsibilities. Legislators have a specialised role in 
the promulgation of laws which do not themselves promote or permit the 
violation of human rights and in the adoption of measures which will 
assist in the prevention of violations, but our principal concern here 
is with those who are involved in the application and practice of law, 
namely judges and lawyers, particularly in relation to detention.
The basic duty of judges is to interpret and apply the law of the 
land impartially and conscientiously, and this should normally mean 
that they must protect the individual from violation of his 
fundamental human rights. As we have seen in previous chapters, the
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judiciary is often responsible for supervising detention procedures, 
and in this connection it is especially important for judges to be 
vigilant and diligent in carrying out their duties, so that effective 
control is maintained and violations of human rights are not permitted 
to occur as a result of insufficient judicial concern. When the 
judiciary has a responsibility for monitoring detention, judges must 
take an active role in ensuring the protection of detainees: they
must investigate every allegation of ill-treatment and not simply rely 
on assurances by the security forces or the government. Furthermore, 
it follows that judges must never connive with the government or 
succumb to governmental pressure, particularly when national security 
is involved, but must fulfil their professional responsibilities in 
the administration of justice and ensure that the individual does not 
suffer as a result of the erosion of his legal rights. Of course, if 
the government introduces legislation which itself permits the 
violation of human rights, the courts may be rendered impotent, at 
least if constitutional review is not possible and international 
obligations are not directly enforceable through the courts, and a 
similar situation may arise when jurisdiction in political matters is 
transferred from independent civilian courts to military tribunals. 
In such circumstances, the only form of protest open to the judge of 
honour and integrity may be resignation.
Defence lawyers also have a role in the protection of human 
rights, since they are in a position to bring alleged violations to 
the attention of the courts on the basis of information which they 
receive from clients. Whenever they have reason to believe that a 
violation has taken place, defence lawyers should lodge an official 
complaint with the appropriate authorities and endeavour to ensure
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that all necessary steps are taken to pursue the matter, whether or 
not they have been instructed by a client or will be paid for doing 
so. Generally speaking, defence lawyers will be sympathetic to the 
position of their clients and may be expected to initiate the 
appropriate remedial action. Prosecuting agents, on the other hand, 
may be less inclined to take action, but they also have a duty to 
report any irregularities which come to their attention, and in this 
connection it may be helpful for the prosecuting agency to be distinct 
from the authority responsible for investigation, as suggested in the 
previous chapter. Prosecutors should also reject evidence which they 
know or suspect has been obtained by unlawful means; and ensure that a 
thorough investigation is carried out.
The draft principles prepared by Amnesty International were 
intended to deal with these issues. Article 1 imposed on defence 
lawyers an obligation to bring any allegations of torture made by 
their clients to the attention of the competent authorities and to 
institute the appropriate proceedings with a view to obtaining a 
remedy. Article 2 referred to the obligation of prosecutors to reject 
evidence obtained by coercion, and article 3 imposed the same 
obligation on judges, requiring them to carry out a thorough 
investigation whenever allegations of torture were made. Article 4 
suggested that lawyers in government service should do all they could 
to promote the adoption into national law of the UTT Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, an idea which might now be 
extended to include the UM Convention and the Draft Body of Principles 
for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment. Finally, article 5 provided for the support by 
professional associations of those defending the standards laid down
436
in the draft, and also provided for the reporting of violations of the 
1975 UI Declaration.
The United lations has not ignored the role of the legal 
profession: a Study on the Independence and Impartiality of the
Judiciary, Jurors and Assessors and the Independence of Lawyers was 
commissioned by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, and a final report was presented by the 
Special Rapporteur, Mr L.M. Singhvi, in 1985. The emphasis of this 
study was, as the title implies, on judicial independence and the 
prevention of governmental interference in the judicial process, and 
in 1987, Mr Singhvi presented a Draft Universal Declaration on the 
Independence of Justice.20
The other major area of concern dealt with by the United lations 
is that of medical ethics. The use of torture and ill-treatment by 
members of the security forces is perhaps understandable, but the 
involvement of medical personnel in such activities seems to 
constitute a contradiction of the very philosophy of healing and 
relief of suffering and the pursuit of the general improvement of the 
physical and mental well-being of the human person which underlies the 
practice of medicine. In spite of this clear incompatibility, 
however, the well-documented involvement of medical personnel in the 
practice of torture and ill-treatment has caused concern within the 
United lations since the inception of the world organisation in 1945. 
In particular, the 'experiments' carried out in lazi concentration 
camps during the Second World War evoked both horror and outrage and 
produced a determination to ensure that such crimes would never be 
repeated, yet the fact is that it is not uncommon for doctors and 
other medical staff to become involved in the practice of torture.
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For centuries there has been an insistence on the integrity and
ethical conduct of medical practitioners:
"The doctor is in duty bound to restore bodily 
and mental health without distinction as to 
persons. He is expected to have the utmost 
respect for human life and human dignity. "s:i
Many people enter the medical profession because of personal 
motivation to help and care for their fellow human beings, and indeed 
view their work as a vacation rather than as a career, and even those 
who do not have this attitude must consciously recognise that their 
essential responsibility is to promote health and alleviate suffering. 
The training of doctors and nurses is aimed entirely at imparting 
knowledge and instructing in techniques which will enable them to 
dispel pain, cure illness and restore health whenever possible, and 
the deliberate infliction of pain and suffering to the detriment of 
the patient's well-being is clearly incompatible with the duties of 
medical personnel. This being the case, it might be thought unlikely 
that doctors would ever condone the use of torture, but the fact is 
that there have been regular and consistent reports from many 
different parts of the world confirming that medically qualified 
people have been directly involved in the infliction of torture. 
Some, no doubt, have no desire to be involved, and are more or less 
compelled to co-operate or at least subjected to strong pressure, 
while others may take part in torture with grave misgivings or in the 
mistaken belief that the use of torture is justified in certain 
circumstances, but in many cases medical personnel have in various 
ways quite clearly assisted in the application of torture willingly 
and in full awareness of its moral, and sometimes legal, 
unacceptabi1ity.
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The most obvious way in which doctors may be involved in torture 
is in the direct infliction of pain and suffering. Their knowledge of 
the human anatomy and psyche and of medical science puts them in a 
unique position, and doctors and scientists may find themselves of 
particular value to the security forces because of their ability to 
develop and apply sophisticated interrogation techniques. In some 
instances, such methods may not actually cause severe pain or 
suffering, for example where a 'truth drug' is administered forcibly, 
but even in such cases the doctor's actions must be regarded as a 
breach of medical ethics because the welfare of the 'patient' is not 
his paramount concern. In most cases, even refined techniques will 
cause some degree of pain or mental anguish, and involvement in the 
wilful infliction of pain or suffering is essentially inconsistent 
with the professional responsibilities of medical personnel.
One particularly sinister practice which may be mentioned is the 
abuse of psychiatry, which has been reported most frequently from the 
Soviet Union and other Eastern European states, although it does occur 
in other parts of the world, and indeed unrecorded incidents may be 
widespread.22 In fact, the problem has reached such proportions that 
the UI Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities has made a special study of detention on grounds of 
mental illness.*-3 The principal form of abuse is the committal of 
political and religious dissidents to psychiatric institutions because 
of their beliefs rather than on genuinely medical grounds. This is 
not usually intended to achieve an immediate compulsion in the same 
way as torture employed for the purpose of interrogation, but rather 
represents a longer term exercise, certainly for the coercion of 
political dissidents, but often for a much more radical manipulation
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of the mind. Abuse of psychiatric treatment is always a danger, of 
course, because the patient, classed as incapable of running his own 
affairs, loses many of the normal legal rights and becomes largely 
dependent upon the goodwill of the state authorities. If treatment is 
compulsory, and the patient is confined to a psychiatric institution, 
he may be unable to secure his release without external assistance, 
and will obviously be in a vulnerable position, especially if the 
authorities regard him as an enemy of the state. The detention of 
dissidents on psychiatric grounds is, then, a useful expedient for 
repressive regimes, because it ensures effective control over 
troublesome political opponents whilst depriving them of most of their 
rights.
In normal circumstances, confinement in a psychiatric institution 
requires the co-operation of doctors who are prepared to certify the 
patient as mentally ill. The very nature of mental illness creates 
difficulties in obtaining the patient's consent to treatment, and 
there are undoubtedly cases in which compulsory detention for 
psychiatric care is n e c e s s a r y , b u t  it is clear that there are 
serious risks involved in such detention and that strict safeguards 
are essential if abuses are not to occur. The basic problem lies in 
the determination of what constitutes psychiatric illness, which is 
largely dependent on notions of 'normal' behaviour: even
psychiatrists cannot agree on the criteria which ought to be 
applied.2S In such circumstances, it is not at all difficult to 
equate non-conformity or dissent with abnormality and mental 
aberration: in the Soviet Union, for example, the definition of
mental illness allows even "seemingly normal" people who display no 
symptoms of mental illness to be regarded as schizophrenic and
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confined to psychiatric institutions, and people may also be detained 
in this way for “religious delirium" or "reformist delusions". It is 
not illogical for an atheist to regard religious belief as a symptom 
of an underlying psychological imbalance, and an atheistic regime may 
consider it a duty to provide treatment for those suffering from such 
an 1 illness*, There is, then, a fundamental difficulty in formulating 
a definition of mental illness and delineating the conditions in which 
a person may legitimately be detained on grounds of mental illness.
In every society there are those whose behaviour does not conform 
to social norms, and it may not always be easy to distinguish mere 
eccentricity from genuine mental derangement which might respond to 
psychiatric treatment. However, although it will be necessary to 
confine those who constitute a danger to society (or to themselves), 
the criterion must be social rather than political, and there can be 
no justification for the compulsory confinement of persons whose only 
deviation is to hold political views which differ from those of the 
authorities, even though the government may regard such dissent as a 
threat to the social fabric. The dividing line between sanity and 
insanity may be narrow, but in general no one should be compulsorily 
confined to a psychiatric institution unless he represents a threat 
other people (primarily because of violent behaviour) or to himself, 
or is unable to take care of himself, and this clearly does not 
include political or religious dissidents.
The detention of political dissidents in psychiatric hospitals 
may be utilised as a simple expedient to remove opponents of the 
government from circulation, but often it is employed in a positive 
attempt to persuade the 'patient* to renounce his beliefs. The 
authorities equate a return to normality with a renunciation of
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beliefs, so that 'recovery' is dependent on the denial of political or 
religious convictions and acceptance of the state ideology. It is 
obvious that such 'treatment' is essentially coercive rather than 
remedial, and in fact it is claimed that the conditions within Soviet 
psychiatric hospitals are often geared to the intimidation of 
political inmates: for example, there have been frequent reports of
beatings, sometimes by criminals recruited from conveniently located 
corrective labour colonies. Even in the treatment of political 
patients, the aim seems to be to forcibly change the political views 
of the patient by means of the infliction of pain and suffering, and 
it is difficult to accept that the medical staff really consider these 
coercive techniques to be legitimate medical treatment.
The use of drugs is a common feature of psychiatric abuse, and 
indeed occurs outwith the context of psychiatric treatment as an 
interrogation technique.2S In psychiatric abuse, drugs are employed 
primarily as a method of controlling the patient, and for this purpose 
powerful tranquilisers are particularly useful. Such drugs are 
utilised in many countries in the bona fide treatment of psychiatric 
disorders such as schizophrenia and other psychoses, but many of these 
drugs can also have serious side-effects which normally have to be 
controlled by the administration of other drugs and the careful 
avoidance of contra-indicated drugs. When these precautions are 
taken, the use of major tranquilisers may be acceptable, but it is 
alleged that in Soviet psychiatric institutions the tranquilisers are 
not only administered to patients who are not mentally ill, but are 
given without regulation of dosage and without the necessary 
medication to counter-act any possible side-effects. The result is 
that the patient (or, more accurately, the victim) often deteriorates
442
physically as well as mentally, and the use of drugs is thus valuable 
in the debilitation process for the purpose of interrogation or 
brainwashing. In this process, drugs such as apomorphine, which 
induces vomiting, and suxamethonium or tubocurarine, which induces 
paralysis, are particularly effective. The administration. of such 
substances obviously causes a great deal of suffering and distress to 
the victim, and they can thus be used for punishment and deterrence as 
well as for coercion.
In the genuine treatment of psychiatric illness (or, indeed, any 
other kind of illness), the medical profession takes great care to 
cause as little suffering as passible. Thus, electro-convulsive 
therapy (ECT) is normally used only under anaesthetic, and its 
usefulness is under constant review. In some cases, of course, it 
will be necessary to occasion extreme discomfort and perhaps even pain 
in seeking to cure illness or at least alleviate future pain and 
suffering, and although in most instances consent must be given for 
such treatment, there are circumstances in which an individual may not 
be able to give his consent. In such situations, the responsibility 
of the medical profession is always to put the interests of the 
patient first and, while a real dilemma may arise, it will in most 
cases be clear what the doctor's duty is. In particular, it is 
obvious that the infliction of pain or suffering for the purpose of 
coercing political dissidents into renouncing their beliefs cannot be 
justified in any circumstances.^ Members of the medical profession 
should never be directly involved, then, in the infliction of pain or 
suffering which is not purely in the interests of the patient.
The responsibility of medical personnel may not be as clear-cut 
when involvement in torture is less direct. For instance, doctors may
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be required by the security forces to examine detainees for the 
purpose of confirming that they are fit to be tortured, or they may be 
required to attend torture sessions in order to intervene if there is 
any likelihood of the victim dying. Often, this will only involve 
army or police doctors, but it may apply on a wider level, and in 
these circumstances the doctor's duty is probably to refuse to take 
any part in the torture on the grounds that the interests of the 
victim cannot be regarded as paramount. Moreover, the doctor should 
use all his influence to oppose the use of torture, and it might even 
be suggested that he should take what action he can to certify as many 
detainees as passible unfit to be tortured. The optimum policy does 
seem, however, to be one of non-co-operation.
There is another level on which doctors may become involved in 
torture, and it is this aspect which perhaps presents the most acute 
moral dilemma. In this grey area, the doctor is required to treat 
victims of torture rather than merely examine them, the purpose of 
such treatment being, however, not the long-term recovery of the 
individual, but rather a temporary patching up to enable him to 
undergo further torture. In such a situation, refusal to render 
assistance might be interpreted as a failure to fulfil the essential 
role of the medical profession, namely the relief of suffering, yet 
the temporary alleviation of the victim's pain and suffering may 
simply result in long-term pain and suffering of an even more intense 
nature.
In many cases, the administration of medical aid would be for the 
benefit of the victim: for instance, treatment of an injury might
ensure that torturers would not be able to exploit the injury by 
applying pain to a particularly sensitive area. Furthermore, a doctor
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may have to take action in order to prevent any long-term or permanent 
damage to the victim, assuming the victim survives further torture. 
On the other hand, where the medical treatment effectively contributes 
to the suffering of the victim, for example by keeping him conscious 
for interrogation purposes, this really constitutes direct 
participation in torture, and clearly cannot be condoned. However, 
the problem with which we are concerned here is whether a doctor whose 
main concern is the welfare of the victim should administer treatment 
in the knowledge that his efforts to keep the person alive and achieve 
short-term relief will only result in him being subjected to further 
torture. The essence of the dilemma is whether short-term relief 
should be attempted when the immediate consequence will be the 
infliction of further pain and suffering or whether the doctor should 
refuse to treat the victim so that he cannot be subjected to further 
torture without considerable risk of death, even though the-result may 
be that the victim dies or sustains permanent damage. It might be 
relevant that torture will continue even if the doctor does not render 
assistance, so that he should endeavour to alleviate the pain and 
suffering as much as possible, but it could be argued that this may 
simply prolong the victim's ordeal, and that he should be allowed to 
die quickly (at least if there is a probability that he will die under 
torture). This introduces the whole issue of euthanasia: does the
medical practitioner have a right to permit a victim of torture to die 
on the grounds that it is preferable to allowing him to be subjected 
to further torture? Ho doubt many victims feel that they would rather 
die than endure more torture (and many have taken their own lives on 
that basis), but does this confer upon doctors the right to end life 
or even withhold medical assistance? In answering these questions,
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doctors have to take into consideration the probability of the victim 
being released and rehabilitated in the long-term, and with this in 
view they might deem it preferable to treat a victim in spite of the 
prospect of further torture if in the long-term the prognosis for a 
return to normal life is favourable, whereas if death or very serious 
debilitation are inevitable they may consider it preferable to refuse 
any treatment and allow the victim to die from his initial injuries. 
In the final analysis, each doctor faced with such a dilemma has to 
make the decision in the light of his own experience and moral 
conscience, and it may be that there is no definitive solution. 
However, the purpose of professional codes of ethics is to provide 
some guidance on these issues, and there are in fact several codes 
relating to the responsibilities of the medical profession in at least 
some of these situations.
In August 1975, the Council of National Representatives of the
International Council of Nurses (ICN) adopted a resolution on the Role
of the Nurse in the Care of Detainees and Prisoners. This resolution
referred to the ICN's Code for Nurses, which provides, inter alia:
"The fundamental responsibility of the nurse is
fourfold: to promote health, to prevent
illness, to restore health and to alleviate 
suffering.,,:Z:S
Reference was also made to the ICN's support for the Red Cross 
Rights and Duties of Nurses under the Geneva Conventions and for the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The responsibilities of the
nurse are, in general, similar to those of the doctor and, indeed, to 
those of the whole medical profession, and it is clear that these 
duties do not permit participation in the practice of torture and ill- 
treatment. The resolution adopted by the Council of National 
Representatives in 1975 confirms this:
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"WHEREAS in relation to detainees and prisoners 
of conscience, interrogation procedures are 
increasingly being employed which result in ill 
effects, often permanent, on the person’s mental 
and physical health;
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that ICR condemns the 
use of all such procedures harmful to the mental 
and physical health of prisoners and detainees; 
and
FURTHER BE IT RESOLVED that nurses having 
knowledge of physical or mental ill-treatment of 
detainees and prisoners take appropriate action 
including reporting the matter to appropriate 
national and/or international bodies; and.
FIHALLY BE IT RESOLVED that the nurse’s first 
responsibility is towards her patients, 
notwithstanding considerations of national 
security and interest."33
Also in 1975, the World Health Organization formulated a document
entitled 'Health Aspects of Avoidable Maltreatment of Prisoners and
Detainees',30 at the request of the General Assembly of the United
Rations. This document mentioned the moral dilemma discussed above,
but did not attempt to resolve it; it did, however, suggest as one
solution certain parts of the World Health Organization's Guidelines
for Medical Doctors, which were subsequently adopted as the
Declaration of Tokyo in October 1975 by the 29th World Medical
Assembly.31 The Declaration proclaims:
"It is the privilege of the medical doctor to 
practise medicine in the service of humanity, to 
preserve and restore bodily and mental health 
without distinction as to persons, to comfort 
and to ease the suffering of his or her 
patients. The utmost respect for human life is 
to be maintained even under threat, and no use 
made of any medical knowledge contrary to the 
laws of humanity."33
The Declaration contains six articles dealing with the duties of 
the doctor in relation to the problem of torture, which is defined as 
’the deliberate, systematic or wanton infliction of physical of mental 
suffering by one or more persons acting alone or on the orders of any
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authority, to force another person to yield information, to make a
confession, or for any other reason."33
Article 1 of the Declaration of Tokyo states:
"The doctor shall not countenance, condone or 
participate in the practice of torture or other 
forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading procedures, 
whatever the offence of which the victim of such 
procedures is suspected, accused or guilty, and 
whatever the victim's beliefs or motives, and in 
all situations, including armed conflict and
civil strife."
Article 2 further provides:
"The doctor shall not provide any premises, 
instruments, substances or knowledge to 
facilitate the practice of torture or other 
forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or to diminish the ability of the victim to
resist such treatment."
Article 3 adds:
"The doctor shall not be present during any
procedure during which torture or other forms of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is used or 
threatened."
These articles cover every situation in which a doctor might
actively or passively contribute to the infliction of torture, and 
even forbid doctors from being present at an act of torture: this
means that doctors should not attend torture sessions for the purpose 
of intervening when the victim has reached the limits of his
endurance. The references to "treatment" might be seen as excluding
the infliction of pain for the purposes of punishment, although the 
definition mentions "any other reason" and is not restricted to 
coercion. There are countries in which corporal punishment is 
employed, and the presence of a doctor is often required, but to the 
extent that corporal punishment violates the prohibition of torture 
and ill-treatment doctors should not attend, even if this creates a 
problem in depriving the victim of immediate medical attention.
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Article 4 of the Declaration provides:
"A doctor must have complete clinical
independence in deciding upon the care of a 
person for whom he or she is medically
responsible. The doctor's fundamental role is 
to alleviate the distress of his or her fellow
men, and no motive - whether personal,
collective or political - shall prevail against 
this higher purpose."
This article establishes in unequivocal terms the primary duty of 
the doctor, and it spells out clearly the unacceptability of any 
putative justification of torture as the lesser of two evils. It does 
not, however, clarify the role of the doctor in circumstances where 
the administration of medical treatment may be fallowed by the 
infliction of further torture, and while there is no doubt that 
doctors are always under a duty to protest at the use of torture and 
do all they can to prevent it, the Declaration does not provide a 
solution to the dilemma identified above, namely whether short-term 
relief should be sought without taking into account the possibility 
that the victim may be subjected to further torture. The Preamble 
does seem to reject the idea of euthanasia when it states that the 
"utmost respect for human life is to be maintained even under threat", 
but this may be reading too much into the provision. The dilemma 
remains unresolved.
Article 5 is of some interest, as it deals with the problem of
hunger-strikes, but this matter will be examined later in the chapter.
Article 6, finally, is a general provision relating to doctors who
stand by their responsibilities as expressed in the Declaration:
"The World Medical Association will support and 
should encourage the international community, 
the national medical associations and fellow 
doctors to support the doctor and his or her 
family in the face of threats or reprisals 
resulting from a refusal to condone the use of 
torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment."
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As we noted earlier in this chapter, the General Assembly of the
United Nations has also adopted a code of medical ethics, which is
contained in the Annex to resolution 37/194,^  This code is concerned
particularly with the role of health personnel in relation to detained
and imprisoned persons, and Principle 1 accordingly defines the
primary responsibility of health personnel in this field:
"Health personnel, particularly physicians, 
charged with the medical care of prisoners and 
detainees, have a duty to provide them with 
protection of their physical and mental health 
and treatment of disease of the same quality and 
standard as is afforded to those who are not 
imprisoned or detained."35
The basic right to medical care and assistance is a generally 
recognised principle of human rights, which appears in a limited form 
in article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Eights, and is applied specifically to prisoners by Eules 24 
and 25 of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, article 6 of the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement
Officials, and Principle 21 of the Draft Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment.
The scope of the right is unclear, but essentially its purpose is to 
ensure that all persons deprived of their liberty are provided with 
medical treatment whenever necessary: if a detainee requires
assistance or claims to be in need of medical attention, a preliminary 
examination should be carried out by a competent person and the
appropriate treatment administered in exactly the same manner as it 
would be in the case of a free person.
Principle 2 of the code of medical ethics states:
"It is a gross contravention of medical ethics, 
as well as an offence under applicable 
international instruments, for health personnel, 
particularly physicians, tD engage, actively or
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passively, in acts which constitute 
participation in, complicity in, incitement to 
or attempts to commit torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. "3S
Reference is made to the definition of torture provided in the 
1975 UI Declaration rather than to that in the Declaration of Tokyo,3,7 
indicating the inter-relationship between the various elements of the 
United Rations strategy for the elimination of torture. Article 7 of 
the 1975 UR Declaration is also referred to.33 Principle 2 of the 
code is a specific application to the medical profession of the 
general prohibition on the use of torture, in the same way as the Cade 
of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials applies the prohibition to 
the police and security forces and prison staff.33 It characterises 
torture as entirely incompatible with the duties and functions of the 
medical profession, and gives clear confirmation that the involvement 
of health personnel in the practice of torture cannot be condoned.
Principle 3 of the code of medical ethics provides:
"It is a contravention of medical ethics for 
health personnel, particularly physicians, to be 
involved in any professional relationship with 
prisoners or detainees the purpose of which is 
not solely to evaluate, protect or improve their 
physical and mental health."
This provision not only emphasises the primary consideration of 
health personnel as being the patient's welfare, but also condemns any 
other role, presumably referring to involvement in interrogation and 
similar activities which would be incompatible with their essential 
responsibility or would not have the patient's interests as paramount. 
However, the provision appears to forbid even a bona fide relationship 
which is not in any way detrimental to the welfare of the detainee, 
and some clarification might be appropriate.4-0
Principle 4 of the code states:
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" It is a contravention of medical ethics for 
health personnel, particularly physicians:
(a) To apply their knowledge and skills in 
order to assist in the interrogation of 
prisoners and detainees in a manner that may 
adversely affect the physical or mental health 
or condition of such prisoners or detainees and 
which is not in accordance with the relevant 
international instruments;
(b) To certify, or to participate in the 
certification of, the fitness of prisoners or 
detainees for any form of treatment or 
punishment that may adversely affect their 
physical or mental health and which is not -in 
accordance with the relevant international 
instruments, or to participate in any way in the 
infliction of any such treatment or punishment 
which is not in accordance with the relevant 
international instruments.""11
This principle deals with less direct areas of involvement in 
torture: it prohibits any contribution to the infliction of pain or
suffering, and also deals uncompromisingly with the question of 
whether medical personnel should certify detainees as fit to be 
subjected to pain for the purpose of interrogation or punishment. The 
responsibility of medical personnel in relation to detainees is 
clearly spelt out in Principles 2 and 4, then, and in every case the 
welfare of the detainee emerges as the paramount consideration. 
Principle 4 may also cover the use of scientific techniques which do 
not actually cause pain or suffering, but which are objectionable 
because they interfere with the mind and will of the victim.
Principle 5 of the code provides:
"It is a contravention of medical ethics for 
health personnel, particularly physicians, to 
participate in any procedure for restraining a 
prisoner or detainee unless such a procedure is 
determined in accordance with purely medical 
criteria as being necessary for the protection 
of the physical or mental health or the safety 
of the prisoner or detainee himself, of his 
fellow prisoners or detainees, or of his 
guardians, and it presents no hazard to his 
physical or mental health."
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Principle 6 expresses the general principle that there can be no 
derogation from the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment in any 
circumstances.42
These principles of medical ethics are significant in a number of 
areas. Firstly, their promulgation and publicisation ensures that 
members of the medical profession are made aware of the dangers which 
they may face if they become embroiled in security matters, and that 
they are not ignorant of their professional duties and moral 
responsibilities in such situations, namely to promote the health and 
well-being of the individual and to refrain from any involvement in 
the violation of fundamental human rights. Secondly, national and 
international professional associations may be able to impose 
disciplinary sanctions on the basis of the code, particularly when no 
action is taken by the state authorities against members of the 
medical profession who abuse their position. This aspect would, of 
course, be strengthened by the establishment of an international 
monitoring system which would permit censure of individuals found to 
have violated professional standards of conduct,'43 especially if 
recognition of the guilty party as a member of the profession could be 
revoked effectively. Indeed, even when formal disciplinary
proceedings cannot take place, professional associations often have a 
certain influence which may enable them to bring pressure to bear on 
governments. Thirdly, the code of medical ethics represents the views 
of a prestigious profession, and even non-medical personnel involved 
in security operations may invoke it to justify their refusal to 
participate in the violation of human rights. In fact, individuals 
may be able to utilise the principles to influence their colleagues.^ 
The code of medical ethics produced by the United lations does not
453
deal with all the problem areas, and some ambiguities remain,'but 
in general the principles give clear guidance regarding the duties and 
functions of the medical profession in relation to detainees.
The code of.- medical ethics is due to be supplemented by 
guidelines on the protection of persons detained on grounds of mental 
ill-health, proposals for which were prepared for the UI Sub- 
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities by a special rapporteur. 4-G The rapporteur indicated that 
abuses were taking place in several parts of the world, but also 
stated in the introductory comments to the draft principles that "not 
all of the principles, guidelines and guarantees are capable of 
immediate application in all countries at all times. ,,4-e On the other 
hand, it is stated that the principles "represent, as a whole, minimum 
United Nations standards for the protection, in general, of the 
fundamental freedoms, human and legal rights of the mentally ill and 
of persons suffering from mental disorder.,'4-7' We have seen that the 
abuse of psychiatric treatment is a matter of some concern, and for 
this reason these principles are an important step forward. There are 
47 principles in all, covering such matters as the diagnosis of mental 
illness, the procedures for voluntary and involuntary admission to 
psychiatric hospitals, and review and appeal procedures. Involuntary 
detention is permitted only when the patient has been certified by a 
competent court or health tribunal as dangerous to himself or to 
others or to the community at large,4-3 and most of the articles 
relate to the problem of ensuring that persons are not wrongly 
diagnosed as mentally ill and detained on that basis, rather than to 
the actual conditions or treatment. However, as well as establishing 
general rights and certain freedoms,43 the principles also require
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humane treatment,60 and although torture is not specifically
mentioned, it is provided that every patient shall "have the right to
protection from exploitation, abuse and degrading treatment.,,S1
Article 7, paragraph 2, provides that every patient "shall have a
legal right to receive whatever social and medical services and
assistance are necessary to protect him from any harm, including
chemical intrusions, abuse by other patients and staff or acts causing
mental distress." Moreover, paragraph 3 of the same article states
that these rights "shall be guaranteed by the national Constitution."
This indicates that, unlike the code of medical ethics, these
guidelines are intended principally for governments, and this is borne
out by article 47, which provides:
"States should implement these principles and
guidelines through appropriate legislative, 
judicial and administrative measures and means 
which shall be reviewed periodically."
Other provisions relevant to the question of treatment are 
article 9, paragraph 4, which prohibits the use of psychiatric
knowledge and skills for non-medical purposes, and article 10, 
paragraph 1, which prohibits the use of medication for the purpose of 
punishment or restraint or the convenience of the medical or nursing 
staff. Article 25 provides for communication with the outside world. 
Finally, in this connection, attention should also be drawn to the 
Declaration of Hawaii, adopted by the General Assembly of the Sixth 
World Congress on Psychiatry in 1977, which delineated the role of the 
psychiatrist, in particular emphasising the best interests of the 
patient as crucial and prohibiting participation in compulsory
psychiatric treatment in the absence of psychiatric illness.
There remain two points which require special mention. Firstly, 
the issue of hunger-strikes, referred to above: this is not directly
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a matter of torture, as the suffering involved is self-imposed, 33
although a distinction may be drawn where the hunger-strike is a
legitimate protest against treatment which itself is in violation of
fundamental human rights.34 There is no mention of the issue in the
United nations code of medical ethics, but article 5 of the
Declaration of Tokyo does make reference to the question of force-
feeding persons on hunger-strike:
"Where a prisoner refuses nourishment and is
considered by the doctor as capable of forming
an unimpaired and rational judgement concerning
the consequences of such a voluntary refusal of 
nourishment, he or she shall not be fed
artificially. The decision' as to the capacity 
of the prisoner to form such a judgement should 
be confirmed by at least one other independent 
doctor. The consequences of the refusal of
nourishment shall be explained by the doctor to 
the prisoner."
Thus, while there should never be a denial of food, the
implication of the article is that a detainee on hunger-strike should 
be allowed to die if he takes a conscious decision to refuse
nourishment. The provision is possibly too inflexible, and there may 
be other considerations which should be taken into account, such as 
the validity of the decision to refuse food, but the duty not to 
force-feed is stated categorically. The principle might even be 
extended by implication to the situation in which a detainee refuses 
medical treatment because he prefers to die rather than be subjected 
to torture, although it could be argued that in such circumstances the 
detainee is not capable of forming an "unimpaired and rational
judgement". There is, however, no suggestion in article 5 of the 
Declaration of Tokyo that a doctor should ever hasten the death of a 
detainee by positive action.
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Finally, we must consider the matter of medical or scientific
experimentation, a subject which was discussed at some length by the
Commission on Human Rights and by the Third Committee of the General
Assembly during the preparation of article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.BS The second sentence of
article 7 was finally adopted in the fallowing terms:
"In particular, no one shall be subjected 
without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation."ss
The express purpose of this provision was to prevent any 
recurrence of "atrocities such as those committed in concentration 
camps during the Second World War."67 It was felt that the general 
prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment, as encompassed in the 
first sentence of the article, was not sufficiently precise to cover 
such situations adequately. Ba It was clear that experiments involving 
risk should not, in principle, be carried out without the free consent 
of the person concerned, but it was recognised that there might be 
exceptions to this principle where the interests of the health of the 
individual or the community were involved. Ba Some delegations felt 
that it should be left to states to define the extent of such 
exceptions, although it was appreciated that it would be difficult to 
draw up a list of relevant criteria.*50 There was general agreement 
that failure to obtain consent of a sick or even unconscious person 
should not make any dangerous experimentation illegal where "such was 
required by his state of physical or mental health."ei However, a 
proposal that compulsory measures might be taken "in the interests of 
community health" was not accepted, on the grounds that this could 
lead to abuses.'52
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The question of free consent is a difficult one, and applies to
medical treatment as well as to experimentation. There are
circumstances in which it may be impassible for the person to give
consent, and while it is not possible to lay down rigid rules, the
general principle must be that the welfare of the patient is
paramount. This is indicated in Principle 19, paragraph 3, of the
Draft Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment:
"lo detained or imprisoned person shall, even 
with his consent, be subjected to any medical or 
scientific experimentation which may be 
detrimental to his health."
This ensures that there is maximum protection for those who are 
at risk: the determining factor is the welfare of the detainee, even
if consent is given. This is a safeguard against consent being 
elicited under pressure, which is likely to happen in circumstances 
where a person is deprived of his liberty, although the problem of who 
decides what is in the best interests of the person remains.
The United nations code of medical ethics does not deal directly 
with the question of medical experimentation, and even the Declaration 
of Tokyo omits to mention the issue. However, the I Cl resolution does 
contain a pertinent provision, asserting that nurses should 
"participate in clinical research carried out on prisoners, only if 
the freely given consent of the patient has been secured after a 
complete explanation and understanding by the patient of the nature 
and risk of the research.
These, then, are the provisions of the various codes of conduct 
and ethics which have been developed for the purpose of providing 
guidance for members of different professions regarding their duties 
and responsibilities in relation to the protection of human rights.
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The provisions are aimed essentially at individuals rather than at 
governments, although governments ought to promote the codes at 
national level and incorporate the relevant principles into domestic 
law. The codes cannot in themselves ensure the elimination of 
torture, but they can certainly contribute to that goal through their 
influence on individuals.
This concludes our consideration of the various measures which 
have been introduced in international law for the purpose of 
preventing the use of torture, and it is obvious that none of these 
measures can by itself or in conjunction with the others ensure the 
full and effective protection of individuals from being subjected to 
torture by security farces operating with the approval of national 
governments. In the following chapter, we shall examine the reasons 
for this failure and consider whether it is not in fact inevitable 
under existing conditions.
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CHAPTER TER; CQRCLUSIORS
Although the practice of torture is prohibited by international 
law, it remains in widespread use, and many national governments 
authorise or permit the employment of torture by their security 
forces, often as a routine instrument of political represssion against 
those who are regarded as representing a subversive threat to the 
security of the state. The problem of torture, then, essentially 
involves the internal political conditions within a state, arising out 
of a governmental response to particular circumstances which are 
perceived as constituting a serious threat to national security, that 
is to the existing socio-political system. Thus, although it has been 
argued that the issue of human rights has been internationalised, so 
that the way in which a government treats its own nationals can no 
longer be considered a purely domestic matter, the fact is that the 
whole question of fundamental human rights revolves around the 
relationship between the authorities of a sovereign state and the 
individuals over whom they have jurisdiction. Consequently, the 
protection of human rights is in the first instance dependent upon the 
effectiveness with which the government and its various subsidiary 
organs can be restrained within the national context and the extent to 
which it can be ensured that the authorities act in accordance with 
the principles of humanity and the rule of law.
Restraint of governmental action at national level is secured 
primarily by means of constitutional and legal safeguards, although 
the democratic process also constitutes a less formal but no less 
potent inhibition on governmental activity. Essentially, fundamental 
rights must be guaranteed constitutionally, and there must be
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effective limitation of executive power by means of legal machinery 
operated by democratic institutions and upheld by a genuine commitment 
to the rule of law. It is especially important that in times of 
national difficulty emergency measures should only be resorted to when 
absolutely essential, and should remain under the strict and constant 
control of independent authorities, with special safeguards for the 
protection of core rights, which are liable to suffer as a result of 
the general climate created by an emergency situation. States of 
emergency may in certain circumstances be genuinely justifiable 
(although not as frequently as they are in fact invoked), and the 
curtailment of civil liberties may be legitimate under particular 
conditions, but it is crucial for such derogations to be accompanied 
by adequate safety measures which ensure that the special powers are 
not abused.
The extent to which the protection of human rights is secured 
within a particular state, then, is dependent on the degree to which 
such safeguards ensure the restraint of governmental action, while 
conversely the violation of fundamental human rights will be made 
possible by the absence or ineffectiveness of such safeguards: in
particular, the use of torture is facilitated by the absence of
sufficient safeguards, either as a result of the erosion of civil 
liberties and procedural rights during a state of emergency or because
the constitutional framework of the state itself fails to provide
adequate protective mechanisms. In such circumstances, it is the
function of international law to supply a secondary level of 
protection for the individual. Unfortunately, however, existing 
international procedures have proved incapable of fully discharging 
this function, and have been largely ineffective in procuring the
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elimination of the practice of torture, and the explanation for this 
failure lies in the fact that international authorities are unable to 
impose mandatary obligations on states or even ensure the enforcement 
of the obligations voluntarily undertaken by states, as a result of 
which they have no real control over the actions of national 
governments as far as internal matters are concerned.
The structure of the international political order is founded on 
the concepts of national sovereignty and self-determination: each
state represents an autonomous political entity, and in general the 
only accepted limitations on the actions of a government within the 
territory subject to its exclusive jurisdiction are those determined 
by the constitutional provisions applying within the particular state. 
The authority of international agencies is correspondingly restricted 
by the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs (encompassed 
in article 2, paragraph 7, of the UN Charter), which ensures that 
national governments are not (except with their consent) subject to 
the dictates of such agencies in matters of purely national interest 
and, while fundamental human rights can certainly be regarded as a 
matter of international concern, the violation of such rights 
essentially takes place within the domestic sphere and is therefore a 
problem relating to internal conditions and political relationships, 
so that in practical terms the principles of sovereignty and non­
intervention do present a significant impediment to any effective 
action by the international community. In effect, then, the problem 
is that international authorities are unable to ensure the limitation 
and restraint of national governments because they have no compulsory 
jurisdiction over them and have no control over their implementation 
of domestic policies.
467
The only real power in international affairs lies in the hands of 
national governments, and the effectiveness of international law is 
largely dependent upon the political will of these governments. Mo 
international legislature with authority to promulgate universally 
applicable statutes exists: rather, international lav/ is largely
either conventional or customary, and as such it is essentially the 
creation of the states which are subject to it, its scope and content 
being effectively determined by national governments. Moreover, 
specific rules of international law generally apply only to those 
states which have accepted them, so that while legally binding 
obligations can be created, they cannot normally be imposed upon 
states without their consent. In this way, international law differs 
fundamentally from national legal systems. Civilised legal systems 
have evolved beyond a primitive form of society in which the extent of 
an individual's obligations depended purely on his status and physical 
ability to maintain his position into sophisticated frameworks in 
which duties can be imposed upon individuals and enforced by 
independent authorities representing the community, but international 
law has not developed in this way, and it therefore remains a very 
primitive form of legal order dependent on unilateral acceptance of 
obligations and voluntary compliance with its requirements.
It is impassible, then, to establish international protection of 
human rights on a universal basis, because many regimes will not 
accept international intervention of any kind in this sphere. 
Furthermore, even when governments voluntarily undertake obligations, 
there is no executive authority with the necessary power and resources 
to ensure compliance with these obligations. In other words, there is 
no international equivalent of a police force which can enforce
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international obligations and impose effective sanctions when 
violations of international law occur. This is a crucial deficiency 
in the international legal system, but in view of the extreme 
reluctance of most governments to compromise their jealously defended 
sovereignty by submitting to any form of international supervision, it 
is unlikely that such an authority will ever be created, and in any 
event there are enormous practical problems in developing such a 
system in the international context. There are certain sanctions 
available, but these are largely diplomatic or economic, and because 
they are imposed by individual governments rather by an independent 
agency the highly politicised nature of international affairs tends to 
militate against the success of such measures. Consequently, the 
protection of human rights by international law remains dependent not 
only on acceptance of obligations by governments but also on their 
continuing co-operation with the international authorities responsible 
for supervision. The problem is that regimes which engage in the 
systematic violation of human rights will seldom offer such co­
operation, and indeed will rarely undertake legally binding 
obligations in the first place. In effect, therefore, the protection 
of fundamental human rights by international law is inhibited by the 
concept of sovereign nation-states on which international politics is 
based and which ensures that governments enjoy a virtually 
unrestrained freedom of action within their own territorial
jurisdiction, as a result of which international authorities cannot 
exercise any control over them.
International human rights procedures do have some value, of 
course, when governments voluntarily undertake obligations and
continue to give their full co-operation, accepting the
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recommendations of international agencies and taking appropriate 
remedial action when required. However, for the reasons mentioned 
above, it is clear that international procedures cannot ensure the 
comprehensive protection of fundamental human rights, because the 
procedures are not universally applicable and, even if they were, 
there is no means of enforcing compliance with obligations. In 
situations outwith the scope of international law, therefore, the 
protection of human rights is clearly dependent entirely upon the 
adequacy of safeguards at the domestic level. The limitations of 
international law have been recognised within the international 
community, in particular by the United Nations, and this is reflected 
in the recent tendency to emphasise the adoption of internal 
safeguards as the most effective method of ensuring the protection of 
human rights. In other words, it has been realised that under current 
international political conditions the protection of fundamental human 
rights cannot be secured at the international level, but is 
ultimately determined by the sufficiency of safeguards, constitutional 
and legal, within the political framework of each state. However, 
such safeguards are in fact absent from many national legal systems, 
and it is obvious that repressive regimes are even less likely to 
undertake a revision of constitutional provisions with a view to 
restricting their own power than they are to accept international 
obligations involving submission to international jurisdiction in 
human rights matters. Indeed, the very concept of limitation of power 
is unlikely to appeal to such regimes, and is actually rejected by 
many on ideological grounds. Consequently, international conventions 
requiring parties to adopt internal reforms are unlikely to attract 
significant support from such regimes, rendering them just as futile
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as conventions requiring submission to international monitoring. 
Essentially, a radical review of the constitutional system is 
necessary in such states, but often the violation of human rights is 
inherent in the perpetuation of the existing socio-political system, 
so that unilateral change is out of the question: in other words,
where it is the policy of the government to perpetuate an undemocratic 
system which necessitates the violation of human rights, the
government is neither going to ratify international human rights
instruments nor effect constitutional re-structuring at national 
level. The promotion of internal measures by international law is, 
therefore, a rather futile gesture, depending ultimately on the 
political will of individual governments.
To state that the protection of human rights depends on the 
sufficiency of safeguards at national level is simply to recognise the
limitations of international measures as they currently exist and the
fact that at present it is only within the domestic context that 
restraint of government can be achieved. It does not imply that there 
is any more likelihood of repressive regimes adopting internal 
measures than there is of them accepting international supervision or 
indeed that the protection of human rights should be left to national 
governments. It is merely a recognition of the facts rather than a 
proposed solution to the problem; in fact, it would be preferable for 
the protection of human rights to be ensured through international 
law.
In spite of its limitations, international law does have a role 
to play in the protection of human rights, principally in relation to 
those states whose governments are willing to accept binding 
obligations by ratifying human rights conventions. Although support
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for such instruments is often forthcoming only from the liberal 
democracies which' do not normally have significant human rights
problems, international procedures constitute an important additional 
level of protection. Abuses tend to involve less critical rights or 
violations of a non-systematic nature, but the governments concerned 
are generally prepared to comply with the decisions of the relevant 
authorities, and while this is essentially a voluntary submission to 
international limitation of government, the fact is that important 
reforms can be brought about. The success of the European system can 
be seen as an indication of the potential value of such procedures 
when the governments are prepared to accept a degree of international 
involvement in internal affairs. Furthermore, the machinery can be 
put into operation when more serious violations arise, thus permitting 
condemnation of the recalcitrant government even if it fails to 
rectify the situation. The value of international law within its 
limitations should not be underestimated, then, and the procedures
could in fact be improved and strengthened by more extensive powers 
being conferred on the agencies responsible for supervision.
Firstly, international law can fulfil an important function in
standard-setting even when the instruments adopted do not impose 
legally binding obligations. The affirmation of basic principles by
authoritative international organisations establishes universally 
applicable guidelines against which the activities and policies of 
governments can be measured, and on the basis of such internationally 
recognised norms a degree of moral pressure can be exerted. The 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners and the 1975 Declaration against
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Torture are all examples of this, each being frequently invoked in the 
condemnation of unacceptable governmental actions.
Secondly, international law can promote the adoption of 
safeguards at the domestic level, not only by providing guidance and 
assistance for governments which wish to eliminate violations of human 
rights, but also by creating supervision over governments in their 
implementation of obligations to introduce appropriate measures into 
their national legal systems. To some extent this is the aim of the 
conventions against torture, although clarification is required in a 
number of areas: in particular, the powers of the international
agency must be clearly defined, and should include the right to 
comment on the adequacy of measures, the power to censure governments 
in the event of a failure to comply with obligations and the 
opportunity to suggest improvements. It would also be of great value 
if international control could be established over the introduction of 
states of emergency, so that the decision as to whether a state of 
emergency is warranted could be taken out of the hands of governments 
and could only be made if sanctioned by an international authority on 
the basis of recognised criteria. Of course, support for stronger 
measures will often come only from states with liberal democratic 
governments, but monitoring procedures are still of value in relation 
to such states, and indeed their willingness to accept international 
supervision should be exploited by seeking wider powers for the 
relevant agencies. Although this might dissuade many regimes from 
submitting to the procedures, it would mean that the procedures could 
not be accepted by such regimes for the purpose of giving themselves 
credibility while not really exposing them to any risk of censure.
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Thirdly, international law can create legally binding obligations 
backed up by investigation and complaint procedures which, if accepted 
by states, may contribute to the prevention of human rights 
violations. Various types of procedure exist, some of which apply to 
all states parties to conventions, others of which require separate 
acceptance. The purpose of all such procedures is to create a system 
whereby international authorities can receive information about 
alleged violations and institute a thorough investigation with a view 
to procuring a remedy for the particular victims and ensuring that 
there is no repetition of the violation. The most effective form of 
procedure would be one which permitted an international authority to 
take action on the basis of information emanating from any reputable 
source (individuals, human rights organisations or states) and which 
conferred on the authority constitutional status within each state to 
carry out a full investigation and ensure compliance with its ultimate 
directions. Ho such system has been developed, however, and in fact
support for existing procedures is so weak that they normally have to
be expressed as optional provisions within conventions so that their 
inclusion will not deter governments from ratifying the conventions 
themselves. International procedures are accordingly relevant only in 
respect of those,states which have accepted them, and this often means 
liberal democracies against which few allegations are made, although 
in some circumstances repressive regimes may be subject to 
investigation. However, the reality of national sovereignty means 
that no enforcement action can be taken, so that the best that can be 
achieved is an investigation procedure which permits the categoric 
condemnation of any government found to have violated human rights.
Verbal censure is really the only sanction available, yet some
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existing procedures do not even provide clearly for this: it is
imperative that international authorities should be permitted to 
express unequivocal criticism of recalcitrant regimes and should be 
empowered to utilise all the resources available to them in order to 
bring moral, political and diplomatic pressure to bear on governments 
responsible for violations of human rights. Of course, an in-depth 
investigation will normally require the co-operation of the state in 
question, but where this is not forthcoming there should be a 
presumption that violations have occurred, and a similar presumption 
should apply if representatives of the international authority are 
denied free access to places of detention within the territory of a 
state under investigation.
Conferring wider powers on international authorities under 
optional procedures is unlikely to have any significant detrimental 
effect on support for such procedures, or indeed on general support 
for conventions, and optional procedures should therefore be made as 
strong as possible. The optimum course is probably to establish 
various levels of supervision, so that while each government can 
decide on the extent to which it is prepared to compromise its freedom 
of action, at least a degree of control may be established over those 
governments which consistently refuse to accept any significant 
supervision. In a sense, this is the effect of existing human rights 
procedures, but a broader spectrum of measures is desirable to ensure 
the widest range of support possible.
International law does, then, have some relevance to the 
protection of human rights, and it could be made even more effective 
in certain respects, but the basic problems remain: firstly, the
regimes responsible for the most serious violations of human rights
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are not normally subject to any form of international supervision 
because they refuse to accept such supervision, and secondly the lack 
of sanctions effectively renders international authorities powerless 
when governments simply refuse to co-operate. The dependence of 
international law on the consent of individual governments and the 
need for continuing co-operation represent, then, the dual obstacles 
to the development of international protection of human rights.
The question with which we are faced is how international law can 
tackle the problem of human rights violations, and in particular the 
systematic use of torture, on a universal basis, that is including 
violations within those states whose governments refuse to accept any 
kind of international interference. Certainly, the problem can be 
tackled to a limited extent through those governments which do have a 
concern for human rights, for example in the establishment of 
universal jurisdiction, as has been done in the case of torture, but 
this is really only a peripheral solution, and the essential problem 
remains, namely that in effect nothing can be done to prevent 
governments acting as they wish within their own territorial
jurisdiction. Of course, powerful states can influence weaker ones to 
a considerable degree, and may even intervene forcibly in some
instances, but essentially there is a deeply entrenched respect for 
the principle ,of state sovereignty which is not lightly repudiated in 
legal terms. In the final analysis, the only way in which 
international law can ever be effective in the comprehensive
protection of human rights is if there can be evolved some form of 
mandatory supervision supported by enforcement machinery: in other
words, there cannot be genuine international protection of fundamental 
human rights on a universal basis until there takes place a radical
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re-structuring of the existing international political system and a 
new humanitarian order is created within which effective restraint of 
national governments by international authorities can be established. 
This would require the principle of state sovereignty to be 
compromised, and it is clear that this constitutes a major impediment 
to such a development, although it would not be necessary for states 
to surrender their sovereignty to a world government: only the sphere
of human rights (or at least ‘core rights' on which some consensus 
could be reached) would be excluded from the scope of "domestic 
affairs" and placed under the jurisdiction of an independent and non­
political international agency with automatic constitutional authority 
in each state to control the actions of governments in human rights 
matters. This would by no means be a straightforward process, since 
even if the agency could be made part of the constitutional framework 
of the state, its authority would depend on conditions within the 
state and in particular the loyalty of the executive organs of 
government, including the police and armed forces, and their 
willingness to comply with the orders of the agency rather than the 
government. In many cases, of course, it is the executive organs of 
government which are actually responsible for carrying out violations 
of human rights. It is highly improbable that even such a limited 
form of international supervision will ever gain support: the failure
of the resolution 1503 procedure is an indication of the degree of 
opposition to international intervention in human rights affairs. 
This procedure, if operated to its full potential, could have a 
powerful impact by permitting condemnation of regimes on a virtually 
universal basis, but political considerations and constraints and the
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fact that the process is under the ultimate control of governments 
have effectively enervated it.
In spite of the considerable difficulties, the international 
human rights movement must concentrate on the promotion of this idea 
if any real progress is to be made in the prevention of gross 
violations through international means. In effect, the fight against 
torture will remain based in complaints procedures, political pressure 
and moral persuasion unless a new humanitarian order can be 
established in which the concept of humanity is given precedence over 
political goals and national interests: a conceptual framework must
be developed within the international arena in which the individual is 
central and his humanity is recognised as paramount. The diversity of 
social, cultural and political ideas of man and society, of course, 
creates massive obstacles, but it should be passible to identify or at 
least elicit a general consensus on the most essential humanitarian 
rights and in this way persuade governments to accept international 
supervision in a restricted field. Rights which are genuinely 
fundamental and universal should not be dependent on national 
conditions and attitudes, but should more properly be the subject of
international control, and this can only be achieved if there is a
global re-examination of the foundations of human rights and a re­
definition of the content and direction of the concept with a view to
identifying a true philosophical consensus on which such a system 
could be built. The ultimate aim must be the constitutional 
recognition within each state of the supreme status and authority of 
an international human rights agency in the protection of fundamental 
human rights.
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The key to the problem lies in the unique nature of core rights: 
they are based purely on humanity and do not depend on cultural or 
political attitudes, so that they can be characterised as genuinely 
universal. The first step, then, must be multilateral discussions at 
a global level in order to reach a definitive identification of those 
fundamental rights on which there already exists an ostensible 
consensus: this would clearly include the prohibition on torture. On
the basis of this consensus, it should be argued that such rights are 
truly international by nature and that no government can claim 
exemption from some form of international monitoring, so that 
mandatory measures should be created and an independent agency with 
effective powers of control established. The ostensible consensus 
would permit liberal governments to apply tremendous diplomatic 
pressure which might secure at least a compromise solution in the face 
of vehement resistance from less enlightened regimes. In realistic 
terms, however, there is little prospect of such a system being 
developed within the foreseeable future: the problem is not the
logistics of establishing limitations on national governments, but 
rather the reluctance of governments, including those of liberal 
states, to compromise their sovereignty even when there is a 
compelling philosophical argument for doing so.
A possible alternative would be for liberal governments and non­
governmental human rights organisations to set up an autonomous human 
rights agency, to whose jurisdiction the liberal governments would 
voluntarily submit, but which would also be empowered to investigate 
situations in other states and take whatever action it could to 
prevent violations of core rights. Limiting the jurisdiction of the 
agency to such rights would enhance its credibility by de-politicising
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it to some degree, although, ultimately its ability to take action 
(other than verbal censure) in respect of non-consenting states would 
be extremely limited. In a sense, the functions of such an agency 
would be a combination of the rales of existing international 
tribunals and non-governmental human rights organisations, depending 
on which states it was dealing with, and in the case of states which 
had not accepted its jurisdiction its powers would not really be any 
greater than those of a non-governmental organisation. However, if 
sufficient governmental support could be attracted and the agency 
operated purely on humanitarian criteria, it might earn sufficient 
respect to allow it to gain wider acceptance in much the same way as 
the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Even if a system of mandatory international supervision could be 
established, the lack of effective sanctions remains a critical 
problem. Ultimately, the doctrine of state sovereignty means that 
compliance with international obligations cannot be enforced directly, 
so that national governments cannot actually be compelled to change 
their domestic policies, but can only be encouraged to do so through 
the application of various forms of pressure. Normally, this is 
restricted to moral and political pressure applied through diplomatic 
channels, and the exploitation of government sensitivity by the public 
condemnation of violations, but there are also more direct methods of 
applying pressure, and it is important to consider whether these could 
be employed to more effect.
One obvious sanction which can be imposed for violation of 
obligations is expulsion from the organisation concerned, although 
this will not usually achieve any positive results unless some 
specific benefit of membership is forfeited. In general, therefore,
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tiiis course is avoided because it often simply means that any 
remaining influence over the government will be lost, and it would 
really only be appropriate when there was a complete and deliberate 
failure to comply with specific responsibilities, although less severe 
measures, such as the loss of voting rights, might be valuable.
Diplomatic sanctions might also be considered, involving the 
termination or suspension of diplomatic relations with any government 
found to have perpetrated gross violations of human rights. While 
individual governments may occasionally take this step in response to 
particularly serious incidents, however, the effectiveness of the 
sanction really depends on concerted action, and the political 
composition of the international community ensures that this will 
rarely be possible: only a few maverick states could ever be
effectively isolated by diplomatic sanctions. Indeed, governments 
will not only be unwilling to offend or alienate their political 
allies, but may also be reluctant to break off relations with hostile 
regimes for various reasons. The sanction may have some value within 
the limited context of regional or economic communities, but in the 
final analysis the suspension of diplomatic relations is little more 
than a formal protest which usually has little impact. There are 
other methods of isolating regimes, such as suspension of 
communications, but in general these are impracticable as they cause 
considerable disruption to other states as well as.to the citizens of 
the target state.
Joint military action under the auspices of the United Nations is 
the ultimate enforcement measure. There has in the past been military 
intervention by individual states on allegedly humanitarian grounds, 
but unilateral armed intervention by individual states is entirely
481
unacceptable, as it opens the door to all sorts of abuse, permitting 
governments to invoke humanitarian principles to justify action which 
is actually motivated by political self-interest. Any intervention of 
a military nature, then, must be under the control of an autonomous 
international agency. Such action by the United Nations would never 
be contemplated, however, primarily because the nature and political 
composition of the organisation prevents it operating in such a 
manner. The United Nations is practically a collection of states 
rather than a separate legal entity, its actions being determined by 
the will of governments, and political affiliations and considerations 
would ensure that there was never sufficient support behind the use of 
a military farce. United Nations forces have, of course, been 
involved in numerous conflict situations, but the involvement of 
United Nations troops is never for the purpose of coercing national 
governments into complying with international obligations, and indeed 
the organisation has no mandate to intervene without the express 
consent of the government concerned. Military intervention for 
humanitarian reasons would be an entirely different proposition, and 
is in reality quite impracticable. If force was to be used against 
more than just a few isolated regimes, the decision to take action 
would require to be made by a majority vote, which would inevitably 
lead to political polarisation with a consequent escalation of world 
tensions. Ideally, then, the decision would have to be under the sole 
authority of an executive non-governmental agency outwith the 
influence of national governments. To confer such powers on an agency 
of this nature, of course, immediately creates a problem in persuading 
governments not just to accept its jurisdiction but actually to create 
it. Moreover, the forces available to such an agency would have to be
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drawn from nationals of states, and the natural tendency of these 
troops will be to remain loyal in the first instance to their country, 
so that a potential conflict of loyalties could arise if governments 
ordered their nationals not to become involved in a particular 
situation. In other words, the national sovereignty mentality would 
remain, and political considerations might interfere with concerted 
action unless the agency had a force whose allegiance was entirely to 
it and its aims. The difficulty with this is that the force would 
either have to be drawn from those with a personal commitment to a new 
international humanitarian order (who would be unlikely to wish to 
fight) or from mercenaries, and since it would have to be a force of 
significant size with modern arms (so that it could take action even 
against world powers) neither of these solutions seems practicable. 
Even if these problems could be overcome, it would be extremely 
difficult to define the circumstances in which intervention would be 
justified, and indeed the acceptance of the principle of military 
intervention on humanitarian grounds could create a dangerous 
precedent in international affairs. In any case, it does seem rather 
incongruous that an organisation created to preserve peace and protect 
human rights should have a military force at its disposal, the use of 
which might lead to full-scale conflict with consequences worse than 
the original violations of human rights. War inevitably involves such 
violations, and military intervention cannot therefore be regarded as 
an acceptable means of securing protection of human rights. It might 
be effective against a relatively small and weak state, but it is 
difficult to imagine it being successful against the modern military 
might of major powers, and the credibility of the whole system would 
be undermined if it could not be applied universally. Thus, while
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military action by the international community clearly constitutes the 
most potent form of enforcement of international law, the 
unpredictable and potentially drastic consequences of such 
intervention make it an unrealistic proposition.
Perhaps the most valuable and realistic sanction in international 
law is the economic one, although only within certain limitations. It 
is particularly relevant in the case of developing Third World nations 
which rely heavily on the industrialised countries of the, northern 
hemisphere for economic assistance, but it can be useful even in the 
case of wealthier countries. Economic sanctions have been imposed 
under the auspices of the United Nations (as well as unilaterally) in 
the past, but only against politically isolated states such as South 
Africa, and in such cases they have been largely ineffective because 
an insufficient number of states has co-operated to ensure a 
comprehensive embargo. One reason for this is that political allies 
are always reluctant to alienate each other; the other is that 
governments rarely accord human rights issues priority over commercial 
considerations and economic interests, even in the domestic sphere, so 
that it is unlikely they will regard human rights violations in 
another part of the world as sufficient justification for severing 
trade ties and forfeiting foreign markets. The problem with economic 
sanctions is that export markets may be seriously affected, with 
adverse economic repercussions in the states imposing sanctions. In 
any event, economic sanctions will often result in hardship to the 
population as a whole, so that the poor and oppressed whose rights are 
being violated suffer deprivation while the government officials 
responsible may be scarcely affected. If the government is vulnerable 
to internal pressure, this may eventually force change, but in many
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situations the government will simply remain intransigent.
Consequently, a trade embargo may not only be damaging to the economy
of states putting it into effect, but will often fail to achieve the 
desired result. The same problem arises when it is simply a case of 
withholding investment and loans, though the International Monetary 
Fund has used this threat as an incentive to governments to improve 
their human rights records, and certain western governments have also 
linked economic aid to human rights in recent years. It remains 
unclear, however, to what extent the protection of fundamental human 
rights is improved as a result of such action.
With regard to private enterprise, there is frequently a
relunctance at executive level to allow humanitarian considerations to 
interfere with commercial goals. Multinational corporations, in 
particular, including banks and other financial institutions, often 
have a central role in the economies of Third World countries, and 
there is no doubt that they could exercise a powerful influence over 
the governments of these countries. However, human rights are rarely 
taken into account in the financial strategies of such corporations: 
economic criteria alone are regarded as relevant in executive
decision-making, and the fact is that it is often in the interests of 
such organisations not only to invest in countries governed by right- 
wing authoritarian regimes, but also to actively support repression, 
as this creates a degree of operational stability and ensures that 
assets will not be expropriated by a revolutionary government, while 
the perpetuation of social inequalities ensures that there will always 
be a limitless pool of cheap labour. There are thus numerous 
compelling incentives for those motivated purely by financial gain to 
operate within repressive systems. Profit-making is the fundamental
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philosophy of commercial enterprises, and as a result everyone 
involved, from director to shareholder and even employee, has an 
interest in the optimum operational conditions and the security of the 
market. Accordingly, while they may not wish to violate the law, 
moral considerations will rarely be allowed to interfere with 
decisions. There is little difficulty in turning a blind eye to 
repression and human rights violations where self-interest is 
involved, and while of course many people connected with commercial 
organisations do have a genuine concern for human rights, the general 
tendency is to take economic factors alone into account. Even small 
companies will be reluctant to give up export markets on humanitarian 
grounds, and may attempt to circumvent a legal prohibition. The 
imposition of economic sanctions is thus likely to face resistance 
from both governments and private enterprise, rendering them largely 
ineffecual.
The question of military aid is a quite different matter. While 
general economic sanctions may simply have an adverse effect on 
ordinary citizens within the target state, without having any 
significant impact on governmental policies, an embargo on the supply 
of arms and military equipment strikes directly at governments, which 
ultimately rely on the armed forces to maintain political power. An 
international prohibition on the sale of arms to repressive regimes 
could clearly have a serious effect on them, as it would strike at 
their very foundations, and it would therefore constitute a vital 
international sanction. However, the supply of arms is not regulated 
by international law, but is controlled by national governments (which 
either sell arms directly or control the sale of arms by private 
companies), and an effective embargo would require the support of all
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those governments in a position to suspend the sale of military 
equipment. In fact, the arms market is dominated by a small number of 
states, so that if their concerted action could be secured and the 
supply of arms and repressive technology to regimes known to be 
responsible for gross violations could be terminated, an extremely 
potent international sanction would be available. It would not, of 
course, be possible to impose similar sanctions on anus-producing 
states, except in respect of specific types of arms to which they 
themselves did not have access, but while this would render the system 
rather arbitrary, it would still be effective in a wide range of 
situations. The familiar problems remain, however, namely that to
governments political and economic considerations take precedence over 
humanitarian concern, as a result of which they will always be
reluctant to withhold support for ideological allies or to forego 
lucrative financial benefits. In practice, therefore, political 
expediency and commercial self-interest combine to effectively prevent 
any united action by those states which currently have a monopoly on 
arms production and distribution.
Governments do, in fact, refrain from selling arms (or permitting 
the sale of arms) to foreign regimes in certain circumstances, 
primarily when those regimes can be regarded as potential enemies and 
there is some prospect of the weapons being used against the supplier 
in the future. While this obviously includes those states with which 
there is a particular dispute, it also applies more generally, so that 
governments will not normally permit the sale of weapons to regimes of 
the opposite ideological persuasion, because in the final analysis
those regimes must be regarded as adversaries. The rationale has been
explained succinctly by Julius Nyerere in the following way:
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"For the selling of arms is something a country 
does only when it wants to support and 
strengthen the regime or the group to whom the 
sale is made. Whatever restrictions or limits 
are placed on that sale, the sale of any arms is 
a declaration of support - an implied alliance 
of a kind. You can trade with people you
dislike; you can have diplomatic relations with 
governments you disapprove of; you can sit in 
conference with those nations whose policies you 
abhor. But you do not sell arms without saying, 
in effect: in the light of the receiving
country's known policies, friends and enemies, 
we anticipate that, in the last resort, we will 
be on their side in the case of conflict. We 
shall want them to defeat their enemies."1
Thus, for example, licensing laws in the United Kingdom are
intended to prevent the sale of arms to communist regimes, on the
basis that this would be self-defeating since any military conflict 
which arises is most likely to be with such states.2 The same general 
attitude is held by the other major western arms exporters, such as 
France and the United States, particularly towards the Soviet Union 
and its allies, although some are more strict than others. The sale 
of arms to repressive anti-communist regimes is not affected, of
course, except in the most extreme cases, and in the case of non- 
aligned repressive regimes the western powers will actually be more 
anxious to maintain supplies of arms in order to pre-empt any approach 
to communist governments for military assistance in return for the 
provision of bases and influence. Conversely, the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, Cuba and other socialist governments supply arms to 
established and incipient socialist regimes, as well as to 
revolutionary movements around the world. Our main concern here, 
however, is with the role of western liberal governments in indirectly 
supporting the violation of human rights by supplying arms and 
technology to repressive regimes. The problem is that western 
governments which claim to defend freedom and democracy find it
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necessary to support undemocratic and often brutal regimes as the only 
alternative to a communist takeover: conditions in most Third World
countries are such that decades of social and economic injustice would 
inevitably result in election of a communist government if free 
elections were held, and for ideological, economic and military 
reasons this is totally unacceptable to western states, which are
consequently compelled to support the perpetuation of right-wing 
repression rather than promote democracy. Successive United States 
administrations, in particular, have consistently preferred 
authoritarian right-wing rule to democratically elected communist
regimes, especially in Latin America and South-east Asia.3 For these 
reasons, western governments have a vested interest in continuing the 
supply of arms to anti-communist regimes, even those which are known 
to violate human rights, since deprivation of armaments would 
effectively benefit potential enemies. The same applies to socialist 
governments supplying their political allies.
It is understandable that the western alliance should emphasise 
the military security of the 'free world' and support right-wing 
regimes in the Third World in order to ensure that communism does not 
spread, either by force or through the ballot-box, especially in
strategic areas, but it is questionable whether this attitude is
justifiable in moral terms, at least when it results in toleration of 
gross violations of fundamental human rights. In such circumstances, 
it is clearly hypocritical for liberal governments to continue to 
support the regime in question on the basis that communism violates 
human rights, and the denial of arms could be utilised to secure 
improvements without prejudicing the political position. This 
approach was adapted under the Carter administration in the United
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States during the 1970's, and other governments have also supported an 
arms embargo in a few prominent instances, but such action is often 
dependent on the particular political party or even the individual in 
power at the time, and policies of this kind have not always attracted 
widespread support within liberal democracies. Certainly, in the 
United States Carter's endeavours contributed to his fall from power, 
partly due to right-wing influences in government, and partly due to 
the powerful business lobby. It is clear, then, that any aspirations 
to a unified arms embargo is unrealistic in view of the political 
constraints on the governments involved. It is to the economic aspect 
that we shall now turn.
Trade and commerce are an essential feature of international 
relations. The promotion of economic stability and material 
prosperity constitutes one of the primary responsibilities of every 
national government, and the existing international political system 
based on the concept of state sovereignty means that each government's 
aim is to protect the interests of its own economy, even at the 
expense of other economies. Governments are concerned only with 
conditions within their own territory, and cannot afford to adopt an 
altruistic view of world economics: self-interest is central to
economic - and therefore also political - survival. Consequently, 
there is no desire to forego trade opportunities or commercial 
benefits, especially when competitors are always eager to take 
advantage. For this reason, even liberal governments are unwilling to 
refrain from selling arms and equipment to repressive regimes on 
humanitarian grounds. The attitude of many of these governments is 
that the paramount task of running the country successfully in 
economic terms makes it unrealistic to expect idealistic sentiments to
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interfere with international trade and commerce. The following
statement by Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, former Conservative
Minister responsible for arms sales in the United Kingdom, typifies
this pragmatic approach:
" ’We have an instinctive feeling that we would 
wish to sell unless there was a compelling 
reason not to. I think the Labour Government 
had an instinctive feeling that we should not 
sell unless there was a compelling reason.1 Had 
Britain, in the past, lost lucrative arms 
contracts because she took a more high-minded 
attitude than some other countries such as 
France? ' We did lose out to France because we 
took a more moral point of view,' he said. 'But 
we think we are less venal than the French, But 
now,' he said, ' I hope we give the French more 
of a run for their money.'"14
Ironically, sentiments expressed by Denis Healey in 1966 while 
Labour Secretary of State for Defence reveal a not dissimilar 
attitude:
"While the Government attaches the highest 
importance to making progress in the field of 
arms control and disarmament, we must also take 
what practical steps we can to ensure that this 
country does not fail to secure its rightful 
share of this valuable commercial market."3
Such statements indicate that even within liberal parliamentary 
democracies many politicians are inclined to take a somewhat mercenary 
approach where commercial considerations are involved. Politicians 
are normally concerned with power, and since one of the major factors 
influencing the electorate is the economic climate, this is reflected 
in the emphasis which politicians put on commerce and trade, as a 
result of which they will be more amenable to selling arms to any 
country which is not an obvious military adversary without questioning 
the morality or legality of the regime. This is, of course, a 
generalisation, and many individual politicians would reject such 
venality, but it seems clear that within western governments there is
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an overall reluctance to take concerted action against repressive 
regimes by halting the supply of arms, and this is one of the reasons.
The same observations apply, of course, to private companies
engaged in the supply of weapons: their motive is profit, and
sensitivity to human rights issues is hardly to be looked for in those
who deal in arms. No moral responsibility is accepted by such people:
if their activities fall within the legally prescribed limits (and
often even if they do not), they will readily trade with repressive
governments, and will supply without compunction equipment and
technology which they know or suspect is to be employed directly in
the violation of human rights, including the use of torture. This is
illustrated by the following statement, made by Sir Ranald Ellis when
Head of Defence Sales:
”I have no scruples about selling to any country 
with which the Government says I can deal.... I 
lose no sleep whatever on the moral issue. The 
morality lies with the user.,,e;
Amnesty International has argued strongly that controls on the 
sale of equipment which might be used for repressive purposes require 
to be tightened up, especially in the United Kingdom, but the British 
Government has consistently maintained that the introduction of a 
licensing system for export of such items would be fraught with 
difficulties in practical terms as well as being damaging to trade. 
Certainly, there are problems in defining those items which might be 
employed in repression: land-rovers, computers, cattle-prods, drugs
and so on might be put to repressive uses, but they may also have 
acceptable uses and indeed be particularly important to developing 
countries. Nevertheless, it should be possible to work out some 
system which would at least limit the possible abuse of equipment and 
technology. Any form of action, however, requires the political will
492
of western governments, and at present this does not seem to exist.
There is less than whole-hearted support for economic sanctions of any
kind, and this raises the question whether there is really any concern
for human rights within liberal governments when it involves some cost
to themselves. Again, this depends ultimately upon the personal
attitudes of individuals, but it is clear that many western
politicians do not regard humanity and the dignity of the individual
as fundamental, and this is reflected not only in a reluctance to
allow the violations of other governments to interfere with political
advantage, but also in the fact that many of them would actually
justify the use of torture in their own country in certain
circumstances. This is borne out by the words of the former Labour
Minister, Roy Hattersley, which is remarkable in its similarity to the
logic relied on by apologists of torture:
"Let's imagine 250 people in an aeroplane.
Let's say we know some terrorists mean business 
because one bomb has gone off already. Let's 
assume we've got a man who we know to be the 
terrorist who planted the bomb and could save 
200-odd lives by finding out where the second 
bomb is. If he wouldn't tell me I'd have to 
think very hard before I said don't bring any 
pressure to bear on that man that might cause 
him pain.1,7
This statement indicates that torture is not a product of 
primitive, unenlightened cultures, but may be justified by educated, 
intelligent and liberal men after careful consideration of the 
implications. Mo doubt cultural factors are important in certain 
respects, but it is clear that many people in the 'enlightened' West 
will quite unashamedly justify the use of torture in particular 
situations. We have, of course, already dealt with the issue of 
justification, and noted the dangers of hypothetical examples, but 
this does not alter the fact that fundamental human rights are not
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regarded as the ultimate criterion of action by everyone. The 
protection of human rights is not a matter of any inherent moral 
superiority on the part of the western character, but rather is a 
question of the effectiveness of the legal mechanisms and 
constitutional institutions of the state which ensure that the more 
enlightened elements within society have an opportunity of restraining 
the government when its actions are dictated by those who do not have 
any respect for human rights.
In this study, we have been arguing that in practice the
protection of fundamental human rights depends ultimately upon the
adequacy of safeguards at the national level, because measures
established at the international level are subject to limitations
which prevent the effective protection of human rights by
international authorities. We have suggested, however, that core
rights at least should be protected at the international level,
because such rights are by nature universal, and in many countries
there are inadequate safeguards and insufficient restraints on the
government. The problem is that in the present form of inter-state
political relations international law cannot achieve this goal,
because the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention in
domestic affairs effectively inhibit any direct international action
in the field of human rights, and no significant progress can be made
without a radical reformation of the international political order
which will permit mandatory supervision and control of national
governments by autonomous international authorities:
"As we examine the objective and subjective 
factors which inhibit the unfolding of the idea 
of international concern with human rights, we 
find the assertion of the right of nations to 
order their political, economic and social life 
in accordance with their own predilections 
without interference from abroad standing
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astride all efforts toward the development of an 
authentic concern with the fate of man that 
transcends all national boundaries and all norms 
of traditional international law and relations.
This right emerges as an inviolate concept far 
more potent than the traditional notion of 
national sovereignty to keep all attempts at 
broadening the area of international 
jurisdiction powerless in its spell. The right 
of nations to an internal order of their own 
choosing not only circumscribes the breadth and 
depth of application of international concern 
with human rights; it also excludes from the 
purview of the organized international community 
situations in which human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are engaged on a massive scale and 
which 'are permitted to drift towards their 
destined ends with the dismal rhythm of 
catastrophe.,,S!
The international protection of human rights is, then, in direct 
conflict with the honoured principles of national sovereignty and non­
intervention, and in the final analysis governments will never 
relinquish ultimate authority within their territories. International 
law has not emerged from the Dark Ages of inter-state relations, and 
until it does core human rights cannot be comprehensively protected on 
a universal basis. It is neither possible nor desirable that state 
boundaries should be removed to create a global political community, 
but the development of effective international protection of human 
rights does require the universal recognition of the principle of 
restraint of national governments in human rights matters by an 
autonomous international authority with guaranteed constitutional 
status in each state. The establishment of such a system depends on 
acceptance of the primacy of humanity, justice and equality over 
political interests, but there is no real political will to develop 
effective mechanisms at the international level, and indeed the basic 
problem is that human rights are not regarded as paramount:
”In the final analysis, the frustrations of all 
international effort to promote, defend and 
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms
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have their root cause in the absence of a 
genuine international concern with human rights 
- a concern that is informed, by a great idea and 
strong enough to confront and master the many 
obstacles which stand in the way of affirmative 
action....International concern with human 
rights will not be advanced by multiplying 
activities and by creating institutions and
agencies in their support; however useful these 
may be in a limited context, they are plainly 
inadequate as a whole. All efforts are bound to 
remain more formal than effective until the 
nations of the world come to realise and accept 
that their own best interests coincide with the 
wider interests of the international community, 
whose unimpeachable claims upon humanity are 
embodied and expressed in the idea of 
international concern with human rights.
It is clear, then, that for the effective protection of
fundamental human rights to be ensured, time-honoured concepts must be 
directly challenged and a complete transformation of the international 
system must take place, the crucial factor being the acceptance by
national governments of the contention that human rights are genuinely 
fundamental and must take precedence over the interests of individual 
states:
"The fact is that without a genuine 
international concern with human rights, 
international protection of human rights 
enforced by international institutions and 
procedures worthy of the name is not in the 
cards; the international community cannot at
the present juncture of international relations 
successfully interpose itself between the 
citizen and his government. As has already been 
suggested, international intervention in defense 
of human rights against violations and for 
redress of wrongs has real meaning if it is part 
of an authentic international concern with the 
fate of the human person, transcending national 
boundaries and state institutions; it cannot be 
effective unless it is part of an interlocking 
international system of politics and 
jurisprudence, grounded in the universal 
acceptance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as the organizing principle of 
international co-operation."10
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What are the prospects for such a development? The attitudes of 
governments at the present time give no cause for optimism, and in 
view of the diversity of cultural and ideological conceptions of human 
rights which we identified at the beginning of this study, it must be 
concluded that the outlook is bleak. Essentially, the protection of 
fundamental human rights must focus on the individual, and the fact is 
that the primacy of the individual is simply not accepted universally; 
rather, the less sublime concerns of national interest and the defence 
of existing socio-economic and political conditions are the main 
motivating force in governmental policies, with the result that 
individual rights are rarely a significant consideration. Certainly, 
international protection of human rights must continue to be promoted 
and encouraged, and procedures must be evolved and strengthened so as 
to operate at full capacity, but as far as the universal protection of 
human rights is concerned, international law will remain subject to 
incapacitating limitations unless radical reforms can be introduced on 
the basis of a philosophical consensus which will permit effective 
restraint of national governments by the international community. It 
is towards this goal that the human rights movement must strive, 
emphasising the humanitarian nature of truly fundamental rights.
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